{ "id": 8203739, "name": "FRANCIS FREDERICK KRAFT, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF MT. OLIVE, Defendant and PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK, Defendant/Intervenor", "name_abbreviation": "Kraft v. Town of Mt. Olive", "decision_date": "2007-06-05", "docket_number": "No. COA06-856", "first_page": "415", "last_page": "423", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "183 N.C. App. 415" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634310 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "noting that it is \"well settled that a lot owner who purchases real property in reliance on a plat depicting certain amenities obtains an interest in those amenities\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352246 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "noting that it is \"well settled that a lot owner who purchases real property in reliance on a plat depicting certain amenities obtains an interest in those amenities\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 W. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 W. 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 W. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "quoting Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession \u00a7 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572697 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711", "parenthetical": "quoting Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession \u00a7 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763602 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624967 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617691 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 686", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2506767 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 S.E.2d 565", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.C. App. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523184 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/105/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524701 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554903 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842", "parenthetical": "explaining that the intention of the owner to dedicate is the \"foundation and very life of every dedication\"" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624420 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468", "parenthetical": "explaining that the intention of the owner to dedicate is the \"foundation and very life of every dedication\"" }, { "page": "469" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 S.E. 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "868", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11252649 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626101 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560050 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527276 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0154-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 880, "char_count": 19904, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3608438240779086e-07, "percentile": 0.6358075316360143 }, "sha256": "5190295ba4aca51c153a3dbf8b9af60811b9970944edbde0ef8aa0b79b4a7157", "simhash": "1:961af40aef2fae66", "word_count": 3355 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:07:58.512650+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "FRANCIS FREDERICK KRAFT, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF MT. OLIVE, Defendant and PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK, Defendant/Intervenor" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nFrancis Frederick Kraft (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) filed a complaint on 24 June 2004 seeking to quiet title to property. Plaintiff asserted that the property in question be quieted either pursuant to the Marketable Title Act (\u201cthe Act\u201d) or under the theory that there had been no public dedication of the property. Town of Mt. Olive (\u201cTown\u201d or \u201cdefendant\u201d) asserted that there had been a dedication and acceptance of the property, an alley, as a public right-of-way or in the alternative that the Town had acquired a prescriptive easement and that the Act did not apply. Defendant/Intervenor Peoples National Bank (\u201cBank\u201d or \u201cdefendant\u201d) asserted the same. The parties agreed to a bifurcated trial where the issues of dedication and marketable title would be addressed first. If the issues were determined in favor of plaintiff, a jury trial as to the issue of a prescriptive easement would follow. The trial court entered judgment as to the first set of issues in favor of the Town and the Bank on 30 November 2005 so that the second phase of the trial was not needed. Plaintiff appeals this ruling.\nThis case involves a dispute over the ownership of an alley (\u201cthe alley\u201d) in the Town. Plaintiff owns property located at the corner of West Center Street and West James Street in the Town. Based on plaintiff\u2019s deed, he contends that he owns the alley running along the southeastern boundary of his property. Defendants assert that the property had been dedicated to the public by a prior owner.\nThe alley in question is approximately ten (10) feet in width and runs from West James Street to West John Street. The alley has been in existence since the 1920s. The original owner of the dominant tract, including the alley, was Ben W. Southerland (\u201cSoutherland\u201d). Southerland conveyed portions of the dominant tract along West Center Street between West John Street and West James Street to various grantees. At least three of the five conveyances were made subject to and with reference to the alley.\nThe first conveyance from Southerland\u2019s estate stated that the alley \u201cshall at all times be kept open and unobstructed!.]\u201d The second stated that the alley \u201cshall at all times be kept open, free for passage and unobstructed!.]\u201d Finally, the fifth reserved the \u201cfree use of a ten foot alleyway\u201d and stated that this alley shall \u201cbe kept open for the benefit of the public!.]\u201d\nAfter the death of Southerland, his estate recorded a plat of the remaining portions of the dominant tract on 15 December 1926. Among the parcels sold was a portion of the dominant tract to Rubineal Witherington (\u201cWitherington\u201d), including what is now the Kraft Building site, subject to and with reference to the alley.\nOn 6 May 1981, Witherington conveyed the Kraft Building to Kraft Studios, Inc. by general warranty deed. Kraft Studios, Inc. conveyed the Kraft Building, by the description referenced in footnote one above, to plaintiff Francis Kraft and his then wife, Linda S. Kraft. Linda S. Kraft, pursuant to a divorce settlement, conveyed her interest in the Kraft Building to plaintiff by a quitclaim deed on 11 August 1989.\nPlaintiff operates various businesses and lives in the Kraft Building. Plaintiff sought to build a courtyard within .the boundary of the alley. The Town denied this request, and plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to his property. The trial court ruled in favor of the Town and the Bank.\nPlaintiff presents three questions for this Court to review: (1) whether the alley had been properly dedicated to the public use; (2) if so, whether the Town accepted that dedication; and (3) whether the Act bars defendants\u2019 claim to the alley. After careful consideration, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.\nWhen the trial court sits without a jury, as it did in this case, \u201cthe standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.\u201d Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C. App. 154, 160, 418 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1992). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Humphries v. City of Jacksonville, 300 N.C. 186, 187, 265 S.E.2d 189, 190 (1980).\nI.\nDedication is a form of transfer whereby an individual grants to the public rights of use in his or her lands. Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149, 159, 79 S.E.2d 748, 756 (1954). An easement by dedication can occur \u201cin express terms or it may be implied from conduct on the part of the owner.\u201d Id. The ultimate issue is whether the owner of the property intended to dedicate the property. Milliken v. Denny, 141 N.C. 224, 230, 53 S.E. 867, 869 (1906); see also Nicholas v. Furniture Co., 248 N.C. 462, 468, 103 S.E.2d 837, 842 (1958) (explaining that the intention of the owner to dedicate is the \u201cfoundation and very life of every dedication\u201d).\n\u201c \u2018The intention to dedicate must clearly appear, though such intention may be shown by deed, by words, or by acts.\u2019 \u201d Milliken, 141 N.C. at 230, 53 S.E. at 869 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Where an intention to dedicate is found, and followed by an acceptance by the public, the dedication is complete. Nicholas, 248 N.C. at 469, 103 S.E.2d at 842. Plaintiff brings forth three arguments as to whether the alley was dedicated to the public. However, because we find that the deeds from Southerland establish an intent to dedicate the alley to the public we need only address one argument.\nAs previously noted, intention to dedicate may be shown by deed. Milliken, 141 N.C. at 230, 53 S.E. at 869. Here, Southerland, the prior owner of the dominant tract, made at least five conveyances of property, all of which referenced the alley. Three of them specifically dealt with the dedication of the alley. The first stated that the alley \u201cshall at all times be kept open and unobstructed!.]\u201d The second stated that the alley \u201cshall at all times be kept open, free for passage and unobstructed!.]\u201d Finally, the fifth reserved the \u201cfree use of a ten foot alleyway\u201d and stated that this alley shall \u201cbe kept open for the benefit of the publicf.]\u201d These deeds, taken together, clearly establish the intention of Southerland to dedicate the alley to the public.\nPlaintiff argues that the deeds conveying other property abutting the alley are ineffective to constitute an offer of dedication because plaintiffs deed does not contain such restrictive language. We disagree.\nPlaintiff relies on Board of Transportation v. Pelletier, 38 N.C. App. 533, 537, 248 S.E.2d 413, 415 (1978), for the proposition that interpretation of deeds goes \u201cno further than the four corners of the instrument.\u201d Plaintiff is essentially arguing that the trial court should have only looked at plaintiff\u2019s deed. Pelletier is not on point. In that case, there was only one deed to be interpreted. Id. In the instant case, however, the trial court was attempting to determine whether Southerland had intended to dedicate the entire alley. In such cases, intent to dedicate may be found outside the four corners of the deed and \u201cmay be either by express language, reservation, or by conduct showing an intention to dedicate!.]\u201d Milliken, 141 N.C. at 227, 53 S.E. at 868 (emphasis added).\nFurthermore, this Court has held that a purchaser will have constructive notice of all duly recorded documents that a proper examination of the title should reveal. Stegall v. Robinson, 81 N.C. App. 617, 619, 344 S.E.2d 803, 804 (1986). It is well settled that a \u201ctitle examiner must read the prior conveyances [of the dominant tract owner] to determine that they do not contain restrictions applicable to the use of the subject property.\u201d Id. at 620, 344 S.E.2d at 805. Given the prior conveyances of Southerland dedicating the alley to the public and our requirements to research those prior conveyances, we hold that plaintiff had record notice of the dedication and the restrictions placed on the alley.\nFinally, as to this issue, plaintiff argues that because both he and his predecessor in interest paid taxes on the alley that any intention to dedicate was negated. We disagree.\nPlaintiff correctly states the general rule that payment of taxes \u201ctends to negative any alleged intent on his part to dedicate it to the public.\u201d Nicholas, 248 N.C. at 470, 103 S.E.2d at 843. The trial court, however, made a finding of fact that \u201cneither [p]laintiff, nor his predecessors in interest, have been paying taxes on the [a]lley.\u201d\nWe find competent evidence to support this finding of fact. At trial, plaintiff testified that he had not been paying taxes on the alley for \u201call of these years.\u201d Additionally, the record contains a letter from the Wayne County tax assessor to plaintiff stating that neither the tax map nor real estate card shows that the alley is included in plaintiffs lot. Plaintiffs assignments of error as to this issue are overruled. Having determined that Southerland intended to dedicate the property, we next address whether the Town accepted that property on behalf of the public.\nII.\nPlaintiff next argues that the Town did not accept the offer of dedication by use and control or by a formal resolution. A dedication of a road \u201cis a revocable offer until it is accepted on the part of the public in \u2018some recognized legal manner\u2019 and by a proper public authority.\u201d Bumgarner v. Reneau, 105 N.C. App. 362, 366, 413 S.E.2d 565, 568, modified and affirmed, 332 N.C. 624, 422 S.E.2d 686 (1992) (citation omitted). \u201cA \u2018proper public authority\u2019 is a governing body having jurisdiction over the location of the dedicated property, such as ... an incorporated town ... or any public body having the power to exercise eminent domain over the dedicated property.\u201d Id. Accepting \u201cin \u2018some recognized legal manner\u2019 includes both express and implied acceptance.\u201d Id. at 366, 413 S.E.2d at 569.\nExpress acceptance can occur, inter alia, by \u201ca formal ratification, resolution, or order by proper officials, the adoption of an ordinance, a town council\u2019s vote of approval, or the signing of a written instrument by proper authorities.\u201d Id. at 366-67, 413 S.E.2d at 569. An implicit dedication occurs when: (1) \u201cthe dedicated property is used by the general public\u201d; and (2) \u201ccoupled with control of the road by public authorities for a period of twenty years or more.\u201d Id. at 367, 413 S.E.2d at 569. To be clear, it is not enough for the public to use the alley for twenty years, but the \u201cpublic authorities must assert control over [the alley].\u201d Scott v. Shackelford, 241 N.C. 738, 743, 86 S.E.2d 453, 457 (1955).\nPlaintiff limits his argument to the question of whether the Town asserted control over the alley and does not discuss whether the public used the property. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to the same but note that the record contains ample evidence to support a finding of public use of the alley, including ingress and egress for customers and deliveries to businesses. The requisite level of control may be established by improving, repairing, or paving the alley over the twenty-year period. Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 368, 90 S.E.2d 898, 901 (1956). This is especially true when accompanied by long continued use by the public. Id. There is competent evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the Town accepted the alley through improvement and repairs to it.\nFirst, the Town paved the alley in approximately 1976. Second, the Town, without a utility easement, dug up portions of the alley to maintain and repair the sewer lines and other utilities. Third, the Town provided municipal service to the alley such as garbage, police, and fire service. Finally, as to the length of public use, there is evidence in the record indicating that the public and the Town had used the alley for over forty (40) years. Accordingly, under the rule in Gregoire, this evidence establishes that the Town has implicitly accepted the dedication of the alley.\nBecause we conclude that the Town has implicitly accepted the dedication, we need not consider whether the Town expressly accepted the offer of dedication in a 2005 resolution.\nIII.\nPlaintiffs final argument is that the Marketable. Title Act bars the Town from holding the alley open for public use. We disagree. The Act was created in recognition of the fact that certain \u201c[n] onpossessory interests in real property, obsolete restrictions and technical defects in titles . . . often constitute unreasonable restraints on the alienation and marketability of real property.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47B-1(2) (2005). The Act was adopted with the intent to \u201cexpedite the alienation and marketability of real property.\u201d Heath v. Turner, 309 N.C. 483, 488, 308 S.E.2d 244, 247 (1983).\nUnder the Act, \u201cif a person claims title to real property under a chain of record title for 30 years, and no other person has filed a notice of any claim of interest in the real property during the 30-year period,\u201d then any conflicting claims arising from a title transaction before the thirty (30) year period are extinguished. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47B-1. One of the exceptions to this rule is that rights will not be extinguished for those who are in \u201cpresent, actual and open possession of the real property so long as such person is in such possession.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 47B-3(3) (2005). The possession exception, however, does not automatically defeat a thirty-year marketable title but will \u201c \u2018only protect[] whatever ownership the [party challenging ownership] already ha[d.]\u2019 \u201d Hill, 174 N.C. App. at 421-22, 621 S.E.2d at 289 (citation omitted).\nIn determining whether there is actual possession of land, \u201c \u2018considerable importance must be attached to its nature, character, and locality, and to the uses to which it can be applied, or to which the claimant may choose to apply it.\u2019 \u201d Taylor v. Johnston, 289 N.C. 690, 711, 224 S.E.2d 567, 579 (1976) (quoting Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession \u00a7 14). Given the use and character of this alley, we hold that the Town\u2019s paving of the road, maintenance of the utilities underneath the alley, and provision of municipal services to the alley are sufficient to establish actual possession of the alley. In other words, the fact that the Town accepted dedication via use and control necessarily leads us to the conclusion that the Town was in open and actual possession of the road and its interest in the alley cannot be defeated by the Act.\nPlaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the Act would deprive municipalities and the public of their rights in and to public streets and alleys unless municipalities filed notices under the Act every thirty (30) years. Such a result was not intended by our General Assembly. As our Supreme Court has stated, a town \u201cholds its streets in trust not only for the municipality and its citizens, but also for the general public.\u201d Blowing Rock, 243 N.C. at 370, 90 S.E.2d at 902. We find nothing in the Act that would allow the rights of the public to a dedicated right-of-way to be abolished. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error as to this issue.\nIV.\nIn summary, we hold that the alley was dedicated to the Town and the Town accepted the property by use and control. We also hold that the Act does not apply to the facts in the instant case. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.\n. Plaintiff\u2019s deed contains the following language:\nBEGINNING at the southwestern corner of the Mt Olive Theater Building, the corner of West Center Street and West James Street, then N. 46-18-51 W. 91.10 feet to a point, the edge of an alley and said theater building, the beginning point; then continuing N. 46-18-51W. 8.9 feet, the alley; then N. 46-23-12 W. 59.20 feet, the Kraft building; then the Western wall of the Kraft building, N. 43-36-18 E. 109.42 feet; then the back wall and lot, S. 46-20-13 E. 59.80 feet to a stake, the edge of the alley; then continuing S. 46-20-13 E. 9.15 feet across the alley; then the Eastern line of the alley, S. 44-11-43 W. 14-98 feet; then continuing the eastern line of said alley, S. 44-32-06 E. 49.88 feet to the theater building; then the back wall of the theater, S. 43-50-05 E. 44.92 to the point and place of beginning. Being the same land described in that deed dated June 5, 1981, from Kraft\u2019s Studio, Inc. to Francis Frederick Kraft and wife, Linda S. Kraft, recorded in the Wayne County Registry in Book 1009, Page 531.\n. Wayne County Registry in Map Book 3, page 2.\n. We do not address whether the recorded plat is sufficient on its own to create an easement because the Town has conceded that it was not in plaintiff\u2019s chain of title and the Bank makes no argument regarding whether plaintiff had record notice of the plat. See, e.g., Hill v. Taylor, 174 N.C. App. 415, 422, 621 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2005) (noting that it is \u201cwell settled that a lot owner who purchases real property in reliance on a plat depicting certain amenities obtains an interest in those amenities\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rose Rand Attorneys, P.A., by Jeffrey P. Gray and Jason R. Page, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Ward and Smith, P.A., by Ryal W. Tayloe, for defendant-appellee.", "Pendergrass Law Firm, PLLC, by James K. Pendergrass, Jr. and Christopher R. Bullock, for defendant/intervenor-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRANCIS FREDERICK KRAFT, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF MT. OLIVE, Defendant and PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK, Defendant/Intervenor\nNo. COA06-856\n(Filed 5 June 2007)\n1. Cities and Towns\u2014 dedication to public \u2014 alley\nThe trial court did not err by concluding the pertinent alley was dedicated to the public, because: (1) the deeds from the original owner of the dominant tract establish an intent to dedicate the alley to the public; (2) given the prior conveyances of the original owner dedicating the alley to the public and the requirements to research those prior conveyances, plaintiff had record notice of the dedication and the restrictions placed on the alley; and (3) contrary to plaintiffs assertion, neither plaintiff nor his predecessors in interest have been paying taxes on the alley.\n2. Cities and Towns\u2014 implicit acceptance of dedication\u2014 alley \u2014 assertion of control\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that defendant town implicitly accepted the offer of dedication of the pertinent alley by use and control because: (1) the record contains ample evidence to support a finding of public use of the alley, including ingress and egress for customers and deliveries to businesses; (2) there was competent evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the town accepted the alley through improvements and repairs to it; and (3) there was evidence in the record indicating that the public and the town had used the alley for over forty years.\n3. Cities and Towns; Real Property\u2014 Marketable Title Act\u2014 alley open for public use\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that the Marketable Title Act did not bar defendant town from holding the pertinent alley open for public use, because: (1) given the use and character of the alley, the town\u2019s paving of the road, maintenance of the utilities underneath the alley, and provision of municipal services to the alley were sufficient to establish actual possession of the alley; (2) the fact that the town accepted dedication via use and control necessarily led to the conclusion that the town was in open and actual possession of the road and its interest in the alley cannot be defeated by the Act; (3) plaintiff\u2019s interpretation of the Act would deprive municipalities and the public of their rights in and to public streets and alleys unless municipalities filed notices under the Act every thirty years; and (4) nothing in the Act would allow the rights of the public to a dedicated right-of-way to be abolished.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 30 November 2005 by Judge John R. Jolly, Jr. in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 February 2007.\nRose Rand Attorneys, P.A., by Jeffrey P. Gray and Jason R. Page, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWard and Smith, P.A., by Ryal W. Tayloe, for defendant-appellee.\nPendergrass Law Firm, PLLC, by James K. Pendergrass, Jr. and Christopher R. Bullock, for defendant/intervenor-appellee." }, "file_name": "0415-01", "first_page_order": 447, "last_page_order": 455 }