{ "id": 8184522, "name": "TERESA C. HARTLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DWIGHT BLAN HARTLEY, II, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Hartley v. Hartley", "decision_date": "2007-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA06-833", "first_page": "121", "last_page": "130", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 121" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. 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Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 689, "char_count": 21806, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20122447293259182 }, "sha256": "5e0fd816c63099510e2923dd1b74f2cac878406eed33452ec58c7a1fdb5b6455", "simhash": "1:0bfaa04ad5ff17f4", "word_count": 3500 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge STEPHENS concurs.", "Judge CALABRIA dissents with a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "TERESA C. HARTLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DWIGHT BLAN HARTLEY, II, Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nTeresa C. Hartley (Plaintiff) and Dwight Blan Hartley, II (Defendant) were married on 30 January 1993. The parties separated on or about 15 February 1997 and were divorced on 6 April 1998. Plaintiff and Defendant are the parents of two minor children, D.H. and T.H. Pursuant to a court order filed on 21 May 1998, D.H. and T.H. were placed in the primary custody of Plaintiff. This order also required Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $664.00 per month.\nPlaintiff and Defendant each remarried after their divorce. Plaintiff\u2019s husband was killed in November 2002. Plaintiff continued working after her husband\u2019s death. However, Plaintiff left her job in May 2004 because her employer would not allow her to work part-time. As a result of the death of Plaintiff\u2019s husband, D.H. and T.H. each receive social security benefits in the amount of $1,095.00 each month.\nDefendant filed a motion on 31 August 2005 to modify the amount of child support paid by Defendant. Defendant alleged \u201ca substantial change in the needs of [D.H. and T.H.] in that those needs [were] being partially met through social security payments through [Plaintiff\u2019s husband].\u201d Defendant requested the trial court deviate from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines (the guidelines) as a result of the social security payments.\nThe trial court heard Defendant\u2019s motion on 4 January 2006 and filed its order on 13 February 2006. The trial court found that although Plaintiff was unemployed, she suffered no disability that would prevent her from being gainfully employed. The trial court found Plaintiffs efforts to obtain employment were \u201cminimal\u201d and imputed income to her in the amount of $892.00 per month, representing minimum wage for forty hours per week. The trial court also found that Defendant: (1) earned a monthly wage of $3,653.00, (2) paid child support in the amount of $650.00 per month for two other minor children he had with a previous wife, (3) had a newborn child with his current wife, and (4) provided health insurance for each of his five children. The trial court further found that Defendant\u2019s current wife earned $2,664.00 monthly.\nPursuant to the guidelines, the trial court found that Defendant was responsible for $630.20 per month for D.H. and T.H. (the children). The trial court found that the reasonable needs of the children would not exceed $2,700.00 per month, notwithstanding Plaintiffs claim that the children\u2019s reasonable needs were $2,841.93. The trial court also found that the children received the sum of $2,190.00 per month in social security benefits to meet these reasonable needs. The trial court concluded, therefore, that the children had $510.00 per month of reasonable needs unmet. Applying Defendant\u2019s guideline percentage of seventy-four percent, the trial court set Defendant\u2019s child support at $379.00 per month. The trial court found that \u201c[a]nything over this amount paid by [] Defendant would exceed the reasonable needs of the children.\u201d Finally, the trial court concluded that \u201c[t]he only reason and basis for the downward deviation is the social security benefits being received by the children due to the death of [Plaintiff\u2019s husband].\u201d From this order, Plaintiff appeals.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) (2005) governs child support determinations and provides that payments\nshall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case.\nThe statute permits any party to request a deviation from the guidelines, whereupon the trial court shall \u201chear evidence\u201d and \u201cfind the facts relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and the relative ability of each parent to provide support.\u201d Id. Where the trial court determines \u201cthat the application of the guidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support or would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate the [trial court] may vary from the guidelines.\u201d Id.\nThis Court has stated\n[a] trial court\u2019s deviation from the [guidelines is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and its determination as to the proper amount of child support will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion, i.e. only if manifestly unsupported by reason. However, the [trial] court must make adequate findings of the specific facts supporting its ultimate decision in a case to enable a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the judgment \u2014 and the legal conclusions which underlie it \u2014 represent a correct application of the law.\nState ex rel. Fisher v. Lukinoff, 131 N.C. App. 642, 644, 507 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). \u201cWhen discretionary rulings are made under a misapprehension of the law, this may constitute an abuse of discretion.\u201d Gailey v. Triangle Billiards & Blues Club, Inc., 179 N.C. App. 848, 851, 635 S.E.2d 482, 484 (2006).\nIn Guilford County ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 344 N.C. 166, 167, 473 S.E.2d 6, 7 (1996), our Supreme Court addressed \u201cwhether third-party contributions may be used to support a deviation from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines.\u201d In Easter, the defendant-mother requested a deviation from the guidelines based on support provided by the defendant-mother\u2019s parents. Id. at 168, 473 S.E.2d at 7. Her parents owned the house in which the plaintiff-father and the children resided, and did not charge the plaintiff-father rent. Id. The defendant-mother\u2019s parents also paid the water bill and provided other support in the form of clothing, haircuts, and medical bills. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that \u201cnothing in North Carolina case law or in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) . . . suggests that the contributions of third parties may not be considered when determining whether to deviate from the guidelines.\u201d Id. at 169, 473 S.E.2d at 8. The Court noted that the statutory duty of the trial court was \u201cto determine whether the reasonable needs of the children are being met and whether imposing the presumptive amount would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the 'children or would be otherwise inappropriate or unjust.\u201d Id. at 169-70, 473 S.E.2d at 8. In doing so, \u201cthe trial court should have at its disposal any information that sheds light on this inquiry.\u201d Id. at 170, 473 S.E.2d at 8. The Court emphasized that it was holding \u201cthat the trial court may consider support by third parties when determining whether there is evidence to support a deviation\u201d but found it important to note that \u201ccontributions from a third party will not always support deviation from the guidelines.\u201d Id. at 171, 473 S.E.2d at 9. The Court stated that\n[i]n each case where the trial court considers whether the contri-buttons of a third party support deviation from the guidelines, that court must examine the extent and nature of the contributions in order to determine whether a deviation from the guidelines is appropriate considering the criteria for deviation set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c).\nId.\nIn Gaston Cty. ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 168 N.C. App. 577, 578, 608 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2005), the issue before this Court was whether the trial court erred by failing to credit adoption assistance payments received by two adopted children against the defendant-father\u2019s child support obligation. The defendant-father argued that the trial court should have applied the entire benefit received by the children against his child support obligation. Id. at 579, 608 S.E.2d at 103. We rejected the defendant-father\u2019s argument and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to credit the payments against defendant-father\u2019s support obligation. Id. at 580, 608 S.E.2d at 103. In our analysis, we concluded that \u201cthe child, rather than the adoptive parent, is the recipient of adoption assistance payments administered pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s adoption assistance program.\u201d Id. at 579, 608 S.E.2d at 103.\nIn Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 625, 400 S.E.2d 736, 741 (1991), this Court upheld the trial court\u2019s decision not to \u201cdiminish or relieve\u201d the father\u2019s child support obligation even though each of the two children had an estate valued in excess of $300,000.00, although we ultimately remanded for further findings. We stated that \u201c[t]he supporting parent who can do so remains obligated to support his or her minor children, even though [the minor children] may have property of their own.\u201d Id. In Browne, \u201cthere [were] ample findings of fact supported by the evidence that the defendant father was able to support his children.\u201d Browne, 101 N.C. App. at 625, 400 S.E.2d at 741. We therefore concluded that \u201cthe trial court was correct in refusing to \u2018diminish or relieve\u2019 the father of his obligation to provide for his children simply because the children had their own separate estates.\u201d Id.\nAdditionally, in Gowing v. Gowing, 111 N.C. App. 613, 617, 432 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1993), this Court reversed a trial court\u2019s decision not to award child support where the minor child was the beneficiary of a structured settlement which provided $2,000.00 per month. We reversed the trial court for making insufficient findings of fact to justify relieving the defendant of his support obligation. Id. We stated:\nIf a parent can support his minor children, the trial court must refuse to diminish or relieve him of this obligation to provide for his children if the sole ground for that relief is that the children have their own separate estates. For the child\u2019s settlement money to be a factor in deviating from the guidelines and awarding no support, the trial court must also find that the defendant father is unable to provide support.\nId. (emphasis added and citations omitted).\nIn the present case, the trial court\u2019s order clearly stated that \u201c[t]he only reason and basis for the downward deviation [from the guidelines was] the social security benefits being received by the children due to the death of [Plaintiff\u2019s husband].\u201d As in Browne, in the present case the trial court made ample findings which were supported by the evidence that Defendant was able to support his children. As in Gowing, the trial court made no finding that Defendant was unable to provide support. Like Browne and Miller, and unlike Easter, this case involves payments made to the children directly. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court erred by crediting the social security benefits when it determined the unmet reasonable needs of the children and Defendant\u2019s corresponding obligation. The trial court was clear that the sole reason for diminishing Defendant\u2019s support obligation was the social security benefits received by the children. The trial court made no finding of fact that Defendant was unable to provide support to the children. Therefore, the trial court erred by diminishing Defendant\u2019s support obligation based upon the children\u2019s social security payments without finding that Defendant could not pay. We reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s order.\nReversed and remanded.\nJudge STEPHENS concurs.\nJudge CALABRIA dissents with a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." }, { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge,\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s decision to reverse and remand the trial court\u2019s order granting a modification of defendant\u2019s child support obligation for his minor children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the child support guidelines based on contributions the children received from a third party.\nThe majority essentially holds that it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to base a deviation from the child support guidelines on third party contributions unless there is a finding that the supporting parent is completely unable to provide support. This holding is overly restrictive and eviscerates the trial court\u2019s discretion to consider third party payments when modifying child support payments.\nBased on the presumptive guidelines, child support payments \u201cshall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) (2005). A trial court may vary from the guidelines if \u201cthe application of the guidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support or would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate.\" Id. (emphasis added). \u201cAtrial court\u2019s deviation from the [guidelines is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.\u201d State ex rel. Fisher v. Lukinoff, 131 N.C. App. 642, 644, 507 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1998). A trial court has committed an abuse of discretion when its ruling is \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Ugochukwu v. Ugochukwu, 176 N.C. App. 741, 747, 627 S.E.2d 625, 628-29 (2006).\nThe majority relies upon Gaston Cty. ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 168 N.C. App. 577, 608 S.E.2d 101 (2005), to support its conclusion. However, Miller actually holds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in considering payments from a third party in determination of child support. In Miller, this Court upheld the trial court\u2019s decision to deviate from the guidelines when it considered how the trial court treated the adoption assistance payments. The majority\u2019s statement that the trial court failed to credit the adoption assistance payments against the defendant-father\u2019s support obligation is misleading. The defendant-father requested a one hundred percent credit. The trial court, in its discretion, reduced the defendant-father\u2019s obligation by only twenty percent of the children\u2019s income. Id. The trial court found:\n[Although the children are considered special needs children for the purpose of receiving adoption assistance income, the children do not have any additional or extraordinary expenses relating to any physical or emotional health needs, educational needs, or other special needs that should be considered by the court.\nId. at 580, 608 S.E.2d at 103. The trial court also made findings as to the parties\u2019 employment circumstances and sources of income. However, there was no finding made that the defendant was unable to provide support for the children. The trial court determined that the presumptive amount would exceed the reasonable needs of the children and that a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate. Id. at 578, 608 S.E.2d at 102. Despite the fact that the trial court did not find that the defendant was unable to support the children, the Miller court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the guidelines based on the payments to the children.\nThe Miller court relied on Guilford County ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 344 N.C. 166, 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996), where our Supreme Court held that contributions from third parties may be used to determine whether deviations from the guidelines are appropriate. The Easter Court stated, \u201cWe find nothing in North Carolina case law or in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) which suggests that the contributions of third parties may not be considered when determining whether to deviate from the guidelines.\u201d Id. at 169, 473 S.E.2d at 8. In reaching its decision, the Easter Court reiterated that \u201c[t]he role of the trial court is to determine whether the reasonable needs of the children are being met and whether imposing the presumptive amount would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the children or would be otherwise inappropriate or unjust.\u201d Id. The Easter Court further stated:\nWe emphasize that we are holding that the trial court may consider support by third parties when determining whether there is evidence to support a deviation. It is important to note that contributions from a third party will not always support deviation from the guidelines. In each case where the trial court considers whether the contributions of a third party support deviation from the guidelines, that court must examine the extent and nature of the contributions in order to determine whether a deviation from the guidelines is appropriate considering the criteria for deviation set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c).\nId. at 171, 473 S.E.2d at 9.\nThe majority also relies upon Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991), to support its holding. However, Browne is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Browne, the father appealed an initial child support order arguing that the trial court did not give due consideration to the estates of each child. The children in Browne each owned separate $300,000.00 estates consisting of real and personal property. The Browne Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision not to reduce the father\u2019s child support obligation merely because the children owned separate estates. The Browne court placed great emphasis on the father\u2019s income from his employment, annual income distributions from a trust fund and payments previously received from the children\u2019s estates as reimbursement for expenditures on behalf of the children. In the case sub judice, defendant\u2019s motion to modify child support payments was not based on separate estates owned by the children but based on monthly payments made on behalf of the children for their support. Further, the defendant in the present case only has one 'source of income and is obligated to support his four non-custodial children as well as his newborn child. In addition, he provides health insurance for all five of them.\nFinally, the majority misapplies Gowing v. Gowing, 111 N.C. App. 613, 432 S.E.2d 911 (1993), to the case sub judice. In Gowing, this Court vacated the trial court\u2019s initial child support determination because the trial court denied the plaintiff\u2019s request for child support without making findings regarding the reasonable needs of the child, the earning capacity or incomes of the parties, the relative ability for each parent to pay support, and the child care and homemaker contributions. In Gowing, the trial court conclusively determined there was no need for child support because the child received monthly payments from a structured settlement. The Gowing Court remanded the order because the trial court did not make adequate findings. The Court stated, \u201cIf the trial court varied from the guidelines because their application would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support, then the court must make findings as to the abilities of each parent to provide support and the reasonable needs of the child.\u201d Id., 111 N.C. App. at 617, 432 S.E.2d at 913. Unlike the trial court in Gowing, the trial court in the case sub judice took into consideration eleven factors to support both the basis for its decision and the basis for the amount of the modified child support payment. Here, the trial court\u2019s findings regarding the reasonable needs of the children, the income and earning capacities of the parties, and the defendant\u2019s other support obligations were sufficient to support its decision to deviate from the guidelines.\nThe majority opinion creates an artificial limitation to the trial court\u2019s discretion and is contrary to the rule set forth by our Supreme court in Easter and followed by this Court in Miller, Browne and Gowing. Specifically, the majority holds that a deviation from the child support guidelines based on third party contributions is an abuse of discretion unless there is a finding that the supporting parent is completely unable to provide support when other findings supporting the deviation have been made.\nBased on our statutes and case law, the trial court has discretion to determine whether deviation from the guidelines is appropriate when there is a substantial change in the needs of the minor children by making findings regarding the reasonable needs of the children as well as the contributions from the parents and their ability to provide support. The trial court made sufficient, findings of fact and its decision is manifestly supported by reason. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the social security payments in ordering a modification of defendant\u2019s liability for child support.", "type": "dissent", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph and Fischer, by J. Clark Fischer, for Plaintiff-Appellant.", "Kara L. Daniels for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TERESA C. HARTLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DWIGHT BLAN HARTLEY, II, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA06-833\n(Filed 19 June 2007)\nChild Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 modification \u2014 deviation from guidelines \u2014 third-party contributions \u2014 social security benefits\nThe trial court abused its discretion in a child support case by reducing defendant father\u2019s required child support obligation from $644 to $379 per month solely based on social security ben-\nefits being received by the two minor children due to the death of plaintiff mother\u2019s husband, because: (1) although our Supreme' Court has concluded that nothing in North Carolina case law or in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(c) suggests that contributions of third parties may not be considered when determining whether to deviate from the guidelines, the trial court made ample findings supported by the evidence that defendant was able to support his children; (2) the trial court made no finding of fact that defendant was unable to provide support to the children; and (3) the social security payments were made to the children directly.\nJudge Calabria dissenting.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from order entered 13 February 2006 by Judge Otis M. Oliver in District Court, Surry County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 February 2007.\nRandolph and Fischer, by J. Clark Fischer, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nKara L. Daniels for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0121-01", "first_page_order": 153, "last_page_order": 162 }