{ "id": 8184632, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFONZA DWANTA COLTRANE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Coltrane", "decision_date": "2007-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA06-895", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "148", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 140" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633956 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1)" }, { "page": "499-500", "parenthetical": "quotations, citations, and alterations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634102 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/620/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Fowler, 353 N.C. 599, 621, 548 S.E.2d 684, 700 (2001)" }, { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798151 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36-37", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1)" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8354293 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525201 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" }, { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135851 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" }, { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580-81", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Fowler, 353 N.C. 599, 621, 548 S.E.2d 684, 700 (2001)" }, { "page": "580-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "10 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553107 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/10/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774686 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525201 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0576-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 805, "char_count": 19655, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1077193646190259e-07, "percentile": 0.7627336574448935 }, "sha256": "c895ccb6eff5adfd4db2821069a5f34d25d4d6f2d5fbe810f9b4293ed850a70e", "simhash": "1:1e285a1a777346fa", "word_count": 3218 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge GEER concurs.", "Judge TYSON dissents by separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFONZA DWANTA COLTRANE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nAlfonza Dwanta Coltrane (defendant) appeals the judgment of the trial court, entered 1 February 2006, convicting him of driving while license suspended; felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest; failing to heed light and siren; reckless driving; transporting unsealed spiritous liquor in the passenger area; and failure to stop for a stop sign. After a thorough review of the record, we find no error.\nOn 12 December 2004, Liberty Police Department Officers William Lee Whitfield and Ray Chapuis (Officers Whitfield and Chapuis) were driving a marked police car in Randolph County when they observed defendant driving past them in the opposite direction. Officer Chapuis recognized defendant from past interactions, the most recent of which occurred a few months prior to that night. That interaction involved Officer Chapuis giving defendant a citation and telling defendant that he was not licensed to drive a motor vehicle. Based on this last encounter, Officer Chapuis checked the status of defendant\u2019s license and was informed that defendant\u2019s license was indefinitely suspended. The officers therefore turned the police car around and followed defendant.\nThe officers observed defendant drive up to a residence and parked the police car to continue watching defendant. After about ten minutes, defendant got back into the car, accompanied by a black male. Defendant began to drive down the street, and the officers followed him with the police car\u2019s blue lights on. Rather than pulling over to the side of the road, defendant accelerated, despite passing several appropriate places where he could have stopped his car. During the ensuing chase, defendant failed to stop at a four way stop sign that was clearly visible. Shortly thereafter, defendant swerved around a stopped car at another stop sign on a residential street, again proceeding past the stop sign without stopping. Eventually, defendant came to an abrupt stop in the middle of the road, exited his car, looked at the officers, and fled towards some nearby houses. Although Officer Whitfield chased after defendant and searched for him for approximately ten to fifteen minutes, he was not able to locate defendant at that time.\nDefendant was subsequently indicted by a Randolph County Grand Jury on 11 July 2005, and on 1 February 2006, a jury found him guilty of driving while license suspended; felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest; failing to heed light and siren; reckless driving; transporting unsealed spiritous liquor in the passenger area; and failure to stop for a stop sign. Defendant appealed in open court from the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment.\nOn appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the driving while license suspended charge for insufficient evidence. Because we hold that the evidence was sufficient to submit the charge to the jury, this argument fails.\n\u201cIn ruling on a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court should consider if the state has presented substantial evidence on each element of the crime and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator.\u201d State v. Replogle, 181 N.C. App. 579, 580-81, 640 S.E.2d 757, 759 (2007) (quoting State v. Fowler, 353 N.C. 599, 621, 548 S.E.2d 684, 700 (2001)). The elements of driving while license revoked are \u201c(1) [defendant] operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked, and (4) had knowledge of the suspension or revocation.\u201d State v. Woody, 102 N.C. App. 576, 578, 402 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1991) (citation omitted). \u201cThe evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the state, with all conflicts resolved in the state\u2019s favor. ... If substantial evidence exists supporting defendant\u2019s guilt, the jury should be allowed to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Replogle, 181 N.C. App. at 580-81, 640 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting Fowler, 353 N.C. at 621, 548 S.E.2d at 700) (alteration in original).\nDefendant concedes that the State proved each of the elements except for knowledge of the suspension. \u201cThis Court has previously held that the State satisfies its burden of proof of a G.S. 20-28 violation when, nothing else appearing, it has offered evidence of compliance with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48 because of the presumption that he received notice and had such knowledge.\u201d State v. Cruz, 173 N.C. App. 689, 697, 620 S.E.2d 251, 256 (2005) (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).\nThe notice requirements, in pertinent part, are as follows:\n[N]otice shall be given ... by deposit in the United States mail of such notice in an envelope with postage prepaid, addressed to such person at his address as shown by the records of the Division. The giving of notice by mail is complete upon the expiration of four days after such deposit of such notice. Proof of the giving of notice in . . . such manner may be made by the certificate of any officer or employee of the Division or affidavit of any person over 18 years of age, naming the person to whom such notice was given and specifying the time, place, and manner of the giving thereof.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48(a) (2005).\nDefendant argues that \u201c[b]ecause the State failed to present evidence raising aprima facie presumption that the revocations notices sent to an [allegedly] incorrect address were received, [defendant] was not obligated to put on evidence that would rebut such a presumption.\u201d Defendant is simply incorrect. In this case, the State produced the signed certificate of Tina Raynor (Raynor), an employee of the Division of Motor Vehicles. The certification states that Raynor deposited notice of suspension in the United States mail in a postage paid envelope, addressed to the \u201caddress ... shown by the records of the Division\u201d as defendant\u2019s address. This certification constitutes \u201c[p]roof of the giving of notice,\u201d under the statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48(a) (2005). Therefore, the State raised prima facie presumption of receipt, and defendant was obligated to rebut the presumption. Defendant chose not to present any evidence at trial; the presumption was clearly not rebutted. Accordingly, the State met its burden of producing \u201csubstantial evidence on each element of the crime,\u201d and defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nDefendant also argues that his conviction for felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest must be vacated because the State relied on the driving while license suspended charge as an aggravating factor for that conviction. Because we have held that defendant\u2019s conviction for driving while license suspended was proper, this argument, too, must fail.\nFinally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the DMV record and other related testimony. Defendant argues that this evidence was irrelevant and overly prejudicial. However, these arguments were not properly preserved for appeal. Accordingly, we must dismiss this assignment of error.\nOur Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue:\nGenerally . . . issues occurring during trial must be preserved if they are to be reviewed on grounds other than plain error. Rule 10(b)(1) provides, in part, that to preserve a question for appellate review, \u201ca party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make.\u201d\nReep v. Beck, 360 N.C. 34, 36-37, 619 S.E.2d 497, 499 (2005) (quoting N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1)) (footnote omitted). We note that although defendant objected to the admission of the DMV evidence at trial, he did so purely on the basis of his contention that the addresses did not match. After the trial court determined that defendant\u2019s objection on the basis of the allegedly incorrect addresses was \u201cmore of a jury argument as opposed to what is admissible evidence,\u201d the trial court gave defendant two additional opportunities to raise other potential grounds for objection:\nTHE COURT: Okay. Do you want anything more on this at this point?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not at this point.\nTHE COURT: Okay. But he\u2019s going to admit it after this, I assume, so there\u2019s no \u2014 Your objection is noted. Do you have any other objections at this point?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not at this point.\nDefendant did not raise any issue regarding relevancy or undue prejudice, which are the only arguments he now seeks to bring on appeal. Moreover, although defendant referenced plain error, he did not make any argument regarding plain error in his brief. We are mindful that\n[t]he purpose of [Rule' 10(b)] is to require a party to call the court\u2019s attention to a matter upon which he or she wants a ruling before he or she can assign error to the matter on appeal. A trial issue that is preserved may be made the basis of an assignment of error pursuant to Rule 10, and the scope of review by an appellate court is usually limited to a consideration of the assignments of error in the record on appeal and if the appealing party has no right to appeal the appellate court should dismiss the appeal ex mero motu.\nReep, 360 N.C. at 37, 619 S.E.2d at 499-500 (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). Accordingly, we will not further address defendant\u2019s arguments on this matter. *\nHaving conducted a thorough review of the record and the briefs on appeal, we find no error.\nNo error.\nJudge GEER concurs.\nJudge TYSON dissents by separate opinion.\n. We note that defendant\u2019s name has apparently been spelled in many different ways throughout his dealings with our courts. For the sake of simplicity, we use the spelling as presented in the judgment.\n. We note that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48 has since been amended. However, as the quoted material was the version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense and trial, we apply it to the case at hand.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." }, { "text": "TYSON, Judge\ndissenting.\nThe majority\u2019s opinion holds the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of driving while license suspended. I disagree.\nI. Driving While License Suspended\nTo sustain a conviction of driving while license suspended, the State must show: \u201c(1) [defendant] operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked, and (4) had knowledge of the suspension or revocation.\u201d State v. Woody, 102 N.C. App. 576, 578, 402 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1991) (emphasis supplied) (citing State v. Chester, 30 N.C. App. 224, 226 S.E.2d 524 (1976)).\nA. Knowledge\nThe State must prove the defendant had knowledge that his driver\u2019s license was suspended. \u201c[T]he burden is on the State to prove that defendant had knowledge at the time charged that his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked; the State satisfie[s] this burden when, nothing else appearing, it has offered evidence of compliance with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48[.]\u201d Chester, 30 N.C. App. at 227, 226 S.E.2d at 526.\nB. Required Notice\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48(a) (2005) states:\nWhenever the Division is authorized or required to give any notice under this Chapter or other law regulating the operation of vehicles, unless a different method of giving such notice is otherwise expressly prescribed, such notice shall be given . . . by deposit in the United States mail of such notice in an envelope with postage prepaid, addressed to such person at his address as shown by the records of the Division.... Proof of the giving of notice in either such manner may be made by the certificate of any officer or employee of the Division or affidavit of any person over 18 years of age, naming the person to whom such notice was given and specifying the time, place, and manner of the giving thereof.\n(Emphasis supplied).\nThe State presented no evidence that the post office box address to where the Division of Motor Vehicles\u2019 (\u201cDMV\u201d) sent notices of suspension was the street address shown on defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license record. The only address shown on defendant\u2019s DMV\u2019s driver\u2019s license record was his street address. All notices DMV sent to defendant were addressed to a post office box. The State presented no evidence tending to show defendant ever provided DMV with a different address from his street address contained on the certified driver\u2019s license report, or that the report contained any other address. DMV failed to prove it provided defendant with the required statutory notice in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48. The warrants for defendant\u2019s arrest reflect his street address, not a post office box.\nO. Presumption\n\u201cIn North Carolina, as elsewhere, there is a prima facie presumption that material which is marked, postage prepaid, and correctly addressed, was received in due course.\u201d In re Terry, 317 N.C. 132, 136, 343 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1986). Because the notices were not correctly addressed and sent to defendant\u2019s address appearing on his DMV record, no presumption arises that defendant received the required statutory notices. Defendant is not obligated to present any evidence to rebut the presumption that he received notice when the State\u2019s evidence failed to raise such a presumption.\nThe majority\u2019s opinion holds the certificate signed by a DMV employee, Tina Raynor, is sufficient to constitute \u201cproof of giving notice\u201d under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48. The certificate must be \u201csworn to and signed by an employee of the Department of Motor Vehicles, certifying that the original of the document was mailed to defendant on [a specific date] at his address shown on the records of the Department.\u201d State v. Herald, 10 N.C. App. 263, 264, 178 S.E.2d 120, 121 (1970). The notices were not sent to the address shown on defendant\u2019s DMV driver\u2019s license record as statutorily required, but to another address. DMV\u2019s signed affidavit raised no presumption that defendant received the notices.\nThe State failed to present any evidence that the address in DMV\u2019s record was the post office box address where the revocation notices were sent, and failed to show that defendant received notice of the suspension of his license. The trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of driving while license suspended.\nII. Felony Operation to Elude Arrest\nDefendant was also convicted under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5 for felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5 (2005) states:\n(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle on a street, highway or public vehicular area while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer who is in the lawful performance of his duties. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, violation of this section shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor.\n(b) If two or more of the following aggravating factors are present at the time the violation occurs, violation of this section shall be a Class H felony.\n(1) Speeding in excess of 15 miles per hour over the legal speed limit.\n(2) Gross impairment of the person\u2019s faculties while driving due to:\na. Consumption of an impairing substance; or\nb. A blood alcohol concentration of 0.14 or more within a relevant time after the driving.\n(3)Reckless driving as proscribed by G.S. 20-140.\n(4) Negligent driving leading to an accident causing:\na. Property damage in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000); or\nb. Personal injury.\n(5) Driving when the person\u2019s drivers license is revoked.\n(6) Driving in excess of the posted speed limit, during the days and hours when the posted limit is in effect, on school property or in an area designated as a school zone pursuant to G.S. 20-141.1, or in a highway work zone as defined in G.S. 20-14102).\n(7) Passing a stopped school bus as proscribed by G.S. 20-217.\n(8) Driving with a child under 12 years of age in the vehicle.\nThe jury found defendant to be guilty of: (1) driving while license suspended; (2) felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest; (3) failure to heed light and siren; (4) reckless driving to endanger; (5) failure to stop for a stop sign; and (6) transporting unsealed spiritous liquor in the passenger area.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5, the combination of convictions for reckless driving and driving while license revoked supports the felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest conviction. Due to the lack of statutorily required notice by DMV and the absence of any other evidence tending to show defendant knew his license was suspended, defendant\u2019s charge of driving while license suspended should not have been submitted to the jury. In addition, defendant was not convicted of two of the required aggravating factors required to elevate his conviction for operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest from a misdemeanor to a felony. The only aggravating factor the jury found defendant to be guilty of was reckless driving.\nIII. Conclusion\nI vote to reverse defendant\u2019s conviction for driving while license suspended, vacate the felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment and resen-tencing for misdemeanor speeding to elude arrest pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-141.5(a) and defendant\u2019s other uncontested convictions. Otherwise, I find no error in defendant\u2019s remaining convictions and the judgments entered thereon. I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "TYSON, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Allison A. Pinchos, for the State.", "Anne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFONZA DWANTA COLTRANE\nNo. COA06-895\n(Filed 19 June 2007)\n1. Motor Vehicles\u2014 driving while license suspended \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a driving while license suspended charge even though defendant concedes the State proved each of the elements except for knowledge of the suspension, because: (1) the State raised prima facie presumption of receipt of notice of suspension through the signed certificate of an employee of the Division of Motor Vehicles that constituted proof of the giving of notice under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-48(a), and defendant was obligated to rebut the presumption; and (2) defendant chose not to present any evidence at trial, thus failing to rebut the presumption.\n2. Motor Vehicles\u2014 felony operation of motor vehicle to elude arrest \u2014 aggravated factor of driving while license suspended\nAlthough defendant contends his conviction for felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest must be vacated based on the State\u2019s alleged improper reliance on a driving while license suspended charge as an aggravating factor for that conviction, the Court of Appeals already concluded the driving while suspended charge was proper.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object \u2014 failure to argue plain error\nAlthough defendant contends the trial court erred in a driving while license suspended, felony operation of a motor vehicle to elude arrest, failing to heed light and siren, reckless driving, transporting unsealed spiritous liquor in the passenger area, and failure to stop for a stop sign case by admitting the DMV record and other related testimony, this assignment of error is dismissed because: (1) defendant did not raise any objection on the grounds of relevancy or undue burden that he now argues on appeal; and (2) although defendant referenced plain error, he did not make any argument regarding plain error in his brief.\nJudge Tyson dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 February 2006 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Allison A. Pinchos, for the State.\nAnne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 172, "last_page_order": 180 }