{ "id": 8184791, "name": "PHILLIP OXENDINE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TWL, INC., Defendant-Appellee, and CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Oxendine v. TWL, Inc.", "decision_date": "2007-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1397", "first_page": "162", "last_page": "168", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 162" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637762 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779", "parenthetical": "\"Assignments of error not set out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635483 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637061 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "quoting Dias v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637245 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375565 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597", "parenthetical": "\"Assignments of error not set out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-39-55", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789468 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788353 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631", "parenthetical": "quoting Dias v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567833 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "quoting Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981)" }, { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9367616 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616", "parenthetical": "quoting Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981)" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718465 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 S.E.2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532-33", "parenthetical": "quoting Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230, 238, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529130 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "quoting Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230, 238, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 N.C. App. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8242544 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/180/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 13, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "noting, \"It is a basic principle of insurance law that the insurer may avoid his obligation under the insurance contract by a showing that the insured made representations in his application that were material and false.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 725", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11363929 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "noting, \"It is a basic principle of insurance law that the insurer may avoid his obligation under the insurance contract by a showing that the insured made representations in his application that were material and false.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0725-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 659, "char_count": 13011, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8975852962947694e-07, "percentile": 0.7298749849894723 }, "sha256": "5be1c90fb110020484d5a854b3e6601e8e81d1067fecdf7a6c8a4b168ca56e97", "simhash": "1:8ad4eb2bde3d58d1", "word_count": 2036 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "PHILLIP OXENDINE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TWL, INC., Defendant-Appellee, and CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nThe present appeal stems from the workers\u2019 compensation insurance contract between TWL, Inc. (TWL) and Canal Insurance Company (Canal). Canal and TWL entered into an insurance contract in March, 2002; the policy\u2019s effective dates were 20 March 2002 through 20 March 2003. On 18 September 2002, Canal prepared a \u201cNotice of Cancellation of Insurance.\u201d The notice stated that TWL\u2019s policy would be cancelled, effective 7 December 2002, for \u201cunderwriting reasons.\u201d On 25 November 2002, Patty Watts, who worked for Canal\u2019s managing agent, Golden Isle Underwriting, Inc. (Golden), sent TWL a letter thanking TWL for its recent payment and stating that TWL\u2019s policy would be cancelled 7 December 2002 due to \u201cunderwriting reasons.\u201d TWL had paid its premiums through 7 December 2002. All parties agree that the notice of cancellation was sent via regular mail, and that the reason given for the purported cancellation was \u201cunderwriting reasons.\u201d\nOn 31 January 2003, Phillip Oxendine (plaintiff) was involved in a car accident. At that time, plaintiff worked for TWL; the accident arose out of his employment with the company. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries and incurred medical expenses in excess of $200,000.00. All parties agree that plaintiff\u2019s injury was compensable. However, as a result of the dispute as to insurance coverage, plaintiff\u2019s payments were significantly delayed. Accordingly, plaintiff filed a motion to join Canal as a party on 20 April 2004, which Chief Deputy Commissioner Stephen T. Gheen granted in an order filed 28 April 2004.\nOn 27 June 2006, Chairman Buck Lattimore, on behalf of the Full Commission, filed an opinion and award affirming Deputy- Commissioner George R. Hall, Ill\u2019s 22 August 2005 opinion and award. Canal appealed.\nOn appeal, Canal argues that TWL made material misrepresentations in its application to Canal for insurance, and that those material misrepresentations prevent recovery under the insurance contract under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-10 and related case law. See, e.g., Bell v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 146 N.C. App. 725, 726, 554 S.E.2d 399, 401 (2001) (noting, \u201cIt is a basic principle of insurance law that the insurer may avoid his obligation under the insurance contract by a showing that the insured made representations in his application that were material and false.\u201d) (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, argues Canal, the Full Commission erred in holding that cancellation of the policy was required pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105. Canal\u2019s argument is without merit.\nOur standard of review for cases originating in the Industrial Commission is well established:\nOur review of the Commission\u2019s opinion and award is limited to determining whether competent evidence of record supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact, in turn, support the conclusions of law. If there is any competent evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal despite evidence to the contrary. However, the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.\nRose v. City of Rocky Mount, 180 N.C. App. 392, 395, 637 S.E.2d 251, 254 (2006) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). \u201cA question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law for the courts.\u201d Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998) (citation omitted). We therefore review this issue, which is controlled by statute, de novo.\nThe crux of Canal\u2019s argument is that the insurance contract at issue was void ah initio due to alleged misrepresentations TWL made in its application for insurance. Because the contract was never valid to begin with, argues Canal, the requirements for cancellation found in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 do not apply. Instead, Canal would have this Court apply N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-10 and hold that no contract was ever formed. We hold that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 does apply; a workers\u2019 compensation insurance contract will therefore never be void ab initio, but must be cancelled in the manner prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-10 reads: \u201cAll statements or descriptions in any application for a policy of insurance, or in the policy itself, shall be deemed representations and not warranties, and a representation, unless material or fraudulent, will not prevent a recovery on the policy.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-10 (2005).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 is titled \u201cCertain workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy cancellations prohibited.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 (2005). It reads, in pertinent part:\n(a) No policy of workers\u2019 compensation insurance . . . shall be cancelled by the insurer before the expiration of the term or anniversary date stated in the policy and without the prior written consent of the insured, except for any one of the following reasons:\n(2) An act or omission by the insured or the insured\u2019s representative that constitutes material misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact in obtaining the policy, continuing the policy, or presenting a claim under the policy.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 (2005).\nIt is a general rule of statutory construction that\n[w]here one of two statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which deals more directly and specifically with the situation controls over the statute of more general applicability. When two statutes apparently overlap, it is well established that the statute special and particular shall control over the statute general in nature . . . unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the general statute to control.\nFowler v. Valencourt, 334 N.C. 345, 349, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532-33 (1993) (quoting Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C. 230, 238, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1986)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nIn this case, \u00a7 58-3-10 is the more general statute, applying to \u201cany application for a policy of insurance.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-3-10 (2005). In contrast, \u00a7 58-36-105 applies specifically to workers\u2019 compensation insurance. As \u00a7 58-36-105 contemplates the very sort of \u201cmaterial misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact in obtaining the policy\u201d that Canal alleges in this case, it clearly governs our review of the matter. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105(a)(2) (2005).\nHaving established that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 applies, we must consider whether Canal\u2019s attempted cancellation of the policy was effective. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 provides in pertinent part:\n(b) Any cancellation permitted by subsection (a) of this section is not effective unless written notice of cancellation has been given by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the insured not less than 15 days before the proposed effective date of cancellation. . . . The notice shall state the precise reason for cancellation. Whenever notice of intention to cancel is required to be given by registered or certified mail, no cancellation by the insurer shall be effective unless and until such method is employed and completed.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105(b) (2005) (emphasis added).\nIt is uncontested that Canal failed to send its purported notice of cancellation via registered or certified mail. Despite this, Canal argues that \u201c[t]he legislative intent of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105 was fulfilled\u201d by TWL\u2019s actual receipt of the notice more than fifteen days prior to cancellation.\nAs plaintiff points out in his brief, \u201cIf the North Carolina Legislature intended to forego the requirement of service by registered or certified mail, it would not have provided language in the statute which specifically states that a cancellation is not effective until service by certified or registered mail is \u2018employed and completed.\u2019 \u201d \u201c[A] statute must be considered as a whole and construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered useless or redundant. It is presumed that the legislature intended each portion to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere sur-plusage.\u201d R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res., 148 N.C. App. 610, 616, 560 S.E.2d 163, 168 (2002) (quoting Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). Canal\u2019s argument regarding substantial compliance therefore must fail.\nMoreover, even if this Court were to agree on that issue, we could not hold that the bald assertion of \u201cunderwriting reasons\u201d constitutes a \u201cprecise reason for cancellation.\u201d No court has interpreted the meaning of \u201cprecise reason.\u201d As our Supreme Court recently stated, however, \u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required.\u201d Patronelli v. Patronelli, 360 N.C. 628, 631, 636 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2006) (quoting Dias v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006)). The term \u201cprecise\u201d is defined as \u201c[c]learly expressed or delineated; definite,\u201d or \u201c[e]xact, as in performance or amount; accurate or correct. . . .\u201d The Am. Heritage Coll. Dictionary 1076 (3rd ed. 1997). We think it clear that a vague assertion of \u201cunderwriting reasons\u201d fails to meet that standard. Furthermore, we observe that our legislature demands, \u201c[i]n the event of an adverse underwriting decision,\u201d that an insurance company \u201cprovide[] the applicant, policyholder, or individual proposed for coverage with the specific reason or reasons for the adverse, underwriting decision . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-39-55 (2005) (emphasis added). As noted, we \u201cpre-sumen that the legislature intended each portion [of a statute] to be given full effect and did not intend any provision to be mere sur-plusage.\u201d R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 148 N.C. App. at 616, 560 S.E.2d at 168. If the legislature believed that the phrase \u201cunderwriting reasons\u201d was precise, it is unlikely that it would have included a requirement that insurance companies provide \u201cspecific reason or reasons\u201d for adverse underwriting decisions. Accordingly, Canal\u2019s purported notice of cancellation stumbles over another statutory hurdle.\nCanal concedes that it failed to follow the procedure outlined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 58-36-105. Accordingly, the insurance contract was in effect at the time of the compensable injury as a matter of law. Canal\u2019s remaining arguments on appeal are therefore irrelevant, and the Full Commission\u2019s opinion and award are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER and GEER concur.\n. The earlier opinion and award does not appear to be a part of the record on appeal.\n. We note that Canal\u2019s only treatment of this issue in its brief is a statement that \u201c[t]he reason for cancellation was noted.\u201d We will not consider unsupported contentions in the absence of legal argument or authority. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Woodley, 181 N.C. App. 594, 597, 640 S.E.2d 777, 779 (2007) (\u201cAssignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d) (quotations and citations omitted).", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Van Camp, Meacham & Newman, \u25a0PLLC, by Thomas M. Van Camp, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Hester, Grady, and Hester, P.L.L.C., by H. Clifton Hester, for defendant-appellee.", "McAngus, Goudelock & Cowrie, PLLC, by Trula R. Mitchell, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PHILLIP OXENDINE, Plaintiff-Appellee v. TWL, INC., Defendant-Appellee, and CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA06-1397\n(Filed 19 June 2007)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 cancellation of policy \u2014 notice\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by holding that cancellation of the pertinent workers\u2019 compensation policy was required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105 even though defendant insurance company contends the insurance contract was void ab initio based on alleged misrepresentations defendant employer made in its application, and thus the insurance contract was in effect at the time of the compensable injury as a matter of law, because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-3-10 is a more general statute, and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105 specifically applies to workers\u2019 compensation insurance; (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105 contemplates the very sort of material misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact in obtaining the policy that defendant insurance company alleges in this case; (3) defendant insurance company failed to send its purported notice of cancellation via registered or certified mail as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-36-105; and (4) the bald assertion of \u201cunderwriting reasons\u201d does not constitute a precise reason for cancellation as required by the statute.\nAppeal by defendant Canal Insurance Company from opinion and award entered 27 June 2006 by Chairman Buck Lattimore of the Full North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 May 2007.\nVan Camp, Meacham & Newman, \u25a0PLLC, by Thomas M. Van Camp, for plaintiff-appellee.\nHester, Grady, and Hester, P.L.L.C., by H. Clifton Hester, for defendant-appellee.\nMcAngus, Goudelock & Cowrie, PLLC, by Trula R. Mitchell, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0162-01", "first_page_order": 194, "last_page_order": 200 }