{ "id": 8185283, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: M.A.I.B.K.", "name_abbreviation": "In re M.A.I.B.K.", "decision_date": "2007-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA07-46", "first_page": "218", "last_page": "229", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 218" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633480 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001)" }, { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "\" 'A trial court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635992 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636189 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637871, 12637872, 12637873, 12637874, 12637875, 12637876, 12637877, 12637878, 12637879, 12637880, 12637881, 12637882, 12637883, 12637884, 12637885, 12637886, 12637887, 12637888, 12637889, 12637890, 12637891 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0417-11", "/se2d/641/0417-01", "/se2d/641/0417-02", "/se2d/641/0417-03", "/se2d/641/0417-04", "/se2d/641/0417-05", "/se2d/641/0417-06", "/se2d/641/0417-07", "/se2d/641/0417-08", "/se2d/641/0417-09", "/se2d/641/0417-10", "/se2d/641/0417-14", "/se2d/641/0417-12", "/se2d/641/0417-13", "/se2d/641/0417-15", "/se2d/641/0417-16", "/se2d/641/0417-17", "/se2d/641/0417-18", "/se2d/641/0417-19", "/se2d/641/0417-20", "/se2d/641/0417-21" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1110", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527964 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526237 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9442570 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8318580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001)" }, { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38", "parenthetical": "citing Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521439 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "citing Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252" }, { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499085 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519300 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411175 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376306 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679227 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)" }, { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34" }, { "page": "233-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519469 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/97/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377367 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1011, "char_count": 26173, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.259244762335987e-08, "percentile": 0.43275187086196915 }, "sha256": "6294bcb353564ee1f6c5b0d857fa4687cea68bee7d5856325541c19fe68d5f28", "simhash": "1:9bc156aab4ae8a52", "word_count": 4213 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: M.A.I.B.K." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nRespondent L.B., father of the minor child M.A.I.B.K., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights. In an opinion filed 6 March 2007, this Court affirmed the termination of the respondent-mother S.K\u2019s parental rights to the child. In re M.A.I.B.K., 182 N.C. App. 175 LEXIS 482, 641 S.E.2d 417 (2007) (unpublished).\nM.A.I.B.K. was born out of wedlock in New York in July 1999, and moved to Wake County, North Carolina with respondent-mother. Wake County Human Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) obtained nonsecure custody of the child and placed her in foster care on 1 July 2004, following respondent-mother\u2019s incarceration on charges of obtaining property by false pretenses and forgery. At the time of her arrest, the mother was unemployed and homeless. Although she identified respondent-father to DSS as the child\u2019s putative father, DSS\u2019 attempts to locate him in New York were unavailing.\nM.A.I.B.K. was adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile on 15 September 2004. On 30 January 2006, DSS filed a petition to ter-m\u00ednate both respondents\u2019 parental rights, alleging the following two grounds for termination as to respondent-father: (1) that he had neglected M.A.I.B.K., and it was probable that such neglect would be repeated if she were placed in his care, and (2) that M.A.I.B.K. had been born out of wedlock, and respondent-father had not established his paternity judicially or by affidavit filed with the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, had not legitimated the child, and had not provided substantial financial support or consistent care for the child or her mother. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1111(a)(1), (5) (2005). Attached to the petition was an affidavit from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (\u201cNCDHHS\u201d), affirming that \u201c[n]o Affidavit of Paternity has been received from any person acknowledging paternity or purporting to be the father of [M.A.I.B.K.].\u201d The petition was served upon respondent-father by publication, and he appeared at the termination hearing scheduled for 21 June 2006. The trial court granted respondent-father\u2019s request for appointed counsel and a continuance to prepare for the proceedings. The trial court then proceeded with respondent-mother\u2019s termination hearing, and entered an order terminating her parental rights on 20 July 2006.\nThe trial court held respondent-father\u2019s termination hearing on 20 September 2006. DSS Social Worker Heather Shapiro (\u201cShapiro\u201d), who had supervised M.Ai.B.K\u2019s foster care since July of 2004, testified that respondent-father was never married to respondent-mother and had not established his paternity of M.A.I.B.K. or legitimated the child prior to the filing of DSS\u2019s petition; nor had an affidavit of paternity been filed with NCDHHS. Respondent-father told Shapiro that he had not seen M.A.I.B.K. since she was two years old, and although he was not \u201cin a position to care for\u201d M.A.I.B.K., he \u201cdid have relatives that he wanted to see her placed with possibly.\u201d Other than inquiring about the results of the paternity test in July 2006, respondent-father did not contact Shapiro about the child after their initial interview. His friend, Trudy Beamon (\u201cBeamon\u201d), called Shapiro to request a visit with the child while respondent-father and Beamon were in North Carolina for the termination hearing. At no time did respondent-father provide any support for respondent-mother or M.A.I.B.K., and even after learning the results of the paternity test which determined he was the child\u2019s father, he made no attempt to communicate with the child. In addition to Shapiro\u2019s testimony, the trial court took judicial notice of the order terminating the parental rights of respondent-mother and the prior adjudication of neglect entered on 15 September 2004.\nRespondent-father testified, inter alia, that although respondent-mother told him that he was M.A.I.B.K.\u2019s father within two months of her birth in 1999, he \u201cdidn\u2019t know for sure one way or the other.\u201d He stated that he tried to arrange a paternity test in New York, but that respondent-mother had \u201cjust disappeared\u201d with the child. Respondent-father was aware that his friend, William Worth, was in touch with respondent-mother but he made no effort to communicate \u25a0with her or to ascertain her whereabouts through Worth. In June of 2006, four or five years since his last contact with respondent-mother, respondent-father learned from Worth that \u201cher parental rights were about to be taken from her.\u201d After speaking to respondent-mother\u2019s attorney, respondent-father obtained a paternity test through DSS in June 2006, and learned conclusively that he was M.AI.B.K\u2019s father in July 2006. He acknowledged that he had not established his paternity of M.A.I.B.K. prior to June 2006, and had neither legitimated nor provided any support for the child.\nAfter hearing the parties\u2019 evidence, the trial court found each of the grounds for termination as alleged by DSS under section 7B-llll(a)(l) and (5). The court then heard additional testimony from Shapiro, respondent-father, and Beamon regarding the best interests of M.A.I.B.K. The trial court also considered a report on the child\u2019s best interests submitted by her guardian ad litem. Based upon the evidence at disposition, the trial court concluded that termination of respondent-father\u2019s parental rights would facilitate the permanent placement plan of adoption and would serve the best interests of the child. The order terminating respondent-father\u2019s parental rights was entered on 13 October 2006.\nWe initially note that respondent-father asserts twenty-four assignments of error in the record on appeal. However, respondent-father\u2019s brief addresses only eight of the assignments of error. Therefore, the remaining assignments of error for which no argument has been presented are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. R 28(b)(6) (2006).\nOn appeal, respondent-father asserts that the evidence adduced at the termination hearing was insufficient to support either of the grounds for termination found by the trial court.\nAt the initial, adjudicatory stage of termination proceedings, the petitioner \u201c \u2018must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist\u2019 \u201d under North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-llll(a). In re L.A.B., 178 N.C. App. 295, 298, 631 S.E.2d 61, 64 (2006) (citation omitted). A finding of any one of the statutory grounds for termination is sufficient. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). Where, as here, a respondent does not challenge any of the trial court\u2019s adjudicatory findings of fact by a properly briefed assignment of error, the findings are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Therefore, our review is limited to a determination of whether the facts found by the trial court support its conclusion that a ground for termination exists pursuant to section 7B-1111(a). In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (citing In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984)).\nUnder North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-llll(a)(5), the trial court may terminate a father\u2019s parental rights if it finds as follows:\nThe father of a juvenile born out of wedlock has not, prior to the filing of a petition or motion to terminate parental rights:\na. Established paternity judicially or by affidavit which has been filed in a central registry maintained by the Department of Health and Human Services; provided, the court shall inquire of the Department of Health and Human Services as to whether such an affidavit has been so filed and shall incorporate into the case record the Department\u2019s certified reply; or\nb. Legitimated the juvenile pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10 or filed a petition for this specific purpose; or\nc. Legitimated the juvenile by marriage to the mother of the juvenile; or\nd. Provided substantial financial support or consistent care with respect to the juvenile and mother.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(5) (2005). In its termination order, the trial court made particularized findings as to M.A.I.B.K.\u2019s out-of-wedlock birth and respondent-father\u2019s failure to take any of the actions required by this subsection. Rather than contest the sufficiency of the trial court\u2019s findings under section 7B-llll(a)(5), respondent-father asserts that the actions of respondent-mother after the birth of M.A.I.B.K. \u201cprevented [him] from taking any of the steps required to establish paternity\u201d or to provide support and care for the child. While acknowledging the \u201cbright line test\u201d adopted by our courts in interpreting this subsection, he suggests that this Court \u201cshould set aside its\u2019 [sic] prior line of cases which apply N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(5) without consideration for the particular circumstances of each case.\u201d\n. Respondent-father likens his circumstances to that of the father in A Child\u2019s Hope, LLC v. Doe, 178 N.C. App. 96, 630 S.E.2d 673 (2006), and he argues that, for reasons similar to those stated in the dissent in A Child\u2019s Hope, we should set aside the bright line test. We find no merit to respondent-father\u2019s claim. In A Child\u2019s Hope, this Court reiterated that the provisions of section 7B-llll(a)(5) are applied strictly, without regard to the respondent-father\u2019s knowledge of the minor child:\nOur Court has previously considered and rejected the argument that a putative father \u201cwas unable to take the steps set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(5) because he did not know of\u2019 the existence of the child. The similarity of the requirements between the statute permitting the termination of a putative father\u2019s rights and the statute requiring the consent of a father of a child bom out of wedlock to its adoption reflect the intention of the legislature not to make an \u201cillegitimate child\u2019s future welfare dependent on whether or not the putative father knows of the child\u2019s existence at the time the petition is filed.\u201d\nId. at 103, 630 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting In re T.L.B., 167 N.C. App. 298, 302-03, 605 S.E.2d 249, 252 (2004); citing In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 8, 381 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1989), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 327 N.C. 61, 393 S.E.2d 791 (1990)). In A Child\u2019s Hope, we held that the respondent-father\u2019s failure to take any of the acts set forth in section 7B-llll(a)(5) required the district court to find grounds for termination thereunder, notwithstanding evidence that the mother hid the child\u2019s existence from the father by claiming to have miscarried. Id. at 105, 630 S.E.2d at 678. While expressing \u201cno doubt that the biological mother thwarted respondent\u2019s parental rights by lying about the status of the pregnancy[,]\u201d this Court concluded that section 7B-llll(a)(5) \u201cis explicit in its requirements and there was no evidence that respondent met those requirements.\u201d Id. at 105, 630 S.E.2d at 678.\nHere, the record is equally clear that respondent-father took none of the steps required by section 7B-llll(a)(5) to assume his responsibilities as M.A.I.B.K.\u2019s father. Unlike the father in A Child\u2019s Hope, respondent-father was aware of his daughter\u2019s existence and had been told by the child\u2019s mother that he was the father. Respondent-father also saw the child on at least two occasions. Moreover, despite knowing that his friend, William Worth, was in contact with respondent-mother, respondent-father made no attempt to contact her regarding M.A.I.B.K. over a period of almost seven years. In addition, unlike the father in A Child\u2019s Hope, once respondent-father learned he was the father of M.A.I.B.K., he still took no action to communicate with or provide support for the child. Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly found grounds to terminate respondent-father\u2019s parental rights under North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-llll(a)(5). Because we uphold the court\u2019s adjudication under section 7B-llll(a)(5), we need not review the second ground for termination found under section 7B-llll(a)(l). Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34.\nRespondent-father next claims the trial court violated the procedures set forth in North Carolina General Statutes, sections 7B-1109(e) and -1110(a) (2005), by considering M.A.I.B.K.\u2019s best interests prior to adjudicating the existence of grounds to terminate his parental rights. As the basis for this argument, he notes that the trial judge who presided over his termination hearing previously heard evidence and reached conclusions about the best interests of the child in terminating respondent-mother\u2019s parental rights on 20 July 2006. Respondent-father suggests that the trial judge\u2019s disposition in his case was impermissibly \u201ctainted\u201d by her earlier disposition of the mother\u2019s case.\nOur Juvenile Code contemplates a two-stage proceeding for the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re White, 81 N.C. App. 82, 85, 344 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1986) (citing Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252). During the initial, adjudicatory stage prescribed by section 7B-1109, \u201c[t]he court shall take evidence, find the facts, and shall adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B-1111 which authorize the termination of parental rights of the respondent.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1109(e) (2005). The second, dispositional stage is governed by North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1110, which provides, \u201c[ajfter an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent\u2019s rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent\u2019s rights is in the juvenile\u2019s best interest.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1110(a) (2005). The trial court need not conduct a separate and distinct hearing for each stage, however, and may hear adjudicatory and disposi-tional evidence concurrently, provided that it applies the appropriate standard of proof at each stage. White, 81 N.C. App. at 85, 344 S.E.2d at 38. Moreover, \u201c \u2018[e]vidence heard or introduced throughout the adjudicatory stage, as well as any additional evidence, may be considered by the court during the dispositional stage.\u2019 \u201d In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 23, 616 S.E.2d 264, 277 (2005) (quoting In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613, 543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001)). The trial court\u2019s determination of a child\u2019s best interests at disposition is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 24, 616 S.E.2d at 278 (citing In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995)).\nWe find no error in the procedures employed by the trial court in the instant case. While not required to do so, the trial court conducted a separate dispositional hearing after adjudicating the existence of grounds for termination of respondent-father\u2019s rights. Nothing in the trial court\u2019s dispositional findings and conclusions suggests its reliance upon any evidence other than what was presented by the parties at the hearing for respondent-father. Moreover, in evaluating the best interests of M.A.I.B.K., the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice that the respondent-mother\u2019s parental rights also had been terminated. See generally J.B., 172 N.C. App. at 16, 616 S.E.2d at 273 (\u201c \u2018A trial court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting In re Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991)). Respondent:father cites no authority that would bar a trial judge from presiding in an action to terminate the parental rights of one parent of a child simply because the judge previously has terminated the rights of the other parent. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006).\nIn addition, we note that the Tenth Judicial District has a specialized division of the District Court known as Family Court. The Family Court program began with a pilot program in three judicial districts in 1999, and the Administrative Office of the Courts has since expanded the Family Court program to eleven judicial districts in North Carolina. One of the primary characteristics of the Family Court is its \u201cone judge, one family\u201d policy. This policy is \u201c[o]ften cited as the most critical component of any successful family court,\u201d as it helps \u201cavoid the fragmentation, the duplication of effort and expense, and the potential for conflicting court orders\u201d in a domestic case. Cheryl Daniels Howell, North Carolina\u2019s Experiment with Family Court, Popular Gov\u2019t, Summer 2000, at 15, 18.\nPursuant to the authority granted by North Carolina General Statutes, section 7A-146, the Tenth Judicial District has adopted local rules which govern its juvenile Family Court cases. These rules require judicial assignment of one judge to each juvenile\u2019s case. Specifically, Rule 19.1 of the Tenth Judicial District Juvenile Abuse/Neglect/Dependency Court Rules, which became effective 15 February 2006, provides as follows:\n19.1 Judicial Assignment upon Adjudication.\nOnce a juvenile case involving allegations of abuse, neglect, or dependency has been adjudicated, that case shall be assigned to the judge presiding over the Adjudication/Disposition hearing. All subsequent hearings in the case shall be scheduled before the same judge, including Termination of Parental Rights hearings and future adjudications regarding the same juvenile(s), unless extraordinary circumstances require otherwise.\n10th Jud. Dist. Juv. Abuse/Neglect/Dependency Ct. R. 19.1 (Feb. 15, 2006).\nThe petition for termination of parental rights in this case was filed just prior to the effective date for Rule 19.1, but this Rule was in effect at the time of the termination of parental rights hearings of both the mother and respondent-father. Therefore, Judge Sasser, as the assigned judge in juvenile court, was required pursuant to Rule 19.1 to hear all juvenile matters involving M.A.I.B.K., \u201cunless extraordinary circumstances require[d] otherwise.\u201d Id. Respondent-father has not argued any extraordinary circumstances in this case which would call for removal or recusal of the assigned judge. The fact that the assigned judge would have heard other matters involving the particular child and/or family is entirely appropriate in juvenile Family Court cases such as this one.\nAs further support for his claim that the trial court pre-judged the issue of M.AJ.B.K\u2019s best interests, respondent-father contends the \u201conly findings of facts which refer to [him]\u201d on the issue of M.A.I.B.K.\u2019s best interests are the following:\n39. That it is in the best interests of M.A.I.B.K. that the rights of the father, [L.B.], be terminated.\n41. That the conduct of the father ... has been such as to demonstrate that he will not promote the healthy and orderly, physical and emotional well being of the child, M.A.I.B.K.\n42. That the minor child, M.A.I.B.K., is in need of a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age which can be obtained only by the severing of the relationship between the child and her father, and by termination of the parental rights of the father[.]\n43. That it is in the best interests of the child, M.A.I.B.K., that the parental rights of the father ... be terminated.\nRespondent-father contends these findings \u201care not supported by competent evidence\u201d and are mere reiterations of conclusions of law appearing elsewhere in the order.\nAgain, we find no merit to this claim. Regarding the quantity of the trial court\u2019s findings on the child\u2019s best interests vis a vis respondent-father, we note that he fails to reckon with the following uncontested findings pertinent to the issue:\n18. That when the child was born, the father believed, but was not 100% sure, that he was the father of the child.\n19. That the father last saw the child when she was two and a half years old.\n21. That when the mother left with the child the father took no steps to find the child or the child\u2019s mother.\n22. That the father and mother have, and have had since the birth of the child, a mutual acquaintance in the child\u2019s godfather [, Worth],\n23. That after the mother left with the child, the father was aware the mother occasionally contacted [Worth].\n24. That the father never asked [Worth] if he knew the whereabouts of the mother or the child; the father did not ask [Worth] to relay messages to the mother or the child; and the father took no steps to utilize [Worth] as a way to look for the child.\n25. That the father has not legitimated the child by statute or through marriage.\n26. That the father has provided no financial support for the child during her life.\n27. That the father did not establish paternity for the child prior to the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.\n28. That the father\u2019s first appearance in this matter was at a hearing.initially held on June 21, 2006. The father met with the social worker at this time. He told the social worker that he is not in a position to care for the child in the future, but wants her to live with family in New York.\n29. That since that date the father has not traveled to North Carolina to visit with the child. The father did not send the child any cards or gifts. He did not request a visit until, through his companion, he requested to see the child while he was in town for today\u2019s hearing.\n31. That the permanent plan for M.A.I.B.K. is adoption. The agency at this time is looking at the foster parent who is interested in adopting.\n32. That a child needs stability and needs a safe and secure sense of belonging in order to develop a healthy life. It is not a safe, permanent plan for a child to be in limbo in foster care ....\n33. That the child has been placed with the current foster parent[] since she has been in care and has developed a strong bond with her. M.A.I.B.K. also has a strong bond with the foster parent\u2019s extended family.\n34. That M.A.I.B.K. is a very adoptable child. She is articulate, intelligent, outgoing, beautiful, has no behavior issues and does well in school.\n35. That M.A.I.B.K. and her father have no bond.\n36. That M.A.I.B.K. turned seven years of age . . ., and the likelihood of her adoption appears great.\nSee N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1110(a)(l)-(6) (2005). Moreover, we find ample support for findings of fact 39, and 41-43 in the testimony of Shapiro and respondent-father, and the guardian ad litem\u2019s report. The report noted respondent-father\u2019s failure to provide the guardian ad litem with promised documentation regarding his criminal and employment histories, housing, and other information pertinent to his ability to care for a child. It also noted that he \u201cmade no efforts to acknowledge [M.A.I.B.K.\u2019s] birthday in mid July or to request [] visits or phone call privileges.\u201d The report advised the trial court that M.A.I.B.K. \u201ccontinues to thrive in her original foster care placement\u201d and \u201cis very bonded with her foster mother.\u201d The foster mother was described as \u201canxious to take permanent custody of [M.A.I.B.K.] if [] she becomes free for adoption.\u201d The guardian ad litem portrayed M.A.I.B.K. as having experienced \u201ca tremendous amount of grief, loss and stress in her short life[,]\u201d pointing specifically to her loss of respondent-mother after five \u201cvery chaotic\u201d years in her care. She concluded her report as follows:\nM.A.I.B.K. needs a stable nurturing permanent home. ... It is apparent that [she] is doing very well and feels safe and secure in her present home. This Guardian feels that [it] is in the best interest of M.A.I.B.K. to be adopted by her current foster parent.\nFinally, although the determination of a child\u2019s best interests is in the nature of a conclusion of law rather than pure fact-finding, see Helms, 127 N.C. App. at 511, 491 S.E.2d at 676, we hold the trial court\u2019s conclusion to be fully supported by its findings of fact and the evidence presented at the hearing. Respondent-father\u2019s final assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.\n. North Carolina General Statutes, section 7A-146 (2005) states in pertinant part:\nThe chief district judge, subject to the general supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, has administrative supervision and authority over the opertation of the district courts and magistrates in [her] district. These powers and duties include, but are not limited to, the following:\n(1) Arranging schedules and assigning district judges for sessions of district courts;\n(2) Arranging or supervising the calendaring of noncriminal matters for trial or hearing;\n(7) Arranging sessions, to the extent practicable for the trial of specialized cases, including traffic, domestic relations, and other types of cases, and assigning district judges to preside over these sessions so as to permit maximum practicable specialization by individual judges ....", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wake County Attorney\u2019s Office, by Corinne G. Russell, for Wake County-Human Services, 'petitioner-appellee.", "Poyner & Spruill, LLP, by Bryn Dodge Wilson, for Guardian ad Litem.", "Annick Lenoir-Peek, for respondent-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: M.A.I.B.K.\nNo. COA07-46\n(Filed 19 June 2007)\n1. Termination of Parent Rights\u2014 grounds \u2014 failure to assume responsibility as father\nThe trial court properly found grounds to terminate respondent-father\u2019s parental rights in a child born out of wedlock where he took none of the steps required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-lll(a)(5) to legitimate the child and to assume his responsibilities as the child\u2019s father.\n2. Termination of Parental Rights\u2014 decision by same judge who had previously terminated other parent\u2019s rights \u2014 no error\nThere was no error where a judge who had previously terminated a mother\u2019s parental rights concluded that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the father\u2019s rights. Nothing suggests reliance by the court upon evidence other than that presented at the father\u2019s hearing, and the court was entitled to take judicial notice that the mother\u2019s rights had been terminated. Moreover, this district has a Family Court, one of the primary characteristics of which is the assignment of one judge to one family.\nAppeal by respondent from order entered 13 October 2006 by Judge Debra Sasser in Wake County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 May 2007.\nWake County Attorney\u2019s Office, by Corinne G. Russell, for Wake County-Human Services, 'petitioner-appellee.\nPoyner & Spruill, LLP, by Bryn Dodge Wilson, for Guardian ad Litem.\nAnnick Lenoir-Peek, for respondent-appellant." }, "file_name": "0218-01", "first_page_order": 250, "last_page_order": 261 }