{ "id": 8185491, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LEWIS WALL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wall", "decision_date": "2007-06-19", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1011", "first_page": "280", "last_page": "285", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 280" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499065 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518853 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249743 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "741", "parenthetical": "citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9248811 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "89-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0084-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 505, "char_count": 10929, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20123682886531222 }, "sha256": "b48ce1f2335e399fa8a2618b9541fa761fa3c094e2f23020ef7b49bbebdc20f2", "simhash": "1:ad2dd388d7628fde", "word_count": 1791 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LEWIS WALL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nWhen .the defendant\u2019s own assertion is the sole evidence of record that the trial court did not comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 in executing defendant\u2019s waivers of counsel, this standing alone is insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of prior waivers under State v. Kinlock, 152 N.C. App. 84, 566 S.E.2d 738 (2002).\nWilliam Lewis Wall (\u201cdefendant\u201d) was charged with misdemeanor disorderly conduct and communicating threats on 4 March 2005. Defendant executed a written waiver of counsel on 24 March 2005, before District Court Judge Joseph Williams, and waived his right to assigned counsel. On 9 June 2005, Attorney Eddg\u00e9tt-Meacham made a limited appearance in district court and defendant was found guilty on both counts. The trial court sentenced defendant to thirty days, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on unsupervised probation for twenty-four months. Defendant appealed to the superior court for a trial de novo.\nOn 13 February 2006, defendant executed a second written waiver form, before Superior Court Judge Mark A. Klass, and waived his \u201cright to all assistance of counsel which includes my right to assigned counself.]\u201d Defendant\u2019s case came on before Judge Kimberly Taylor on 13 March 2006. After a colloquy, defendant proceeded to trial pro se. A jury found defendant guilty of disorderly conduct and communicating threats. Judge Taylor sentenced defendant to 120 days in the Department of Correction for the conviction of communicating threats. For the disorderly conduct conviction, Judge Taylor sentenced defendant to sixty days at the expiration of the communicating threat sentence. Both sentences were suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal, and then requested that his sentences be activated. Judge Taylor held that the matter would be held open until the next day.\nDefendant was brought back before Judge Taylor, who asked defendant whether he wanted to appeal his convictions, given his request that the sentences be activated. Defendant informed the trial court that he wanted to appeal his case and that he wanted an attorney for his appeal. Defendant then stated that neither Judge Taylor nor Judge Klass informed him of the \u201cpossible jail sentence . . . the charges would carry.\u201d Defendant appeals.\nIn defendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal, he contends the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself without establishing that his waiver of counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. Defendant specifically argues that the trial court did not make an inquiry to satisfy itself that defendant comprehended \u201cthe range of permissible punishments\u201d as required by subsection (3).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 provides:\nA defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:\n(1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;\n(2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and\n(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 (2005).\n\u201cThe provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 are mandatory where the defendant requests to proceed pro se. The execution of a written waiver is no substitute for compliance by the trial court with the statute.\u201d State v. Evans, 153 N.C. App. 313, 315, 569 S.E.2d 673, 675 (2002) (citations omitted). When a claim is made relating to the adequacy of the foregoing statutory inquiry, \u201cthe critical issue is whether the statutorily required information has been communicated in such a manner that defendant\u2019s decision to represent himself is knowing and voluntary.\u201d State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 583, 451 S.E.2d 157, 164 (1994). The inquiry detailed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 has been deemed sufficient to meet the constitutional standards in determining \u201cwhether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to in-court representation by counsel.\u201d State v. Thomas, 331 N.C. 671, 674, 417 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1992).\nWhere the inquiry required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 has been made during a preliminary proceeding by a different judge, it is not necessary for the trial judge to repeat the statutory inquiry. Kinlock, 152 N.C. App. at 89, 566 S.E.2d at 741 (citations omitted). \u201cA thorough inquiry into the three substantive elements of the statute, conducted at a preliminary stage of a proceeding, meets the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242 even if it is conducted by a judge other than the judge who presides at the subsequent trial.\u201d Id. Furthermore, there is a presumption of regularity accorded the official acts of public officers, such that \u201c[w]hen a defendant executes a written waiver which is in turn certified by the trial court, the waiver of counsel will be presumed to have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, unless the rest of the record indicates otherwise.\u201d Id., 152 N.C. App. at 89-90, 566 S.E.2d at 741 (citations and quotations omitted).\nFollowing his waiver of counsel and conviction in district court, defendant appealed to the superior court, where he again executed a waiver of all counsel. The written waiver contained a certification by Judge Klass and an acknowledgment by defendant, that he:\n[was] fully informed in open court of the charges against [him], the nature of and the statutory punishment for each charge, and the nature of the proceedings against [him] and [his] right to have counsel assigned by the court and [his] right to have the assistance of counsel to represent [him] in this action; that [he] comprehend[ed] the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of punishments; that [he] understood and appreciated the consequences of [his] decision and that [he]... voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently elected in open court to be tried . . . without the assistance of counsel[.]\nOn 13 March 2006, the cases were called for trial before Judge Taylor, who had the following discussion with defendant about representation:\nTHE COURT: I\u2019ll note for the record that Mr. Wall is pleading not guilty. I assume that\u2019s correct, Mr. Wall?\nTHE DEFENDANT: That\u2019s correct.\nTHE COURT: He had been previously advised about his rights to counsel, and apparently has signed a waiver of assistance of all counsel on February 13 of 2006 before Judge Mark Klass. That continues to be your wish, Mr. Wall, that you represent yourself?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I\u2019d rather have \u2014 Excuse my voice, Your Honor. My voice is kind of gone. I\u2019d rather have an attorney to represent me, but there\u2019s no attorney here that would represent me, that I would like to have represent me'. They don\u2019t represent me to the full of their abilities. So I would like nothing more than to have an attorney to represent me in my case \u2014 but represent me. That\u2019s what I wanted. And I want \u2014 You know, that\u2019s what I want. But I can\u2019t get that. That\u2019s the reason why my not having\u2014 me representing myself. That is the full reason as to that. I had an attorney on a case \u2014 on this same case. And he didn\u2019t represent me. Me and him was going back and forth, you know, during the duration of this case, you know. So I just ended up telling the Judge \u2014 you know, I had to release him because he wasn\u2019t representing me. He wasn\u2019t letting me know what was going on, he wasn\u2019t telling me nothing. He wasn\u2019t, you know, letting me know what\u2019s \u2014 He wasn\u2019t even telling me nothing about nothing. I didn\u2019t know nothing about nothing until the day of court, date of trial. I didn\u2019t know nothing. And now\u2014\n\u2022 THE COURT: Let me stop you for a minute, Mr. Wall. All I really wanted to talk about right now is your right to counsel. You have previously come into court back in February and told the Judge then that you wanted to represent yourself; is that correct?\nTHE DEFENDANT: That\u2019s correct.\nTHE COURT: All right. And though you say that you want representation of counsel, you said that you don\u2019t feel any of the attorneys would represent you adequately?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma\u2019am.\nTHE COURT: So today you still want to represent yourself; is that correct?\nTHE DEFENDANT: In light of what I just said, yes, ma\u2019am.\nTHE COURT: All right, sir. I just wanted to make sure that was still your position in the case. I would note for the record that Mr. Wall is present in court, and he has confirmed that he wishes to represent himself in these matters.\nHere, the record indicates that defendant executed written waivers of counsel on 13 February 2006 and on 24 March 2005. At trial, Judge Taylor questioned the defendant about whether he still wished to represent himself. This inquiry was not intended to be a full counsel inquiry as provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242, but rather to confirm defendant\u2019s prior waiver of counsel to make sure defendant had not changed his mind about wanting counsel. The above-cited colloquy between Judge Taylor and defendant in no way invalidated defendant\u2019s prior waiver of counsel on 24 March 2005 and 13 February 2006. The result of the colloquy was that def\u00e9ndant confirmed to the court that he wished to proceed pro se in these cases.\nThe record on appeal in this matter contains no transcript of the proceedings of the earlier two waivers. The only evidence before this Court that a thorough and proper counsel inquiry was.made is defendant\u2019s statement in the record, following his conviction, that Judge Taylor and Judge Klass failed to advise him of the \u201cpossible jail sentence ... the charges would carry.\u201d Defendant\u2019s statement in no manner challenges the validity of his waiver of counsel before Judge Williams. We hold that defendant\u2019s assertion alone is insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of the waivers under Kinlock, and that defendant\u2019s waivers of counsel before Judges Klass and Williams were knowing, intelligent and voluntary.\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sharon Patrick-Wilson, for the State.", "Susan J. Hall for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LEWIS WALL\nNo. COA06-1011\n(Filed 19 June 2007)\nConstitutional Law\u2014 prior waiver of counsel \u2014 failure to comply with requirements \u2014 defendant\u2019s assertion insufficient standing alone\nDefendant\u2019s assertion that the trial court did not comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1242 in executing defendant\u2019s waivers of counsel was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of validity of prior waivers where the assertion stood alone.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 March 2006 by Judge Kimberly S. Taylor in Richmond County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Sharon Patrick-Wilson, for the State.\nSusan J. Hall for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0280-01", "first_page_order": 312, "last_page_order": 317 }