{ "id": 8186125, "name": "STRATES SHOWS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff v. AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey corporation; ROCKY MOUNT FAIR, INC., a North Carolina corporation; FAIR MANAGEMENT INC., a Florida Corporation; SMOKEY MOUNTAIN AMUSEMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; POWERS GREAT AMERICAN MIDWAYS, a North Carolina business entity; MORRIS J. VIVONA, SR.; MORRIS J. VIVONA, JR.; DOMINIC A. VIVONA, SR.; DOMINIC A. VIVONA, JR.; JOHN J. VIVONA; PHILIP A. VIVONA; SEBASTIAN J. VIVONA; CHRISTOPHER R. VIVONA; NORMAN Y. CHAMBLISS, III; MARGARET SCOTT PHIPPS; ROBERT E. PHIPPS; BOBBY C. McLAMB; LINDA J. SAUNDERS; MICHAEL E. BLANTON; ROBIN LEE TURNER; DEANN S. TURNER; BILLY JOE CLARK; LESLIE E. POWERS; and The Estate of RICHARD D. JANAS, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc.", "decision_date": "2007-07-03", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1363", "first_page": "455", "last_page": "464", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 455" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638079 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637385 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "citing Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469194 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439355 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656034 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685024, 685107 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0599-02", "/nc/352/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685063 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8174226 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539", "parenthetical": "citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "503 U.S. 258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6226783 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "265-66" }, { "page": "542-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/503/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 451", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275572 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453", "parenthetical": "quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c)" }, { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c)" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1962", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" }, { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985361 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "quoting Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993)" }, { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8999320 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "quoting Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511527, 1511629, 1511511, 1511639, 1511292 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0675-01", "/nc/356/0675-02", "/nc/356/0675-03", "/nc/356/0675-05", "/nc/356/0675-04" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 555", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11730070 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560-61" }, { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249087 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 402", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655250 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 F. Supp. 2d 817", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8938435 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "832" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/379/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1047, "char_count": 25387, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2856608214989709e-07, "percentile": 0.6186457202717224 }, "sha256": "66fb0645790851b62c3d6106dad0a65ced2b90e0e55cb9e9de3fb9072b99c5fe", "simhash": "1:cbced556482b1466", "word_count": 4095 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and LEVINSON concur." ], "parties": [ "STRATES SHOWS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff v. AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey corporation; ROCKY MOUNT FAIR, INC., a North Carolina corporation; FAIR MANAGEMENT INC., a Florida Corporation; SMOKEY MOUNTAIN AMUSEMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; POWERS GREAT AMERICAN MIDWAYS, a North Carolina business entity; MORRIS J. VIVONA, SR.; MORRIS J. VIVONA, JR.; DOMINIC A. VIVONA, SR.; DOMINIC A. VIVONA, JR.; JOHN J. VIVONA; PHILIP A. VIVONA; SEBASTIAN J. VIVONA; CHRISTOPHER R. VIVONA; NORMAN Y. CHAMBLISS, III; MARGARET SCOTT PHIPPS; ROBERT E. PHIPPS; BOBBY C. McLAMB; LINDA J. SAUNDERS; MICHAEL E. BLANTON; ROBIN LEE TURNER; DEANN S. TURNER; BILLY JOE CLARK; LESLIE E. POWERS; and The Estate of RICHARD D. JANAS, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nStrates Shows, Inc. (\u201cStrates\u201d), a Florida-based family business, performed the contract for provision of the midway at the annual North Carolina State Fair uninterrupted for more than fifty years. In 1999, Jim Graham, the long-time Commissioner of Agriculture, announced that he would not seek re-election for the 2000-2004 term. At some point after Commissioner Graham\u2019s announcement, defendant Amusements of America (\u201cAOA\u201d), a New Jersey based midway operator, including its principals, the individual Vivona family defendants (\u201cVivonas\u201d), initiated a conspiracy with a long-time North Carolina-based business associate, defendant Norman Chambliss (\u201cChambliss\u201d). The purpose of the conspiracy was to secure the State Fair midway operation contract for AOA. This conspiracy, and the illegal acts perpetrated in furtherance of it, culminated in a major public corruption scandal.\nThe criminal acts of defendants are numerous and complex, but include acts such as the making and accepting of bribes, money laundering, the structuring of transactions to avoid reporting requirements, state procurement conflict of interest violations, and potential election law violations. Defendant Meg Scott Phipps (\u201cPhipps\u201d) was elected to replace Commissioner Graham, and in 2001 she set about forming a process by which the State of North Carolina would choose a midway-operator for the 2002 State Fair.\nCommissioner Phipps decreed the formation of a \u201cFair Advisory Committee\u201d ostensibly to hear and vote on presentations made by various bidders for the midway operation. Strates presented a bid for the midway contract to the Fair Advisory Committee, along with seven other bidders, including AOA. According to an investigation of the vote taken by the committee, Strates was the choice to receive the midway contract. Commissioner Phipps did not attend any of the formal bid presentations. Rather, she was advised of the various presentations by Chambliss, and he recommended that the Commissioner choose AOA as the 2002 midway operator.\nCommissioner Phipps ultimately awarded the midway contract to AOA, which was not the choice of the Fair Advisory Committee, but which had been deeply involved in the above described conspiracy. Strates challenged the Commissioner\u2019s award of the 2002 midway contract in the Office of Administrative Hearings (\u201cOAH\u201d), ultimately settling the action with entities who are not parties to the. instant case. Based upon investigations performed by the State Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, several of the individual defendants including Michael Blanton, Chambliss, Bobby McLamb, Meg Scott Phipps, Linda Saunders, and M. Vivona, Jr. faced prosecutions, and subsequently pled guilty to or were convicted of various state and federal offenses.\nOn 23 August 2004, Strates filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction was a single federal claim, which Strates asserted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\u201cRICO\u201d), 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961, et seq. Plaintiff also asserted several state claims including fraud, tortious interference with business relations and prospective economic advantage, unfair competition and unfair and deceptive trade practices, conversion, civil conspiracy, and a claim for punitive damages. Specifically, Strates sought damages based upon an alleged deprivation of the 2002 midway contract and its lost business and profits as a result, the costs in preparing Strates\u2019 bid proposal, and the legal fees and costs associated with Strates\u2019 appeal to OAH.\nIn an order filed 25 July 2005, Chief Judge for the Eastern District Louise W. Flanagan dismissed Strates\u2019 RICO claim for a lack of standing. Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of America, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 817 (E.D.N.C. 2005). The federal District Court specifically found that with respect to the RICO claim involving the 2002 midway contract, Strates \u201cpoints to no property interest which it had in the 2002 midway contract. . . prior to\u201d the illegal activity by defendants. Id. at 826. In addition, the court held that Strates had \u201cnot alleged an injury proximately caused by defendants\u2019 illegal activity.\u201d Id. at 828. Weighing against a finding of proximate cause was the existence of several intervening factors, including other bidders who were not involved in the conspiracy, the lack of a set procedure or criteria for the selection of the midway contract, and administrative discretion. Id. Ultimately the court held that the relationship between defendants\u2019 illegal conduct and the harm to Strates was indirect and speculative, and therefore Strates had failed to establish that any injury suffered by it was proximately caused by defendants\u2019 actions. Id. at 832. As such, plaintiff lacked standing to assert a RICO claim based upon the loss of the midway contract. Id. With respect to Strates\u2019 RICO claim seeking damages for its costs in preparing its bid, the district court held that the costs \u201cdo not meet even the cause-in-fact requirement for RICO injury[,]\u201d and that Strates would have incurred these costs not withstanding defendants\u2019 wrongful conduct. Id. Similarly, the court held that Strates\u2019 legal fees and costs associated with appealing the contract award to OAH \u201cdo not satisfy the standing requirement of RICO.\u201d Id. at 833. The court held that \u201cthese legal fees and costs are not \u2018direct\u2019 injury flowing from defendants\u2019 illegal conduct, but rather, at best, \u2018indirect\u2019 injury which [Strates] did not automatically incur, but chose to incur, in mitigating the effect of defendants\u2019 conduct.\u201d Id. The district court went on to hold that \u201cwhile the illegal conduct by defendants may have been the cause-in-fact of [Strates\u2019] legal fees and costs, it was not the \u2018proximate cause\u2019 of such fees and costs.\u201d Id. With respect to the state claims alleged, however, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dismissed them without prejudice. Id. Strates initially appealed the dismissal of the RICO claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. However, prior to briefing in the Court of Appeals, Strates elected to proceed only on its state law claims, and filed an unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal, which was granted on 25 October 2005.\nOn 28 November 2005, Strates filed the instant action in Wake County Superior Court. The factual allegations and claims alleged in the state action were almost identical to the federal action, with the exception of the RICO claim which had been alleged in the federal action. In the state action, Strates alleged claims for unfair competition and unfair and deceptive trade practices, tortious interference with business relations and prospective economic advantage, civil conspiracy, fraud, as well as seeking punitive damages. On 1 February 2006, defendants AOA and the Vivonas filed a motion to dismiss based upon Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of our Rules of Civil Procedure, and collateral estoppel. The Phipps defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 14 March 2006, based upon a lack of standing, Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), estoppel, and the ruling of the federal district court which held that Strates was unable to show causation and injury. Defendants Chambliss and Rocky Mount Fair, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on 12 May 2006, based upon Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In an order filed 26 June 2006, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions. Defendants now appeal from the 26 June 2006 order denying their various motions.\nOn appeal, defendants argue the trial court erred in denying the various motions to dismiss where, in a fully-argued action arising out of the same alleged facts, a court of competent jurisdiction decided that Strates has not sufficiently alleged any legally cognizable injury and that its alleged injuries could not have been proximately caused by the alleged conduct of defendants.\nGenerally, the denial of a party\u2019s motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and thus is not immediately appealable. McCarn v. Beach, 128 N.C. App. 435, 437, 496 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1998). \u201cAn order is interlocutory if it does not dispose fully of a case, but rather requires further action by the trial court in order to finally determine the rights of all the parties involved in the controversy.\u201d Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 160, 638 S.E.2d 526, 532 (2007) (citing Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)). However, this Court has jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal when the order appealed from affects a substantial right which would be lost absent an immediate appeal. Id.) see also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(a) (2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(d)(l) (2005). We previously have held that \u201c[w]hen a trial court enters an order rejecting the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the order \u2018can affect a substantial right and may be immediately appealed.\u2019 \u201d Foster, 181 N.C. App. at 162, 638 S.E.2d at 533 (quoting McCallum v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 142 N.C. App. 48, 51, 542 S.E.2d 227, 231 (2001)). Thus, based upon the facts of the instant case, we hold defendants\u2019 appeal is properly before us, as the trial court denied their motions to dismiss based in part on a rejection of defendants\u2019 affirmative defense of collateral estoppel.\nThe standard of review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction is de novo. Fuller v. Easley, 145 N.C. App. 391, 395, 553 S.E.2d 43, 46 (2001). For a motion to dismiss based upon Rule 12(b)(6), the standard of review is whether, construing the complaint liberally, \u201c \u2018the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u2019 \u201d Block v. County of Person, 141 N.C. App. 273, 277, 540 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2000) (citation omitted).\nDefendants contend Strates lacks standing, and now is collaterally estopped from bringing the claims in the instant action because the federal district court previously held that Strates lacked standing to bring its RICO claim due to a failure to establish that defendants\u2019 illegal activity was the proximate cause of Strates\u2019 alleged injuries. In order for a plaintiff to have standing to bring a claim, the plaintiff must establish three elements:\n\u201c(1) \u2018injury in fact\u2019 \u2014 an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.\u201d\nNeuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 114, 574 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 675, 577 S.E.2d 628 (2003). \u201cStanding most often turns on whether the party has alleged \u2018injury in fact\u2019 in light of the applicable statutes or caselaw.\u201d Id.\n\u201c \u2018The companion doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) have been developed by the courts for the dual purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.\u2019 \u201d Williams v. City of Jacksonville Police Dep\u2019t, 165 N.C. App. 587, 591, 599 S.E.2d 422, 427 (2004) (quoting Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993)).\n\u201cWhere the second action between two parties is upon the same claim, the prior judgment serves as a bar to the relitigation of all matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action. Where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim, the prior judgment serves as a bar only as to issues actually litigated and determined in the original action.\u201d\nId. (quoting Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 492, 428 S.E.2d at 161). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,\n\u201calso known as \u2018estoppel by judgment\u2019 or \u2018issue preclusion,\u2019 the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.\u201d\nId. (quoting Whitacre P\u2019ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15, 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004)). \u201cCollateral estoppel bars \u2018the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different claim.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 591-92, 599 S.E.2d at 427-28 (quoting Whitacre, 358 N.C. at 15, 591 S.E.2d at 880). The doctrine also applies when \u201cthe first adjudication is conducted in federal court and the second in state court.\u201d McCallum, 142 N.C. App. at 52, 542 S.E.2d at 231 (citation omitted).\nWe begin our analysis by holding that Strates \u201cenjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate\u201d the issue of proximate cause in the prior federal action. In the federal action, Strates filed its complaint, defendants filed their motions to dismiss, and Strates responded to the motions. Strates initially appealed from the federal district court\u2019s dismissal of the action, however Strates chose to dismiss the appeal. Thus, the ruling of the federal district court is a final judgment as to the issues decided by it. Therefore, we must now determine whether the proximate cause element required for a RICO claim is the same as for a claim under our State\u2019s Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act and whether the federal district court\u2019s ruling collaterally estops Strates from pursuing the instant action.\nIn the prior federal action, the federal district court held that Strates failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the proximate cause element of its RICO claim. The federal RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1961, et seq., prohibits certain conduct involving \u201ca pattern of racketeering activity.\u201d 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1962(b) (2000 ed.). \u201cOne of RICO\u2019s enforcement mechanisms is a private right of action, available to \u2018[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation\u2019 of the Act\u2019s substantive restrictions.\u201d Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453, 164 L. Ed. 2d 720, 726 (2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1964(c)). In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258, 268, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532, 544 (1992), the United States Supreme Court \u201cheld that a plaintiff may sue under \u00a7 1964(c) only if the alleged RICO violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injury.\u201d Anza, 547 U.S. at 453, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 726. The Court in Holmes explained that section 1964(c) \u201cprovides a civil cause of action to persons injured \u2018by reason of\u2019 a defendant\u2019s RICO violation.\u201d Anza at 456, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 728. The Holmes court held that \u201cthe phrase \u2018by reason of\u2019 could be read broadly to require merely that the claimed violation was a \u2018but for\u2019 cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injury.\u201d Anza at 456, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 728 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-66, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 542-43). In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., the Supreme Court interpreted the holding of Holmes, and held that \u201c[w]hen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\u201d Id. at 461, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 731.\nOur State\u2019s Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (\u201cUDP\u201d), found in North Carolina General Statutes, section 75-1 et seq., provides that \u201c[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1(a) (2005). Section 75-16 of the Act \u201ccreates a cause of action to redress injuries resulting from violations of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes and provides that any damages recovered shall be trebled.\u201d Richardson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 182 N.C. App. 531, 539, 643 S.E.2d 410, 416 (2007) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-16 (2005)). \u201cThese two statutes establish a private cause of action for consumers.\u201d Id. at 539, 643 S.E.2d at 416 (citing Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass\u2019n, 352 N.C. 61, 68, 529 S.E.2d 676, 681, reh\u2019g denied, 352 N.C. 599, 544 S.E.2d 771 (2000)). \u201cAn unfair and deceptive trade practice claim requires plaintiffs to' show: (1) that defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) in or affecting commerce; and (3) plaintiffs were injured thereby. Plaintiffs must also establish they \u2018suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants\u2019 [unfair or deceptive act].\u2019 \u201d Edwards v. West, 128 N.C. App. 570, 574, 495 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1998) (citations omitted).\nOur courts have defined \u201cproximate cause\u201d as Williamson v. Liptzin, 141 N.C. App. 1, 10, 539 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2000) (citation omitted); accord, Loftis v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 219, 222, 609 S.E.2d 481, 484 (2005); see also Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 234 (8th ed. 2004) (proximate cause is \u201c[a] cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred\u201d).\n\u201ca cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the plaintiff\u2019s injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred, and one from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or consequences of a generally injurious nature, was probable under all the facts as they existed.\u201d\nUpon reviewing the elements required for, both a RICO and an UDP claim, we are able to see that each claim requires a showing by the plaintiff that he or she suffered an injury that was a proximate result of the defendant\u2019s improper actions, whether the improper actions constitute racketeering or unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Both Acts require a showing that the plaintiff suffered an actual injury, and that the defendant\u2019s improper, or illegal conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff\u2019s injuries.\nIn both the prior federal action, and the instant state action, Strates seeks damages for the same injuries: the loss of the 2002 midway contract; its costs in preparing a bid for the 2002 midway contract; and the legal fees and costs associated with its appeal to OAH. The federal court previously determined that Strates\u2019 \u201cclaim that it was injured by not being awarded the midway contract . . . fails both because it is premised upon an expectancy interest and because the injury is not proximately connected\u201d to the defendants\u2019 illegal conduct. Strates, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (emphasis added). As the federal court has previously held that Strates failed to establish the element of proximate cause, as it relates to the alleged injury of not receiving the midway contract, we therefore hold Strates is collaterally estopped from relitigating this same issue in the instant state action.\nThe element of causation in Strates\u2019 federal RICO claim is the same as in the state UDP claim, and thus the state claims must fail based upon the federal court\u2019s prior ruling on the issue of causation. At no time was Strates actually awarded, or promised, the 2002 midway contract. Strates\u2019 state action fails to establish that but for defendants\u2019 illegal conduct, Strates would have been awarded the contract. Strates cannot show that it suffered any actual injury as a result of the illegal conduct, only that it was not awarded the midway contract. Complicating Strates\u2019 claim is the fact that Strates and AOA were not the only bidders vying for the 2002 midway contract \u2014 there were six other bidders in addition to Strates and AOA. The fact that defendants participated in an illegal conspiracy surrounding the 2002 midway contract does not create an automatic claim under our State\u2019s UDP; Strates still must show a causal relationship between the alleged improper act and the injury claimed. Even assuming defendants\u2019 conduct constitutes actionable conduct pursuant to section 75-1.1 et seq., Strates has failed to show that it suffered any actual injury as a matter of law that was proximately caused by the illegal conduct.\nWith respect to the damages Strates suffered as a result of preparing the bid for the midway contract and in pursuing the appeal through OAH, we hold the federal district court\u2019s ruling also finally determined this issue. With or without defendants\u2019 illegal conduct, Strates would have incurred the costs to prepare its bid for the midway contract. Thus, Strates cannot show that any costs incurred in preparing the bid were proximately caused by defendants\u2019 illegal conduct. With respect to the costs and fees incurred in pursuing the administrative hearing with OAH, we hold the federal district court\u2019s ruling also finally determined this issue. Strates chose to incur these costs as a result of not being awarded the midway contract. As the federal court determined, \u201cwhile the illegal conduct by defendants may have been the cause-in-fact of plaintiff\u2019s legal fees and costs, it was not the \u2018proximate cause\u2019 of such fees and costs.\u201d Strates, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 833.\nWe therefore hold the trial court erred in denying defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss, as Strates was collaterally estopped from asserting claims based upon issues which were finally decided in a prior judicial proceeding between the same parties.\nReversed.\nJudges McGEE and LEVINSON concur.\n. Michael Blanton pled guilty in federal court to one count of Conspiracy to Commit Obstruction of Justice and Tampering with a Witness. United States v. Michael Eugene Blanton, No. 5:03-CR-169-H (Sept. 23, 2003). Norman Chambliss, III, pled guilty in federal court to one count of Obstruction of Justice. United States v. Norman Y. Chambliss, III, No. 5:04-CR-59-H (Apr. 5, 2004). Bobby McLamb pled guilty in federal court to one count of Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, and to Structure Deposits, and one count of Extortion Under Color of Official Right and Aiding and Abetting. United States v. Bobby C. McLamb, No. 5:03-CR-58-2H3 (Mar. 3, 2004). Meg Scott Phipps was found guilty of violating our state\u2019s election laws, along with other crimes including perjury, and she also plead guilty in federal court to one count of Conspiracy to Commit Offenses Against the United States, two counts of Scheme and Artifice to Deprive Others of Right of Honest Services through Wire Fraud and Aiding and Abetting, and two counts of Extortion Under Color of Official Right and Aiding and Abetting. United States v. Meg Scott Phipps, No. 5:03-CR-263-H (Mar. 2, 2004). Linda Saunders pled guilty in federal court to one count of Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud, Wire Fraud, and to Structure Deposits, two counts of Extortion Under Color of Official Right and Aiding and Abetting, two counts of Money Laundering and Aiding and Abetting, and one count of Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements and Aiding and Abetting. United States v. Linda Johnson Saunders, No. 5:03-CR-58-01H3 (Mar. 3, 2004). M. Vivona, Jr. pled guilty in federal court to one count of Obstruction of Justice. United States v. Morris Vivona, Jr., 5:04-CR-196-H (June 7, 2004).", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Blanchard, Miller, Lewis & Styers, P.A., by E. Hardy Lewis, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Cheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by John Keating Wiles, for Amusements of America, Inc. and the Vivonas, defendants-appellants.", "Tharrington Smith, LLP, by F. Hill Allen, IV, for Margaret Scott Phipps and Robert E. Phipps, defendants-appellants.", "Smith Moore LLP, by Alan W. Duncan, Shannon R. Joseph, and S. Montaye Sigmon, for Norman Y. Chambliss, III and Rocky Mount Fair, Inc., defendants-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STRATES SHOWS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff v. AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, INC., a New Jersey corporation; ROCKY MOUNT FAIR, INC., a North Carolina corporation; FAIR MANAGEMENT INC., a Florida Corporation; SMOKEY MOUNTAIN AMUSEMENTS, INC., a Delaware corporation; POWERS GREAT AMERICAN MIDWAYS, a North Carolina business entity; MORRIS J. VIVONA, SR.; MORRIS J. VIVONA, JR.; DOMINIC A. VIVONA, SR.; DOMINIC A. VIVONA, JR.; JOHN J. VIVONA; PHILIP A. VIVONA; SEBASTIAN J. VIVONA; CHRISTOPHER R. VIVONA; NORMAN Y. CHAMBLISS, III; MARGARET SCOTT PHIPPS; ROBERT E. PHIPPS; BOBBY C. McLAMB; LINDA J. SAUNDERS; MICHAEL E. BLANTON; ROBIN LEE TURNER; DEANN S. TURNER; BILLY JOE CLARK; LESLIE E. POWERS; and The Estate of RICHARD D. JANAS, Defendants\nNo. COA06-1363\n(Filed 3 July 2007)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 collateral estoppel\u2014 substantial right\nRejection of the affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata affects a substantial right and may be immediately appealed, as here.\n2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 prior federal RICO litigation \u2014 proximate cause determined \u2014 subsequent state unfair practices claim \u2014 estoppel\nThe trial court erred by denying defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss claims arising from the award of a contract to operate the midway at the State Fair. Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the element of proximate cause as it relates to not receiving the midway contract.\nAppeal by defendants from an order entered 26 June 2006 by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 May 2007.\nBlanchard, Miller, Lewis & Styers, P.A., by E. Hardy Lewis, for plaintiff-appellee.\nCheshire, Parker, Schneider, Bryan & Vitale, by John Keating Wiles, for Amusements of America, Inc. and the Vivonas, defendants-appellants.\nTharrington Smith, LLP, by F. Hill Allen, IV, for Margaret Scott Phipps and Robert E. Phipps, defendants-appellants.\nSmith Moore LLP, by Alan W. Duncan, Shannon R. Joseph, and S. Montaye Sigmon, for Norman Y. Chambliss, III and Rocky Mount Fair, Inc., defendants-appellants." }, "file_name": "0455-01", "first_page_order": 487, "last_page_order": 496 }