{ "id": 8187030, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: I.R.T., A Juvenile", "name_abbreviation": "In re I.R.T.", "decision_date": "2007-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA06-676", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "596", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636135, 12636136, 12636137, 12636138, 12636139, 12636140, 12636141, 12636142, 12636143, 12636144, 12636145, 12636146, 12636147, 12636148, 12636149, 12636150, 12636151, 12636152, 12636153 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0237-11", "/se2d/631/0237-01", "/se2d/631/0237-02", "/se2d/631/0237-03", "/se2d/631/0237-04", "/se2d/631/0237-05", "/se2d/631/0237-06", "/se2d/631/0237-07", "/se2d/631/0237-08", "/se2d/631/0237-09", "/se2d/631/0237-10", "/se2d/631/0237-12", "/se2d/631/0237-13", "/se2d/631/0237-14", "/se2d/631/0237-15", "/se2d/631/0237-16", "/se2d/631/0237-17", "/se2d/631/0237-18", "/se2d/631/0237-19" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 1088", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5868964, 5922408, 5887338, 5877035, 3632844, 5897547, 5868718, 5909141, 3633468, 5891352, 3633948, 5893885, 5916862 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/1088-12", "/us/541/1088-02", "/us/541/1088-01", "/us/541/1088-06", "/us/541/1088-09", "/us/541/1088-05", "/us/541/1088-11", "/us/541/1088-04", "/us/541/1088-13", "/us/541/1088-10", "/us/541/1088-08", "/us/541/1088-03", "/us/541/1088-07" ] }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566402, 8566501, 8566469, 8566439, 8566365 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0592-02", "/nc/293/0592-05", "/nc/293/0592-04", "/nc/293/0592-03", "/nc/293/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632785 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314046 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602", "parenthetical": "vacating the sentence imposed upon the verdict of guilty of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and remanding for resentencing \"as upon a verdict of guilty of simple possession of marijuana,\" a lesser included offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561423 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "vacating the sentence imposed upon the verdict of guilty of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and remanding for resentencing \"as upon a verdict of guilty of simple possession of marijuana,\" a lesser included offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 L. Ed. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491517 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468544 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 N.C. App. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549378 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/33/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917298 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9004353 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556155 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435707 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526338 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2395265 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520702 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that \"courts have allowed highly intrusive warrant-less searches of individuals where exigent circumstances are shown to exist, such as imminent loss of evidence or potential health risk to the individual\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796061 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that \"courts have allowed highly intrusive warrant-less searches of individuals where exigent circumstances are shown to exist, such as imminent loss of evidence or potential health risk to the individual\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "noting that \"courts have allowed highly intrusive warrant-less searches of individuals where exigent circumstances are shown to exist, such as imminent loss of evidence or potential health risk to the individual\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916879 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/118/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523891 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 730, 411 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524146 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 730, 411 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500771 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "noting that this sort of behavior would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant was attempting to hide contraband" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915438 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "noting that this sort of behavior would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant was attempting to hide contraband" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525588 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/67/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 61, 312 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520024 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 61, 312 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "576" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132043 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" }, { "page": "707-08" }, { "page": "707, n.1", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9441549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" }, { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "219", "parenthetical": "the defendant's acquiescence to an officer's request to remove an item from his pocket amounted to clear and unequivocal consent for the seizure" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251401 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he Mendenhall standard of whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave is an objective standard, not subjective\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520836 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he Mendenhall standard of whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave is an objective standard, not subjective\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "considering that the defendant was seventeen years old and the police officer was fifty years old in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562375 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "considering that the defendant was seventeen years old and the police officer was fifty years old in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-54" }, { "page": "508-09" }, { "page": "554" }, { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "White, J., concurring" }, { "page": "913", "parenthetical": "White, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 F. Supp. 344", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3599778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/340/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506", "parenthetical": "citing United States v. Hill, 340 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558310 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "citing United States v. Hill, 340 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1972)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554966 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/38/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635296 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244", "parenthetical": "In determining there was no reasonable suspicion; the court stated, \"Officer Henderson did not observe the juvenile committing any criminal acts, nor had there been other reports of any criminal activity in the area that day.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 L. Ed. 441", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "371 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 450611 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/371/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558792 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301421 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "In determining there was no reasonable suspicion; the court stated, \"Officer Henderson did not observe the juvenile committing any criminal acts, nor had there been other reports of any criminal activity in the area that day.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 U.S. 366", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8897100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/540/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314046 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 808", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524146 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0808-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "\"[the police officer] observed defendant not simply in a general high crime area, but on a specific corner known for drug activity and as the scene of recent, multiple drug-related arrests.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500771 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "\"[the police officer] observed defendant not simply in a general high crime area, but on a specific corner known for drug activity and as the scene of recent, multiple drug-related arrests.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915438 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558310 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0203-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1468, "char_count": 42815, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5493919333341736e-07, "percentile": 0.6743559180477318 }, "sha256": "0dcb580066acbbe375267a2f15ad2304427cd30b9303b072cbdba45a2e8320df", "simhash": "1:0665d46a318a386e", "word_count": 7008 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge JACKSON concurs in a separate opinion.", "Judge CALABRIA concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: I.R.T., A Juvenile" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nI.R.T. (\u201cjuvenile\u201d) appeals from an order adjudicating him delinquent for possessing crack cocaine with the intent to sell or distribute. After careful consideration, we remand for disposition based on an adjudication finding juvenile responsible for simple possession.\nOn the afternoon of 19 May 2005, Durham Police Officers S. E. Kershaw (\u201cCorporal Kershaw\u201d) and J. L. Honeycutt (\u201cOfficer Honeycutt\u201d) were on patrol along Beaman Street when they observed a group of individuals standing outside an apartment building. The officers exited their vehicles and walked up to the group, engaging the group members in conversation. Corporal Kershaw testified that officers have previously arrested people on drug charges in the area, but stated that on 19 May police had not received any reports of drug sales nearby.\nCorporal Kershaw testified that he approached juvenile, that juvenile looked at him, and then quickly turned his head away. Corporal Kershaw asked juvenile if he lived in the building, and juvenile answered no. \u201c[A]s I was talking to him, he kept his head turned away from me and I could tell that he was not moving his mouth as though he had something inside of his mouthf,]\u201d Corporal Kershaw stated.\nCorporal Kershaw explained that he had previously encountered individuals acting evasive and hiding crack cocaine in their mouths, and those experiences made him suspect juvenile might be hiding drugs in his mouth. \u201cBy his mannerisms, by turning away, by not opening his mouth as he talked, you could tell that he had something in his mouth that he was trying to hide[,]\u201d Corporal Kershaw stated.\nSuspecting juvenile of hiding drugs in his mouth, Corporal Kershaw requested juvenile to spit out what was in his mouth. Juvenile then spit out one crack cocaine rock wrapped in cellophane. Corporal Kershaw then placed juvenile under arrest for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. A search of juvenile\u2019s person turned up $271.00 in cash.\nFollowing a bench trial in Durham County District Court, Judge James T. Hill entered an order adjudicating juvenile delinquent for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. He placed juvenile on probation for a period of twelve months and required juvenile to complete a substance abuse assessment and a mental health assessment, as well as 200 hours of community service. The order further provided that the juvenile would maintain passing grades in at least four courses during each grading period, and refrain from associating with anyone in the Blood gang. From this order, juvenile appeals.\nI.\nJuvenile first argues that the trial court erred by determining that juvenile was competent to stand trial. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1001(a) (2005) states in relevant part:\nNo person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. This condition is hereinafter referred to as \u201cincapacity to proceed.\u201d\nId. \u201cThe question of defendant\u2019s capacity is within the trial judge\u2019s discretion and his determination thereof; if supported by the evidence, is conclusive on appeal.\u201d State v. Reid, 38 N.C. App. 547, 548-49, 248 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1978).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court considered the opinions of two psychologists who testified and submitted reports giving conflicting opinions. Dr. David Vande Vusse (\u201cDr. Vande Vusse\u201d) submitted a forensic screening evaluation stating that, \u201cThough legal terms and procedures will need to be explained to [juvenile] in concrete terms, [juvenile] does not demonstrate any mental defect that would preclude his capacity to proceed to trial.\u201d\nDr. Timothy Hancock (\u201cDr. Hancock\u201d) offered a different opinion, stating in his report that juvenile was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Hancock based his opinion on juvenile\u2019s evaluations showing a progressive decline in intellectual abilities. \u201cWhile it is possible that he may be educated about the concrete facts of the courtroom, just as would a young child... [t]he preponderance of the evidence indicates that [juvenile] is not competent to stand trial.\u201d\nFollowing the competency hearing, the trial court entered an order on 19 January 2006 finding juvenile competent to stand trial. The order cited the evidence offered by both psychologists and cited Dr. Vande Vusse\u2019s evaluation in support of its findings. Specifically, the court found that juvenile is able to assist in his own defense and work with his attorney; that juvenile does not demonstrate symptoms of any mental disorder that could interfere with his ability to participate in court proceedings; and that juvenile has the ability to understand legal terms and procedures that are explained in concrete terms.\nAs the court\u2019s findings were based on testimony and evaluations submitted by experts, those findings were supported by competent evidence. We determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, upon those findings, that juvenile was competent to stand trial. This assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nJuvenile next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of crack cocaine found on his person. We disagree.\nThe Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV. A consensual encounter with the police in a public place is neither a search nor a seizure. See State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 208, 195 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1973) (citing United States v. Hill, 340 F. Supp. 344, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). Accordingly, the Constitution does not \u201cprevent[] a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.\u201d Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 913 (1968) (White, J., concurring)). When an encounter with the police develops into a \u201cseizure\u201d (or \u201cstop\u201d), however, the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment are implicated. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 508-09 (1980).\nA person will be \u201c \u2018seized\u2019 within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\u201d Id. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (footnote omitted). Factors relevant to whether a seizure has occurred \u2014 that is, whether a reasonable person would not feel free to leave \u2014 include: (1) \u201cthe threatening presence of several officers,\u201d (2) \u201cthe display of a weapon by an officer,\u201d (3) \u201csome physical touching of the person of the citizen,\u201d or (4) \u201cthe use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer\u2019s request might be compelled.\u201d Id. (citations omitted).\nThere has not been an explicit holding by the courts of this state as to whether the age of a defendant or juvenile is a relevant inquiry in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. See State v. Freeman, 307 N.C. 357, 363, 298 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1983) (considering that the defendant was seventeen years old and the police officer was fifty years old in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave) cf. State v. Christie, 96 N.C. App. 178, 184, 385 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1989) (\u201c[t]he Mendenhall standard of whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave is an objective standard, not subjective\u201d). A defendant\u2019s age has been used to determine whether he was in custody, but the test to determine custody is not identical to the test to determine whether a seizure has occurred. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001). That said, we see no legal or common sense reason to make a distinction. Thus, we hold that the age of a juvenile is a relevant factor in determining whether a seizure has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\n\u201cOur review of a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress is limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence, and if so, whether the findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d State v. McRae, 154 N.C. App. 624, 627-28, 573 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2002). In the instant case, the officer \u201crequested\u201d that juvenile spit out what was in his mouth. However, the trial court made no finding as to consent. Accordingly, we are unable to determine whether this seizure was consensual. See id. at 630, 573 S.E.2d at 219 (the defendant\u2019s acquiescence to an officer\u2019s request to remove an item from his pocket amounted to clear and unequivocal consent for the seizure).\nAlthough there is no case on point, we believe a seizure occurred under the facts of this case. First, there were two officers present, both of whom arrived in marked police cars. Second, the guns they were carrying were visible. Third, the officers had a gang unit emblem on their shirt. Fourth, juvenile was fifteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. Given this show of authority, the officer\u2019s \u201crequest\u201d could have been construed by a reasonable person of juvenile\u2019s age as an order, compliance with which was mandatory. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Having determined that juvenile was seized, we must now address whether that seizure was constitutional.\nIII.\nIn order for a seizure to pass constitutional muster, the officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot. State v. Roberts, 142 N.C. App. 424, 429, 542 S.E.2d 703, 707 (2001). Factors relevant in determining whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion include: (1) nervousness of an individual (State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 639, 517 S.E.2d 128, 134 (1999)); (2) presence in a high crime area (Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000)); and (3) unprovoked flight (Id. at 125, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 577). \u201cNone of these factors, standing alone, are sufficient to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion, but must be considered in context.\u201d Roberts, 142 N.C. App. at 429, 542 S.E.2d at 707-08. Additionally, refusal to cooperate, \u201c \u2018 \u201cwithout more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Id. at 429, n.1, 542 S.E.2d at 707, n.1 (citations omitted). Also, \u201c[t]he facts known to the officers at the time of the stop [or seizure] \u2018must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by experience and training.\u2019 \u201d State v. McDaniels, 103 N.C. App. 175, 180, 405 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1991) (quoting State v. Harrell, 67 N.C. App. 57, 61, 312 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1984)). In short, an officer\u2019s belief that criminal activity may be afoot must be based on objective, articulable facts. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979).\nIn the instant case, the trial court concluded that the police had reasonable suspicion because he was located in a high crime area, the police had received complaints that drug dealing had been occurring in the area, and the way juvenile conducted himself. We hold that the juvenile\u2019s conduct, his presence in a high crime area, and the police officer\u2019s knowledge, experience, and training are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.\nThe officer testified that there had been \u201cdrug arrests [and gang activity] in the area before,\u201d that juvenile \u201cquickly turned his head away\u201d from the officer, and that juvenile \u201ckept his head turned away from [him] and . . . [the officer] could tell that he was not moving his mouth [while responding to the officer\u2019s questions] as though he had something inside of his mouth.\u201d According to the officer, \u201cindividuals that have exhibited those characteristics have generally kept crack-cocaine in their mouths.\u201d\nIn a similar case, this Court found reasonable suspicion when a defendant placed drugs in his mouth and took evasive action by attempting to walk into a store. State v. Watson, 119 N.C. App. 395, 398, 458 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1995) (noting that this sort of behavior would lead a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant was attempting to hide contraband). Similarly, in this case juvenile\u2019s turning away from the officer and not opening his mouth while speaking constituted evasive actions. Finally, \u201c[o]ur Supreme Court has . . . noted that the presence of an individual on a corner specifically known for drug activity and the scene of multiple recent arrests for drugs, coupled with evasive actions by defendant are sufficient to form reasonable suspicion to stop [or seize] an individual.\u201d Id. (citing State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 415 S.E.2d 719 (1992)). Such is the case here, and we find that the officers in this case had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory seizure. This, however, does not end our inquiry on the issue of constitutionality of the search. We must next address whether the warrantless search was constitutional.\nIV.\nHaving determined that there was reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory seizure, we next address whether there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search.\nSo long as a stop [or seizure] is investigative, the police only need to have a reasonable suspicion [to conduct a Terry weapons frisk or \u201cpat down\u201d]. However, if the police conduct a full search of an individual without a warrant or consent, they must have probable cause, and there must be exigent circumstances.\nState v. Pittman, 111 N.C. App. 808, 812, 433 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1993) (citing State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 730, 411 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1991)); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 237 (1983) (\u201c[detentions may be \u2018investigative\u2019 yet violative of the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause. In the name of investigating a person who is no more than suspected of criminal activity, the police may not carry out a full search of the person or of his automobile or other effects. Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest\u201d).\nAlthough this Court in Watson did not address whether there was probable cause to conduct a full search of a defendant, it did find probable cause to arrest the defendant on the same grounds on which it found reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory seizure. Watson, 119 N.C. App. at 400, 458 S.E.2d at 523. Thus, in this case, we find probable cause based on the same factors in which we found reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory seizure. The exigent circumstances are also apparent in this case: Juvenile had drugs in his mouth and could have swallowed them, destroying the evidence or harming himself. See State v. Smith, 118 N.C. App. 106, 115, 454 S.E.2d 680, 686, reversed on other grounds, 342 N.C. 407, 464 S.E.2d 45 (1995) (noting that \u201ccourts have allowed highly intrusive warrant-less searches of individuals where exigent circumstances are shown to exist, such as imminent loss of evidence or potential health risk to the individual\u201d).\nThe dissent\u2019s reliance on State v. Fleming is misplaced. In that case, this Court held that the officer \u201chad only a generalized suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity\u201d because the defendant was merely in a high crime area. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. at 171, 415 S.E.2d at 785. It is well settled that presence \u201c \u2018in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [defendant] himself was engaged in criminal conduct.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 170, 415 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 362-63). The defendant in Fleming merely walked away from the officers which, without more, such as evasive maneuvers, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id. Such is not the case here. Juvenile in this case appeared to have something in his mouth. Based on the officer\u2019s training and experience, he knew this was a common method in which people hide drugs. Unlike Fleming, the fact that juvenile in this case was in a high crime area was only one factor the officer used to form reasonable suspicion and probable cause that criminal activity was afoot. Thus, we find Fleming distinguishable from the case at bar and would uphold the trial court\u2019s ruling denying the motion to suppress the evidence. Having determined that the evidence was properly admitted we now turn to the question of whether the evidence presented was sufficient to justify an adjudication of possession with intent to sell or distribute.\nV.\nJuvenile next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession with intent to sell or distribute. We agree.\nIn reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, we determine whether, in the light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence supporting each element of the charged offense. In re Bass, 77 N.C. App. 110, 115, 334 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1985). \u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984) (citing State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)). Here, the issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the element of intent to sell or distribute crack cocaine.\nThe offense of possession with intent to sell or deliver has three elements: (1) possession of a substance; (2) the substance must be a controlled substance; and (3) there must be intent to sell or distribute the controlled substance. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 90-95(a)(l); State v. Fletcher, 92 N.C. App. 50, 55, 373 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1988). While intent may be shown by direct evidence, it is often proven by circumstantial evidence from which it may be inferred. State v. Jackson, 145 N.C. App. 86, 90, 550 S.E.2d 225, 229 (2001). Although \u201cquantity of the controlled substance alone may suffice to support the inference of an intent to transfer, sell, or deliver,\u201d it must be a substantial amount. State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 659-60, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835-36 (1991).\nState v. Nettles, 170 N.C. App. 100, 105, 612 S.E.2d 172, 175-76 (2005), \u201cBased on North Carolina case law, the intent to sell or distribute may be inferred from (1) the packaging, labeling, and storage of the controlled substance, (2) the defendant\u2019s activities, (3) the quantity found, and (4) the presence of cash or drug paraphernalia.\u201d Id. at 106, 612 S.E.2d at 176 (citing State v. Carr, 122 N.C. App. 369, 373, 470 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1996)).\nHere, the evidence showed a single rock of crack cocaine wrapped in cellophane, as well as $271.00 in cash on juvenile\u2019s person. The State argues that the cellophane packaging plus the presence of unexplained cash are sufficient to satisfy the intent to sell or distribute element. We disagree.\nThe State is correct in pointing out that packaging and unexplained cash are appropriate factors to consider in determining whether there is sufficient evidence on the intent element. However, we conclude that here the evidence, viewed cumulatively, was insufficient. The single crack rock does nothing to advance the intent element since possession of one rock, with nothing more, could only be possession of crack cocaine. The cellophane wrapper also does nothing to demonstrate intent. Cellophane may frequently be used to package street drugs, but under the facts in this case, the cellophane could just as easily be in his possession in his role as a consumer who purchased the packaged crack rock from a dealer. Cases in which packaging has been a factor have tended to involve drugs divided into smaller quantities and packaged separately.\nThe issue of the unexplained $271.00 in cash on juvenile\u2019s person is a factor to consider. However, unexplained cash is only one factor that can help support the intent element. We are not convinced the amount of cash found here, given the totality of the circumstances, is enough to establish intent. We have previously determined that a large quantity of contraband, alone, is insufficient to establish an inference that its possessor intended to sell or deliver it. In State v. Wiggins, 33 N.C. App. 291, 235 S.E.2d 265, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 592, 241 S.E.2d 513 (1977), we rejected the argument that 215.5 grams of marijuana alone is sufficient to infer intent. Id. at 294-95, 235 S.E.2d at 268. As with a large quantity of drugs, we determine that the presence of cash, alone, is insufficient to infer an intent to sell or distribute.\nThe charge of simple possession, however, is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to sell or distribute. State v. Turner, 168 N.C. App. 152, 159, 607 S.E.2d 19, 24 (2005). \u2018When [the trier of fact] finds the facts necessary to constitute one offense, it also inescapably finds the facts necessary to constitute all lesser-included offenses of that offense.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Squires, 357 N.C. 529, 536, 591 S.E.2d 837, 842 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1088, 159 L. Ed. 2d 252 (2004)). Thus, in this case, when the trier of fact adjudicated juvenile responsible for possession with intent to sell or deliver, it necessarily found juvenile responsible for simple possession of a controlled substance. Id. Accordingly, we remand for disposition based on an adjudication finding juvenile responsible for simple possession which was supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Gooch, 307 N.C. 253, 258, 297 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1982) (vacating the sentence imposed upon the verdict of guilty of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and remanding for resentencing \u201cas upon a verdict of guilty of simple possession of marijuana,\u201d a lesser included offense).\nVI.\nIn summary, we uphold the trial court\u2019s ruling regarding the admission of evidence but remand for disposition based on an adjudication finding juvenile responsible for simple possession.\nNo error in part; remanded in part.\nJudge JACKSON concurs in a separate opinion.\nJudge CALABRIA concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.\n. The term \u201cseizure\u201d is often used in multiple contexts. In this case, we use the term to refer to the situation where a person is seized, that is, stopped, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.\n. The application of actual physical force to the person results in a seizure. State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165, 169, 415 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1992) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991)). There is no evidence in this case that there was any physical contact between the officers and juvenile.\n. We note without relying on State v. Scott, 178 N.C. App. 393, 631 S.E.2d 237 (2006) (unpublished) (finding reasonable suspicion where an officer observed defendant chewing and attempting to swallow items in his mouth while located in a high crime area and upholding the officer\u2019s request for defendant to \u201cspit out\u201d what was in his mouth).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." }, { "text": "JACKSON, Judge\nconcurs in a separate opinion.\nI concur with the majority\u2019s ruling regarding the admission of evidence and remanding the case for disposition based upon an adjudication finding juvenile responsible for simple possession. I also concur with the majority\u2019s affirming the trial court\u2019s finding that the juvenile is competent to stand trial; however, I write in a separate opinion to express my concerns with this decision.\nAlthough the determination of whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial is one that lies within the discretion of the trial court, I am troubled by the particular circumstances found in the instant case. In the juvenile\u2019s case, he was subjected to two competency evaluations by two different psychologists, both resulting in conflicting determinations.\nThe first competency evaluation, done on 23 September 2005 by Dr. VandeVusse, a psychologist, concluded that although the juvenile has significant intellectual limitations that affect his verbal skills, his limitations do not lead to a diagnosis of mental retardation or of a learning disability. Dr. VandeVusse assessed the juvenile by conducting a clinical interview and observing the juvenile\u2019s behaviors. He also reviewed all of the court documents, interviewed the juvenile\u2019s mother, and reviewed his previous evaluation of the juvenile conducted a year and a half prior. Dr. VandeVusse stated in his evaluation that although the juvenile would need to have legal terms and procedures explained to him in concrete terms, \u201che does not demonstrate any mental defect that would preclude his capacity to proceed to trial.\u201d In Dr. VandeVusse\u2019s previous evaluation performed 3 March 1989, he stated that the juvenile\u2019s overall IQ score was within the borderline range of intellectual functioning, however his verbal IQ score was found to be in the mildly mentally retarded range. Despite this, Dr. VandeVusse previously had found that the juvenile was \u201cable to discuss the charges against him and appeared to appreciate the consequences of the possible outcomes of the legal proceedings against him.\u201d\nThe second competency evaluation was conducted by Dr. Hancock, licensed clinical psychologist, within weeks of Dr. VandeVusse\u2019s second evaluation. In assessing the juvenile, Dr. Hancock conducted several tests, including the Test of Memory Malingering, the Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights, and the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial \u2014 Revised. Dr. Hancock also reviewed the juvenile\u2019s school records, the Durham Police Department Offense Record for the instant offense, prior competency evaluations by two other doctors including Dr. VandeVusse, he interviewed the juvenile\u2019s mother, and reviewed the motion for competency examination signed by the juvenile\u2019s attorney. Based upon his evaluation, Dr. Hancock reached a very different conclusion than Dr. VandeVusse. Dr. Hancock found that the juvenile\u2019s \u201clanguage deficits contribute to an overall condition of significant impairment in verbal IQ that impacts his competence.\u201d Dr. Hancock found the juvenile\u2019s verbal IQ to be within the mentally retarded range, and that this, coupled with the results of the competency test performed, \u201cindicate significant impairment in his factual and rational understanding of the legal system.\u201d Dr. Hancock found that the juvenile had a very limited understanding of the legal system, and did not have a clear understanding even of who the participants in the court system \u2014 including the jury \u2014 were. Based upon his review, Dr. Hancock concluded that the juvenile was not competent to stand trial.\nWhile I am troubled by the fact that one evaluator conducted such extensive and relevant competency testing that the other did not, I recognize that the facts of this case cause it to be a difficult determination for the trial court. Thus, given that our standard of review is that of an abuse of discretion, this Court has no choice but to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the juvenile competent to stand trial. The trial court\u2019s determination was properly supported by the Dr. VandeVusse\u2019s evaluation, and thus the decision was a proper one.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JACKSON, Judge" }, { "text": "CALABRIA, Judge,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI concur with the majority that the juvenile was competent to stand trial and that the court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss since there was insufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of possession of crack cocaine with intent to sell or deliver.\nHowever, I respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s determination that the search and seizure of the defendant was justified because I believe the officers had neither reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain the defendant, nor the probable cause and exigent circumstances required to search him. The majority determines that the defendant was seized by the officers\u2019 show of force, but concludes that such a seizure was justified. I disagree. The majority opinion bases its conclusion on three factors: defendant\u2019s presence in a high-crime area, his reluctance to speak with the police, and the presence in his mouth of some unknown object. The majority determines that these factors simultaneously provided Officer Kershaw with reasonable, articulable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent circumstances justifying a search of defendant\u2019s person. Assuming, arguendo, that these factors justify a brief investigatory seizure, they certainly do not rise to the level of probable cause.\n\u201c[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.\u201d Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 552 (1983). \u201cProbable cause for an arrest has been defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty.\u201d State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 207, 195 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1973) (citation omitted). \u201cThe probable cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.\u201d Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769, 775 (2003).\n\u201cThe fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.\u201d Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63 (1979). Under Brown, the defendant\u2019s presence in an area characterized by law enforcement as \u201chigh crime\u201d does not alone justify his seizure.\nThe majority notes Officer Kershaw\u2019s statement that there had previously been drug arrests in the area to support its determination that the officer had reasonable grounds to seize the defendant. However, as the majority notes, police had received no calls concerning drug activity in the area where defendant was seized. The relevant exchange was as follows:\n[Defense counsel] So you would say that was a drug area?\n[Officer Kershaw] We\u2019ve made drug arrests in the area before, yes.\n[Defense counsel] But you didn\u2019t receive any calls about drugs being sold on that day?\n[Officer Kershaw] Correct.\nFurther, Officer Kershaw testified that he had not seen defendant prior to the encounter and thus had no reason to suspect defendant might use or deal with illegal drugs.\nAlthough an area previously known for drug arrests may be one factor to consider in determining reasonable suspicion and probable cause, our courts have indicated that when there have been no recent arrests in the area, such a factor does not carry substantial weight. State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992) (\u201c[the police officer] observed defendant not simply in a general high crime area, but on a specific corner known for drug activity and as the scene of recent, multiple drug-related arrests.\u201d) (emphasis supplied); In re J.L.B.M., 176 N.C. App. 613, 621, 627 S.E.2d 239, 244 (2006) (In determining there was no reasonable suspicion; the court stated, \u201cOfficer Henderson did not observe the juvenile committing any criminal acts, nor had there been other reports of any criminal activity in the area that day.\u201d).\nSince there was no evidence of any recent drug activity in the area in question, this fact adds little support to the majority\u2019s assertion that the officer had probable cause to search defendant, especially given the fact that Officer Kershaw testified that no drug activity was reported on the date in question. Officers were not responding to any reports of drug \u00bfctivity and had no specific reason to suspect that any illegal activity may be afoot. While a neighborhood\u2019s character as a high-crime area may be a factor in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, I find such a factor has little weight when, as here, there is no indication of recent drug activity.\nThe majority also relies on the fact that defendant turned his head and seemed reluctant to engage in conversation with Officer Kershaw. However, this fact is indicative of nothing more than a desire on the part of defendant to avoid speaking with police. Unless defendant was seized prior to Officer Kershaw questioning him, he was free to disengage from the encounter with Officer Kershaw. See generally State v. Corbett, 339 N.C. 313, 326, 451 S.E.2d 252, 258 (1994). If defendant was seized at the point Officer Kershaw questioned him, his seizure could not have been based on any other factor besides his presence in a high-crime area. Such a seizure would clearly violate defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights as articulated in Brown. Accordingly, any evidence discovered from such a seizure would be fruit of the poisonous tree and subject to suppression. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 441 (1963). Thus, defendant had a legal right to turn away from the officer, or alternatively, was illegally seized at that moment.\nLastly, the majority relies on the fact that defendant appeared to have some unknown object in his mouth. Despite the majority\u2019s assertion to the contrary, the fact that defendant appeared to have something in his mouth cannot provide probable cause, as the object very well could have been gum, a piece of candy, or a breath mint. Officer Kershaw himself admitted that the item could have been any number of things besides contraband.\n[Defense counsel] You couldn\u2019t tell what was in his mouth]?]\n[Officer Kershaw] Not at that time, no.\n[Defense counsel] You didn\u2019t know if it was a piece of gum[?]\n[Officer Kershaw] Correct.\n[Defense counsel] You didn\u2019t know if it was a piece of hard candy[?]\n[Officer Kershaw] Correct.\n[Defense counsel] You didn\u2019t know if it was just the way that he talks]?]\n[Officer Kershaw] Possibly.\nIn support of its holding, the majority relies on State v. Watson, 119 N.C. App. 395, 458 S.E.2d 519 (1995), which is distinguishable from the case sub judice. In Watson, the defendant was observed in an area where officers constantly made drug arrests by an officer who knew the defendant had previously been arrested on drug charges. Upon seeing the officer, the defendant hurriedly placed something in his mouth, began walking away from the officer, and attempted to take a drink of a beverage. Based on the totality of the circumstances, this Court determined the officer\u2019s demand was reasonable when he ordered defendant to spit out the contents of his mouth.\nThe majority misstates Watson\u2019s scope and ignores crucial distinctions between Watson and the instant case. In Watson, the officer was able to form a more particularized suspicion than the officer in this case, given the fact that the defendant, a known drug user in a specific location notorious for drug sales, was observed hurriedly placing something into his mouth and then trying to swallow the object by taking a drink of a beverage when he saw the police approaching. In this case, there is no evidence that defendant was a known drug user, and no evidence that he hurriedly tried to place any item in his mouth as the officers approached him. Here, officers simply approached some individuals and noticed that defendant turned his head and, when he spoke, appeared to have some indeterminate object in his mouth. For the reasons stated above, these facts fall short of the probable cause standard.\nI believe the facts of this case are more similar to those in State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165, 415 S.E.2d 782 (1992). In Fleming, an officer observed two individuals walking in an area where crack cocaine was regularly sold. The officer first told the individuals to \u201chold it a minute\u201d and then said, \u201cCome here.\u201d When the officer patted one of them down for weapons, he felt an object and asked what it was. The defendant admitted the object was crack cocaine.\nIn reversing the defendant\u2019s conviction, we determined that the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize the defendant in that the officer had no specific reason for suspecting any criminal wrongdoing. Brown is also similar to the case sub judice. In Brown, officers detained a defendant based on vague suspicions formed after seeing two individuals walk away from each other in an alley located in a high-crime area. The court noted that vague suspicions of wrongdoing are insufficient to justify a seizure. I believe this case is more in line with Fleming and Brown, and disagree with the majority\u2019s determination that Officer Kershaw had grounds to stop and search defendant.\nThe totality of the circumstances in this case can be summarized as such: an officer observed an unfamiliar individual who was not a known drug user or a criminal on a day in which no drug activity had been reported in the area and who seemed reluctant to speak with police and appeared to have some unknown object in his mouth. These facts, taken together, in no way permit a conclusion that Officer Kershaw had probable cause to search defendant\u2019s person.\nTo hold otherwise would allow police to search any individual located in an area where past crimes have occurred who exhibits a desire to be left alone and either has something in his mouth or speaks with a speech impediment. Such a holding eviscerates the protections of the Fourth Amendment and lowers the probable cause standard to allow police to conduct intrusive searches of residents of neighborhoods plagued by crime on the barest of suspicions. Because I believe there was no probable cause justifying the search, I see no need to address the majority\u2019s assertion that exigent circumstances existed. As the majority recognizes, a warrantless search of the person requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Pittman, 111 N.C. App. 808, 812, 433 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1993).\nIn conclusion, I dissent from the majority\u2019s determination that Officer Kershaw had grounds to stop and search defendant. However, I concur with the majority\u2019s determination that defendant was competent to stand trial and that there was insufficient evidence that defendant intended to sell or deliver crack cocaine.\nFor the foregoing reasons, I would remand this case to the trial court for a new trial with evidence gathered from the illegal search and seizure suppressed.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "CALABRIA, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kathleen M. Waylett and Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.", "Terry F. Rose for juvenile-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: I.R.T., A Juvenile\nNo. COA06-676\n(Filed 17 July 2007)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 juvenile\u2019s competency to stand trial\u2014 abuse of discretion standard\nThe trial court did not abuse its- discretion by determining that a juvenile was competent to stand trial under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1001(a) for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, because: (1) the court held a competency hearing, entered an order citing evidence offered by two psychologists giving conflicting opinions, and cited one evaluation in support of its findings; and (2) the court found the juvenile was able to assist in his own defense and work with his attorney, that he did not demonstrate symptoms of any mental disorder that could interfere with his ability to participate in court proceedings, and that he had the ability to understand legal terms and procedures that are explained in concrete terms.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 investigatory seizure \u2014 motion to suppress evidence \u2014 cocaine\nThe trial court did not err by concluding officers had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory seizure of a juvenile in a possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver case when an officer requested that the juvenile spit out what was in his mouth, because: (1) the juvenile was located in a high crime area and the police had received complaints that drug dealing had been occurring in the area; (2) the juvenile quickly turned his head away from the officer and was not moving his mouth while speaking as though he had something inside his mouth; and (3) the officer testified that individuals who have exhibited such characteristics have generally kept crack cocaine in their mouths.\n3. Search and Seizure\u2014 warrantless search \u2014 probable cause\nThe trial court did not err by denying a juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of crack cocaine found on his person in a possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver case based on probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, because: (1) there was probable cause based on the same factors found for reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory seizure; (2) exigent circumstances existed when the juvenile had drugs in his mouth and could have swallowed them, thus destroying the evidence or harming himself; (3) based upon the officer\u2019s training and experience, he knew that putting drugs in the mouth was a common method in which people hide drugs; and (4) the fact that the juvenile was in a high crime area was only one factor the officer used to form reasonable suspicion and probable cause that criminal activity was afoot.\n4. Drugs\u2014 possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 simple possession\nThe trial court erred by denying a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and the case is remanded for disposition based on an adjudication finding juvenile responsible for simple possession, because: (1) although packaging and unexplained cash are appropriate factors to consider in determining whether there was sufficient evidence on the intent element, the evidence viewed cumulatively was insufficient when a single crack rock could only be viewed as possession of crack cocaine and the cellophane could just as easily be in the juvenile\u2019s possession in his role as a consumer who purchased the packaged crack rock from a dealer; (2) cases, in which packaging have been a factor have tended to involve drugs divided into smaller quantities and packaged separately; (3) the $271 in cash on juvenile\u2019s person was not enough to establish intent given the totality of circumstances; and (4) when the trier of fact adjudicated the juvenile responsible for possession with intent to sell or deliver, it necessarily found juvenile responsible for simple possession of a controlled substance.\nJudge JACKSON concurring.\nJudge CALABRIA concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by juvenile from a juvenile adjudication order entered 8 February 2006 by Judge James T. Hill in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2007.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kathleen M. Waylett and Assistant Attorney General Jay L. Osborne, for the State.\nTerry F. Rose for juvenile-appellant." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 628 }