{ "id": 8187939, "name": "THOMAS G. INGERSOLL, and wife BARBARA D. INGERSOLL, Plaintiffs v. GLENN D. SMITH, and wife MAUREEN T. SMITH, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Ingersoll v. Smith", "decision_date": "2007-07-17", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1113", "first_page": "753", "last_page": "756", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "184 N.C. App. 753" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 22-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520722 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526838 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12168782 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0501-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 407, "char_count": 6291, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20127737176955104 }, "sha256": "0ed58589bd1ac1510a647ad52e4b329bf95e0362b2240f63e4ae9a1e275aed45", "simhash": "1:cbc94253940d14d0", "word_count": 1042 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:59.559545+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "THOMAS G. INGERSOLL, and wife BARBARA D. INGERSOLL, Plaintiffs v. GLENN D. SMITH, and wife MAUREEN T. SMITH, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUNTER, Judge.\nHusband and wife Thomas G. Ingersoll and Barbara D. Ingersoll (\u201cplaintiffs\u201d) appeal from an order granting a motion on the pleadings by husband and wife Glenn D. Smith and Maureen T. Smith (\u201cdefendants\u201d). After careful review, we affirm.\nOn 16 January 2004, plaintiffs purchased a house from defendants located on lot 24 of Magnolia Bay in Corolla, North Carolina. The house property included a swimming pool which, because of winter weather, plaintiffs were unable to have inspected prior to closing. As a result, the parties entered into an escrow agreement that contained the following clauses:\nWHEREAS, [plaintiffs] ha[ve] been unable to obtain a pool inspection of the swimming pool located on the property prior to closing due to the winter weather and desires to insure that, if problems are revealed [by such an inspection], funds will be available to pay for correction of deficiencies, [defendants] ha[ve] agreed to provide funds for such purpose and this agreement documents the terms of such deposit.\n1. Amount of Deposit. Seller and Buyer hereby deposit with the Depositary the sum of $500 in cash (the \u201cfund\u201d), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by Depositary for deposit to Depositary\u2019s regular trust checking account.\n2. Terms of Deposit. Depositary shall hold the fund until Buyer, acting in good faith and within reasonable time not to exceed May 15, 2004, causes the pool to be prepared for use in the 2004 season and inspects the pool for damage. In the event that damages are revealed, the fund will be used to pay for such damages.\nWhen plaintiffs had the inspection done (within the time limit specified by the escrow agreement), they found that the pool needed repairs that would cost $8,600.00. They notified defendants, who refused to pay anything over the $500.00 in the escrow account. Plaintiffs brought suit, arguing that the escrow agreement was not intended to be the total commitment and liability of defendants; defendants\u2019 subsequent answer and motion for judgment on the pleadings refuted this claim. The motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted by the trial court on 13 June 2006. Plaintiffs appeal from that order.\nPlaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in holding that the statute of frauds and parol evidence rule foreclosed the admission of extrinsic evidence. This argument is without merit.\nCourts may properly grant a motion for judgment on the plead.ings made pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(c) \u201cwhen all the material allegations of fact are admitted on the pleadings and only questions of law remain.\u201d DeTorre v. Shell Oil Co., 84 N.C. App. 501, 504, 353 S.E.2d 269, 271 (1987). The court must \u201cview[] the facts and permissible inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party\u201d and determine that the movant \u201cis clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Id.\nIn its order granting defendants\u2019 motion, the trial court made a conclusion of law that \u201c[t]he terms of the Escrow Agreement are not ambiguous and the application of the Statute of Frauds and/or the Parol Evidence Rule forecloses admission of prior or contemporaneous promises, conversations or agreements between the parties which would give rise to other inferences favorable to the Plaintiffs.\u201d The court also concluded that \u201c[t]he Escrow Agreement sets forth in plain language the limit of the Defendants\u2019 obligation at $500.00.\u201d\nThe statute of frauds and parol evidence rule operate similarly in this case in that both prevent the consideration of extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the escrow agreement. \u201cThe parol evidence rule prohibits the admission of parol evidence to vary, add to, or contradict\u201d the terms of an integrated written agreement, Hall v. Hotel L\u2019Europe, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 664, 666, 318 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1984), though \u201can ambiguous term may be explained or construed with the aid of parol evidence.\u201d Vestal v. Vestal, 49 N.C. App. 263, 266-67, 271 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1980). Similarly, the statute of frauds requires that \u201c[a]ll contracts to sell or convey any lands ... or any interest in or concerning them ... be put in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith[.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 22-2 (2005).\nHere, we agree with the trial court that the relevant contractual provisions need no clarification. It states: \u201cIn the event that damages are revealed, the fund will be used to pay for such damages.\u201d The amount of that fund was also clearly delineated by its description as \u201cthe sum of $500 in cash (the \u2018fund\u2019).\u201d Holding that this agreement created an unlimited obligation on the part of defendants to pay for repairs to the pool regardless of their cost would twist the clear meaning of the agreement and commit defendants to a monetary obligation they did not agree to undertake. Further, because the agreement concerns the parties\u2019 interests in the pool and thus in the house and land being conveyed, any terms of the parties\u2019 agreement must have been set down in writing to be valid. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs does not change the fact that the escrow agreement is clear on its face.\nThus, the trial court properly held that both the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds foreclosed the admission of any extrinsic evidence as to the agreement between the parties. As such, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and JACKSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUNTER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Vincent Law Firm, P.C., by Branch W. Vincent, III, for plaintiff - appellants.", "Dan L. Merrell & Associates, P.C., by James A. Clark, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THOMAS G. INGERSOLL, and wife BARBARA D. INGERSOLL, Plaintiffs v. GLENN D. SMITH, and wife MAUREEN T. SMITH, Defendants\nNo. COA06-1113\n(Filed 17 July 2007)\nReal Property\u2014 escrow agreemept at closing \u2014 terms clear\u2014 extrinsic evidence of intent not admitted\nContractual provisions in an escrow agreement concerning a swimming pool in real estate closing did not need clarification, and the trial court properly held that both the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds foreclosed the admission of any extrinsic evidence as to the agreement between the parties.\nAppeal by plaintiffs from an order entered 13 June 2006 by Judge C. Christopher Bean in Currituck County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 2007.\nVincent Law Firm, P.C., by Branch W. Vincent, III, for plaintiff - appellants.\nDan L. Merrell & Associates, P.C., by James A. Clark, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0753-01", "first_page_order": 785, "last_page_order": 788 }