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  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARK N. PATTERSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Patterson",
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    "judges": [
      "Judge TYSON concurs.",
      "Judge WYNN concurs in the result with a separate opinion."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARK N. PATTERSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CALABRIA, Judge.\nMark N. Patterson (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of possession of stolen property pursuant to a breaking or entering and possession of implements of house breaking. We find no error.\nOn 2 November 2005, Tonya Sellers (\u201cSellers\u201d) reported for work at Four-Square Community Action Head Start (\u201cHead Start\u201d) and noticed that someone had broken into a room in the Head Start office. \u201cOne of the file cabinets was messed up, some money was missing from the extended day room, and we had a camera that was missing,\u201d Sellers testified. Sellers identified the missing camera as a silver colored Kodak Easy-Show digital camera that was kept in a white pack with a USB cord. Sellers reported the break-in and theft to the police, speaking with James Jones (\u201cDetective James Jones\u201d), a detective with the Graham County Sheriff\u2019s Department.\nThree weeks later, on 22 November 2005, Detective James Jones received a call from Kyle Boring (\u201cBoring\u201d), a Graham County resident. Boring informed Detective James Jones that he allowed defendant to store property inside a camper trailer on Boring\u2019s premises and that he believed some of the property inside the trailer may be items the police were seeking. Following Boring\u2019s tip, Detective James Jones sent Brian Jones (\u201cDetective Brian Jones\u201d), also with the Graham County Sheriff\u2019s Department, to search for the stolen property.\nWith Boring\u2019s consent, Detective Brian Jones searched the trailer and found several black bags containing items including papers with defendant\u2019s name on them. He also found a camera matching the description of the digital camera Sellers reported stolen. At trial, Sellers testified that the camera found in the trailer was the same as the one taken from Head Start.\nDetective Brian Jones also found a set of bolt cutters and other tools, which he characterized as a \u201chomemade lock-picking kit.\u201d Detective Brian Jones testified that such items were typically used for breaking and entering buildings. In addition to the camera found in the trailer, Detective Brian Jones found a camcorder. Noah Crowe (\u201cPastor Crowe\u201d), pastor of the First Baptist Church in Robbinsville, testified that the camcorder found in the trailer was one that had been stolen from his church.\nDefendant testified that the camera, camcorder, and alleged burglary tools belonged to him. He stated the tools were not burglary tools, but were used for other purposes such as his job as a plumber. Following his trial in Graham County Superior Court, the jury returned guilty verdicts. Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr. sentenced defendant to a minimum of 10 months and a maximum of 12 months in the North Carolina Department of Correction for possession of property stolen pursuant to a breaking or entering and a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 8 months for possession of implements of house breaking. Judge Guice suspended the sentence for possession of implements of house breaking and placed defendant on supervised probation for a period of five years. From those judgments, defendant appeals.\nDefendant initially argues the trial court erred by admitting Detective Brian Jones\u2019 statements regarding other businesses that had reported break-ins. Defendant contends that the admission of such statements over his objection was improper in that the statements were hearsay, speculative, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. We disagree.\nWe first note that relevant evidence is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2005). Hearsay is defined as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801 (2005).\nThe relevant exchange in the record was as follows:\n[Detective Brian Jones]: With the items I then \u2014 after finding what was missing, first of all I put them in a safe place in our evidence room. Then we started going through reports. Then I loaded several items on the back of a pickup truck, which belongs to the sheriffs department. I then went to local businesses that had reported break-ins and stolen merchandise[.]\n[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, to what somebody might have said.\nThe Court: Overruled, just to what he did.\n[Prosecutor]: Did you do anything else with regard to investigating the incident at Head Start \u2014 breaking and entering at Head Start?\n[Detective Brian Jones]: Not that I\u2019m aware of, no.\nThis exchange clarifies that the trial court overruled the defendant\u2019s objection only to the extent it sought to preclude statements about what Detective Brian Jones did, not what he had heard regarding the break-ins, by stating, \u201cOverruled, just to what he did.\u201d As such, the evidence offered was both relevant, in that it explained the chain of events in the police investigation, and was non-hearsay, because it precluded the further admission of statements regarding the reported break-ins. The statements were offered to explain the chain of events and were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.\nFurther, it is clear that the probative value of the statements was not substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Therefore, their admission did not violate N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2005) (\u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d).\nDefendant relies upon State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 567 S.E.2d 120 (2002), in which our Supreme Court granted a new trial to a defendant after the trial court allowed testimony accusing the defendant of two previous crimes for which he had been neither indicted nor convicted. This case is distinguishable from Al-Bayyinah in that here there was no testimony directly accusing defendant of other crimes. Implicit in Detective Brian Jones\u2019 testimony is that the police may have suspected defendant of committing other break-ins, but defendant was not in fact accused of any other break-ins. Here, the trial court cured any defect by stating that Detective Brian Jones\u2019 testimony should be limited to what he did, not what he had heard. As such, the undue prejudice resulting from the admission of the statements in Al-Bayyinah was much greater than any slight prejudice which may have occurred here and which did not substantially outweigh the probative effect of the statements.\nFurther, Al-Bayyinah dealt with the issue of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2005), which states that\nevidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nId. The exchange quoted above makes clear that Detective Brian Jones\u2019 statement was not offered to prove defendant\u2019s conformity with character to commit wrongs, but was offered to explain the sequence of events. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next argues the trial court erred in allowing Sellers to testify that the camera produced at trial was the same one taken from the Head Start office. Defendant contends there was no foundation for Sellers\u2019 statement and that the statement was not credible and therefore irrelevant. We disagree.\nSellers testified that she was familiar with the camera stolen from Head Start, and stated that she had used it on a number of occasions. When asked to identify the camera in court, she stated, \u201c[I]t looks like the camera that we had at Head Start.\u201d When defense counsel objected, Sellers stated, \u201c[I]t\u2019s the same one we had down there that we always used.\u201d The trial court then overruled defense counsel\u2019s objection.\nAs previously noted, relevant evidence is evidence showing any fact of consequence to be more or less probable. Here, the witness\u2019 identification of the camera was clearly relevant. She stated that she was personally familiar with the camera and testified that she recognized the camera found in Boring\u2019s trailer as the camera that was taken from Head Start. Defendant\u2019s arguments go to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. \u201cAny contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for resolution by the jury.\u201d State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984).\nDefendant further argues the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding the camcorder on the ground that no foundation was laid, and further objects to the admission of the camcorder itself. Like Sellers, Pastor Crowe testified that he was familiar with the camcorder and that he recognized it as the one taken from Boring\u2019s trailer. As such, his identification of the camcorder was relevant and was preceded by a proper foundation. Defendant\u2019s characterization of Pastor Crowe\u2019s identification of the camcorder as \u201cweak\u201d goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. This assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next argues the trial court erred by allowing testimony concerning his reasons for being in jail in Swain County when the sheriff\u2019s deputies searched Boring\u2019s trailer. Defendant argues the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, while the State contends defendant opened the door allowing the prosecutor to elicit the testimony.\nWe first note that defendant\u2019s assignment of error preserving this issue for appeal fails to state legal grounds for his challenge. The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure state, \u201cEach assignment of error shall, so far as practicable, be confined to a single issue of law; and shall state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned.\u201d N.C. R. App. 10(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis supplied). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error number 5 states, \u201cThe trial court erred by overruling Defendant\u2019s objections about details of why he was in jail in Swain County when he was arrested on these charges.\u201d This assignment of error, while objecting to the admission of evidence, states no legal basis supporting the objection.\nOur Supreme Court, in State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309,-S.E.2d-(2007) established that this Court may invoke N.C. R. App. P. 2 (2006) to suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure to prevent \u201cmanifest injustice.\u201d In the present case, appellate review is frustrated in that the-assignment of error in question is overly broad. This assignment, \u201clike a hoopskirt \u2014 covers everything and touches nothing. It is based on numerous exceptions and attempts to present several separate questions of law \u2014 none of which are set out in the assignment itself\u2014 thus leaving it broadside and ineffective.\u201d State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 131, 171 S.E.2d 416, 422 (1970). The concurring opinion concedes that the result would be no different if we chose to invoke Rule 2 to suspend the rules. As such, no \u201cmanifest injustice\u201d results from our refusal to suspend the rules in this case. Accordingly, this assignment of error is dismissed for failure to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.\nDefendant lastly argues the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges. Our courts have established the following standard in reviewing motions to dismiss:\nIn ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. The court must determine whether substantial evidence supports each essential element of the offense and the defendant\u2019s perpetration of that offense. If so, the motion must be denied and the case submitted to the jury. \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence\u2019 is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d\nState v. Hairston, 137 N.C. App. 352, 354, 528 S.E.2d 29, 30 (2000) (internal citations omitted).\nPossession of stolen goods is defined as follows:\nIf any person shall possess any chattel, property, money, valuable security or other thing whatsoever, the stealing or taking whereof amounts to larceny or a felony, either at common law or by virtue of any statute made or hereafter to be made, such person knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, he shall be guilty of a Class H felony, and may be indicted and convicted, whether the felon stealing and taking such chattels, property, money, valuable security or other thing shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to justice; and any such possessor may be dealt with, indicted, tried and punished in any county in which he shall have, or shall have had, any such property in his possession or in any county in which the thief may be tried, in the same manner as such possessor may be dealt with, indicted, tried and punished in the county where he actually possessed such chattel, money, security, or other thing; and such possessor shall be punished as one convicted of larceny.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14.71.1 (2005).\nPossession of burglary tools is defined as such:\nIf any person shall be found armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon, with the intent to break or enter a dwelling, or other building whatsoever, and to commit any felony or larceny therein; or shall be found having in his possession, without lawful excuse, any picklock, key, bit, or other implement of housebreaking; or shall be found in any such building, with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein, such person shall be punished as a Class I felon.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-55 (2005).\nHere, the State presented evidence that the camera and camcorder were stolen, and Sellers and Pastor Crowe both identified those items at trial. It further presented evidence that the items were seized from Boring\u2019s trailer, and defendant claimed the items belonged to him. In addition, the State presented evidence that a break-in had occurred at the Head Start office, and that the tools found with the camera and camcorder in Boring\u2019s trailer were consistent with the tools typically used to break and enter locked properties. In light of this, it is clear from the record that there was ample evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, could support the jury\u2019s finding that defendant possessed stolen goods and burglary tools. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nNo error in part, dismissed in part.\nJudge TYSON concurs.\nJudge WYNN concurs in the result with a separate opinion.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CALABRIA, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "WYNN, Judge,\nconcurring in the result.\nI concur with the majority\u2019s holding as to all issues presented by Defendant, save that of the testimony concerning his being in the Swain County jail at the time of the search of the camper. On that question, I would reach the merits of Defendant\u2019s argument and find no error in the trial court\u2019s allowing the objected-to testimony; thus, I concur in the result only as to that issue.\nAt trial, Defendant testified on direct examination from his attorney that he was not present for the search of his trailer because he was in jail in Swain County. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Defendant why he was in jail; defense counsel objected, but the trial court ruled that Defendant\u2019s testimony on direct had \u201copened the door\u201d and allowed Defendant\u2019s answer that he was in jail in Swain County for possession of stolen goods.\nThe majority is correct in noting that Defendant\u2019s assignment of error as to this exchange at trial is overly broad and fails to state the legal basis upon which error is assigned. However, I observe that the majority was also able to ascertain and summarize, from both Defendant\u2019s and the State\u2019s briefs, their respective arguments on this point. As such, I find that appellate review has not been frustrated, nor has the State been denied notice of Defendant\u2019s contentions, as to this issue. Given the liberty interest at stake for a criminal defendant such as in the instant case, I would invoke Rule 2 to suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure and reach the merits of Defendant\u2019s argument.\nIt is well settled in North Carolina that otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admissible if the door has been opened by the opposing party\u2019s examination of the witness. See, e.g., State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 752-53, 446 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1994). Here, Defendant opened the door as to his whereabouts when the trailer was searched; I would find no error by the trial court in allowing the prosecutor to ask follow-up questions related to his whereabouts, as such information was certainly relevant. See State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 480, 509 S.E.2d 428, 441 (1998) (finding a defendant opened the door to cross-examination by the State on his prior convictions by testifying about them on direct examination), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040, 144 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2005) (\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d).\n. Though the majority opinion suggests that \u201cthe concurring opinion concedes that the result would be no different if we chose to invoke Rule 2 to suspend the rules,\u201d it should be noted that one judge on a three-judge panel cannot \u201cconcede\u201d a result. Indeed, the majority\u2019s adherence to technical rules of procedure denies this incarcerated defendant an opportunity to determine how the judges in the majority here would decide this issue if they chose to reach the merits of his appeal. That is a manifest injustice.",
        "type": "concurrence",
        "author": "WYNN, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Conklin, for the State.",
      "Daniel F. Read, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MARK N. PATTERSON\nNo. COA06-1347\n(Filed 7 August 2007)\n1. Evidence\u2014 other break-ins \u2014 chain of events\nEvidence about other reported break-ins was properly admitted in a prosecution for possession of stolen property. The evidence explained the chain of events in the police investigation and was not hearsay.\n2. Evidence\u2014 possession of stolen property \u2014 other break-ins \u2014 not prejudicial\nThe probative value of testimony about other break-ins in a prosecution for possession of stolen property was not outweighed by the prejudicial value. There was no testimony directly accusing defendant of the other crimes, and the court gave an instruction limiting the testimony to what the detective did, not what he heard.\n3. Evidence\u2014 identification of stolen property \u2014 properly admitted\nTestimony identifying a recovered camera as one that had been stolen was properly admitted in a prosecution for possession of stolen property. The testimony was relevant, the witness stated that she was personally familiar with the camera, and she testified that she recognized it as the one stolen.\n4. Evidence\u2014 possession of stolen property \u2014 relevancy\u2014 proper foundation\nTestimony identifying a recovered camcorder as having been stolen was properly admitted in a prosecution for possession of stolen property. The witness\u2019s testimony was relevant and was preceded by a proper foundation.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 assignment of error \u2014 no supporting legal basis \u2014 dismissal\nAn assignment of error was dismissed where it included no legal basis opposing the admission of certain evidence. There was no manifest injustice to support invocation of Rule 2 because the result would not change if the rule was applied.\n6. Possession of Stolen Property\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\u2014 property claimed by defendant\nThere was sufficient evidence to support charges of possessing stolen property and possessing housebreaking tools where there was evidence that stolen items were recovered which defendant claimed were his, and tools found with the stolen items were consistent with tools typically used to break and enter locked properties.\nJudge WYNN concurring in the result.\nAppeal by defendant from judgments entered 16 March 2006 by Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr., in Graham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 May 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Conklin, for the State.\nDaniel F. Read, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0067-01",
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