{ "id": 8208915, "name": "BRUNING & FEDERLE MFG. CO., Plaintiff v. RICKY D. MILLS and ASSOCIATED METAL WORKS, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Bruning & Federle Mfg. Co. v. Mills", "decision_date": "2007-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1047", "first_page": "153", "last_page": "157", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 N.C. App. 153" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635069, 12635070 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0782-01", "/se2d/625/0782-02" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634016, 12634017, 12634018, 12634019, 12634020, 12634021, 12634007, 12634008, 12634009, 12634010, 12634011, 12634012, 12634013, 12634014, 12634015 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0594-10", "/se2d/619/0594-11", "/se2d/619/0594-12", "/se2d/619/0594-13", "/se2d/619/0594-14", "/se2d/619/0594-15", "/se2d/619/0594-07", "/se2d/619/0594-01", "/se2d/619/0594-02", "/se2d/619/0594-03", "/se2d/619/0594-04", "/se2d/619/0594-05", "/se2d/619/0594-06", "/se2d/619/0594-08", "/se2d/619/0594-09" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559814 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609700 ], "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624853 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574896 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570426 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405", "parenthetical": "citing In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565402 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288", "parenthetical": "citing In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511249, 1511273, 1511579, 1511207 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0668-04", "/nc/356/0668-02", "/nc/356/0668-01", "/nc/356/0668-03" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 N.C. App. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439655 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/142/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "quoting Edwards v. Wall, 142 N.C. App. 111, 115, 542 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251005 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623", "parenthetical": "quoting Edwards v. Wall, 142 N.C. App. 111, 115, 542 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562977, 8562958, 8563031, 8563002, 8562940 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0468-03", "/nc/307/0468-02", "/nc/307/0468-05", "/nc/307/0468-04", "/nc/307/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525918 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1326", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793766, 3788363, 3795889, 3789044, 3793752, 3794619, 3788252, 3795613 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0174-03", "/nc/360/0174-08", "/nc/360/0174-05", "/nc/360/0174-07", "/nc/360/0174-06", "/nc/360/0174-02", "/nc/360/0174-01", "/nc/360/0174-04" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-152", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 524, "char_count": 9385, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2475624436516503e-07, "percentile": 0.7808414699080911 }, "sha256": "f608e9cb5998c8c4ee2f3511decc4e22e3b34be0e2ecdb617e8145e210cb1f12", "simhash": "1:8e6893245f3b04f4", "word_count": 1561 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:26.584781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "BRUNING & FEDERLE MFG. CO., Plaintiff v. RICKY D. MILLS and ASSOCIATED METAL WORKS, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nOn 13 September 2002, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants for alleged misappropriation of trade secrets under the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act (\u201cTSPA\u201d), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-152 el seq., and for alleged unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 el seq. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 12 April 2004. In addition to stating \u201cthere [are] no genuine issue[s] as to any material fact[,]\u201d the order granting summary judgment stated that \u201cPlaintiff is hereby [] taxed with all costs of this action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21.\u201d Plaintiff filed notice of appeal on 10 May 2004 challenging the order granting summary judgment. In Bruning & Federle Mfg. Co. v. Mills, 173 N.C. App. 641, 619 S.E.2d 594 (unpublished) (No. COA04-999) (Oct. 4, 2005), disc, review denied, 360 N.C. 174, 625 S.E.2d 782 (2005), this Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.\nOn 29 December 2005, Defendant Ricky D. Mills filed a motion with the trial court seeking \u201can [o]rder awarding and quantifying the amount of attorneys\u2019 fees and costs to be taxed to the Plaintiff\u2019 pursuant to the court\u2019s earlier summary judgment order. Defendant Associated Metal Works, Inc. had filed a similar motion on 15 December 2005. In response, Plaintiff filed a request that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions of law under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2). In its order following a hearing on Defendants\u2019 motions, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21 does not itself form the legal basis for an award of attorney fees in a TSPA case; rather, it only allows such award (1) if the conditions provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d) exist, and (2) if the Court then exercises its discretion to award attorney fees based on evidence offered in support of an appropriate Motion.\nConcluding that \u201c[n] either Defendant offered any evidence to establish, or made any argument to support, a finding by the Court that Plaintiff acted in \u2018bad faith\u2019 [one of the conditions provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d)] in prosecuting its TSPA claims,\u201d the trial court denied Defendants\u2019 motions for attorneys\u2019 fees, but allowed \u201cthe recovery of costs other than attorney fees[.]\u201d From the order denying their motions for attorneys\u2019 fees, Defendants appeal. Defendants\u2019 sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21 as only allowing a trial court to award attorneys\u2019 fees in a TSPA case if the conditions provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d) exist. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.\nIn this case, we must interpret two statutes that both address the award of attorneys\u2019 fees in actions under the TSPA. Under Section 66-154(d) of that Act, as enacted by the legislature in 1981 and since unamended,\n[i]f a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees to the prevailing party.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d) (2005). In the same legislation by which it enacted the TSPA, the General Assembly added subsection twelve (12) to Section 6-21 of our General Statutes. Act of Jul. 9, 1981, ch. 890, sec. 2, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1326. That statute, after the 1981 addition, reads in pertinent part:\nCosts in the following matters shall be taxed against either party, or apportioned among the parties, in the discretion of the court:\n(12) In actions brought for misappropriation of a trade secret under [the TSPA],\nThe word \u201ccosts\u201d as the same appears and is used in this section shall be construed to include reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees in such amounts as the court shall in its discretion determine and allow[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21 (2005). Defendants contend that these statutes \u201cmay be harmonized and given separate effect,\u201d that the statutes \u201care in no way contradictory[,]\u201d and that the trial court erred in interpreting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 6-21 as only allowing a trial court to award attorneys\u2019 fees in a TSPA case if the conditions provided in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d) exist. We disagree.\n\u201cThe case law in North Carolina is clear that to overturn the trial judge\u2019s determination [on the issue of attorneys\u2019 fees], the defendant must show an abuse of discretion.\u201d Hillman v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co., 59 N.C. App. 145, 155, 296 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1982) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 307 N.C. 468, 299 S.E.2d 221 (1983). However, \u201c \u2018where an appeal presents [a] question[] of statutory interpretation, full review is appropriate,\u2019 \u201d and we review a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Coffman v. Roberson, 153 N.C. App. 618, 623, 571 S.E.2d 255, 258 (2002) (quoting Edwards v. Wall, 142 N.C. App. 111, 115, 542 S.E.2d 258, 262 (2001)), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 668, 577 S.E.2d 111 (2003).\n\u201cAs always, our primary task in statutory construction is to ensure that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting the law, the legislative intent, is accomplished.\u201d State ex rel. Hunt v. N.C. Reinsurance Facil, 302 N.C. 274, 288, 275 S.E.2d 399, 405 (1981) (citing In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962)). \u201cThe best indicia of that legislative purpose are \u2018the language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)). \u201cMoreover, we must be guided by the rules of construction that statutes in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\u201d Id. (citing Redevelopment Comm\u2019n of Greensboro v. Sec. Nat\u2019l Bank of Greensboro, 252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (I960)). \u201cSuch statutes should be reconciled with each other when possible and any irreconcilable ambiguity should be resolved in a manner which most fully effectuates the true legislative intent.\u201d Id. (citing Duncan v. Carpenter & Phillips, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951), overruled on other grounds, Taylor v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E.2d 144 (1980)).\nSection 66-154(d) is at odds with Section 6-21. A trial court \u201cmay\u201d award attorneys\u2019 fees under Section 66-154(d), while under Section 6-21, a trial court \u201cshall\u201d award costs, which \u201cshall be construed to include\u201d attorneys\u2019 fees. Under Section 66454(d), the trial court may only award attorneys\u2019 fees to the prevailing party if \u201ca claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if willful and malicious misappropriation exists[.]\u201d Under Section 6-21, a trial court has the discretion to tax costs against either party or apportion costs between the parties, and has the discretion to determine the amount of a \u201creasonable\u201d fee. Importantly, neither party must show \u201cbad faith\u201d or \u201cwillful and malicious misappropriation\u201d under Section 6-21 to be awarded costs. While we agree with Defendants that to superimpose the conditions of Section 66454(d) on Section 6-21 would \u201ceviscerate[] [Section 6-21] for TSPA cases,\u201d we also note that to ignore the conditions of Section 66454(d) when awarding \u201ccosts\u201d under Section 6-21 would render Section 66-154(d) meaningless. We must resolve the statutes\u2019 conflict in a manner which most fully effectuates the legislative intent.\nBased on our principles of statutory construction, we conclude that in an action under the TSPA, a trial court may only award attorneys\u2019 fees to the prevailing party \u201c[i]f a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if willful arid malicious misappropriation exists,\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d). While we agree with Defendants that \u201chad the legislature intended to limit the assessment of attorneys\u2019 fees in [Section 6-21] by cross referencing the bad faith. requirement of [Section 66-154(d)], it could have easily done so[,]\u201d we are nevertheless persuaded that our reading of the two statutes accomplishes the legislative intent. As Defendants do not dispute the trial court\u2019s conclusion \u201cthat the actions of Plaintiff [do not] merit the award of attorney fees under . . . N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 66-154(d)[,]\u201d the order of the trial court is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nJudges McGEE and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Eisele, Ashbum, Greene & Chapman, PA, by Douglas G. Eisele, for Plaintiff-Appellee.", "Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, by Robert B. Gordie and W.C. Turner Herbert, and Pope McMillan Kutteh Simon & Privette, P.A., by William P Pope, for Defendants-Appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRUNING & FEDERLE MFG. CO., Plaintiff v. RICKY D. MILLS and ASSOCIATED METAL WORKS, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA06-1047\n(Filed 7 August 2007)\nTrade Secrets\u2014 misappropriation \u2014 attorney fees\nThe trial court did not err by denying attorney fees in a trade secret appropriation case based on a finding that defendant had not offered evidence of or made an argument to support bad faith. Although N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-21 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 66454(d) both address the award of attorney fees in actions under the Trade Secrets Protection Act, a trial court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party only if a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith or if willful and malicious misappropriation exists pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 66-154(d).\nAppeal by Defendants from order entered 27 April 2006 by Judge Kimberly S. Taylor in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 March 2007.\nEisele, Ashbum, Greene & Chapman, PA, by Douglas G. Eisele, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\nMayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, by Robert B. Gordie and W.C. Turner Herbert, and Pope McMillan Kutteh Simon & Privette, P.A., by William P Pope, for Defendants-Appellants." }, "file_name": "0153-01", "first_page_order": 185, "last_page_order": 189 }