{ "id": 8209374, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER DON STYLES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Styles", "decision_date": "2007-08-07", "docket_number": "No. COA06-684", "first_page": "271", "last_page": "277", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 N.C. App. 271" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636416 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461-62" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632827 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132043 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794266 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550418 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11437574 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005169 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 S.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411088 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "alteration and emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249037 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94", "parenthetical": "alteration and emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75-6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526045 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20454", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636416 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 S.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630917 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794266 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 13749, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.07707973269116e-08, "percentile": 0.3752487114113603 }, "sha256": "bb28de829a05e16fab075d9a3426726b64238937646f4d5f6706ebc7aa252c3b", "simhash": "1:f3ab6446777fbd54", "word_count": 2221 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:26.584781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN concurs.", "Judge STEPHENS dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER DON STYLES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEELMAN, Judge.\nThe arresting Officer had probable cause to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle, and thus the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the stop and the evidence procured \u00e1s. a result of the subsequent search of the vehicle.\nOn 28 February 2004, Officer Greg Jones of the Bryson City Police Department was on duty around 1:00 in the morning traveling on Main Street, a three lane road. There were two lanes in Officer Jones\u2019 direction of travel and one lane in the opposite direction. Directly in front of Officer Jones\u2019.patrol vehicle and proceeding in the same direction as Officer Jones was a vehicle operated by Christopher Don Styles (\u201cdefendant\u201d). Defendant changed lanes without signaling. Officer Jones stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle, approached the driver\u2019s side door, and made verbal contact with defendant. Officer Jones immediately detected an odor of marijuana about defendant\u2019s person. Defendant declined to consent to a search of his vehicle. Officer Jones then deployed a drag dog which was in his patrol vehicle. The dog indicated that narcotics were present in or on the vehicle. Officer Jones then initiated a search of the interior of defendant\u2019s vehicle. He discovered a small amount of marijuana and a pipe. Officer Jones placed defendant under arrest. A subsequent pat-down search of defendant\u2019s person revealed methamphetamine.\nOn 29 June 2005, defendant was indicted for possession of schedule II controlled substances, drag paraphernalia, and marijuana. On 24 October 2005, defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle. On 31 October 2005, Judge Cornelius denied defendant\u2019s motion. Defendant pled guilty to all of the charges on that same day, expressly reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-979(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to 6-8 months imprisonment. This sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on supervised probation for 18 months. Defendant appeals the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress.\nIn his sole argument on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. We disagree.\nOur review of a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were supported by competent evidence, in which event they are binding on appeal, and whether those findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). The trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 141, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).\nDefendant was stopped for the violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154(a):\nThe driver of any vehicle upon a highway or public vehicular area before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in safety ... and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal as required in this section, plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle, of the intention to make such movement.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154(a) (2005). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20454(a) has been held to apply to the type of movement defendant made here: changing lanes. See Sass v. Thomas, 90 N.C. App. 719, 723, 370 S.E.2d 73, 75-6 (1988).\nIn the instant case, defendant assigns error to the following findings of fact:\nThe officer did at that point stop the vehicle for an investigatory stop.\nThe Court will find that the stop by the officer was an investigatory stop in regards to a moving violation that he observed committed in his presence.\nThat he had probable cause to stop the vehicle.\nA \u201ctraffic stop based on an officer\u2019s [reasonable] suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed, but which can only be verified by stopping the vehicle, such as drunk driving or driving with a revoked license, is classified as an investigatory stop ....\u201d State v. Wilson, 155 N.C. App. 89, 94, 574 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2002) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). However, a stop pursuant to a readily observed traffic violation will be valid if it was supported by probable cause. State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C. App. 228, 231, 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2004). Probable Cause exists when, based upon the facts and circumstances within his knowledge, a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer believes that the defendant has or was committing a traffic violation. State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 306, 612 S.E.2d 420, 425 (2005).\nIt is clear from the trial court\u2019s findings of fact that defendant was traveling immediately in front of Officer Jones. Defendant changed lanes without signaling. Because he readily observed a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154(a), Officer Jones had probable cause to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nDefendant contends that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding an \u201cinvestigatory stop\u201d were unsupported by the evidence, and that because the only reason for the stop was an alleged traffic violation, no investigatory stop could be made. The trial court\u2019s mention of an \u201cinvestigatory stop\u201d was in fact erroneous because Officer Jones\u2019 stop of defendant was based upon a readily observed traffic violation, requiring that Officer Jones have probable cause instead of a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. However, \u201c \u2018irrelevant findings in a trial court\u2019s decision do not warrant a reversal of the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Hernandez, at 305, 612 S.E.2d at 424 (citing Goodson v. Goodson, 145 N.C. App. 356, 360, 551 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2001)). We have already determined that the trial court properly found that Officer Jones had probable cause to stop defendant. Therefore, the trial court\u2019s findings regarding an \u201cinvestigatory stop\u201d do not warrant a reversal of the trial court.\nThe trial court made the following conclusions of law:\nState and constitutional rights were not violated in this investigatory stop.\nThat there was probable cause for the stop and probable cause for the arrest, and the motion to suppress is denied.\nThe trial court\u2019s conclusions of law must reflect a correct application of the law to the facts found. Barnhill, at 230-31, 601 S.E.2d at 217. As the trial court erroneously concluded that an investigatory stop occurred without violation of defendant\u2019s State and federal constitutional rights, we must apply the correct standard and determine whether defendant\u2019s State and federal constitutional rights were violated in the stop, applying the probable cause standard. See id. at 231, 601 S.E.2d at 217.\nProbable cause exists where a reasonable law enforcement officer readily observes a traffic violation. See Hernandez, at 306, 612 S.E.2d at 425. In the instant case, Officer Jones had probable cause to stop and search defendant\u2019s car. Therefore, neither defendant\u2019s State nor federal constitutional rights were violated. See State v. Frederick, 31 N.C. App. 503, 506-07, 230 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1976).\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact were supported by competent evidence and those findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. \u201cAs a result, [Officer Jones\u2019] stop did not violate defendant\u2019s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Since the stop was valid, any evidence which resulted from the stop need not be suppressed.\u201d Barnhill, at 233, 601 S.E.2d at 219.\nDefendant argues that this case is controlled by the recent North Carolina Supreme Court case of State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006). In Ivey, our Supreme Court held that an Officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154(a) when the defendant\u2019s maneuver could not have affected the Officer or any other vehicle. Id. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461-62. The defendant in Ivey was making a right-hand turn at an intersection where he could only turn right. Id. at 563, 633 S.E.2d at 460. The facts of the instant case are readily distinguishable. Defendant was traveling immediately in front of Officer Jones on a road containing two lanes in his direction of travel. Defendant changed lanes without signaling, which affected the operation of Officer Jones\u2019 vehicle, which was proceeding immediately behind defendant. \u201cBecause of the violation[] of [this] traffic law[], the officer[] had probable cause to stop the vehicle[] . . . State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). This assignment of error is without merit.\nAssignments of error listed in the record but not argued in defendant\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2007).\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN concurs.\nJudge STEPHENS dissents in a separate opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "STEELMAN, Judge." }, { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge,\ndissenting.\nBecause I do not conclude that Officer Jones had probable cause to stop Defendant\u2019s vehicle, I respectfully dissent.\nAt the hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court made only two findings of fact that could support its conclusion that Officer Jones had probable cause to stop: (1) that Officer Jones \u201cobserved a vehicle being operated by the defendant immediately in front of him[]\u201d and (2) \u201c[t]hat [Defendant\u2019s] vehicle changed lanes in front of the officer without signaling a change.\u201d The only evidence supporting these findings is one exchange between the prosecutor and Officer Jones:\nQ. Okay. And what attracted your attention to the vehicle operated by Mr. Styles?\nA. Upon getting behind the vehicle in question, the defendant had changed lanes and failed to signal. That\u2019s why I stopped the vehicle.\nThis evidence arguably supports the trial court\u2019s finding that Defendant \u201cchanged lanes in front of [Officer Jones] without signaling a change.\u201d This evidence does not, however, support the court\u2019s finding that Defendant\u2019s vehicle was \u201cimmediately\u201d in front of Officer Jones, nor do the findings support the court\u2019s conclusion that Officer Jones \u201chad probable cause to stop [Defendant].\u201d\nIt is settled that, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-154(a), \u201c[t]he duty to give a statutory signal of an intended . . . turn [or lane change] does not arise in any event unless the operation of some \u2018other vehicle may be affected by such movement.\u2019 \u201d Cooley v. Baker, 231 N.C. 533, 536, 58 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1950). \u201c[F]ailure to give a signal, in and of itself, does not constitute a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-154(a) . . . .\u201d State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 566, 633 S.E.2d 459, 462 (2006).\nThe majority concludes without explanation that Defendant\u2019s lane change \u201caffected the operation of Officer Jones\u2019 vehicle].]\u201d Officer Jones offered no such testimony, and the trial court made no such finding. On the contrary, Officer Jones testified that there was nothing \u201cerratic\u201d about Defendant\u2019s movement from one lane to the other. Furthermore, the State offered no evidence that there was any other automobile traffic on the road at the early morning hour when Defendant and Officer Jones were traveling down Main Street in Bryson City. Therefore, I cannot conclude from the evidence in the record that \u201ca reasonable officer would have believed, under the circumstances of the stop, that defendant\u2019s actions violated subsection 20-154(a)[.]\u201d Id. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461.\nI can imagine factual circumstances under which the movement of one\u2019s vehicle from one lane to another without signaling could affect the safe operation of another vehicle traveling in the same direction. Just as easily, I can imagine factual circumstances under which a lane change would have absolutely no effect on the operation of other vehicles traveling in the same direction. Here, the evidence not only fails to establish that the former factual circumstance was created when Defendant changed lanes in front of Officer Jones, it is patently insufficient to permit even an inference of such. When constitutional rights and protections are involved, I will not presume a violation of the law to give Officer Jones probable cause.\nThe mere fact that Officer Jones, while traveling \u201cbehind\u201d Defendant on a road with two lanes of traffic headed in the same direction, observed Defendant change lanes without signaling did not give Officer Jones probable cause to stop Defendant. Thus, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court on Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.", "type": "dissent", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Rudy Renfer, and Assistant Attorney General William B. Crumpler, for the State.", ". Charlotte Gail Blake for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER DON STYLES\nNo. COA06-684\n(Filed 7 August 2007)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 stop of vehicle \u2014 traffic violation\u2014 motion to suppress evidence \u2014 probable cause\nThe trial court did not err in a possession of schedule II controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and marijuana case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the stop of his vehicle and the evidence procured as a result of the subsequent search of the vehicle, because: (1) although the trial court\u2019s mention of an investigatory stop was erroneous since the officer\u2019s stop of defendant was based upon a readily observed traffic violation, the officer was required to have probable cause instead of reasonable suspicion to stop defendant; and (2) the officer had .probable cause to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle based on defendant\u2019s violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-154(a) when he changed lanes without signaling.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue\nAssignments of error listed in the record but not argued in defendant\u2019s brief are deemed abandoned under N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nJudge STEPHENS dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 3 November 2005 by Judge C. Preston Cornelius in Swain County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Rudy Renfer, and Assistant Attorney General William B. Crumpler, for the State.\n. Charlotte Gail Blake for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0271-01", "first_page_order": 303, "last_page_order": 309 }