{ "id": 8210998, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRYAN KEITH HESS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hess", "decision_date": "2007-08-21", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1413", "first_page": "530", "last_page": "535", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 N.C. App. 530" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634832, 12634830, 12634831 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0369-03", "/se2d/624/0369-01", "/se2d/624/0369-02" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632818 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "612 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632827 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 484 S.E.2d 350 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/612/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637747, 12637748 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0059-01", "/se2d/640/0059-02" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636088 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 P.3d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 1565708 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/141/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 P.2d 1026", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2348903 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1027", "parenthetical": "holding that if an officer knows that the owner's driver's license is suspended, \"he may make a stop . . . unless other circumstances put him 'on notice that the driver is not the vehicle's owner' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/101/0006-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.W.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10598371 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[i]t was reasonable to infer the vehicle was being driven by its owner given the absence of evidence to the contrary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/458/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "905 A.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 8469283 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/905/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.W.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "765 A.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "551 N.W.2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10709779, 10709635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/551/0919-02", "/nw2d/551/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 N.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11869305 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787393, 3794473, 3786572, 3787286, 3788150, 3795577, 3798174, 3794495 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0075-06", "/nc/360/0075-01", "/nc/360/0075-08", "/nc/360/0075-03", "/nc/360/0075-02", "/nc/360/0075-05", "/nc/360/0075-04", "/nc/360/0075-07" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005009 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139403 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005169 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 484 S.E.2d 350 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-74", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955191 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211-12", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3742650, 3740178, 3737844, 3741058 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0177-02", "/nc/361/0177-04", "/nc/361/0177-01", "/nc/361/0177-03" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377534 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0330-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 632, "char_count": 12187, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2545655727606997e-07, "percentile": 0.781941920166002 }, "sha256": "c40f4d541371715894b9a0ba6c86bea2584af547d21f52bd1b251266a9465fd8", "simhash": "1:a2caf8ee5bf73aff", "word_count": 2019 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:26.584781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRYAN KEITH HESS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STEPHENS, Judge.\nOn 15 May 2004, Officer Jarrett Doty of the Granite Quarry Police Department was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle. At approximately 9:32 p.m., Officer Doty pulled his automobile \u201cin behind a Pontiac vehiclef.]\u201d It was dark and Officer Doty could not determine the sex, race, or ethnicity of the driver of the Pontiac, or how many individuals were riding inside. Officer Doty traveled behind the Pontiac for approximately \u201c[a] milef,] ... [m]aybe two miles\u201d and did not observe the driver of the vehicle commit any traffic violations or weave in the lane of travel. Nevertheless, Officer Doty \u201cran the registration plate that was attached to the rear of the vehicle\u201d through a computer in his patrol car. Officer Doty discovered that the vehicle was registered to Defendant. He then \u201cran [Defendant\u2019s] license number from the registration information\u201d and determined that Defendant\u2019s license had been suspended. Once he had this information, but still not knowing whether Defendant was driving the vehicle, Officer Doty activated the blue lights on his patrol car and stopped the Pontiac. When he approached the Pontiac, Officer Doty found that Defendant was operating the vehicle. As a result of the stop, Defendant was cited for driving while impaired and driving with a revoked license.\nOn 10 March 2005, Defendant moved to suppress \u201cany and all statements and/or evidence which was obtained or received as a result of Defendant being stopped ... without reasonable and articu-lable suspicion to believe that. . . Defendant was either committing a crime or about to commit a crime.\u201d A hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion was held before the Honorable Michael E. Beale in Rowan County Superior Court on 12 July 2006. After the hearing, in an order dated 14 July 2006, Judge Beale denied Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Upon preserving his right to appeal Judge Beale\u2019s decision, Defendant pled guilty to both charges. From the denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant appeals. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.\nBy his only assignment of error, Defendant asserts the trial court erred in determining that Officer Doty had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant\u2019s vehicle. Contending to the contrary, he argues further that Officer Doty\u2019s investigatory stop violated Defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the totality of the circumstances presented herein, we disagree.\nWe first observe that Defendant has not assigned error to any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. Therefore, our review of the order denying his motion to suppress \u201cis limited to the question of whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, which are presumed to be supported by competent evidence, support its conclusions of law and judgment.\u201d State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 334, 631 S.E.2d 203, 206 (citation omitted), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 177, 640 S.E.2d 59 (2006). \u201cThis Court must not disturb the trial court\u2019s conclusions if they are supported by the court\u2019s factual findings.\u201d State v. McArn, 159 N.C. App. 209, 211-12, 582 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (2003) (citing State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982)). \u201cHowever, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and must be legally correct.\u201d State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 304, 612 S.E.2d 420, 423 (2005) (citing State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 484 S.E.2d 350 (1997)).\nIn his order denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, Judge Beale made the following uncontested findings of fact:\n2. That one witness testified, . . . C.J. Doty, and the court is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of his testimony.\n4. That at 9:32 p.m. on the 15th day of May, 2004, Mr. Doty was on routine patrol in the town of Granite Quarry in an unmarked patrol car and was dressed in a regular police issued uniform.\n7. That it was dark and he had his headlights on when he got behind a Pontiac vehicle operated on Legion Club Road.\n8. That Mr. Doty could not determine anything about the driver from behind that vehicle. That he was unable to determine either the sex or the race of the operator of that vehicle or how many people were in the vehicle.\n9. That he observed no traffic violations or weaving or er[r]atic driving.\n10. That he was able to observe the registration plate and ran the registration plate and determined that the vehicle was registered to one Bryan Keith Hess, the Defendant in this case. That he ran a license check on the license number that came up for Mr. Hess and he determined from that check that Mr. Hess\u2019[s] license had been suspended.\n12. That upon making the observations found herein the patrolman initiated the stop by activating his blue light and the vehicle pulled over and stopped.\nFrom these findings, Judge Beale concluded \u201c[t]hat Officer Doty had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in question and make an investigatory stop\u201d and \u201c[t]hat none of the Defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, either State or Federal were violated in the making of this stop.\u201d\nThe Fourth Amendment protects private individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusions on the individual\u2019s liberty or property. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). However, \u201c[i]t is well-established that a law enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person for investigative purposes without violating the Fourth Amendment.\u201d State v. Shearin, 170 N.C. App. 222, 226, 612 S.E.2d 371, 375 (citing Terry, supra), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 75, 624 S.E.2d 369 (2005). \u201cAn investigatory stop must be justified by \u2018a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.\u2019 \u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)). \u201cWhen determining whether an officer had \u2018a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop\u2019... trial courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.\u201d Shearin, 170 N.C. App. at 226, 612 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting State v. Willis, 125 N.C. App. 537, 541, 481 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1997)).\nThe appellate courts of this State have yet to address the constitutionality of an investigatory stop based solely on an officer\u2019s knowledge that an automobile currently being operated is registered to an individual with a suspended or revoked driver\u2019s license. We thus find it instructive to examine decisions from other jurisdictions for guidance.\nIn Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 591 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 455 (Ill. 1992), the Illinois Court of Appeals held that\n[p]olice knowledge that an owner of a vehicle has a revoked driver\u2019s license provides a reasonable suspicion to stop the owner\u2019s vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the status of the license of the driver. Common sense dictates that such information, even alone, is enough to provide a constitutional basis for stopping a vehicle or its occupants.\nSimilarly, in State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn. 1996), the Minnesota Supreme Court held \u201cthat the knowledge that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of a \u2018reasonable suspicion of criminal activity\u2019 when an officer observes the vehicle being driven.\u201d However, Minnesota\u2019s high court limited the application of its holding to circumstances where, based on the information that the police officer was able to gather about the physical characteristics of the driver, it was reasonable to infer that the owner of the automobile was also the driver. Id.\nRelying on Village of Lake in the Hills, supra, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that when \u201can officer observed a vehicle, which he properly determined to be registered to an owner who had a suspended driver\u2019s license, being driven on a public roadway\u201d and the \u201cofficer observed nothing that would indicate that the driver was not the owner[,]\u201d it \u201cwas reasonable for the officer to infer\u201d that the owner of the vehicle was driving. State v. Richter, 765 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2000). Additionally, in People v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that\n[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, a police officer may reasonably suspect that a vehicle is being driven by its registered owner . . . [and that] [w]here information gleaned from a computer check provides a basis for the arrest or further investigation of the registered owner of the vehicle, a police officer may initiate an investigatory stop to determine if the driver is the registered owner of the vehicle.\nIn sum, our research reveals that when an officer knows that a vehicle being operated is registered to an owner with a suspended or revoked driver\u2019s license, the majority of jurisdictions have held that an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, absent evidence that the driver is not the owner. See, e.g., State v. Tozier, 905 A.2d 836, 839 (Me. 2006) (holding that \u201c[although it is possible that a driver under suspension could register a vehicle and that others . . . could drive it, it is reasonable for an officer to suspect that the owner is driving the vehicle, absent other circumstances that demonstrate the owner is not driving\u201d); accord State v. Mills, 458 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that \u201c[i]t was reasonable to infer the vehicle was being driven by its owner given the absence of evidence to the contrary\u201d); accord State v. Panko, 788 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that if an officer knows that the owner\u2019s driver\u2019s license is suspended, \u201che may make a stop . . . unless other circumstances put him \u2018on notice that the driver is not the vehicle\u2019s owner\u2019 \u201d) We are persuaded by the rationale of the majority of jurisdictions and thus adopt the holding of the majority of jurisdictions that when a police officer becomes aware that a vehicle being operated is registered to an owner with a suspended or revoked driver\u2019s license, and there is no evidence appearing to the officer that the owner is not the individual driving the automobile, reasonable suspicion exists to warrant an investigatory stop.\nAfter careful review of these cases and the facts of the case before us, we hold that because Officer Doty knew Defendant was the owner of the Pontiac and that Defendant\u2019s license had been suspended, it was reasonable for Officer Doty, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to infer that Defendant was driving the automobile. Based on this inference, reasonable suspicion existed for Officer Doty to make an investigatory stop to determine if Defendant was operating the vehicle. Furthermore, because the unchallenged findings of fact made by the trial court support this conclusion, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.\n. However, in State v. Cerino, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Idaho Ct. App. 2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals held \u201cthat the mere observation of a vehicle being driven by someone of the same gender as the unlicensed owner is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "STEPHENS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins, for the State.", "Haakon Thorsen for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRYAN KEITH HESS\nNo. COA06-1413\n(Filed 21 August 2007)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 investigatory stop \u2014 vehicle owned by driver with suspended license \u2014 reasonable suspicion\nAn officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle when he knew that defendant was the owner of the vehicle and that defendant\u2019s license had been suspended. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it was reasonable to infer that defendant was driving the vehicle, and the judge did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress in the resulting prosecution for driving while impaired.\nAppeal by Defendant from order entered 14 July 2006 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Hal F. Askins, for the State.\nHaakon Thorsen for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0530-01", "first_page_order": 562, "last_page_order": 567 }