{ "id": 8211058, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS DANIELS, JR., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Daniels", "decision_date": "2007-08-21", "docket_number": "No. COA06-478", "first_page": "535", "last_page": "539", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 N.C. App. 535" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633265 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349-50", "parenthetical": "The trial court's findings are to include \"actions a reasonable person would pursue in seeking to notify defendant of his probation violation and conduct a hearing on the matter.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637288 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987357 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8439659 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762-63", "parenthetical": "The trial court's findings are to include \"actions a reasonable person would pursue in seeking to notify defendant of his probation violation and conduct a hearing on the matter.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740911 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102-03" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637288 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740911 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0100-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 382, "char_count": 8963, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.976916637553343e-08, "percentile": 0.537964182467781 }, "sha256": "b36e355b3f0719413e4f5256ac129af47cfb030e5b74c3e08e2694300f414381", "simhash": "1:33ef74f4622e0ff2", "word_count": 1413 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:26.584781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge HUNTER concurs.", "Judge WYNN dissents in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS DANIELS, JR., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nOn 3 April 2001, defendant James Curtis Daniels, Jr. was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The trial court sentenced him to a suspended term of twenty-nine to forty-four months imprisonment and placed him on supervised probation for thirty-six months.\nOn 19 March 2003, three probation violation reports were filed alleging that defendant failed to comply with the terms of his probation. On 31 August 2005, the arrest warrant was served on defendant. Following a hearing on 12 September 2005, the trial court revoked defendant\u2019s probation and activated the suspended sentence. Defendant appeals contending that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his probation and the trial court\u2019s findings were insufficient and incomplete.\nNorth Carolina General Statute Section 15A-1344(f) states:\n(f) Revocation after Period of Probation. \u2014 The court may revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if:\n(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written motion with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a revocation hearing; and\n(2) The court finds that the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1344(f) (2005). In State v. Bryant, the Supreme Court held that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1344(f) \u201c. . . unambiguously requires the trial court to make a judicial finding that the State has made a reasonable effort to conduct the probation revocation hearing during the period of probation set out in the judgment and commitment.\u201d 361 N.C. 100, 102-03, 637 S.E.2d 532, 534 (2006). Moreover, \u201c[i]n the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the probationary period is not preserved.\u201d Id. at 103, 637 S.E.2d at 534.\nHere the trial court made the following ruling regarding the State\u2019s burden of making a reasonable effort to conduct a hearing prior to the expiration of the probationary period: \u201cI think that issuing an order for arrest on March 19th of 2003 was sufficient. That was [the State\u2019s] effort . . . and the efforts were reasonable as of March 19th, 2003. And that\u2019s my ruling.\u201d Technically, it appears the trial court made the statutorily required findings. However, this Court has previously held that merely issuing a warrant for arrest is not a \u201creasonable effort,\u201d in which case the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are incomplete. See State v. Burns, 171 N.C. App. 759, 762-63, 615 S.E.2d 347, 349-50 (2005) (The trial court\u2019s findings are to include \u201cactions a reasonable person would pursue in seeking to notify defendant of his probation violation and conduct a hearing on the matter.\u201d). According to Bryant, \u201c \u2018when [there is a failure] to make a material finding of fact . . ., the case must be remanded ... for a proper finding . . . .\u2019 [However], when the record lacks sufficient evidence to support such a finding, the case should not be remanded in order to conserve judicial resources.\u201d Bryant, 361 N.C. at 104, 637 S.E.2d at 535 (citing N.C. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 674-75, 599 S.E.2d 888, 904 (2004)).\nIn the instant case there is sufficient additional evidence in the record to support a reasonable effort finding. Specifically, .the State presented evidence through sworn testimony that it made an effort to contact defendant prior to the expiration of his probation in the following ways: (1) calling defendant\u2019s employer, only to be informed that defendant no longer worked there; (2) leaving a note at defendant\u2019s residence, only to receive a phone call from defendant\u2019s mother saying that defendant no longer lived there; (3) attempting to personally serve the warrant at defendant\u2019s residence, but being unable to locate defendant; and (4) soliciting the help of a surveillance officer to locate defendant after the warrant was returned unserved. Therefore, because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the State made reasonable efforts to conduct a hearing prior to the expiration of defendant\u2019s probation, this case is remanded to the trial court to enter sufficient material findings. See Bryant at 104, 637 S.E.2d at 535. 1\nRemanded.\nJudge HUNTER concurs.\nJudge WYNN dissents in a separate opinion.\n. The trial court attached several other intermediate punishments to defendant\u2019s sentence. Defendant was ordered to serve an active term of 217 days in the custody of Department of Correction and defendant was placed on intensive probation for six months.\n. Defendant testified at trial that he had lived with his mother since the age of three, and denied having told his mother to tell authorities he no longer lived there.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." }, { "text": "WYNN, Judge\ndissenting.\n\u201cIn the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the probationary period is not preserved.\u201d State v. Bryant, 361 N.C. 100, 103, 637 S.E.2d 532, 534 (2006). Here, the majority holds, and I agree, that the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings to preserve its jurisdiction to revoke Defendant\u2019s probation after the expiration of the period of probation. I, however, disagree with the majority\u2019s decision to remand this matter \u201cto enter sufficient findings\u201d because under Bryant, in the absence of the required statutory findings, this Court should vacate the order revoking Defendant\u2019s probation. In Bryant, the Supreme Court held that Section 15A-1334(f) of the North Carolina General Statute \u201cunambiguously requires the trial court to make a judicial finding that the State.has made a reasonable effort to conduct the probation revocation hearing during the period of probation set out in the judgment and commitment.\u201d Id. at 102-03, 637 S.E.2d at 534. Moreover, \u201c[i]n the absence of statutorily mandated factual findings, the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction to revoke probation after expiration of the probationary period is not preserved.\u201d Id. at 103, 637 S.E.2d at 534. Furthermore,\u201c[t]he statute makes no exception to this finding of fact requirement based upon the strength of the evidence in the record.\u201d Id.\nHere, as in Bryant, the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings of fact. Accordingly, Bryant compels us to set aside the trial court\u2019s order revoking Defendant\u2019s probation. Additionally, as in Bryant, the State asks this Court to remand this matter to the trial court to make additional findings. However, in this case, \u201cfurther proceedings are neither necessary nor advisable.\u201d Id. at 104, 637 S.E.2d at 535 (citation omitted).\nMoreover, the majority states that it has found the necessary facts to support upholding the invocation of jurisdiction after the expiration of Defendant\u2019s probation:\nTherefore, \u00a1because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the State made reasonable efforts to conduct a hearing prior to the expiration of defendant\u2019s probation, this case is remanded to the trial court to enter sufficient material findings.\nHaving so found and enumerated the findings of fact that would support the order in this case, the majority usurps the authority of the trial court to do the same by directing it to \u201center sufficient findings of fact.\u201d\nBecause the trial court failed to make the statutorily mandated findings, this matter should be vacated.", "type": "dissent", "author": "WYNN, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott K. Beaver, for the State.", "Gilda C. Rodriguez for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS DANIELS, JR., Defendant\nNo. COA06-478\n(Filed 21 August 2007)\nProbation and Parole\u2014 probation revocation \u2014 reasonable effort to conduct hearing prior to expiration of probation\nThe trial court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant\u2019s probation and activate the suspended sentence for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and the case is remanded to make sufficient material findings, because although the trial court\u2019s statutorily required findings of fact were incomplete since merely issuing a warrant for arrest is not a reasonable effort to conduct a hearing prior to the expiration of defendant\u2019s probation, there was sufficient additional evidence in the record to support a reasonable effort finding including: (1) calling defendant\u2019s employer only to be informed that defendant no longer worked there; (2) leaving a note at defendant\u2019s residence only to receive a phone call from defendant\u2019s mother saying he no longer lived there; (3) attempting to personally serve the warrant at defendant\u2019s residence but being unable to locate defendant; and (4) soliciting the help of a surveillance officer to locate defendant after the warrant was returned unserved.\nJudge WYNN dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 12 September 2005 by Judge Alma L. Hinton in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Scott K. Beaver, for the State.\nGilda C. Rodriguez for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0535-01", "first_page_order": 567, "last_page_order": 571 }