{ "id": 8212517, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY DOWD EDWARDS, JR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Edwards", "decision_date": "2007-09-04", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1415", "first_page": "701", "last_page": "707", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "185 N.C. App. 701" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634478 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635674, 12635675 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0009-01", "/se2d/628/0009-02" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641530 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0433-02" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-173", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807", "parenthetical": "citing Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8471538 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657", "parenthetical": "citing Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796005 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 57", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541929 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793199 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583-84", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498848 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353318 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1524630 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568285 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d. 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "quoting Arrington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526376 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "quoting Arrington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4681578 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" }, { "page": "636" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 U.S. 257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6163485 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/362/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238-39", "parenthetical": "quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)" }, { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)" }, { "page": "547", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "543" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quotations omitted" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "550", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 727", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205246 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721, 724 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914262 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721, 724 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219945, 220139, 219894, 220120, 220187 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0752-04", "/nc/355/0752-03", "/nc/355/0752-01", "/nc/355/0752-02", "/nc/355/0752-05" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9126560 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" }, { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9186267 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0117-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 690, "char_count": 14648, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.759478428133377e-07, "percentile": 0.8956068481212611 }, "sha256": "ff61518cb1708789197bbeba93982d4f81f2fc14e105ec0d6fe88d03952417b2", "simhash": "1:4b491132624d0f7e", "word_count": 2330 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:26.584781+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McCULLOUGH concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY DOWD EDWARDS, JR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nThe State of North Carolina appeals from order entered granting Henry Dowd Edwards, Jr.\u2019s, (\u201cdefendant\u201d) motion to suppress evidence seized and dismissing the charges against defendant. We reverse and remand.\nI.Background\nOn 14 July 2005, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer M.F. Warren (\u201cOfficer Warren\u201d) signed an affidavit, applied for, and was issued a search warrant to search defendant\u2019s home. Officer Warren executed the warrant later that day. During the search of defendant\u2019s home, Officer Warren found and seized cocaine, oxycodone, and drug paraphernalia.\nDefendant was charged with: (1) trafficking in cocaine by possessing more than twenty-eight grams, but less than 200 grams of cocaine; (2) felony possession of oxycodone; (3) possession of drug paraphernalia; and (4) intentionally maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping or selling cocaine.\nOn 14 March 2006, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. This motion was calendered before the Mecklenburg County Superior Court on 10 April 2006. Defendant asserted the affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the magistrate to issue the search warrant. On 11 April 2006, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized and dismissed the indictments ex mero motu. The State appeals.\nII.Issues\nThe State argues the trial court erred by: (1) granting his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search of his home with a search warrant and (2) dismissing the indictments pretrial.\nIII.Standard of Review\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding a motion to suppress are conclusive and binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence. This Court determines if the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusions of law. State v. McHone, 158 N.C. App. 117, 120, 580 S.E.2d 80, 83 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 368, 628 S.E.2d 9 (2006); State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001); State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). \u201cOur review of a trial court\u2019s conclusions of law on a motion to suppress is de novo.\u201d State v. Chadwick, 149 N.C. App. 200, 202, 560 S.E.2d 207, 209 (citing Brooks, 337 N.C. at 140-41, 446 S.E.2d at 585), disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 752, 565 S.E.2d 672 (2002).\nSpecifically, \u201cthe standard for a court reviewing the issuance of a search warrant is \u2018whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate\u2019s decision to issue the warrant.\u2019 \u201d State v. Ledbetter, 120 N.C. App. 117, 121, 461 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1995) (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721, 724 (1984)). After reviewing the purposes and goals of the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court adopted a flexible standard in which \u201cthe duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a \u2018substantial basis for . . . concluding]\u2019 that probable cause existed.\u201d Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980)). When reviewing the magistrate\u2019s decision to issue a search warrant, the \u201cmagistrate\u2019s determination of probable cause should be paid great deference[.]\u201d Id. at 236, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 547 (citation omitted).\nIV. Probable Cause\nSection 20 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution is similar to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and states that \u201cprobable cause [must] \u00e9xist[] for issuance of a search warrant.\u201d State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984). N.C. Gen Stat. \u00a7 15A-244 (2005) governs the contents of the application for a search warrant:\nEach application for a search warrant must be made in writing upon oath or affirmation. All applications must contain:\n(1) The name and title of the applicant; and\n(2) A statement that there is probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure under G.S. 15A-242 may be found in or upon a designated or described place, vehicle, or person; and\n(3) Allegations of fact supporting the statement. The statements must be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances establishing probable cause to believe that the items are in the places or in the possession of the individuals to be searched; and\n(4) A request that the court issue a search warrant directing a search for and the seizure of the items in question.\nDefendant asserted before the trial court that Officer Warren\u2019s affidavit did not \u201cparticularly\u201d allege \u201cfacts and circumstances establishing probable cause\u201d for the issuance of the search warrant. Id.\nThe United States Supreme Court has adopted a \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d approach in determining whether probable cause exists in support of the issuance of a search warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 543. \u201cTo establish probable cause, an affidavit for a search warrant must set forth such facts that a \u2018reasonably discreet and prudent person would rely upon[.]\u2019 \u201d State v. King, 92 N.C. App. 75, 77, 373 S.E.2d. 566, 568 (1988) (quoting Arrington, 311 N.C. at 636, 319 S.E.2d at 256).\nThe issuing magistrate must determine whether probable cause exists in order to support issuance of the search warrant. State v. McKinnon, 306 N.C. 288, 293, 293 S.E.2d 118, 122 (1982). \u201cThe task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.\u201d Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 548 (quotations omitted) (emphasis supplied). Probable cause need not be shown by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether it is more probable than not that drugs or other contraband will be found at a specifically described location.\nHere, the magistrate determined sufficient and reliable information was shown in Officer Warren\u2019s affidavit to establish probable cause and that a search warrant should be issued. Reviewing courts should give \u201cgreat deference\u201d to the issuing \u201cmagistrate\u2019s determination.\u201d Id. at 236, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 547.\nOfficer Warren\u2019s affidavit states that he \u201creceived information from a confidential and reliable informant\u201d who had seen hydro-codone inside defendant\u2019s home, without a prescription, within the past forty-eight hours. (Emphasis supplied). The trial court concluded Officer Warren\u2019s affidavit showed no basis for believing the information was reliable. We disagree.\nOfficer Warren asserted in his affidavit he had known the informant for nine years, during which time the informant had provided \u201cconfidential and reliable\u201d information in the past that had proven to be true through independent investigations. The fact that the word \u201cinvestigations\u201d was plural implies Officer Warren had used this particular informant on more than one occasion throughout the past nine years. Officer Warren\u2019s ongoing relationship with the informant supports the magistrate\u2019s determination that the information provided was reliable.\nThe affidavit also states that the informant was familiar with this drug and its uses, further supporting the inference that the information was reliable. \u201cAn officer may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant\u2019s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer\u2019s knowledge.\u201d Id. at 242, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 550 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).\nOfficer Warren\u2019s twenty-four years of prior experience with the police department, including seven years of street level drug interdiction, shows he has. attained extensive knowledge regarding drug investigations and the issuance of search warrants. Even though Officer Warren did not spell out in exact detail the connection between the informant and the previous drug investigations, the magistrate could properly infer the confidential informant had provided reliable information to Officer Warren in previous situations. Following Gates, Officer Warren supplied sufficiently reliable information in his affidavit through his own extensive experience and his previous knowledge of the informant\u2019s reliability throughout their nine year relationship. Id.\nDefendant\u2019s arguments would require the officer\u2019s application and affidavit to technically spell out every detail to specifically show probable cause exists. \u201c[A]ffidavits \u2018are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity ... have no proper place in this area.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 235, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 546 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 689 (1965)). Officer Warren\u2019s affidavit was drafted by an experienced police officer during an investigation of a potential drug offender and was sufficient to establish probable cause for the magistrate.\nWe find under the \u201ctotality of the circumstances,\u201d the affidavit provided the magistrate with probable cause through a common sense knowledge determination based on the following: (1) Officer Warren\u2019s extensive experience; (2) his long established relationship with the informant; (3) the information provided; and (4). the specificity of the type of drugs observed. Id. at 230, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 543. The trial court erred in concluding the magistrate did not have a substantial basis in fact for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. The trial court\u2019s order suppressing the evidence recovered during the search is reversed.\nV. Case Dismissal\nThe State also argues the trial court erred by dismissing the case when no motion to dismiss the indictments was pending or made before the trial court and the case was still in its pretrial stage. We agree.\nDefendant asserts the issuance of a search warrant without probable cause so fragrantly violated his constitutional rights that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the case was required to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-954(a). The State argues the trial court ex mero motu dismissed the charges because it determined that without the suppressed evidence, the State did not have sufficient evidence to submit this case to a jury.\nThe standard of review for deciding whether to dismiss \u201cis whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 790, 795, 622 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2005) (quoting State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990)). \u201cSubstantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 583-84, 461 S.E.2d 655, 663 (1995) (quoting State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991)). The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the State and \u201cthe State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 150, 463 S.E.2d 193, 199 (1995) (citing State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). \u201cUltimately, the court must decide whether a reasonable inference of defendant\u2019s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.\u201d State v. Ellis, 168 N.C. App. 651, 657, 608 S.E.2d 803, 807 (2005) (citing Powell, 299 N.C. at 99, 261 S.E.2d at 117).\nThe granting of a motion to suppress does not mandate a pretrial dismissal of the underlying indictments. The district attorney may elect to dismiss or proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence and attempt to establish a prima facie case. If so, a defendant may move to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and renew his motion at the close of all evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15-173 (2005). We have held the trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. The issuance of the search warrant did not violate defendant\u2019s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. The trial court\u2019s pretrial order to dismiss defendant\u2019s charges is reversed.\nVI. Conclusion\nProbable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant. Defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated when the police legally and reasonably searched his home pursuant to a valid search warrant and seized illegal drugs and paraphernalia. The search warrant was properly issued and the evidence seized from the execution of the search should not have been suppressed.\nEven if this evidence had been properly suppressed, it is possible for the State to present evidence, apart from the poisonous fruits of an illegal search, to survive defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and allow the jury to find the facts. The trial court erred by granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence seized and in dismissing the charges ex mero motu. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and Remanded.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge McCULLOUGH concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Grumpier, for the State.", "Rudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HENRY DOWD EDWARDS, JR.\nNo. COA06-1415\n(Filed 4 September 2007)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 probable cause for warrant \u2014 evidence erroneously suppressed\nA trial court order suppressing the evidence recovered during a search was reversed where the court erred by deciding that a magistrate lacked a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause for a warrant did not exist. Under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit provided the magistrate' with probable cause through a common sense determination based on the officer\u2019s extensive experience, his long established relationship with the informant, the information provided, and the specificity of the type of drugs observed.\n2. Drugs\u2014 ex mero motu dismissal of charges \u2014 evidence erroneously suppressed\nThe trial court erred by dismissing ex mero motu narcotics charges which arose from the search of defendant\u2019s home where the court had erroneously suppressed the evidence seized from the home. Even if the evidence had been properly suppressed, it is possible for the State to present other evidence; the granting of a motion to suppress does not mandate the pretrial dismissal of the underlying indictments.\nAppeal by the State from order entered 11 April 2006 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 August 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Grumpier, for the State.\nRudolf Widenhouse & Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0701-01", "first_page_order": 733, "last_page_order": 739 }