{ "id": 8154366, "name": "MAXTON McDOWELL, WANDA H. McDOWELL, CLAUDE WINSLOW, and BARBARA WINSLOW, Plaintiffs v. RANDOLPH COUNTY and McDOWELL LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "McDowell v. Randolph County", "decision_date": "2007-09-18", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1533", "first_page": "17", "last_page": "30", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 N.C. App. 17" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638081 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d. 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637514 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2482580 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-14", "parenthetical": "quoting Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249985 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321", "parenthetical": "quoting Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1008" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11255587 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/172/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527459 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 S.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626458 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "alteration added" }, { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219598 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "alteration added" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567570 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522879 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 103", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562113, 2566065, 2560632, 2561049, 2561822 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0171-04", "/nc/323/0171-03", "/nc/323/0171-01", "/nc/323/0171-05", "/nc/323/0171-02" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524247 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543405 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524627 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "684" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2548640, 2547147, 2546833, 2548952, 2548026 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0462-04", "/nc/333/0462-05", "/nc/333/0462-02", "/nc/333/0462-03", "/nc/333/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541", "parenthetical": "citing Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 389" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523581 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "citing Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 389" }, { "page": "238" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" }, { "page": "774", "parenthetical": "finding \"no evidence demonstrating compatibility between the rezoning and an existing comprehensive plan\"" }, { "page": "771", "parenthetical": "\"A zoning authority cannot satisfy the 'clear showing of a reasonable basis' requirement simply by catalogu-ing the many benefits it received as a result of the zoning change.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219914 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "389" }, { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "590", "parenthetical": "\"While this Court understands that it was the Chrismons alone who lived next door to the operation, we do note that it was the Chrismons, and no one else, who spoke up against the rezoning.\" (emphasis in original)" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517410 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 S.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 S.E. 83", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630161 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557751, 8557736, 8557705, 8557719, 8557689 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0178-05", "/nc/291/0178-04", "/nc/291/0178-02", "/nc/291/0178-03", "/nc/291/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555266 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562814 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "622-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8174530 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739419 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0193-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1336, "char_count": 31455, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.322899802535605e-08, "percentile": 0.4802754909649173 }, "sha256": "b04d9947258c03c521adbc813a0b2187b7a392edbe27fc946ffbc5b81d4d0596", "simhash": "1:c32de1a4821f3a96", "word_count": 5058 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:40.090074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "MAXTON McDOWELL, WANDA H. McDOWELL, CLAUDE WINSLOW, and BARBARA WINSLOW, Plaintiffs v. RANDOLPH COUNTY and McDOWELL LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nMaxton and Wanda McDowell (\u201cthe McDowells\u201d) and Claude and Barbara Winslow (\u201cthe Winslows\u201d) (collectively, \u201cplaintiffs\u201d) brought an action against Randolph County (\u201cdefendant\u201d) and McDowell Lumber Company, Inc. (\u201cMLC\u201d), requesting that the trial court, inter alia, (1) invalidate defendant\u2019s rezoning of a portion of MLC\u2019s property; (2) enjoin certain operations at the MLC property; and (3) issue mandamus ordering defendant to enforce its zoning ordinance against the MLC property. The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff in part and for defendant in part. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nThe McDowells own a home located adjacent to MLC\u2019s property in Randolph County, and the Winslows own a home located adjacent to and east of MLC\u2019s property. Defendant has in effect a Unified Development Ordinance (\u201cUDO\u201d), adopted on 6 July 1987. According to the UDO, a portion of MLC\u2019s property lies in a Light Industrial zoning district (\u201cLI\u201d), and the balance of the property is zoned Residential Agricultural (\u201cRA\u201d). The surrounding areas, including plaintiffs\u2019 properties, all are zoned RA. Pursuant to the UDO, permanent-sawmills and planing mills are prohibited in both the RA and LI zoning districts. MLC has on its property a lumber yard, a permanent saw mill, a pallet-making operation, and other related milling operations. A portion of MLC\u2019s operation existed prior to the adoption of the UDO in 1987.\nOn 4 February 2002, defendant adopted the Randolph County Growth Management Plan (\u201cGMP\u201d), in which it designated the tract at issue as \u201cRural Growth.\u201d Between March 2000 and December 2004, MLC routinely sought and obtained building permits from defendant, notwithstanding continued zoning as LI and RA. During this time, MLC expanded its operations further into the portion of its property zoned RA, and in late 2004, MLC erected an 800 square foot kiln building and an 8,000 square foot addition to an existing building within twenty feet of the Winslows\u2019 property.\nPlaintiffs allege that MLC\u2019s operation results in noise pollution, air pollution resulting from sawdust and fumes, and increased truck traffic, all of which cause injury to the value of their properties and diminution in their ability to use and enjoy their properties. Defendant alleges that MLC is in compliance with all applicable state regulations with respect to air pollution, water contamination, and vehicular traffic issues. Defendant also notes that the UDO specifically recognizes uses in place at the time of the initial adoption as lawful either by zoning classification or as non-conforming uses. Further, defendant argues that at the time of the adoption of the UDO in 1987, MLC\u2019s property mistakenly was designated LI and RA when it should have been designated Heavy Industrial (\u201cHI\u201d). Defendant has treated the property as if it had been properly zoned or as if MLC\u2019s operations constituted valid, pre-existing, non-conforming uses under the UDO.\nOn 18 November 2004, MLC applied to defendant to change the zoning classification of its property from LI and RA to Heavy Industrial/Conditional Use (\u201cHI-CU\u201d). On- 7 February 2005, the application was brought for review at a public hearing, during which plaintiffs and their family members voiced their objections to the rezoning, citing inconsistencies between the use of the property and the UDO and the GMR On 2 May 2005, the Randolph County Board of Commissioners approved MLC\u2019s rezoning application. Plaintiffs contested the decision, alleging that they have been damaged by defendant\u2019s failure to enforce the UDO and that defendant engaged in illegal spot zoning by rezoning MLC\u2019s property.\nOn 25 May 2005, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and petition for writ of mandamus. On 18 September 2006, the trial court held a hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, and plaintiffs thereafter voluntarily dismissed MLC from their lawsuit. On 28 September 2006, the trial court entered an order granting plaintiffs\u2019 motion for summary judgment in part, declaring that defendant\u2019s rezoning decision on 2 May 2005 constituted illegal spot zoning and, therefore, was null and void. The trial court, however, denied plaintiffs\u2019 request that defendant be required to enforce the UDO against MLC and thereby limit the use of MLC\u2019s property to operations as they existed on 6 July 1987. Plaintiffs and defendant both filed timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court (1) properly declared the rezoning of MLC\u2019s property null and void; and (2) erred in denying plaintiffs\u2019 petition for writ of mandamus. On cross-appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) in not granting summary judgment for defendant pursuant to the doctrine of laches; and (2) in concluding that defendant\u2019s action constituted illegal spot zoning.\nThe standard of review from an order allowing summary judgment is well-established: \u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s order for summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is a \u2018genuine issue of material fact\u2019 and whether either party is \u2018entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196, 639 S.E.2d. 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)). Here, since the parties stipulated before the trial court that there existed no disputed issue of material fact, \u201c[w]e need only determine whether summary judgment was properly entered in plaintiffs\u2019 favor, or conversely should have been entered in favor of defendant.\u201d Geitner v. Mullins, 182 N.C. App. 585, 589, 643 S.E.2d 435, 438 (2007).\nIn its first cross-assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment for defendant pursuant to the doctrine of laches. We disagree.\n\u201c[L] aches is an affirmative defense. It must be pleaded and the burden of proof is on the party who pleads it.\u201d Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 622, 227 S.E.2d 576, 584 (1976). In the instant case, defendant specifically and affirmatively pled the doctrine of laches. The trial court, however, failed \u201cto make any finding, reach any conclusion or otherwise rule on the[] plea.\u201d Stutts v. Swaim, 30 N.C. App. 611, 615, 228 S.E.2d 750, 753, disc. rev. denied, 291 N.C. 178, 229 S.E.2d 692 (1976). Therefore, we must determine \u201cwhether the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of laches and to require a finding and conclusion by the court.\u201d Id.\n\u201cIn equity, where lapse of time has resulted in some change in the condition of the property or in the relations of the parties which would make it unjust to permit the prosecution of the claim, the doctrine of laches will be applied.\u201d Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 294, 199 S.E. 83, 88 (1938). As our Supreme Court later clarified, \u201cthe mere passage or lapse of time is insufficient to support a finding of laches; for the doctrine of laches to be sustained, the delay must be shown to be unreasonable and must have worked to the disadvantage, injury or prejudice of the person seeking to invoke it.\u201d Taylor, 290 N.C. at 622-23, 227 S.E.2d 584-85 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nIn the case sub judice, regardless of the passage of time, defendant, as the party seeking to invoke the defense of laches, has not demonstrated prejudice resulting from any alleged delay in plaintiffs\u2019 initiating this action. Although the record indicates that MLC has invested substantial sums of money in reliance on defendant\u2019s actions, defendant has failed to argue and the evidence fails to demonstrate that defendant itself has sustained any injury. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s cross-assignment of error is overruled.\nIn its second cross-assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that its zoning action with respect to MLC\u2019s property constituted illegal spot zoning. We disagree.\n\u201cZoning, as a definitional matter, is the regulation by a local governmental entity of the use of land within a given community, and of the buildings and structures which may be located thereon.\u201d Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 617, 370 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1988). \u201c[A]s a general proposition, a municipality\u2019s zoning actions are presumed to be reasonable and valid.\u201d Good Neighbors of S. Davidson v. Town of Denton, 355 N.C. 254, 258 n.2, 559 S.E.2d 768, 771 (2002). This presumption, however, is set aside when a municipality\u2019s actions constitute spot zoning. See id. Spot zoning has been defined as a zoning action that \u201csingles out and reclassifies a relatively small tract owned by a single person and surrounded by a much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to . . . relieve the small tract from restrictions to which the rest of the area is subjected.\u201d Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972). \u201c[I]n any spot zoning case in North Carolina courts, two questions must be addressed by the finder of fact: (1) did the zoning activity in the case constitute spot zoning as our courts have defined that term; and (2) if so, did the zoning authority make a clear showing of a. reasonable basis for the zoning.\u201d Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 627, 370 S.E.2d at 589.\nIn the case sub judice, defendant does not dispute that the rezoning constituted spot zoning, and therefore, this issue is not before us. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a), 28(b)(6) (2006). The dispute, instead, centers on the validity of the spot zoning, with the trial court\u2019s concluding that \u201c[t]here is no clear showing of a reasonable basis for this rezoning. The undisputed evidence is that there is no accompanying benefit to the plaintiffs and no benefit to the surrounding community or to the public interest.\u201d On appeal, defendant contends \u201cthat the action of Randolph County was permissible, valid, and lawful spot zoning.\u201d We disagree.\n\u201c[A] judicial determination as to the existence or nonexistence of a sufficient reasonable basis in the context of spot zoning is, and must be, the product of a complex of factors.\u201d Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 589 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court has enumerated several factors that are relevant to a showing of the existence of a sufficient reasonable basis for spot zoning.\n1. The size of the tract in question.\n2. The compatibility of the disputed action with an existing comprehensive zoning plan.\n3. The benefits and detriments for the owner, his neighbors and the surrounding community.\n4. The relationship of the uses envisioned under the new zoning and the uses currently present in adjacent tracts.\nCovington v. Town of Apex, 108 N.C. App. 231, 238, 423 S.E.2d 537, 541 (1992) (citing Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 628, 370 S.E.2d at 389), disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 462, 427 S.E.2d 620 (1993).\n\u201cThe first factor is the size of the tract in question.\u201d Id. Although the size of the property is not dispositive, our Courts have found illegal spot zoning present in cases in which the tract of land at issue ranged from 0.58 acres, see Mahaffey v. Forsyth County, 99 N.C. App. 676, 394 S.E.2d 203, aff'd, 328 N.C. 323, 401 S.E.2d 365 (1991) (per curiam), to fifty acres. See Good Neighbors, 355 N.C. 254, 559 S.E.2d 768. Here, the tract of land, which amounted to 29.95 acres, falls squarely within that range. Defendant approved MLC\u2019s application to rezone a 29.95-acre portion of its 120.30-acre property from the LI and RA districts to the HI-CU district. The remaining 90.35 acres, or approximately seventy-five percent, of MLC\u2019s property remains zoned LI or RA; the land surrounding MLC\u2019s property, which plaintiff Maxton McDowell estimated as comprising thousands of acres and which includes plaintiffs\u2019 property, remains uniformly zoned RA.\n\u201cThe second factor is the compatibility of the disputed action with an existing comprehensive zoning plan. \u2018Zoning generally must be accomplished in accordance with a comprehensive plan in order to promote the general welfare and serve the purpose of the enabling statute.\u2019 \u201d Covington, 108 N.C. App. at 238, 423 S.E.2d at 541 (quoting Alderman v. Chatham County, 89 N.C. App. 610, 615-16, 366 S.E.2d 885, 889, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 171, 373 S.E.2d 103 (1988)). Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, .section' 153A-341, \u201c[z]oning regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan\u201d and \u201cshall be designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-341 (2005).\nIn the instant case, defendant adopted the UDO on 6 July 1987 and the GMP on 4 February 2002. Through both the UDO and the GMP, defendant\u2019s comprehensive zoning plan has included the goal of separating incompatible land uses and ensuring that such uses are not placed immediately adjacent to one another. According to the UDO, the purpose of the RA district\nis to provide a place for agricultural operations; forestry; scattered non-farm residences on traditional rural lots while preserving rural open space and natural heritage assets. To maintain rural character[,] only minor conventional residential subdivisions are allowed in this District.\nThe HI-CU district, to which defendant rezoned a portion of MLC\u2019s property, encompasses the same regulations as the HI district and \u201cis designed to accommodate those industries whose normal operations include dust, noise; odor, or other emissions which may be deemed objectionable.\u201d Similarly, the GMP expressly provides that \u201c[industrial development should not be located in areas that would diminish the desirability of existing and planned residential uses.\u201d The tract at issue in the instant case is located within an area in the GMP characterized as a \u201cRural Growth Area,\u201d which is comprised of predominantly agricultural and rural residential development. The GMP notes as a \u201cDevelopment Consideration!]\u201d that \u201c[c]onflict among incompatible land uses can be extreme\u201d in a rural growth area. Therefore, as a \u201cDevelopment Polic[y],\u201d the GMP \u201c[r]equire[s] dedicated open space as a buffer between incompatible land uses.\u201d\nHere, the tract that defendant rezoned as HI-CU is surrounded by land uniformly zoned RA and is immediately adjacent to property developed for residential uses. As a result, plaintiffs\u2019 properties, along with other properties zoned RA, have experienced some of the problems that the UDO and the GMP exist to prevent. Specifically, during the rezoning public hearing on 7 February 2005, residents noted- increased and sustained noise, increased odor pollution, increased sawdust emission, heightened traffic and safety concerns, and the likelihood of diminished property values. These problems have been exacerbated by the fact that no substantial buffer between the HI-CU land and plaintiffs\u2019 land has been established, even though the GMP requires such a buffer between heavy industrial sites and residential areas.\nAlthough some of MLC\u2019s operations existed prior to the adoption of the UDO and the GMP, the record reflects that MLC\u2019s application for rezoning coincided with an expansion of its operations in late 2004 \u2014 namely, MLC added a pallet-making operation, located directly adjacent to the Winslows\u2019 property. In late 2004, defendant issued building permits and zoning permits for new structures on MLC\u2019s property, including an 800 square foot kiln building and an 8,000 square foot addition to an existing building within twenty feet of the Winslows\u2019 property. The UDO, however, provides that \u201cit is the intent of this ordinance to permit these non-conformance[s] to continue until they are removed . . ., but not to encourage their continuance.\u201d\nBy approving MLC\u2019s rezoning application, defendant acted \u201cin direct contravention of its comprehensive zoning plan.\u201d Covington, 108 N.C. App. at 239, 423 S.E.2d at 541; see also Good Neighbors, 355 N.C. at 262, 559 S.E.2d at 774 (finding \u201cno evidence demonstrating compatibility between the rezoning and an existing comprehensive plan\u201d).\n\u201cThe third relevant factor is the benefits and detriments to the owner, his neighbors and the surrounding community.\u201d Covington, 108 N.C. App. at 239, 423 S.E.2d at 542. As our Supreme Court stated in Chrismon, \u201c[t]he standard is not the advantage or detriment to particular neighboring landowners, but rather the effect upon the entire community as a social, economic and political unit.\u201d Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 629, 370 S.E.2d at 590 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nHere, defendant asserts that permitting \u201cthe continued operation of McDowell Lumber Company after 31 years .. ., with its investment and payroll exceeding 100 employees is in the public interest by increasing \u2018economic activity, job creation, and the tax base of Randolph County.\u2019 \u201d However, defendant presented no evidence of such benefits to the planning board, and there is no evidence in the record to support defendant\u2019s assertion. See Good Neighbors, 355 N.C. at 258, 559 S.E.2d at 771 (\u201cA zoning authority cannot satisfy the \u2018clear showing of a reasonable basis\u2019 requirement simply by catalogu-ing the many benefits it received as a result of the zoning change.\u201d).\nDefendant also contends that \u201cthe restrictive conditions, enforceable by the County, attached to the conditional use rezoning which were nonexistent before,... inure to the sole benefit of the two adjacent landowners.\u201d Those conditions include: (1) obtaining clearance from the cable company before digging near a cable right-of-way; (2) not constructing buildings north of any existing structure facing Old N.C. Highway 49; (3) maintaining three rows of trees fronting Old N.C. Highway 49, three rows along MLC\u2019s eastern property line, one row along the southeastern property line, and one row along the western property line; (4) relocating certain existing fans; (5) enclosing one wall of the pallet building with an insulated roof to reduce noise; (6) revamping the breathing and inspection portion of the sawdust waste bin to reduce dust; (7) reducing the number of outside lights by approximately one-half, contingent upon employee security; (8) establishing a schedule for truck traffic; (9) continuing to comply with provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (\u201cOSHA\u201d) with respect to safety, noise, and air quality; and (10) continuing to comply with state and federal regulations with respect to stormwater run-off.\nFirst, those opposing the rezoning application were not concerned with stormwater run-off, cable right-of-ways, or outside lighting. Additionally, MLC had a pre-existing, ongoing duty to comply with state and federal laws. Furthermore, although defendants drafted the conditions to include specific numbers of trees for different areas along the property line, the trees were to alleviate alleged concerns about \u201cvisual aesthetics.\u201d There is no evidence in the record, however, from which this Court can determine how significant a buffer area the trees would create between plaintiffs\u2019 properties and the MLC property, particularly considering that the trees previously acting as a buffer had been removed and that the proposed evergreens would take years to mature. Next, MLC promised to relocate certain fans on the exterior of the pallet building and to enclose one exterior wall, stating, \u201cThis is gonna [sic] help reduce noise.\u201d The record, however, fails to demonstrate what effect these alterations would have on the noise levels. Finally, defendant promised to enclose \u201c[t]he open breathing inspection hole at the top of the sawdust waste bin\u201d and to install a new sheet metal pipe to channel sawdust, but the record does not include specific information with respect to projected dust reduction. Ultimately, the record fails to detail the precise effect that the conditions MLC agreed to impose upon its property would have \u201cupon the entire community as a social, economic, and political unit.\u201d Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 629, 370 S.E.2d at 590 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and plaintiffs contended at the hearing that \u201cthere are [no] . . . conditions whatsoever that can cure that situation.\u201d\n\u201cOn the other hand, there is ample evidence showing that the [rezoning action] will result in detrimental consequences for both neighbors of the property and the surrounding community.\u201d Good Neighbors, 355 N.C. at 260, 359 S.E.2d at 773. This is demonstrated first by the fact that several people spoke in opposition to MLC\u2019s rezoning application at the public hearing. In addition to plaintiffs\u2019 attorney, plaintiff Maxton McDowell, plaintiff Barbara Winslow, and plaintiff Claude Winslow, the Winslow\u2019s daughter, plaintiff Claude Winslow\u2019s brother, Marian Mueller (\u201cMueller\u201d), and Gaynelle Vionni (\u201cVionni\u201d) also opposed the rezoning. Compare Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 630, 370 S.E.2d at 590 (\u201cWhile this Court understands that it was the Chrismons alone who lived next door to the operation, we do note that it was the Chrismons, and no one else, who spoke up against the rezoning.\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nAmong the detrimental consequences for the community is the increased truck traffic. As plaintiffs\u2019 attorney explained, \u201c[t]here are many safety issues here to deal with: truck traffic, truck parking, truck issues as they go along, forklifts going in and out,\u201d particularly in light of the age and size of the main highway. Accordingly to plaintiff Claude Winslow,\non January the 12th I took eight hours from eight o\u2019clock in the morning till four o\u2019clock in the afternoon and counted trucks. . . . I sat there and counted trucks all day going in and out of that sawmill. . . . You know how many there were? 156.\nLater in the hearing, Mueller stated, \u201cWhen we first started coming here, there was [sic] no logging trucks. . . . [N]ow it takes me 10 to 15 minutes to get to town, and I will pass one to two trucks every single time on that little road . . . .\u201d Finally, we note, as we did in Budd v. Davie County, 116 N.C. App. 168, 176, 447 S.E.2d 449, 454 (1994), that \u201c[a]ll of the area surrounding the rezoned land and the area surrounding the routes the trucks . . . would drive are residential and agricultural areas. There is no industry in the area . . . .\u201d\nPlaintiffs also presented evidence supporting their contention that MLC\u2019s operations resulted in increased noise and dust that impacted their ability to enjoy their property. The Winslows\u2019 daughter, Kim Huffman (\u201cHuffman\u201d), presented video evidence demonstrating the steady, loud noise generated by operations on MLC\u2019s property. Huffman\u2019s video also depicted how the sawdust produced by MLC covers vehicles owned by neighborhood residents. The noise and air pollution issues also were reflected in a letter written by Vionni, the tenant living at the Winslows\u2019 rental property:\nUnfortunately, I will have to move as soon as possible due to pollution from the mill next door.\nI was aware of the mill when I moved here. At that that [sic] there was a buffer zone of trees between the house and the mill. Although the noise could be heard, it was tolerable. Although the mill was partially visible, the trees effectively blocked most of it, and the trees also served as [a] buffer for the dust \u2014 dust particles. Since the trees have been removed, the noise is extremely intrusive. At times I am unable to hear the television and I have had problems with people calling me on the telephone and asking me, \u201cWhat is that noise?\u201d\n. . . Dust particles continue to cover my car and I\u2019m sure my respiratory system as well, creating a significant health risk.\nThe only thing visible from my kitchen and bedroom windows is the mill, an extremely unattractive view. I am a very patient and tolerable \u2014 tolerant person. I had hoped to live here for many years. It is my opinion that Mr. and Mrs. Winslow will not be able to rent this property at all under these conditions.\nBased upon the foregoing evidence, \u201c[w]e agree that the detriment to the community outweighs any alleged benefit.\u201d Mahaffey, 99 N.C. App. at 684, 394 S.E.2d at 208.\nThe final Chrismon factor is \u201cthe compatibility of the uses envisioned in the rezoned tract with the uses already present in adjacent tracts.\u201d Covington, 108 N.C. App. at 240, 423 S.E.2d at 542. As our Supreme Court noted, \u201crezoning of a parcel in an old and well-established residential district to a commercial or industrial district would clearly be objectionable.\u201d Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 631, 370 S.E.2d at 391. Here, the evidence demonstrates that the heavy industrial operations on MLC\u2019s property are incompatible with the adjacent residential tracts as a result of, inter alia, the noise, air pollution, and truck traffic.\nBased upon the foregoing analysis, we hold \u201cthat the rezoning was an illegal spot zoning and was, therefore, \u2018in excess of the authority\u2019 of the Board of Commissioners and invalid.\u201d Budd, 116 N.C. App. at 178, 447 S.E.2d at 455 (quoting Blades, 280 N.C. at 551, 187 S.E.2d at 46). The trial court, therefore, correctly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and denied summary judgment to defendant on this ground.\nFinally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their request for mandamus, in which they requested that the trial court order defendant to enforce the UDO as to MLC\u2019s property as it existed when the UDO was adopted. We disagree.\n\u201cThe writ of mandamus is an ancient and carefully circumscribed extraordinary remedy.\u201d Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 452, 251 S.E.2d 843, 866 (1979). As our Supreme Court has explained,\nmandamus will lie to compel the performance of a purely ministerial duty imposed by law, and that the party seeking the writ must have a clear legal right to demand it, and the party sought to be coerced must be under legal obligation to perform the duty. \u201c[The function of the writ] is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty \u2014 not to establish a legal right, but to enforce one which has been established.\u201d\nHinshaw v. McIver, 244 N.C. 256, 259, 93 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1956) (alteration added) (quoting St. George v. Hanson, 239 N.C. 259, 263, 78 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1954)). Our Court has noted that mandamus may be appropriate when, as in the instant case, a party seeks to compel the enforcement of a zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Midgette v. Pate, 94 N.C. App. 498, 505, 380 S.E.2d 572, 576 (1989). However, mandamus is not appropriate and \u201cthe writ will not issue . . . where the rights of those not parties to the action would be injuriously affected.\u201d Hinshaw, 244 N.C. at 259, 93 S.E.2d at 92; accord Britt v. Bd. of Canvassers, 172 N.C. 797, 805, 90 S.E. 1005, 1008 (1916).\nHere, enforcement of the zoning ordinance would directly and detrimentally impact MLC\u2019s ability to continue its current use of the property in question. Therefore, MLC\u2019s rights would be injuriously affected by the granting of mandamus. Although MLC initially was a defendant in the case, the trial court noted that during the hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment, \u201c[plaintiffs announced to the court that they were taking a voluntary dismissal as to [MLC].\u201d The basis for the dismissal is not evident from the record on appeal. On 19 September 2006, plaintiffs signed \u2014 and later submitted to the trial court \u2014 the \u201cNotice of Voluntary Dismissal of Claims as Against Defendant McDowell Lumber Company, Inc.\u201d Thereafter, on 28 September 2006, the trial court entered its order on the cross motions between plaintiffs and defendant.\nThe trial court properly denied plaintiffs\u2019 request that m'andamus be issued to compel defendant \u201cto \u2018roll back\u2019 the enforcement of the zoning ordinance as to this property as it existed in 1987.\u201d Although the trial court based its decision upon defendant\u2019s good faith issuance of building permits to MLC and MLC\u2019s good faith reliance upon those permits, it is well-settled that \u201c \u2018[i]f the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered.\u2019 \u201d Wells v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 152 N.C. App. 307, 321, 567 S.E.2d 803, 813-14 (2002) (quoting Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989)). The trial court did not err in refusing to issue the extraordinary writ of mandamus, and accordingly, plaintiffs\u2019 assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and GEER concur.\n. Although plaintiffs raised this issue in their brief as appellants, plaintiffs properly should have addressed this issue in their brief as appellees, since it was defendant who assigned error to this issue.\n. Although defendant\u2019s planning director stated during the 7 February 2005 hearing that these conditions were offered in response to issues raised by plaintiff Maxton McDowell at a planning board hearing in December 2004, the record fails to contain a transcript from that hearing, and, therefore, this Court is unable to determine what precise issues were raised in December 2004.\n. When a zoning action is invalidated on the basis of illegal spot zoning, \u201c[t]he zoning classification of the property at issue reverts to the last legal classification\u201d of the property as defined by the applicable zoning ordinance. Budd, 116 N.C. App. at 178, 447 S.E.2d at 455 (citing Mahaffey, 99 N.C. App. at 684, 394 S.E.2d at 208). Therefore, in the case sub judice, the zoning classification for the property at issue necessarily reverts to its classification prior to the illegal rezoning. See id. However, MLC\u2019s operations on the property prior to the rezoning application constituted a legal non-conforming use, and therefore, plaintiffs petitioned for mandamus to have the UDO enforced against the property as it existed in 1987.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Brough Law Firm, by Robert E. Homik, Jr., for plaintiff - appellants/cross-appellees.", "Gavin Cox Pugh and Wilhoit LLP, by Alan V. Pugh and Darren C. Allen, for defendant-appellees/cross-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MAXTON McDOWELL, WANDA H. McDOWELL, CLAUDE WINSLOW, and BARBARA WINSLOW, Plaintiffs v. RANDOLPH COUNTY and McDOWELL LUMBER COMPANY, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA06-1533\n(Filed 18 September 2007)\n1. Laches\u2014 rezoning \u2014 defense raised by county \u2014 no injury shown\nThe trial court did not err by refusing to grant summary judgment for defendant county on the defense of laches in an action which sought to invalidate a rezoning. Although the company which sought the rezoning invested substantial sums in reliance on defendant\u2019s actions, the evidence does not demonstrate that defendant itself sustained any injury.\n2. Zoning\u2014 illegal spot zoning \u2014 lumberyard\nThe trial court did not err by concluding that a rezoning to permit a lumberyard, a saw-mill, and related operations was illegal spot zoning, considering the size of the tract; the existing comprehensive zoning plan; the benefit and detriment to the owner, the neighbors, and the community; and the relationship of the proposed uses to current uses.\n3. Mandamus\u2014 to enforce zoning plan \u2014 third party injury\u2014 mandamus not appropriate\nThe trial court did not err by denying plaintiff\u2019s request for a writ of mandamus to enforce the zoning plan in place before an illegal spot zoning. Mandamus is not appropriate when it injuriously affects the rights of those not parties to the action; the landowner here had been dismissed from the action and would be injuriously affected by the mandamus.\nAppeal by plaintiffs and cross-appeal by defendants from order entered 28 September 2006 by Judge Charles C. Lamm in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 June 2007.\nThe Brough Law Firm, by Robert E. Homik, Jr., for plaintiff - appellants/cross-appellees.\nGavin Cox Pugh and Wilhoit LLP, by Alan V. Pugh and Darren C. Allen, for defendant-appellees/cross-appellants." }, "file_name": "0017-01", "first_page_order": 47, "last_page_order": 60 }