{ "id": 8155183, "name": "DAVID STANDLEY, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF WOODFIN, an incorporated municipality in the State of NC; and BRETT HOLLOMAN, Chief of Police, in his Official Capacity, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Standley v. Town of Woodfin", "decision_date": "2007-10-02", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1449", "first_page": "134", "last_page": "166", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 N.C. App. 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633132 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 841", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636504 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 U.S. 61", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3657997 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/220/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554234, 8554220 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0835-01", "/nc-app/46/0833-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575129 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L. Ed. 2d 697", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6222105, 1148012 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0739-01", "/us/341/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 739", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6222105 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 L. Ed. 303", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "case_ids": [ 1501273 ], "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314", "parenthetical": "\"[Bjefore the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/272/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395", "parenthetical": "\"[Bjefore the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 100", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8953866 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566577 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 916116 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted" }, { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/521/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 144", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765344 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168-69", "parenthetical": "considering two additional factors not considered in Smithy" }, { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "considering two additional factors not considered in Smithy" }, { "page": "169" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 84", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030411 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661 (1963) (considering two additional factors not considered in Smithy" }, { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661 (1963) (considering two additional factors not considered in Smithy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030296 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640-41" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "641" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552790 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078355 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6228898 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 F.3d 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11427777 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/310/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 F.2d 255", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10528184 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/899/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 F.3d 251", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8914465 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265", "parenthetical": "comparing Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259-68 (3d Cir. 1990) in which intrastate travel is a recognized fundamental right, with Doe, 377 F.3d at 770-71, which rejects sex offenders' claim to a fundamental right to access public parks" }, { "page": "266-67", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/426/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 F.3d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9215146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" }, { "page": "770-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/377/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 U.S. 270", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5708525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1900, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "finding that \"the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment\"" }, { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "finding that \"the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/179/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8434676 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11240754 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8235795 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "539 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8908353, 8908550, 8908454, 8908617, 8908108, 8908205, 8908141, 8908403, 8908500, 8908052, 8908280, 8908251, 8908319 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/539/0915-08", "/us/539/0915-12", "/us/539/0915-10", "/us/539/0915-13", "/us/539/0915-02", "/us/539/0915-04", "/us/539/0915-03", "/us/539/0915-09", "/us/539/0915-11", "/us/539/0915-01", "/us/539/0915-06", "/us/539/0915-05", "/us/539/0915-07" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633104 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 F. Supp. 1310", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7848966 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when plaintiff relied upon scientific publications to establish particular fact, but failed to present expert testimony that those materials constituted learned treatises under Rule 803(18" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/864/1310-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633184 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730118, 4729670, 4725548, 4726092, 4724635 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0174-04", "/nc/320/0174-01", "/nc/320/0174-03", "/nc/320/0174-02", "/nc/320/0174-05" ] }, { "cite": "629 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635722 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "\"Our Supreme Court has held that in considering a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, a trial court may consider material which would be admissible in evidence at trial.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/629/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633154 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637944, 12637942, 12637943 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0802-03", "/se2d/641/0802-01", "/se2d/641/0802-02" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744803, 3740047, 3743632, 3746193, 3741711, 3743098, 3742972, 3745727 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0218-07", "/nc/361/0218-04", "/nc/361/0218-05", "/nc/361/0218-03", "/nc/361/0218-01", "/nc/361/0218-08", "/nc/361/0218-06", "/nc/361/0218-02" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636458, 12636459 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0676-01", "/se2d/633/0676-02" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634719 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527603 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "holding that because professional article was not shown to be learned treatise under N.C.R. Evid. 803(18), it was not admissible as substantive evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556863 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "holding that because professional article was not shown to be learned treatise under N.C.R. Evid. 803(18), it was not admissible as substantive evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Neb. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5275749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109", "parenthetical": "\"When offered to prove the truth of matters asserted in them, learned writings, such as treatises, books, and articles regarding specialized areas of knowledge, are clearly hearsay.\"" }, { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "\"When offered to prove the truth of matters asserted in them, learned writings, such as treatises, books, and articles regarding specialized areas of knowledge, are clearly hearsay.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/248/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 F.2d 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 180498 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is well established that medical textbooks, treatises and professional articles are not freely admissible in evidence to prove the substantive or testimonial facts stated therein, since they are subject to the hearsay rule.\"" }, { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/496/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868", "parenthetical": "exhibit that constituted hearsay \"could not be considered by the trial court on motion for summary judgment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551174 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276", "parenthetical": "exhibit that constituted hearsay \"could not be considered by the trial court on motion for summary judgment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491521, 491781, 491848, 491753, 491727, 491668, 491638, 491482, 491900 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0169-03", "/nc/357/0169-09", "/nc/357/0169-06", "/nc/357/0169-04", "/nc/357/0169-08", "/nc/357/0169-05", "/nc/357/0169-07", "/nc/357/0169-02", "/nc/357/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559879 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554974 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190431 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "holding that party's \"attempt to amend the petition\" was not material that would have been admissible in evidence and, therefore, trial court was not obliged to consider it when ruling upon motion for summary judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11652448 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "holding that party's \"attempt to amend the petition\" was not material that would have been admissible in evidence and, therefore, trial court was not obliged to consider it when ruling upon motion for summary judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301263 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "\"Our Supreme Court has held that in considering a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, a trial court may consider material which would be admissible in evidence at trial.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561041 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161-62", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "31 N.C. App. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550131 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/31/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006 WL 3797974", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*11-13" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 1790", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 1034", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354839, 353190, 353801, 353355, 353102, 354032, 355255, 354130, 355061, 353302, 354263, 355160, 355098 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/1034-04", "/us/535/1034-13", "/us/535/1034-05", "/us/535/1034-08", "/us/535/1034-01", "/us/535/1034-12", "/us/535/1034-07", "/us/535/1034-11", "/us/535/1034-02", "/us/535/1034-03", "/us/535/1034-09", "/us/535/1034-10", "/us/535/1034-06" ] }, { "cite": "755 N.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "865", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "865-66", "parenthetical": "\"Any deprivation of the right to travel, therefore, must be evaluated under a compelling-interest test. Accordingly, the legislation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.\" (internal citation omitted)" }, { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "93 Ohio St. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 248615 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431-32" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/93/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616489 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "quoting Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491505 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "quoting Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.44", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.43", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)(2)" }, { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(f)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.24", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "24 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 5.856", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16945", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16926", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16921", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16918", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16911", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(10)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16925", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(b)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16901", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "120 Stat. 587", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14071", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "108 Stat. 2038", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794414 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155928 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "parenthetical": "second alteration original" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "177-78", "parenthetical": "noting the concern that rights would vary in . different counties and upset the balance reached by General Assembly between economic interests and private property rights" }, { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868", "parenthetical": "\"The constitutionality of a statute will not be considered and determined by the Court as a hypothetical question.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627912 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644", "parenthetical": "\"The constitutionality of a statute will not be considered and determined by the Court as a hypothetical question.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651", "parenthetical": "if town had no authority to adopt ordinance, it would be void, and no one could be punished for violating it" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570981 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "if town had no authority to adopt ordinance, it would be void, and no one could be punished for violating it" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "holding, based on \"contextual reading of the relevant statutes,\" that city ordinance requiring sprinklers was \"invalid and unenforceable\" in light of General Assembly's legislation regarding the State Building Code" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561040 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "75-76" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229", "parenthetical": "although defendant, on appeal, sought to test constitutionality of act under which he was indicted, Supreme Court refused to address constitutional question because appeal could be resolved \"on a question of less moment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622195 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "although defendant, on appeal, sought to test constitutionality of act under which he was indicted, Supreme Court refused to address constitutional question because appeal could be resolved \"on a question of less moment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562312 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766" }, { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522271 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" }, { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631928 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789350, 3794987, 3791275, 3789520, 3791447, 3787453 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0531-05", "/nc/360/0531-01", "/nc/360/0531-02", "/nc/360/0531-04", "/nc/360/0531-03", "/nc/360/0531-06" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8351815 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 419", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "\"It is an established principle of appellate review that this court will refrain from deciding constitutional questions when there is an alternative ground available upon which the case may properly be decided.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574073 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "\"It is an established principle of appellate review that this court will refrain from deciding constitutional questions when there is an alternative ground available upon which the case may properly be decided.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511250 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" }, { "page": "416" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803266 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "457-58", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566577 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 F.3d 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11427777 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/310/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 F.3d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9215146 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773", "parenthetical": "\"The City has banned only one child sex offender, Mr. Doe, from the parks, and they have banned Mr. Doe only because of his near-relapse in January of 2000 . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/377/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.6", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 679610 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805-06", "parenthetical": "party could not object on appeal to contents of summary judgment affidavits when party did not object to affidavits before trial court" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/200/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521227 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437", "parenthetical": "party could not object on appeal to contents of summary judgment affidavits when party did not object to affidavits before trial court" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 39-50", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.29", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.26", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" }, { "page": "710", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "202 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623773 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/202/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200639 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "discussing ordinance as related to the mentally retarded" }, { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "discussing ordinance as related to the mentally retarded" }, { "page": "3259", "parenthetical": "discussing ordinance as related to the mentally retarded" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 F.3d 720", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3463846 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734", "parenthetical": "banning specific sex offender from park when he had been witnessed watching patrons of park through binoculars" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/462/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 U.S. 629", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176239 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642-43" }, { "page": "205-06" }, { "page": "1282" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/390/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 F. Supp. 614", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7845800 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623", "parenthetical": "ordinance not justified even though it was directed at protecting community from harm because conditions in ordinance did not serve that interest in theory and in practice" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/876/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "937 P.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "striking down curfew ordinance when record failed to show any nexus between curfew and juvenile crime rates" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "86 Wash. App. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1278679 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "striking down curfew ordinance when record failed to show any nexus between curfew and juvenile crime rates" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/86/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 F.3d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 405284 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947-48", "parenthetical": "city presented several statistical reports demonstrating that juvenile curfew is a solution to rising juvenile crime and victimization" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/114/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 F. Supp. 1125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7395493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1139" }, { "page": "1140" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/711/1125-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 F. Supp. 2d 1119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9222175 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1128", "parenthetical": "\"Where an ordinance impairs a fundamental right, in order to pass constitutional muster, the government's objective must be compelling and the relation between that objective and the means must be necessary.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/322/1119-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 U.S. 702", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 916123 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" }, { "page": "788" }, { "page": "2268" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/521/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S. Ct. 2276", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "156 L. Ed. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "307 U.S. 496", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6140933 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515-16" }, { "page": "1436-37" }, { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/307/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3799004 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "\"Generally, expert testimony is required when the standard of care and proximate cause are matters involving highly specialized knowledge beyond that of laymen.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8410973 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "\"Generally, expert testimony is required when the standard of care and proximate cause are matters involving highly specialized knowledge beyond that of laymen.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "\"Where a layperson can do no more than speculate as to the cause of a physical condition, the medical opinion of an expert is required to show causation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468870 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "\"Where a layperson can do no more than speculate as to the cause of a physical condition, the medical opinion of an expert is required to show causation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 324", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1670 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "1856-57" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 F.3d 450", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10524341 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/33/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 F.R.D. 539", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 1273817 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "546", "parenthetical": "\"The general rule is that statistical evidence must be supported by expert testimony.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/frd/200/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11471033 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 F.3d 524", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 92923 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/78/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 F.3d 632", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "107 F. Supp. 2d 669", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11244486 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that two unauthenticated medical treatises qualified as learned treatises \"ma[de] the treatises unauthenticated, inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be considered during summary judgment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/107/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8437304 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-35" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169578 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-14" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "holding that article was properly admitted because expert witness testimony established article as reliable scientific authority" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11355280 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179-80", "parenthetical": "holding that article was properly admitted because expert witness testimony established article as reliable scientific authority" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2544898, 2544036, 2542596, 2540463, 2545463 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0571-02", "/nc/328/0571-04", "/nc/328/0571-03", "/nc/328/0571-01", "/nc/328/0571-05" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2825, "char_count": 83052, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.540259037712538e-08, "percentile": 0.40102608298784986 }, "sha256": "d9151e188af78383dd45943a40f29c67dacd4c7bfdd9b83b3bd87497b74e7080", "simhash": "1:32097566b6bfaad2", "word_count": 13371 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:40.090074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge TYSON concurs.", "Judge GEER dissents by separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "DAVID STANDLEY, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF WOODFIN, an incorporated municipality in the State of NC; and BRETT HOLLOMAN, Chief of Police, in his Official Capacity, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nDavid Standley (plaintiff) appeals a judgment of the Buncombe County Superior Court entered 7 August 2006. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision.\nPlaintiff resides with his mother in the Town of Woodfin (Woodfin) in Buncombe County. In 1987, while living in Florida, plaintiff was convicted of attempted sexual battery and aggravated assault against a woman, making him subject to the North Carolina Sex Offender & Public Protection Registry (the Registry). The Registry requires individuals who have committed an offense against a minor or a sexually violent offense to register as sex offenders. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.6(4), 14-208.7(a) (2005). Plaintiff served three and a half years of his nine-and-a-half-year sentence; the remaining six years of his sentence were suspended and he was placed on supervised probation. In 1995, plaintiff was convicted of solicitation of prostitution. As a result, his probation was revoked. In 1999, plaintiff was unconditionally released. In 2004, he moved to Buncombe County, where he registered with the Registry at the sheriffs office as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.7.\nPlaintiff suffered a stroke in 1998, as a result of which he never travels without his mother. Plaintiff frequented the Woodfin Riverside Park, always with his mother and sometimes with other family members as well.\nPlaintiff challenged an ordinance, enacted on 19 April 2005, that prohibits registered sex offenders from knowingly entering any public park owned and operated by defendant-appellee Woodfin (the ordinance). The ordinance states, in relevant part,\nIt shall constitute a general offense against the regulations of the Town of Woodfin for any person or persons registered as a sex offender with the state of North Carolina and or any other state or federal agency to knowingly enter into or on any public park owned, operated, or maintained by the Town of Woodfin.\nWoodfin, N.C., Ordinances \u00a7 130.03 (19 April 2005). Prior to the enactment of the ordinance, two incidents of sexual offenses occurred in or near two of the three public parks in Woodfin. Plaintiff and Woodfin filed motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. The Buncombe County Superior Court granted Woodfin\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.\nWe review the trial court\u2019s decision de novo. Magnolia Mfg. of N.C. v. Erie Ins. Exch. Ins., 179 N.C. App. 267, 277, 633 S.E.2d 841, 847 (2006) (citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)). \u201cAlleged errors of law are subject to de novo review on appeal.\u201d Falk Integrated Tech., Inc. v. Stack, 132 N.C. App. 807, 809, 513 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1999) (citation omitted). Rulings on motions for judgment on the pleadings under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(c) are also reviewed de novo. Toomer v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 171 N.C. App. 58, 66, 614 S.E.2d 328, 335 (2005) (citations omitted).\nPlaintiff first argues that the ordinance violates his fundamental right to travel through \u201cpublic spaces,\u201d protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also argues that the ordinance denies him his constitutional freedom to intrastate travel as recognized in Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 45 L. Ed. 186, 188 (1900) (finding that \u201cthe right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment\u201d).\nSubstantive due process is not a blanket protection. In Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the right to enter public parks for \u201cinnocent, recreational purposes\u201d is not a fundamental right. 377 F.3d 757, 771 (7th Cir. 2004).\nIn Willis v. Town of Marshall, N.C., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted the division on the issue of whether intrastate travel is a fundamental right, but did not reach a conclusion. 426 F.3d 251, 265 (4th Cir. 2005) (comparing Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259-68 (3d Cir. 1990) in which intrastate travel is a recognized fundamental right, with Doe, 377 F.3d at 770-71, which rejects sex offenders\u2019 claim to a fundamental right to access public parks). However, the Willis court points to the general rule that courts \u201cmust be reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts ... in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended,\u201d and courts run the risk of turning the due process clause into a personal preference policy instrument forjudges. Willis, 426 F.3d at 266-67 (quotations and citations omitted).\nThe right to intrastate travel is a \u201cright of function.\u201d Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002). We therefore hold that the right to enter parks is not encompassed by either the fundamental right of travel or the right to intrastate travel. The ordinance does not infringe upon plaintiff\u2019s fundamental right to intrastate travel because it does not impair his daily functions. The ordinance does not prevent plaintiff from enjoying the open air with his mother and his friends in other locations if he so desires: it is restrictive only as to defendant\u2019s public parks.\nPlaintiff further argues that the ordinance is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest and thus violates his substantive due process rights. He claims that although the intent of the ordinance is to protect children who use Woodfin\u2019s park system, the ordinance prohibits all registered sex offenders from entering those parks. The town minutes from a meeting to consider the ordinance recognize child safety as one of the concerns, but do not definitively point to the safety of children as the main purpose of the ordinance. Plaintiff argues that he has never committed a crime against a child, nor has he been accused of engaging in any kind of indecent behavior directed at a child or anyone else while visiting any park in Woodfin.\n\u201c[N] arrow tailoring is required only when fundamental rights are involved. The impairment of a lesser interest . . . demands no more than a \u2018reasonable fit\u2019 between governmental purpose . . . and the means chosen to advance that purpose.\u201d Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1, 18 (1993). Substantive due process serves to protect individuals from arbitrary government actions that lack \u201creasonable justification in the service of a legitimate government objective.\u201d Dobrowolska v. Wall, 138 N.C. App. 1, 14, 530 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2000) (quotations and citation omitted).\nIn State v. Stewart, this Court found overbroad a North Carolina law prohibiting motorists from shining light into the area past a roadway during certain hours, effectively prohibiting cars from having their headlights on during those times. 40 N.C. App. 693, 696-97, 253 S.E.2d 638, 640-41 (1979). The law constituted an \u201carbitrary interference with otherwise innocent conduct and lack[ed] any rational . . . relation to the . . . general welfare.\u201d Id. at 697, 253 S.E.2d at 641. Having found the law overbroad, this Court did not consider whether or not intrastate travel was a fundamental right. Id. at 698, 253 S.E.2d at 641.\nPlaintiff\u2019s assertion that the intended purpose of the ordinance is the protection of children is tenuous. The text of the resolution adopting the ordinance suggests a broader reach:\nWhereas the Town of Woodfin maintains a park system that is meant for the peaceful enjoyment of children and other citizens, and;\nWhereas it is in the interest of promoting the general welfare and safety of the people of Woodfin ....\nThus, plaintiff\u2019s claim that the ordinance was intended only to protect children is unpersuasive. Even if we were to find that the right to access public parks is a fundamental right, which we expressly decline to do, the ordinance is rationally related to the legitimate government interest it aims to address.\nThe United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized the inherent danger of reintegrating sex offenders into society. In Conn. Dep\u2019t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, the Court stated that \u201c[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation. The victims of sex assault are most often juveniles, and when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sex assault.\u201d 538 U.S. 1, 4, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 103 (2003) (quotations and citations omitted).\nBy restricting only registered sex offenders from entering public parks, which are frequented by children and other citizens, the ordinance promotes the general welfare and safety of Woodfin\u2019s citizens, which is a legitimate government purpose. Thus, we find the ordinance to be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.\nPlaintiff next argues that the ordinance is punitive in a way that would violate the ex post facto clause, and relies on the five-part test adopted in Smith v. Doe: (1) whether it \u201cpromotes the traditional aims of punishment\u201d; (2) whether the law was \u201cregarded in history and tradition as punishment\u201d; (3) whether it \u201cimposes an affirmative disability or restraint\u201d; (4) whether it \u201chas a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose\u201d; or (5) whether it \u201cis excessive with respect to [that] purpose.\u201d Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164, 180 (2003) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 661 (1963) (considering two additional factors not considered in Smithy).\nThe Mendoza-Martinez factors should only be used in the absence of conclusive evidence of legislative intent. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. 9 L. Ed. 2d at 661. \u201c[W]e will reject the legislature\u2019s manifest intent only where a party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State\u2019s intention.\u201d Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 515 (1997) (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). As previously noted, the town meeting minutes reveal a non-punitive intention to maintain the parks for the enjoyment and safety of the people of Woodfin.\nPlaintiff argues that despite its lack of punitive intent, the ordinance is punitive in effect. Plaintiff focuses mainly on the assertion that the ordinance promotes deterrence and retribution. He also argues that the ordinance has the effect of banishing him from pub-. lie spaces, which he argues has been traditionally regarded as punishment throughout history. However, the case upon which he relies for this assertion refers to banishment in terms of \u201cforfeiture of citizenship,\u201d which is not at issue here. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 n.23, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 661.\nPlaintiff also reiterates that the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to serve its nonpunitive purpose. He reasons that it could create a false sense of security because children may be molested by someone that they know. However, in Smith, the Supreme Court found that \u201c[a] statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.\u201d Smith, 538 U.S. at 103, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 183 (finding that a statute requiring registration of sex offenders was nonpunitive, serving the purpose of public safety).\nRestrictions on a person\u2019s activities may be imposed without being punitive. The ordinance does not subject registered sex offenders to affirmative disability or restraint; they may still travel freely and attend to their daily functions. Thus, plaintiffs arguments that the ordinance is punitive in effect are not convincing. The ordinance, being neither punitive in intent nor effect, does not violate the ex post facto clause.\n\u201cThe police power of the State is broad enough to sustain the promulgation and fair enforcement of laws designed to restore the right of safe travel by temporarily restricting all travel, other than necessary movement reasonably excepted from the prohibition.\u201d State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 499, 178 S.E.2d 449, 458 (1971). This police power \u201cextends to all the compelling needs of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.\u201d Id. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 457. Though a city does not have inherent police power, this power is delegated by statute to cities in North Carolina: \u201cA city may by ordinance define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts . . . detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens . . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174 (2005). This Court has held that municipalities may regulate within their boundaries for the purpose of protecting public property. Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 60, 584 S.E.2d 100, 102 (2003); see also Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 364, 395, 71 L. Ed. 303, 314 (1926) (\u201c[Bjefore the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.\u201d) (citations omitted).\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court held in Dobbins that although individuals have \u201cthe right to travel upon the public streets of a city\u201d as protected by the due process clause, this freedom may be regulated \u201cwhen reasonably deemed necessary to the public safety, by laws reasonably adapted to the attainment of that objective.\u201d Dobbins, 277 N.C. at 497, 178 S.E.2d 456. The Court balances the police power of the State with the right to travel\nby the process of locating many separate points on either side of the line. So long as this Court sits, it will be engaged in that process, but it is not necessary or appropriate in the present instance to attempt to draw sharply, throughout its entire length, the line between the right of the individual to travel and the authority of the State to limit travel.\nId. at 497-98, 178 S.E.2d 457. Here, as in Dobbins, the ordinance falls on the side of a reasonable restriction.\nWe also note that \u201c[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.\u201d United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707 (1987). \u201cThe presumption is that any act passed by the legislature is constitutional, and the court will not strike it down if [it] can be upheld on any reasonable ground.\u201d Ramsey v. Veterans Commission, 261 N.C. 645, 647, 135 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1964). Similarly, \u201c[a] municipal ordinance is presumed to be valid-\u201d Currituck County v. Willey, 46 N.C. App. 835, 836, 266 S.E.2d 52, 53 (quotations and citation omitted).\n\u201c[T]he burden is upon the complaining party to show its invalidity or inapplicability. And a municipal ordinance promulgated in the exercise of the police power will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly so, and every intendment will be made to sustain it.\u201d Id. Plaintiff is required to show that \u201c \u2018the ordinance does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary;\u2019 and \u2018[i]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the ordinance, the existence of that state of facts at the time the ordinance was enacted must be assumed.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 55 L. Ed. 369, 377 (1910)) (alterations omitted). Here, plaintiff has not met his burden of proof.\nBecause we find the ordinance to be rationally related to its intended purpose of protecting the health and safety of the citizens of Woodfin, we hold that defendant acted within its delegated police power to enact and enforce an ordinance restricting sex offenders from entering Woodfin\u2019s public parks for the purpose of promoting citizen safety.\nThe order of the trial court is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudge TYSON concurs.\nJudge GEER dissents by separate opinion.\n. Brett Hollomon, Chief of Police, is also a party to this case in his official capacity. Hereinafter, references to defendant-appellee Woodfin implicitly include Hollomon.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." }, { "text": "GEER, Judge,\ndissenting.\nBecause I cannot conclude that the trial court properly entered summary judgment upholding the Town of Woodfin\u2019s ordinance, I must respectfully dissent. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b) (2005) provides:\nA city ordinance shall be consistent with the Constitution and laws of North Carolina and of the United States. An ordinance is not consistent with State or federal law when:\n(1) The ordinance infringes a liberty guaranteed to the people by the State or federal Constitution;\n(5) The ordinance purports to regulate a field for which a State or federal statute clearly shows a legislative intent to provide a complete and integrated regulatory scheme to the exclusion of local regulation ....\nI would hold that the Woodfin ordinance violates both N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(l) and (b)(5).\nCourts\u2019 Obligation to Decline to Rule Unnecessarily Upon Constitutional Questions\nAs an initial matter, I recognize that plaintiff has stipulated that \u201c[b]ut for the question concerning its constitutionality, . . . the ordinance is valid and enforceable.\u201d It is, however, a well established principle of jurisprudence that \u201cappellate courts must \u2018avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on other grounds.\u2019 \u201d James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260, 266, 607 S.E.2d 638, 642 (2005) (quoting Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002)). See also Brooks v. Taylor Tobacco Enterprises, Inc., 298 N.C. 759, 761, 260 S.E.2d 419, 421 (1979) (\u201cIt is an established principle of appellate review that this court will refrain from deciding constitutional questions when there is an alternative ground available upon which the case may properly be decided.\u201d); Carillon Assisted Living, LLC v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Health and Human Servs., 175 N.C. App. 265, 271, 623 S.E.2d 629, 634 (declining to address dissent\u2019s constitutional argument because case could be resolved on purely statutory grounds), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 531, 633 S.E.2d 676 (2006), and appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 218, 641 S.E.2d 802 (2007).\nThis rule applies even when the parties\u2019 appeal makes only a constitutional argument. Thus, in State v. Lueders, 214 N.C. 558, 560, 200 S.E. 22, 23 (1938), the defendant had- \u2014 not unlike Mr. Standley here-stipulated at the trial level to the facts because \u201c [t]he purpose of [the] appeal, frankly avowed, [was] to obtain a reconsideration of [a prior Supreme Court decision] and to test again the constitutionality of [a statute].\u201d Nonetheless, our Supreme Court declined to do so since \u201cif a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of lesser moment, the latter alone will be determined [as] [i]t is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.\u201d Id. at 561, 200 S.E. at 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nLikewise, in State v. Wallace, 49 N.C. App. 475, 271 S.E.2d 760 (1980), the defendant based his appeal on his contention that a particular statute was unconstitutional on its face. This Court held:\nWhile defendant\u2019s argument is intriguing and unique, on the record before us we are not required to reach any constitutional question. A constitutional question will not be passed upon if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be decided. If the case can be decided on one of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of lesser importance, the latter alone will be determined. The Court will not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.\nId. at 484-85, 271 S.E.2d at 766. The Court then resolved the appeal on a non-constitutional basis because \u201c[although counsel do not address [that] question, it arises on the face of the record.\u201d Id. at 485, 271 S.E.2d at 766. See also In re Byers, 295 N.C. 256, 259, 244 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1978) (per curiam) (although respondent only raised constitutional issue on appeal, Supreme Court determined that appeal could be resolved on nonconstitutional basis and, therefore, \u201cdeem[ed] it inappropriate to consider the constitutional issue presented by respondent\u2019s appeal\u201d); State v. Muse, 219 N.C. 226, 227, 13 S.E.2d 229, 229 (1941) (although defendant, on appeal, sought to test constitutionality of act under which he was indicted, Supreme Court refused to address constitutional question because appeal could be resolved \u201con a question of less moment\u201d).\nHere, based on these principles, I do not believe that a party should be able to effectively force a court to address a constitutional argument by stipulating that an otherwise unenforceable ordinance is enforceable. We should not leapfrog over the preliminary question of whether the Town of Woodfin had authority to adopt this ordinance in the first place simply because the parties invite us to do so. If the ordinance violates N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(5), then it is \u201cinvalid and unenforceable.\u201d Greene v. City of Winston-Salem, 287 N.C. 66, 74, 213 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1975). See also State v. Tenore, 280 N.C. 238, 248, 185 S.E.2d 644, 651 (1972) (if town had no authority to adopt ordinance, it would be void, and no one could be punished for violating it).\nAs a result, any ruling on the constitutionality of the Town\u2019s ordinance would be unnecessary and amount merely to an advisory opinion. Yet, our appellate courts \u201cnever anticipate questions of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding them, nor venture advisory opinions on constitutional questions.\u201d Lueders, 214 N.C. at 560, 200 S.E. at 23. See also State v. Blackwell, 246 N.C. 642, 644, 99 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1957) (\u201cThe constitutionality of a statute will not be considered and determined by the Court as a hypothetical question.\u201d).\nMoreover, an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance would undoubtedly result in a flurry of enactments of similar ordinances across the State. Because, as I explain below, allowing municipalities and counties to adopt their own ordinances regulating sex offenders would interfere with the comprehensive state and federal legislation in this area, I do not believe we have the luxury to do as the parties urge and blithely move on to the more interesting constitutional issue.\nThe Ordinance\u2019s Interference with the Comprehensive State and Federal Regulation of Sex Offenders\nIn Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 44, 565 S.E.2d 172, 175 (2002), the Supreme Court addressed N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(5) and the question of how to determine whether the General Assembly \u201cintended to implement statewide regulation in the area, to the exclusion of local regulation.\u201d Municipalities have no inherent legislative powers, but rather \u201care instrumentalities of state government and possess only those powers the General Assembly has conferred upon them.\u201d Craig, 356 N.C. at 44, 565 S.E.2d at 175. \u201cIn determining if the General Assembly intended to provide statewide regulation to the exclusion of local regulation, we must decide if it has shown a clear legislative intent to provide such a \u2018complete and integrated regulatory scheme.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 45, 565 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(5)).\nIn undertaking this task, it is immaterial that the General Assembly has not provided an express statement of intent. Instead, \u201c[t]he General Assembly can create a regulatory scheme which, though not expressly exclusory, is so complete in covering the field that it is clear any regulation on the county level would be contrary to the statewide regulatory purpose.\u201d Id. at 46, 565 S.E.2d at 176. \u201c[W]e must primarily look to \u2018the spirit of the act[] and what the act seeks to accomplish.\u2019 \u201d Id. (second alteration original) (quoting State v. Anthony, 351 N.C. 611, 615, 528 S.E.2d 321, 323 (2000)).\nIn this case, we are confronted with comprehensive regulation of convicted sex offenders by both the federal government and the State of North Carolina. As our Supreme Court recently noted, Congress enacted legislation in 1994 that conditioned continued federal funding of state law enforcement on state adoption of sex offender registration laws. State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 559, 614 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2005). This legislation, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (\u201cthe Jacob Wetterling Act\u201d), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14071 et seq. (2000)), also set minimum standards for the state programs. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 14071(b). See also Bryant, 359 N.C. at 559, 614 S.E.2d at 482. The focus of this legislation was on statewide programs. By 1996, every state, the District of Columbia, and the federal government had enacted a sex offender registration and community notification program. Id.\nThe Jacob Wetterling Act was followed in 2006 by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16901 et seq. (Supp. 2007)) (\u201cthe Adam Walsh Act\u201d). The Adam Walsh Act states its purpose:\nIn order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this Act establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16901 (emphasis added). As a condition of receiving certain law enforcement funding, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16925(a) (Supp. 2007), this Act imposes various obligations on \u201cjurisdictions\u201d with respect to convicted sex offenders. \u201cJurisdiction\u201d is defined by the Act to mean the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and various territories; it does not include local governmental bodies. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16911(10) (Supp. 2007).\nIn order to meet the Adam Walsh Act\u2019s purpose of protecting the safety of the public from sexual predators, states are required, among other things, to make registration information available to the public on websites. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16918(d) (Supp. 2007). They must report information regarding sex offenders to the United States Attorney General, law enforcement agencies, school and public housing agencies, social services entities, and volunteer organizations in which contact with minors or other vulnerable individuals might occur. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16921(b) (Supp. 2007). Compliance may, however, be excused if the United States Attorney General determines that certain provisions would place the state in violation of its own constitution, as determined by a ruling of the state\u2019s highest court. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16925(b)(1).\nIn addition, Congress has established the Sex Offender Management Assistance Program, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16926 (Supp. 2007), and the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16945 (Supp. 2007). Finally, federal regulations prohibit a family\u2019s admission to federally assisted housing if a member of the household is required to register as a sex offender on a lifetime basis. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 5.856, 882.518, 960.204, and 982.553 (Supp. 2007).\nIn 1995, North Carolina, consistent with the federal legislation, enacted the Amy Jackson Law, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 545 (codified as amended at N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 et seq. 2005). The General Assembly significantly amended this legislation in 2006. 2006 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 247.\nThe General Assembly adopted this legislation for the following purpose:\nThe General Assembly recognizes that sex offenders often pose a high risk of engaging in sex offenses even after being released from incarceration or commitment and that protection of the public from sex offenders is of paramount governmental interest.\nThe General Assembly also recognizes that persons who commit certain other types of offenses against minors, such as kidnapping, pose significant and unacceptable threats to the public safety and welfare of the children in this State and that the protection of those children is of great governmental interest. Further, the General Assembly recognizes that law enforcement officers\u2019 efforts to protect communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend offenders who commit sex offenses or certain offenses against minors are impaired by the lack of information available to law enforcement agencies about convicted offenders who live within the agency\u2019s jurisdiction. Release of information about these offenders will further the governmental interests of public safety so long as the information released is rationally related to the furtherance of those goals.\nTherefore, it is the purpose of this Article to assist law enforcement agencies\u2019 efforts to protect communities by requiring persons who are convicted of sex offenses or of certain other offenses committed against minors to register with law enforcement agencies, to require the exchange of relevant information about those offenders among law enforcement agencies, and to authorize the access to necessary and relevant information about those offenders to others as provided in this Article.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5 (2005). North Carolina\u2019s sex offender registration law thus has two goals: (1) to generally protect the safety of the public, and (2) to assist law enforcement agencies.\nIn order to accomplish these goals, the General Assembly established two registration programs, with the second more stringent program directed at recidivists and sexually violent predators. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6A (2005). As our Supreme Court summarized in Bryant, the \u201cNorth Carolina Sex. Offender and Public Protection Registration Program\u201d requires:\nevery individual having a reportable conviction as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.6, which includes offenses against minors and \u201csexually violent offenses,\u201d to register as a convicted sex offender with the sheriff of the county in which the person resides. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.7(a). If an individual convicted of such a crime moves to North Carolina \u201cfrom outside this State, the person shall register within 10 days of establishing residence in this State, or whenever the person has been present in the State for 15 days, whichever comes first.\u201d Id. Additionally, non-resident workers and students who have reportable convictions or are required to register as sex offenders in their resident state must also register as a convicted sex offender in the county in which they are employed or attend school. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-208.7(al).\n359 N.C. at 561, 614 S.E.2d at 483-84. The legislation requires the convicted sex offender to notify the sheriff of any change of address or status. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9 (2005). There is a semiannual verification of that information, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.9A (2005), or a 90-day verification for more serious offenders, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.24 (2005). Violations of the registration requirements constitute a Class F felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.11 (2005).\nThe sheriff is required to obtain certain information from the registering sex offenders, including a current photograph, and for recidivists and sexually violent predators, additional information such as any'treatment received. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.7, 14-208.22 (2005). Much of this information then becomes public record and is made available over the internet. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 14-208.10, 14-208.14 (2005).\nIn addition to the registration and notification requirements, the General Assembly has imposed geographical restrictions on convicted sex offenders. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.16(a) (Supp. 2006), \u201c[a] registrant under this Article shall not knowingly reside within 1,000 feet of the property on which any public or nonpublic school or child care center is located.\u201d A violation of this restriction is a Class G felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.16(f).\nFurther, the General Assembly has limited the employment of convicted sex offenders and the ability of sex offenders to be in the presence of minors:\n(a) It shall be unlawful for any person required to register under this Article to work for any person or as a sole proprietor, with or without compensation, at any place where a minor is present and the person\u2019s responsibilities or activities would include instruction, supervision, or care of a minor or minors.\n(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to conduct any activity at his or her residence where the person:\n(1) Accepts a minor or minors into his or her care or custody from another, and\n(2) Knows that a person who resides at that same location is required to register under this Article.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.17(a), (b) (Supp. 2006). A violation of these restrictions is a Class F felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.17(c).\n. Finally, the General Assembly has directed that \u201c[t]he Department of Correction shall establish a sex offender monitoring program that uses a continuous satellite-based monitoring system\u201d to monitor sex offenders classified as a sexually violent predator or a recidivist and sex offenders convicted of an aggravated offense as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a) (Supp. 2006). Monitoring shall be for the person\u2019s natural life unless the requirement is terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.43(a) (Supp. 2006). The monitoring must provide (1) \u201c[t]ime-correlated and continuous tracking of the geographic location of the subject using a global positioning system based on satellite and other location tracking technology,\u201d and (2) \u201c[rjeporting of subject\u2019s violations of prescriptive and proscriptive schedule or location requirements.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(c). Reporting may range from once a day to \u201cnear real-time.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(c)(2). A failure to enroll in this program when required to do so constitutes a Class F felony, while tampering with the monitoring device is a Class E felony. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.44 (Supp. 2006).\nIn conjunction with this specific program related to convicted sex offenders, the General Assembly has also set out special conditions of probation and post-release supervision for sex offenders. A defendant convicted of a reportable conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6(4) (2005) must, among other things, participate in evaluation and treatment as ordered by the court or the Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d); not reside in a household with any minor child if the offense involved evidence of sexual abuse of a minor; and satisfy any other conditions determined by the court or the Commission to be reasonably related to the offender\u2019s rehabilitation or reintegration into society. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1343(b)(2), 15A-1368.4(bl) (2005).\nIn enacting their respective legislation, both Congress and our General Assembly recognized that they were required to balance the interest in public safety with individual rights that even a sex offender still possesses. Thus, Congress recognized that state constitutions might preclude some restrictions, and the General Assembly acknowledged that release of sex offender information must be \u201crationally related to the furtherance of [the] goals\u201d of public safety. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.5.\nAs the Supreme Court stated in Craig, in deciding the applicability of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(5), we must \u201cconsider the breadth and scope of the applicable general statutes in determining whether the overall regulatory scheme was designed to be preemptive.\u201d 356 N.C. at 49, 565 S.E.2d at 178. Here, we have a federal program that states it is a \u201ccomprehensive national system,\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 16901, and that anticipates regulation by the states of convicted sex offenders. North Carolina\u2019s regulatory scheme in turn not only provides for registration and public identification of sex offenders on the internet with pictures and all pertinent information, but also restricts employment and location of residences and requires disclosure of otherwise private information to authorities. Perhaps most significantly, the legislation requires constant satellite monitoring of the most severe offenders with the result that, in North Carolina, it appears that law enforcement may track every step the sex offender takes. Moreover, courts, probation officers, and the Commission may impose further restrictions as necessary given the circumstances of the particular offender.\nLocal regulation would result in different regulations of sex offenders by city and by county. While the Town has chosen to bar sex offenders from parks, other local governments may bar them from libraries or other public buildings. Municipalities may attempt to impose residential or employment restrictions beyond those provided by state law or the offender\u2019s actual sentence, probation conditions, or Commission restrictions.\nIn holding that municipalities could not adopt their own employment discrimination ordinances, our Supreme Court noted that \u201c[upholding the particularized laws in this case could lead to a balka-nization of the state\u2019s employment discrimination laws, creating a patchwork of standards varying from county to county\u201d with the end result a \u201c \u2018conglomeration of innumerable discordant communities.\u2019 \u201d Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.C., 357 N.C. 170, 189, 581 S.E.2d 415, 428 (2003) (quoting Idol v. Street, 233 N.C. 730, 732, 65 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1951)). The same would be true here.\nAs our Supreme Court recognized in Bryant, our sex offender regulatory scheme depends in part on the fact that sex offenders cannot credibly claim ignorance of the law regarding restrictions imposed upon them. 359 N.C. at 568-69, 614 S.E.2d at 488-89. With the \u201cbalkanization\u201d of regulation that will inevitably stem from a decision upholding the ordinance in this case, it will be difficult for anyone to know what \u201cthe law\u201d is in North Carolina regarding convicted sex offenders. Moreover, the balance of public safety versus individual rights will vary in each municipality or county. See Craig, 356 N.C. at 48, 565 S.E.2d at 177-78 (noting the concern that rights would vary in . different counties and upset the balance reached by General Assembly between economic interests and private property rights).\nFurther, if local regulation is allowed, one municipality could, in effect, shift the burden and risk of sex offenders from its geographical confines to other municipalities. Indeed, in this case, with the passage of the ordinance, plaintiff began looking at parks elsewhere in Buncombe County. This factor supports precluding local regulation of convicted sex offenders.\nFinally, in a dramatic intrusion on the justice system, the conditions imposed upon a sex offender after release from custody will no longer be established by the court in imposing his sentence or setting the conditions for probation or by the Commission. Each local government may now weigh in on the appropriate conditions to be imposed upon sex offenders within that government\u2019s jurisdiction. This cannot be the law. See State v. Burnett, 93 Ohio St. 3d 419, 431-32, 755 N.E.2d 857, 868 (2001) (in holding that city lacked authority to enact an ordinance barring people convicted of a drug-related offense from a specified zone, stating that \u201cthere is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for violation of a state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the General Assembly\u201d), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1034, 152 L. Ed. 2d 649, 122 S. Ct. 1790 (2002).\nIn short, I believe that the State\u2019s regulation of convicted sex offenders is \u201cso comprehensive in scope that the General Assembly must have intended that [the statutes] comprise a \u2018complete and integrated regulatory scheme\u2019 on a statewide basis, thus leaving no room for further local regulation.\u201d Craig, 356 N.C. at 50, 565 S.E.2d at 179 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(5)). See Greene, 287 N.C. at 75-76, 213 S.E.2d at 237 (holding, based on \u201ccontextual reading of the relevant statutes,\u201d that city ordinance requiring sprinklers was \u201cinvalid and unenforceable\u201d in light of General Assembly\u2019s legislation regarding the State Building Code). See also Elwell v. Township of Lower, 2006 WL 3797974, *11-13 (N.J. Super. Dec. 22, 2006) (holding that New Jersey\u2019s Megan\u2019s law, setting forth a system of registration for sex offenders, preempted town ordinance prohibiting registered sex offenders from residing or loitering within 500 feet of any school, park, playground, recreation area, or day care facility because state law constituted comprehensive legislation and uniformity is essential regarding post-conviction treatment of sex offenders). Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment to the Town and would direct entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on the grounds that the ordinance violates N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 160A-174(b)(5).\nInadequacy of Evidentiary Record Submitted on Constitutional Question\nIf we do not address the Town\u2019s lack of authority to adopt this ordinance, I cannot overlook the sketchiness of the record presented to the trial court and this Court with respect to the constitutional issue. Our Supreme Court has held that \u201cconstitutional analysis always requires thorough examination of all relevant facts.\u201d Anderson, 356 N.C. at 416, 572 S.E.2d at 102. Accordingly, \u201c[i]f the factual record necessary for a constitutional inquiry is lacking, an appellate court should be especially mindful of the dangers inherent in the premature exercise of its jurisdiction.\u201d Id. at 416-17, 572 S.E.2d at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we disregard the alternative statutory ground, I do not believe, under Anderson, that the factual record in this case is sufficient to resolve the constitutional issues raised by the parties.\nWhile debating vigorously whether the ordinance is constitutional, the parties rely almost exclusively on various publications. These materials are simply included within the record on appeal unsupported by any expert testimony, such as an affidavit or a deposition. Some of the materials are printed from the internet with no explanation as to the identity of the source.\nNot just any material qualifies for consideration on a motion for summary judgment. A party cannot simply submit documents supporting his or its position without considering the Rules of Evidence. It is well established that \u201c[o]n a motion for summary judgment the court may consider evidence consisting of affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, documentary materials, facts which are subject to judicial notice, and any other materials which would be admissible in evidence at trial.\u201d Huss v. Huss, 31 N.C. App. 463, 466, 230 S.E.2d 159, 161-62 (1976) (emphasis added). See also Kessing v. Nat\u2019l Mortgage Corp., 278 N.C. 523, 533, 180 S.E.2d 823, 829 (1971) (\u201cEvidence which may be considered under Rule 56 includes admissions in the pleadings, depositions on file, answers to Rule 33 interrogatories, admissions on file whether obtained under Rule 36 or in any other way, affidavits, and any other material which would be admissible in evidence or of which judicial notice may properly be taken.\u201d); Deer Corp. v. Garter, 177 N.C. App. 314, 325, 629 S.E.2d 159, 168 (2006) (\u201cOur Supreme Court has held that in considering a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, a trial court may consider material which would be admissible in evidence at trial.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chicora Country Club, Inc. v. Town of Erwin, 128 N.C. App. 101, 111, 493 S.E.2d 797, 803 (1997) (holding that party\u2019s \u201cattempt to amend the petition\u201d was not material that would have been admissible in evidence and, therefore, trial court was not obliged to consider it when ruling upon motion for summary judgment).\nHere, both parties blithely disregard the Rules of Evidence. Since \u201c \u2018material offered which set[s] forth facts which would not be admissible in evidence should not be considered when passing on the motion for summary judgment,\u2019 \u201d Strickland v. Doe, 156 N.C. App. 292, 295, 577 S.E.2d 124, 128 (quoting Borden, Inc. v. Brower, 17 N.C. App. 249, 253, 193 S.E.2d 751, 753, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 284 N.C. 54, 199 S.E.2d 414 (1973)), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 169, 581 S.E.2d 477 (2003), we \u2014 -and the trial court \u2014 cannot similarly disregard the question whether these articles and internet publications would be admissible at trial. See Smith v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 269, 276, 258 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1979) (exhibit that constituted hearsay \u201ccould not be considered by the trial court on motion for summary judgment\u201d).\nIt cannot be disputed that the parties\u2019 articles and internet materials constitute hearsay. See N.C.R. Evid. 801(c) (\u201c \u2018Hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d). Both parties have submitted these publications to prove \u201cthe facts\u201d set forth within them. See also Hickok v. G. D. Searle & Co., 496 F.2d 444, 446 (10th Cir. 1974) (\u201c[I]t is well established that medical textbooks, treatises and professional articles are not freely admissible in evidence to prove the substantive or testimonial facts stated therein, since they are subject to the hearsay rule.\u201d); Stang-Starr v. Byington, 248 Neb. 103, 109, 532 N.W.2d 26, 30 (1995) (\u201cWhen offered to prove the truth of matters asserted in them, learned writings, such as treatises, books, and articles regarding specialized areas of knowledge, are clearly hearsay.\u201d).\nOur North Carolina appellate courts have held that such articles are admissible only under the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Rule 803(18). See State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 714, 454 S.E.2d 229, 240 (1995) (holding that because professional article was not shown to be learned treatise under N.C.R. Evid. 803(18), it was not admissible as substantive evidence); Ferguson v. Williams, 101 N.C. App. 265, 275, 399 S.E.2d 389, 395 (holding that excerpt from Physician\u2019s Desk Reference could be admitted only as a learned treatise), disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 571, 403 S.E.2d 510 (1991). Rule 803(18) provides that the following is not excluded as hearsay:\nTo the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.\n(Emphasis added.) In sum, the party offering the publication must demonstrate that it is a \u201creliable authority\u201d through testimony or by judicial notice.\nNeither party has made any attempt to establish through testimony that the materials fall within Rule 803(18). Compare Sterling v. Gil Soucy Trucking, Ltd., 146 N.C. App. 173, 179-80, 552 S.E.2d 674, 678 (2001) (holding that article was properly admitted because expert witness testimony established article as reliable scientific authority). Nor is there any basis for a court to take judicial notice of the publications\u2019 reliability. Simply because a statistical analysis has been generated by the federal government \u2014 as is true of some of the materials \u2014 does not require the conclusion that experts in the field consider that analysis reliable or good science. Articles by the Justice Department are subject to critique by experts just like studies by scientists associated with universities or private research institutions.\nAlternatively, as the Tenth Circuit has pointed out, \u201cexpert witnesses are sometimes allowed to testify as to hearsay matters by discussing published materials, but this is allowed ... solely to establish the basis for the expert\u2019s opinion, and not to establish the veracity of the hearsay matters themselves.\u201d Hickok, 496 F.2d at 447 (internal citation omitted). See also N.C.R. Evid. 703 (\u201cThe facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.\u201d); State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1, 13-14, 354 S.E.2d 527, 534-35 (doctor allowed to testify to body of literature accepted by her profession), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 174, 358 S.E.2d 64 (1987). This Court has held, however, that a study by the American Medical Association and a press release by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services were not admissible in connection with a summary judgment motion when they were attached only to a lay witness\u2019 affidavit and were not relied upon for purposes of an expert opinion. See Duncan v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc\u2019y, 171 N.C. App. 403, 408, 614 S.E.2d 592, 596 (2005). Here, we do not even have a lay witness addressing the materials.\nBecause of the parties\u2019 failure to establish the admissibility of these materials, they should not be considered on summary judgment. See, e.g., Miskin v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 669, 674 (D. Md. 1999) (plaintiff\u2019s failure to demonstrate that two unauthenticated medical treatises qualified as learned treatises \u201cma[de] the treatises unauthenticated, inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be considered during summary judgment\u201d), aff\u2019d, 213 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2000); Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 n.14 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (when plaintiff relied upon scientific publications to establish particular fact, but failed to present expert testimony that those materials constituted learned treatises under Rule 803(18), plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence on that point for purpose of summary judgment), rev\u2019d, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev\u2019d, 522 U.S. 136, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).\nEven apart from the question of the admissibility of the materials, the lack of expert testimony is troubling. The materials contained in the record appear to represent statistical analyses and surveys of studies conducting statistical analyses. As Benjamin Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, reportedly proclaimed: \u201cThere are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.\u201d The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina has stated the idea more tactfully: \u201cIt is undoubtedly true that statistical evidence is inherently malleable and subject to careful scrutiny.\u201d Lott v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Inc., 200 F.R.D. 539, 546 (D.S.C. 2000). For that reason, the Fourth Circuit has held, with respect to employment discrimination claims, \u201cif a plaintiff offers a statistical comparison without expert testimony as to methodology or relevance to plaintiff\u2019s claim, a judge may be justified in excluding the evidence.\u201d Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 457 (4th Cir. 1994). See also Lott, 200 F.R.D. at 546 (\u201cThe general rule is that statistical evidence must be supported by expert testimony.\u201d).\nYet, in this case, no expert exists to address the reliability or meaning of these studies. \u201cWhile all studies have flaws, some have more flaws than others. Study after study has found that many articles in the most prestigious medical journals are replete with shaky statistics and lack of any explanation of . . . critical matters . . . .\u201d Victor Cohn, News & Numbers: A Guide to Reporting Statistical Claims and Controversies in Health and Other Fields 10-11 (1989).\nIn this case, for example, both parties rely heavily upon an article from the United States Department of Justice: Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D., Erica L. Schmitt, and Matthew R. Dur\u00f3se, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 (Nov. 2003). The parties ask us to accept this publication\u2019s reliability and authority on faith. I cannot do that. For example, this publication claims that since no sampling was used to select sex offenders for the study, \u201cpercentages in this report for sex offenders were not subject to sampling error.\u201d Id. at 39. Because, however, the text admits that not all sex offenders released were used in the review and because the analysis focuses only on sex offenders released in 1994 iri 15 states, there was in fact some sampling, and expert testimony is necessary to evaluate whether the publication\u2019s assertion of no sampling error is reliable. In addition, the sample of non-sex offenders used appears to be significantly larger than the total number of sex offenders reviewed \u2014 a fact that an expert witness must assess to determine whether it undermines the validity of the inferences drawn. Finally, the publication asserts broadly \u2014 and without further explanation \u2014 that \u201c[a] 11 differences discussed were statistically significant at the .05 level.\u201d Id. at 39. A basic principle of statistics, however, states that \u201c[sjtatistical significance is not the same thing as practical significance.\u201d David S. Moore and George P. McCabe, Introduction to the Practice of Statistics 474 (2d ed. 1993). There is, however, no expert witness for either party to explain the practical significance of the Justice Department report.\nCertainly, the practical import of the parties\u2019 publications for the ordinance at issue in this case cannot be readily apparent to a lay person. As the United States Supreme Court has cautioned: \u201c [Statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.\u201d Int\u2019l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396, 418, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1856-57 (1977). I would hold that the evidence presented below does not answer a fundamental question: What is the significance of these materials \u2014 none of them specifically addressing an ordinance such as the one at issue \u2014 with respect to the constitutional issues at hand?\nWe might conjecture or assume, but those are not bases for granting summary judgment as to the constitutionality of an ordinance. Under such circumstances, our courts have required expert testimony to guide the trier of fact. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 169 N.C. App. 167, 172, 609 S.E.2d 426, 429 (2005) (\u201cWhere a layperson can do no more than speculate as to the cause of a physical condition, the medical opinion of an expert is required to show causation.\u201d); Pitts v. Nash Day Hosp., Inc., 167 N.C. App. 194, 204, 605 S.E.2d 154, 160 (2004) (\u201cGenerally, expert testimony is required when the standard of care and proximate cause are matters involving highly specialized knowledge beyond that of laymen.\u201d), aff\u2019d per curiam, 359 N.C. 626, 614 S.E.2d 267 (2005).\nAlthough I have an undergraduate degree in sociology that included a strong emphasis on empirical research, I would not presume to be able to assess the scientific reliability or meaning of the limited studies presented by the parties. Nor do I have any basis for determining their practical significance for the constitutional issues involved in this case. These issues are of importance to citizens everywhere. They should not be resolved on a factual record as inadequate as the one presented in this case. I would hold that the evidence submitted by both parties \u2014 for the most part inadmissible at trial \u2014 is insufficient to resolve the case on summary judgment and remand for further proceedings during which the parties can build a proper record. In this appeal, we are presented with precisely the \u201cdangers\u201d of which the Supreme Court warned in Anderson.\nOn the Current Record, the Ordinance Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny\nIn any event, I cannot agree with the majority opinion\u2019s analysis of the constitutional issues. Mr. Standley initially argues that the ordinance violates his right to travel. While courts across the country have split on the question whether the right to engage in intrastate travel is a fundamental constitutional right, the North Carolina Supreme Court has already answered that question.\nIn State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 496, 178 S.E.2d 449, 456 (1971), our Supreme Court considered a curfew imposed by the City of Asheville when it \u201cwas faced with an imminent threat of widespread burning and other destruction of property, public and private.\u201d The Court specifically held that \u201cthe right to travel upon the public streets of a city is a part of every individual\u2019s liberty, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by the Law of the Land Clause, Article I, \u00a7 17, of the Constitution of North Carolina.\u201d Id. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 456. See also id. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 457 (holding that the principles governing international travel \u201capply also to the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment upon state imposed restraints on intracity travel\u201d).\nCuriously, the majority does not address Dobbins in discussing Mr. Standley\u2019s substantive due process claim, but rather relies on decisions from other jurisdictions. Only the Supreme Court, however, may overrule its own decisions.\nThe Town, on the other hand, suggests that Dobbins should be limited to public streets. Public parks are, however, frequently the heart of our communities and cannot reasonably be separated from other walkways. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Hague v. Comm, for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939), in striking down an ordinance:\nWherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.\nId. at 515-16, 83 L. Ed. at 1436-37, 59 S. Ct. at 964. I can perceive no basis for holding that Dobbins does not apply to city parks as well as city streets.\nThe Town also argues that no \u201ctravel\u201d is implicated because persons are not likely to be walking through the parks to get from one place to another. I know of no authority that supports such a limited view of \u201ctravel.\u201d Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has held, the right to travel locally \u201cis fundamentally one of access.\u201d Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 915, 156 L. Ed. 2d 130, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003). The Ohio Supreme Court has explained:\nEvery citizen of this state, much like the citizens of this Nation, enjoys the freedom of mobility not only to cross our borders into our sister states, but also to roam about innocently in the wide-open spaces of our state parks or through the streets and sidewalks of our most populous cities. This freedom of mobility is a tradition extending back to when the first settler crossed into what would eventually become this great state, and it is a tradition no Ohioan would freely relinquish.\nBurnett, 93 Ohio St. 3d at 428, 755 N.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added). Mr. Standley, who is disabled, has been denied his access to the Town\u2019s parks and has been prohibited from \u201croam[ing] innocently,\u201d id., through those parks accompanied by his mother. The ordinance, therefore, implicates his fundamental right to travel.\nIn Dobbins, the Supreme Court confirmed that it is for the courts to determine \u201cthe line between the right of the individual to travel and the authority of the State to limit travel.\u201d 277 N.C. at 498, 178 S.E.2d at 457. The Court acknowledged that the right to intracity travel \u201cmay be regulated, as to the time and manner of its exercise, when reasonably deemed necessary to the public safety, by laws reasonably adapted to the attainment of that objective.\u201d Id. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 456. Nevertheless, \u201cthe right to travel on the public streets is a fundamental segment of liberty and, of course, the absolute prohibition of such travel requires substantially more justification than the regulation of it by traffic lights and rules of the road.\u201d Id. at 499, 178 S.E.2d at 457-58 (emphasis added).\n\u2018The ordinance at issue in this case is not a mere time and manner regulation of the right to travel, but rather is an \u201cabsolute prohibition\u201d against registered sex offenders traveling into town parks. The question is not, therefore, whether the ordinance is \u201creasonably deemed necessary to the public safety.\u201d Id. at 497, 178 S.E.2d at 456. Instead, we must apply strict scrutiny in reviewing the ordinance. \u201cOrdinarily, where a fundamental liberty interest protected by the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment is involved, the government cannot infringe on that right \u2018unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.\u2019 \u201d Johnson, 310 F.3d at 502 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 788,117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997)). See also Yeakle v. City of Portland, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128 (D. Or. 2004) (\u201cWhere an ordinance impairs a fundamental right, in order to pass constitutional muster, the government\u2019s objective must be compelling and the relation between that objective and the means must be necessary.\u201d); Burnett, 93 Ohio St. 3d at 428, 755 N.E.2d at 865-66 (\u201cAny deprivation of the right to travel, therefore, must be evaluated under a compelling-interest test. Accordingly, the legislation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.\u201d (internal citation omitted)).\nHere, Mr. Standley does not dispute that the Town has a compelling interest in ensuring the safety of its citizens from sexual predators. The question before this Court is whether the record establishes that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The record, however, contains no evidence at all supporting this second prong.\nThe Town relies exclusively, on a single point: that there is evidence that sex offenders have a higher rate of recidivism and are more likely to commit another sex offense than non-sex offenders. The Town proclaims that sex offenders are \u201cfour times\u201d as likely to commit another sex offense than a non-sex offender. It then contends that it adopted the ordinance in order to protect the public in light of this substantial risk from sex offenders. There is, however, a glaring gap in the Town\u2019s argument and proof.\nThe record contains no evidence that this particular ordinance serves that interest of protecting the public. The Town admits that no sex offenses committed by a registered sex offender have occurred in any of its parks. In addition, the Town has presented no evidence that sex offenses are likely to occur in parks. Indeed, the only evidence in the record on this point is contrary to the need for the Town\u2019s ordinance. In another United States Department of Justice report \u2014 Lawrence A. Greenfield, Sex Offenses and Offenders: An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault, U.S. Department of Justice (Feb. 1997) \u2014 the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that \u201c[n]early 6 out of 10 rape/sexual assault incidents were reported by victims to have occurred in their own home or at the home of a friend.\u201d Id. at 3. Another 10% of victims stated the crime occurred on a street away from home and 7.3% identified the site of the crime as a parking lot/garage. Parks were not separated out, but \u201c[a]ll other locations\u201d accounted for only 26.1% of the victimizations. Id. at 34. The record contains no evidence at all that sex offenses occur in parks with sufficient frequency to render the ban in this case an effective means of protection from sexual predators.\nIn addition, the same report states that \u201c[a]bout two-thirds of rapes/sexual assaults were found to occur during the 12 hours from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.\u201d Id. at 3. Only 33% occurred between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Id. Significantly, the parties have stipulated that the park at issue in this case opens at sunrise and closes at sunset. The Town\u2019s evidence thus establishes that roughly one-third of rapes and sexual assaults occur during this time frame. When this evidence is considered in conjunction with the Town\u2019s evidence that only some very small unspecified percentage of rapes/sexual assaults occur in parks, then there is no intellectually honest basis for stating that the Town\u2019s ban on access to parks bears any significant relationship to the protection of citizens from sexual predators. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989) (in holding juvenile curfew unconstitutional, pointing out that the record indicated that curfew bore \u201clittle relation to the nature of the problem,\u201d since evidence showed that half of juvenile homicides occurred during non-curfew hours and half occurred in juvenile\u2019s home, suggesting that measures such as the curfew \u201care simply not so closely related to the protection of minors, or to curing the city\u2019s problems with drugs and violence, as to justify the infringement of constitutional interests\u201d).\nWith respect to the efficacy of a park ban, the Town has not pointed to national statistics, the experiences of other municipalities, or even anecdotal evidence, such as the high profile cases reported in the media. Compare Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1997) (city presented several statistical reports demonstrating that juvenile curfew is a solution to rising juvenile crime and victimization). Further, the scary \u201cfour times as likely\u201d to re-offend statistic that forms the entire basis for the Town\u2019s argument provides no support for the ordinance when actually examined. That figure comes from the Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 publication prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics. That report reviewed data relating to the recidivism of sex offenders released from state prisons in 15 states, including North Carolina, of which there were 9,691. Langan, supra at 1. During the same time frame, the 15 states released a total of 272,111 prisoners altogether. Id.\nThe portion of the report relied upon by the Town states in full:\nCompared to non-sex offenders released from State prisons, released sex offenders were 4 times more likely to be rearrested for a sex crime. Within the first 3 years following their release from prison in 1994, 5.3% (517 of the 9,691) of released sex offenders were rearrested for a sex crime. The rate for the 262,420 released non-sex offenders was lower, 1.3% (3,328 of 262,420).\nId. (emphasis added). As discussed above, the practical significance of these results should be addressed in the first instance by expert testimony. Nevertheless, it still appears that, since there are far more non-sex offenders than there are sex offenders and the percentages are so very low, of the few sex offenses that might occur in one of the Town\u2019s parks, the offender would more likely be not registered as a sex offender. There were only 517 released sex offenders committing a sex crime while there were 3,328 non-sex offenders committing a sex crime. Indeed, if we accept the Town\u2019s flawed analysis, we could boldly assert \u2014 although statisticians would surely cringe \u2014 that it is six times more likely that a given sexual assault would be committed by a non-sex offender. Of course, this highlights yet again the need for expert testimony.\nThe parties have submitted 204 pages of publications. I have reviewed every single page. Nowhere is there even a hint or suggestion that barring registered sex offenders from parks would protect the public\u2019s safety to any significant extent. \u201cTo be narrowly tailored, there must be an evidentiary nexus between a law\u2019s purpose and effect.\u201d State v. J.D., 86 Wash. App. 501, 508, 937 P.2d 630, 634 (1997) (striking down curfew ordinance when record failed to show any nexus between curfew and juvenile crime rates). See also Ass\u2019n for Advancement of the Mentally Handicapped, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth, 876 F. Supp. 614, 623 (D.N.J. 1994) (ordinance not justified even though it was directed at protecting community from harm because conditions in ordinance did not serve that interest in theory and in practice). The record in this case shows no evidentiary basis for concluding that the ordinance will have the effect of advancing the goal of protecting citizens from sexual predators.\nI find the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Johnson and the Ohio Supreme Court in Burnett compelling. Each case considered Cincinnati\u2019s ordinance excluding people convicted of drug offenses from entering areas designated as drug-free zones. After holding that the City had a compelling interest in reducing drug abuse and drug-related crime \u2014 an interest comparable to the one at issue in this case \u2014 the Sixth Circuit concluded that the City had failed to present evidence that its ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Johnson, 310 F.3d at 505. The Court pointed out that the ordinance excluded a person \u201cwithout any particularized finding that [he or she] is likely to engage in recidivist drug activity\u201d in the drug-free zone and prohibited that person \u201cfrom engaging in an array of . . . wholly innocent conduct. . . .\u201d Id. at 503. To support this exclusion, the City \u201crelie[d] on only general evidence that individuals arrested and/or convicted for drug activity in [the drug-free zone] typically return to the neighborhood and repeat their offenses.\u201d Id. In short, Cincinnati defended its exclusionary ordinance on the same basis that the Town does here.\nThe Sixth Circuit acknowledged that \u201c[w]e, of course, \u2018do not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of legislation.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 504 (quoting Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195, 205-06, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1282 (1968)). Nevertheless, \u201cwhen constitutional rights are at issue, strict scrutiny requires legislative clarity and evidence demonstrating the ineffectiveness of proposed alternatives.\u201d Id. The court stressed: \u201cIn considering whether a government regulation is narrowly tailored, it is not enough that the regulation achieves its ostensible purpose, it must do so without unnecessarily infringing upon constitutionally protected rights.\u201d Id. After noting that the city had only made conclusory claims that other efforts at battling drug crime were unsuccessful, the court concluded:\nIt is, of course, possible that a regulation like the Ordinance might be the narrowest method of addressing a seemingly uncontrollable drug and crime epidemic. But without some affirmative evidence that there is no less severe alternative, we cannot conclude that the Ordinance, in its present form, survives constitutional scrutiny.\nId. at 505.\nThe Ohio Supreme Court similarly pointed out that the ordinance \u201cencroaches upon a substantial amount of innocent conduct and is not, therefore, narrowly tailored.\u201d Burnett, 93 Ohio St. 3d at 430, 755 N.E.2d at 867. After reciting a number of innocent activities which were, as a result, now forbidden with respect to the people excluded from the drug-free zone, the court observed: \u201cNone of these activities are performed with illegal intention, yet a criminal penalty attaches to them without any evidence of illegality, or improper purpose, or a finding that the person is likely to commit future drug offenses.\u201d Id. The court, therefore, held that while supported by a compelling interest, the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to address that interest since \u201c[a] narrowly tailored ordinance would not strike at an evil with such force that constitutionally protected conduct is harmed along with unprotected conduct.\u201d Id.\nHere, even if we could assume that Woodfin\u2019s ordinance might, to some limited extent, achieve its purpose of protecting its citizens from sexual predators, there has been even less of a showing of narrow tailoring than that presented by Cincinnati. The ordinance precludes registered sex offenders from engaging in a host of innocent activities, some of which would be entitled to their own constitutional protection, such as First Amendment activities or assembling with the public in a park for the Town\u2019s Labor Day festivities. In contrast to Cincinnati, the Town here makes no attempt to argue that other alternative, less restrictive means would be ineffective to meet its interest in public safety. Indeed, the record contains no evidence that other alternatives were considered at any time.\nOther alternatives do in fact exist. For example, the Town could ban individual sex offenders based on conduct suggesting a risk of re-offending in the park. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Michigan City, 462 F.3d 720, 734 (7th Cir. 2006) (banning specific sex offender from park when he had been witnessed watching patrons of park through binoculars); Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 773 (7th Cir. 2004) (\u201cThe City has banned only one child sex offender, Mr. Doe, from the parks, and they have banned Mr. Doe only because of his near-relapse in January of 2000 . . . .\u201d)\u2022 The Town has also not considered the possibility of requiring a permit for registered sex offenders to enter the parks; of banning only those sex offenders most likely to re-offend, such as those required to register under the North Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Registration Program; of banning only persons convicted of certain types of sexual offenses; or of limiting the ban only to parks frequented by unaccompanied minors. Each of these options would be less restrictive than the comprehensive ban adopted by the Town.\nThus, there is no basis in the record for concluding that this ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve the Town\u2019s compelling governmental interest. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1140 (in striking down juvenile curfew adopted to prevent crime, holding that \u201c[bjecause neither logic or [sic] the record permit the conclusion that the classification contained in the Act is narrowly tailored to achieve its expressed objectives, the Court concludes that the Act violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment\u201d). Even under a rational basis analysis, \u201cvague, undifferentiated fears\u201d regarding a particular group cannot support an ordinance. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 326, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3259 (1985) (discussing ordinance as related to the mentally retarded).\nWe cannot simply say that conventional wisdom or commonsense suggests that the ordinance is needed. Not infrequently, the genesis of widely-held beliefs is fear not grounded in reality or science, but rather propogated by collective terror fueled by television or the internet. We cannot strip a whole group of people of a fundamental right based not on their individual behavior, but rather based simply on a desire to be seen as taking action to respond to the public\u2019s fear \u2014 especially when there is only the \u201cbelief\u2019 that such action might possibly make the community a little bit safer. If the record in this case is sufficient to uphold the Town\u2019s ordinance, we are indeed confronted with a slippery slope. Will municipalities next be allowed to bar other groups feared at times by the public \u2014 such as the mentally ill or handicapped, the homeless, gays, or people of middle eastern descent \u2014 because of the possibility that some individual members of those groups might in the future engage in unlawful conduct?\nNothing in Dobbins suggests that the ordinance is constitutional. The Supreme Court stressed: \u201cWe do not have before us a prolonged curfew, imposed by an unduly fearful or arbitrary official upon a serene and peaceful city engaged in its normal pursuits. We have before us a temporary prohibition of travel in a city faced with a clear and present danger of violent upheaval, accompanied by widespread destruction of property and personal injury.\u201d 277 N.C. at 499, 178 S.E.2d at 458. The Court noted that the state and federal constitutions did not require the City of Asheville to wait to act until fires had been ignited and rioting commenced. Id. at 500, 178 S.E.2d at 458. Instead, \u201c[a]ll that is required is the existence of a clear and present danger of such disastrous and unlawful conduct.\u201d Id. Because, \u201caccording to the record before\u201d the Court, that condition existed in Asheville at the time the curfew was proclaimed, the Court found the curfew constitutional. Id. Dobbins thus teaches that the record must demonstrate that there was, at the time the ordinance was adopted, a \u201cclear and present danger\u201d that a registered sex offender would re-offend in one of the Town\u2019s parks. No such evidence exists.\nThe fact that we are talking about convicted sex offenders does not negate constitutional principles. Our Supreme Court, acting 75 years ago, struck down an ordinance that prohibited \u201cany lewd woman\u201d from being on the public streets, in public places, or places of business. See State v. Ashe, 202 N.C. 75, 75, 161 S.E. 709, 709 (1932). In holding the ordinance unconstitutional, the Court stated:\nHowever much they may have offended against the decencies of society, or run counter to the prevailing code of morals, or rendered themselves non grata personae to the community, still they are human beings, citizens of a great Commonwealth, and entitled to the equal protection of the laws.\nTo deny to anyone, not lawfully imprisoned, the right to travel the highways, to buy goods, to eat bread, to attend Divine Worship, and the like, simply because he or she happens, for the time being, to belong to an unfortunate class, is an unwarranted use of the police power. Such an attempt at discrimination is unreasonable and in contravention of common right.\nId. at 76, 161 S.E. at 710 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Surely, we have not \u2014 75 years later \u2014 so strayed from the groundings of our constitution that Ashe\u2019s view of what is an \u201cunwarranted use of the police power\u201d with respect to \u201clewd women\u201d does not apply with equal force to sex offenders, the vast majority of whom will not re-offend.\nConclusion\nThe issue in this case is not whether sexual predators present a risk to our communities. They do. Nor is there any doubt about the ability of state and federal legislatures to act to protect their citizens from such predators. The primary question before this Court is whether the Town has the authority to impose its own regulatory scheme despite the comprehensive state and federal legislation adopted to serve the same purposes. Even if authority does exist, the question remains whether the means used by the Town is sufficiently necessary and tailored to override the rights of people who have already been punished for their crimes, who wish to engage in the innocent behavior of strolling through a park, and who have exhibited no behavior suggesting they will ever offend again.\nA municipality should not be permitted to override fundamental constitutional rights based only on perceived exigency, without consideration of alternatives or efficacy. The public will believe itself safe, although it is not, and people who will never re-offend will be deprived of a fundamental right. I am confident we will come to regret allowing such action to be undertaken in the name of political expediency.\n. The first category has a 10-year registration requirement, while the second category requires lifetime registration. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.6A. A third program governs juveniles not tried as adults. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.26 (2005). Different registration requirements apply to the juveniles, and the information is released only to law enforcement rather than the public. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.29 (2005).\n. The General Assembly has also provided, however, that a landlord offering real property for rent or a person selling real property is not required to disclose that a person convicted of a crime for which registration is required resides near the property. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 39-50, 42-14.2 (2005).\n. Certain other offenders may be subject to a more limited time period of satellite-based monitoring. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-208.40(a)(2).\n. But see Lindsey v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 103 N.C. App. 432, 437, 406 S.E.2d 803, 805-06 (1991) (party could not object on appeal to contents of summary judgment affidavits when party did not object to affidavits before trial court).\n. There has also been no showing that the reports from the United States Justice Department fall within N.C.R. Evid. 803(8), providing a hearsay exception for certain public records and reports.\n. One sexual crime did occur in a park, but the offender apparently was not registered. Thus, the ordinance would not have prevented that crime.\n. I am not, however, suggesting that such media reports would necessarily meet the constitutional standard.\n. It has been stipulated that the park visited by Mr. Standley and his mother contains no amenities for children.\n. I do not intend, by mentioning these options, to express an opinion on their constitutionality since the parties have not had an opportunity to address that question. I am simply demonstrating that options do exist that the Town could have considered. Its failure to consider any other option renders its ordinance constitutionally suspect.", "type": "dissent", "author": "GEER, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Cloninger, Elmore, Hensley & Searson, PLLC, by Bruce A. Elmore, Jr., for plaintiff.", "Ferikes & Bleynat, by Joseph A. Ferikes, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAVID STANDLEY, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF WOODFIN, an incorporated municipality in the State of NC; and BRETT HOLLOMAN, Chief of Police, in his Official Capacity, Defendants\nNo. COA06-1449\n(Filed 2 October 2007)\nConstitutional Law; Sexual Offenses\u2014 registered sex offender \u2014 access to public park prohibited\nThe trial court did not err by granting summary judgment for the defendant town on a challenge to an ordinance which declared that entry into the public parks of the town by registered sex offenders was an offense against the regulations of the town. The ordinance is restrictive only as to defendant\u2019s public parks and does not violate the right to intrastate travel; it is not punitive in intent nor effect and does not violate the ex post facto clause; and it is rationally related to its intended purpose of protecting the health and safety of the citizens of the town.\nJudge GEER dissenting.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 7 August 2006 by Judge James L. Baker in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 May 2007.\nCloninger, Elmore, Hensley & Searson, PLLC, by Bruce A. Elmore, Jr., for plaintiff.\nFerikes & Bleynat, by Joseph A. Ferikes, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0134-01", "first_page_order": 164, "last_page_order": 196 }