{ "id": 8155866, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TREVOR DEMON HALL, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hall", "decision_date": "2007-10-02", "docket_number": "No. COA07-335", "first_page": "267", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 N.C. App. 267" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636089 ], "weight": 13, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "212" }, { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562576 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "340" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550556 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715-16", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between a physician testifying as a fact witness and as an expert witness for purposes of discovery under N.C. R. Civ. R 26(b)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491380 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68", "parenthetical": "distinguishing between a physician testifying as a fact witness and as an expert witness for purposes of discovery under N.C. R. Civ. R 26(b)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545059, 2550093, 2548975, 2548374, 2544791 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0347-02", "/nc/333/0347-04", "/nc/333/0347-03", "/nc/333/0347-01", "/nc/333/0347-05" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499581, 2497002, 2496821, 2499873 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0639-02", "/nc/327/0639-03", "/nc/327/0639-01", "/nc/327/0639-04" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524548 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Huang, 99 N.C. App. 658, 663, 394 S.E.2d 279, 282, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 639, 399 S.E.2d 127 (1990)" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314447 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Huang, 99 N.C. App. 658, 663, 394 S.E.2d 279, 282, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 639, 399 S.E.2d 127 (1990)" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 L. Ed. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "546 U.S. 830", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5908388, 5877157, 5965639, 5991912, 5911081, 6017962, 5986893, 6006128, 5881009, 3806768, 5989878, 5985271, 3809625, 5970362 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/546/0830-10", "/us/546/0830-12", "/us/546/0830-03", "/us/546/0830-13", "/us/546/0830-06", "/us/546/0830-07", "/us/546/0830-02", "/us/546/0830-14", "/us/546/0830-04", "/us/546/0830-01", "/us/546/0830-11", "/us/546/0830-05", "/us/546/0830-09", "/us/546/0830-08" ] }, { "cite": "604 S.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803286 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377705 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-55" }, { "page": "352" }, { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0351-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 17755, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20092619299426337 }, "sha256": "fdcfd9409268c4e278f5cec7960df26a1963e9f38af5f8e5ebf7ff0abf60c120", "simhash": "1:1a694543c52b2e7f", "word_count": 2933 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:40.090074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TREVOR DEMON HALL, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRYANT, Judge.\nTrevor Demon Hall (defendant) appeals from a judgment dated 24 July 2006, and entered upon his conviction for the offense of common law robbery. For the reasons stated herein, we find defendant received a fair trial, free from error.\nFacts\nComplainant Robin Compos testified that on the afternoon of 1 November 2005, she went to visit her friend, Cathy Starling, who was at home recovering from surgery. Compos planned to drive Starling to the bank so that she could cash her check and pay her rent. When Compos arrived at the residence, she found two men and a woman with Starling. Compos recognized one of the men as \u201cTurbo[,]\u201d who was attempting to collect a debt from Starling. With Turbo were defendant and a woman, neither of whom Compos knew.\nCompos drove Starling to a BB&T bank in Riegelwood, North Carolina, where Starling cashed her check. Turbo and his associates followed them in a second car. After paying her rent at a nearby credit union, Starling got into an argument with Turbo. She then returned to the car and handed Compos the bank envelope containing the remainder of the proceeds of her check.\nUpon returning to Starling\u2019s house, Turbo and the unknown woman joined Starling in a bedroom, while defendant and Compos waited in the living room. Defendant walked out of the living room briefly, whereupon his two associates emerged from the bedroom and exited the house. When defendant came back to the living room, Compos \u201ctold him that his ride had just left him.\u201d In defendant\u2019s presence, Starling asked Compos for the bank envelope and removed some of the money. Starling then gave the envelope back to Compos and told her to \u201chold it for her.\u201d Compos put the envelope in her left front pants\u2019 pocket. Starling went into the bathroom.\nVisibly upset by his predicament, defendant forced open the bathroom door and yelled at Starling. Compos threatened to call the police and told defendant that she would \u201ctake him wherever he\u2019s needing to go\u201d if he left Starling alone. Compos and defendant got into her car and drove for approximately three miles toward Whiteville, North Carolina. After directing Compos into a driveway, defendant put the car\u2019s gear shift into park, \u201cstarted beating [her] in the head and started saying, \u2018Give me the money, give me the money.\u2019 \u201d As Compos tried to protect herself, defendant ripped the side of her pants and took the envelope from her pocket. He then \u201ccalmly got out of the car and walked off.\u201d\nCompos drove to the home of her former co-worker and called 911. When police arrived, she told them about the robbery and provided a description of her assailant. The next morning, she sought treatment at the Riegelwood Medical Clinic for blurred vision in her right eye and \u201c[sjharp, throbbing pains going through the side of [her] temple, and into [her] eye.\u201d The doctor found that she had \u201cmuscular swelling in that eye\u201d and temple and prescribed \u201csome really strong medication for the pain[.]\u201d\nThree or four days after the robbery, a detective showed Compos an array of photographs and asked if she could identify her assailant. Compos selected defendant\u2019s photograph as depicting the man who assaulted her and stole Starling\u2019s money from her pocket on 1 November 2005. Compos also identified defendant in court as the robber.\nDaniel Boyes, a physician\u2019s assistant, examined Compos at Riegelwood Medical Clinic on the morning.of 2 November 2005. Compos told Boyes \u201cthat she had been assaulted, struck multiple times ... in the right temporal region[,]\u201d and \u201ccomplained of a headache, blurred vision, tenderness to the scalp and neck pain.\u201d Over defendant\u2019s objection, Boyes testified that his examination of Compos revealed \u201csome swelling and tenderness to the right side of her head\u201d as well as \u201cexquisit[e]\u201d tenderness in the musculature of the left side of her neck.\nColumbus County Sheriff\u2019s Detective Adam Coleman testified that he spoke to Compos on the afternoon of 1 November 2005. She was \u201cvery upset\u201d and \u201chaving problems breathing[,]\u201d and told him she had been robbed of money while giving her assailant a ride in her car after visiting a friend\u2019s house. Compos reported that her assailant hit her in the face and head and ripped her pants pocket while sitting in the front passenger seat of her car. Over defendant\u2019s objection, Coleman also testified that he dusted the front passenger\u2019s side door of Compos\u2019 car for fingerprints and successfully lifted four latent prints. He learned how to lift latent prints as part of his Basic Law Enforcement Training Program, and had performed the activity \u201ca lot\u201d since becoming a deputy in 2003.\nDetective Mack Brazelle and Latent Print Examiner Angela Berry of the Columbus County Sheriffs Office testified as experts in fingerprint identification. After comparing defendant\u2019s fingerprints with the latent print lifted from the passenger\u2019s side door of Compos\u2019 car, both experts averred that the latent print found on the car belonged to \u25a0defendant. Brazelle found \u201cno possibility\u201d that the latent print belonged to anyone other than defendant; and Berry was \u201c[one] hundred percent confident\u201d in her identification. Brazelle also confirmed that Compos selected defendant\u2019s photograph from a lineup he showed her on 3 November 2005.\nOn appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred by allowing the State to adduce expert testimony from physician\u2019s assistant Boyes and Detective Coleman without complying with the discovery requirements for expert witnesses set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2) (2005). Relying on our holding in State v. Blankenship, 178 N.C. App. 351, 631 S.E.2d 208 (2006), he faults the court for allowing Boyes to testify regarding his medical training and experience and his diagnosis of Compos\u2019 condition on the morning of 2 November 2005. Similarly, defendant notes that the court allowed Agent Coleman to testify about his training and the methodology he employed in lifting the latent prints from Compos\u2019 car. Because neither Boyes nor Colemen were designated as expert witnesses in the State\u2019s discovery materials, in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2), defendant asserts that he \u201cmust receive a new trial.\u201d We disagree.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cThe determination of whether a witness\u2019 testimony constitutes expert testimony is one within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Blankenship, 178 N.C. App. at 354-55, 631 S.E.2d at 211 (citing State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 160, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2005)).\nI\nRule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides that \u201c[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2005). By contrast, a lay witness may offer an opinion only where it is \u201c(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (2005).\nHaving agreed to engage in reciprocal voluntary discovery as contemplated by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-902, the State was obliged to undertake the following disclosures regarding its expert witnesses:\nGive notice to the defendant of any expert witnesses that the State reasonably expects to call as a witness at trial. Each such witness shall prepare, and the State shall furnish to the defendant, a report of the results of any examinations or tests conducted by the expert. The State shall also furnish to the defendant the expert\u2019s curriculum vitae, the expert\u2019s opinion, and the underlying basis for that opinion. The State shall give the notice and furnish the materials required by this subsection within a reasonable time prior to trial, as specified by the court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2) (2005). In order to qualify as an expert, a witness need only be found \u201cbetter qualified than the jury as to the subject at hand, with the testimony being \u2018helpful\u2019 to the jury.\u201d State v. Davis, 106 N.C. App. 596, 601, 418 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1992) (citing State v. Huang, 99 N.C. App. 658, 663, 394 S.E.2d 279, 282, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 639, 399 S.E.2d 127 (1990)), disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 347, 426 S.E.2d 710 (1993).\nIn Blankenship, the defendant was charged with possession of precursor chemicals after police found boxes of matches and Sudafed and bottles of iodine, hydrogen peroxide, and rubbing alcohol in the bed of his pickup truck. Blankenship, 178 N.C. App. at 352, 631 S.E.2d at 209. At trial, \u201cthe State proffered testimony by State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Kenneth Razzo (\u201cAgent Razzo\u201d) as to the manufacturing process of methamphetamine and the ingredients used.\u201d Id. The defendant objected to Agent Razzo\u2019s testimony based on the State\u2019s failure to provide notice and other discovery required for an expert witness under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2). Id. at 353, 631 S.E.2d at 209. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding \u201cthat since Agent Razzo would not be giving his opinion as to the specific facts of defendant\u2019s case, and he had not performed any tests or examinations on any of the evidence in the case, he would be permitted to testify as a fact witness.\u201d Id. at 355, 631 S.E.2d at 211.\nOn appeal, we held the trial court abused its discretion by treating Agent Razzo as a fact witness rather than an expert. Id. at 356, 631 S.E.2d at 211. In reaching this conclusion, we assessed both the specialized nature of Agent Razzo\u2019s testimony and the nexus between his field of expertise and the issue before the jury, as follows:\nAlthough the trial court permitted Agent Razzo to testify as a so-called lay witness, we hold that he in fact qualified as, and testified as, an expert witness. The jury was permitted to hear testimony about his extensive training and experience in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and clandestine laboratory investigations, along with his specialized knowledge of the manufacturing process of methamphetamine. Also, the State specifically tendered Agent Razzo as an expert witness, and the trial court failed to take any action to remedy the State\u2019s attempt to tender Agent Razzo as an expert. We hold that based on the presentation of evidence concerning Agent Razzo\u2019s extensive training and experience, he was \u201cbetter qualified than the jury as to the subject at hand,\u201d and he testified as an expert witness.\nId. (citing Davis, 106 N.C. App. at 601, 418 S.E.2d at 267). Because the State had not provided defendant with the required discovery related to its expert witness under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2), we awarded defendant a new trial. Id. at 356, 631 S.E.2d at 212.\nHere, in overruling defendant\u2019s Blankenship objection to Boyes\u2019 testimony, the trial court found that he was testifying as a fact witness for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a), notwithstanding his expertise as a physician\u2019s assistant. We agree. Although Boyes apprised the jury of his diagnosis of Compos\u2019 muscle tenderness \u2014 an opinion informed by his specialized training and experience \u2014 he offered no opinion and brought no expertise to bear \u201cas to the subject at hand\u201d at defendant\u2019s trial. Davis, 106 N.C. App. at 601, 418 S.E.2d at 267. Unlike Agent Razzo, whose specialized knowledge helped the jury to identify the materials found in the Blankenship\u2019s truck as precursors to methamphetamine, Boyes\u2019 opinion as a physician\u2019s assistant was not germane to the issue before the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating Boyes as a fact witness for discovery purposes. See, e.g., Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 167-68, 381 S.E.2d 706, 715-16 (1989) (distinguishing between a physician testifying as a fact witness and as an expert witness for purposes of discovery under N.C. R. Civ. R 26(b)(4)).\nFurther, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court under the particular facts of this case. The offense of common law robbery does not require the application of actual force or the infliction of injury upon the victim. State v. Wilson, 26 N.C. App. 188, 190, 215 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1975). Accordingly, neither the fact nor the degree of Compos\u2019 injuries was essential to the State\u2019s case. Moreover, Boyes offered no opinion regarding the etiology of Compos\u2019 symptoms, or of the consistency between her injuries and her account of the robbery. Rather, his testimony served primarily to corroborate Compos\u2019 claim that she obtained medical treatment on 2 November 2005. Even if the court had excluded Boyes\u2019 opinion testimony, he would have been free to offer factual testimony confirming his treatment of Compos on 2 November 2005, corroborating her statements to him, and stating the treatment he prescribed for her. Finally, we note that \u201c[t]he purpose of discovery under our statutes is to protect the defendant from unfair surprise by the introduction of evidence he cannot anticipate.\u201d Blankenship, 178 N.C. App. at 354, 631 S.E.2d at 210 (citation and quotations omitted). The record reflects that the State provided the defense with records of Compos\u2019 appointment with Boyes at Reigelwood Medical Clinic on 2 November 2005, detailing her diagnosis and treatment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nII\nDefendant raised a similar objection to Deputy Coleman\u2019s testimony about his lifting of the latent fingerprints from Compos\u2019 car. Citing Blankenship, defendant averred that the State failed to designate or qualify Deputy Coleman as an expert witness, or to provide the defense with Coleman\u2019s curriculum vitae pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2). The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection, finding that Deputy Coleman \u201cwas a fact witness and that he entered no expert opinions requiring him \u2014 requiring the State to provide a [curriculum vitae] pursuant to State v[.] Blankenship.\u201d\nWe again find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has held that a witness does not give expert testimony in merely describing the act of collecting latent fingerprints from a surface:\nAdmittedly, a person who lifts latent prints must know how to perform that procedure. But this does not mean he must be qualified as an \u201cexpert.\u201d The basic reason for qualifying a witness as an expert is to insure that he is better qualified than the jury to form an opinion and draw appropriate inferences from a given set of facts.\nState v. Shore, 285 N.C. 328, 340, 204 S.E.2d 682, 690 (1974) (citation omitted); see also State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 277, 215 S.E.2d 348, 355 (1975). Inasmuch as Deputy Coleman did not purport to compare defendant\u2019s fingerprints with the latent prints, \u201cmade no attempt to express an opinion and was asked no questions requiring him to do so[,]\u201d he was properly treated as a fact witness for discovery purposes. Shore, 285 N.C. at 340, 204 S.E.2d at 690. We note that the State provided the defense with proper discovery regarding its two expert fingerprint analysts, Brazelle and Berry.\nThe record on appeal includes two additional assignments of error which are not addressed by defendant in his brief to this Court. By Rule, we deem them abandoned. N.C. R. App. R 28(b)(6).\nNo error.\nJudges WYNN and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRYANT, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Charles E. Reece, for the State.", "Thorsen Law Office, by Haakon Thorsen, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TREVOR DEMON HALL, Defendant\nNo. COA07-335\n(Filed 2 October 2007)\n1. Discovery\u2014 expert testimony \u2014 physician assistant \u2014 fact witness \u2014 protection from unfair surprise\nThe trial court in a common law robbery case did not improperly allow the State to adduce expert testimony from a physician assistant without complying with the discovery requirements for expert witnesses under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2), because: (1) although the physician assistant apprised the jury of his diagnosis of the victim\u2019s muscle tenderness, an opinion informed by his specialized training and experience, he offered no opinion and brought no expertise to bear as to the subject at hand at defendant\u2019s trial; (2) the physician assistant was properly treated as a fact witness for discovery purposes since his opinion as a physician assistant was not germane to the issue before the jury when neither the fact nor the degree of the victim\u2019s injuries was essential to the State\u2019s case; and (3) the purpose of discovery is to protect defendant from unfair surprise, and the State provided the defense with records of the victim\u2019s appointment with the physician assistant detailing her diagnosis and treatment.\n2. Discovery\u2014 expert testimony \u2014 detective\u2014act of collecting latent fingerprints from surface \u2014 fact witness\nThe trial court in a common law robbery case did not improperly allow the State to adduce expert testimony from a detective without complying with the discovery requirements for expert witnesses under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(a)(2), because: (1) our Supreme Court has already held that a witness does not give expert testimony in merely describing the act of collecting latent fingerprints from a surface; and (2) the detective was properly treated as a fact witness for discovery purposes when he did not purport to compare defendant\u2019s fingerprints with the latent prints, made no attempt to express an opinion, and was asked no questions requiring him to do so.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment dated 24 July 2006 by Judge William C. Gore, Jr., in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Charles E. Reece, for the State.\nThorsen Law Office, by Haakon Thorsen, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0267-01", "first_page_order": 297, "last_page_order": 304 }