{ "id": 8158254, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.G. (a.k.a. J.M.G. and J.M.S.)", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.G.", "decision_date": "2007-11-06", "docket_number": "No. COA06-752", "first_page": "496", "last_page": "512", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 N.C. App. 496" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "101 P.3d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 8409787 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "784", "parenthetical": "\"Under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407, Congress has expressly exempted all Social Security benefits from legal process brought by any creditor, including attachment, garnishment, levy or execution . . . .\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/120/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 F.2d 870", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 6560246, 654319 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874", "parenthetical": "noting that the purpose underlying section 407(a) \"is to protect recipients from losing benefits to creditors\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/41/0870-01", "/f2d/739/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634918 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635079 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636049 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 1311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1312-13", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 B.R. 810", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6558416 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812", "parenthetical": "noting that a debtor may waive the protections afforded him by section 407(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/41/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155809, 1155653, 1155879, 1155597, 1155967 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0476-05", "/nc/351/0476-02", "/nc/351/0476-01", "/nc/351/0476-03", "/nc/351/0476-04" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239967 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Wash. L. Rev. 877", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wash. L. Rev.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "arguing that social services entities \"will not apply to act as representative payee if not permitted to use benefits for the child's current maintenance due to the application expenses\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "984 S.W.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11765350 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841", "parenthetical": "\"The patent intent of this statute is to prohibit creditors from asserting claims upon SSI funds that take precedence over the SSI recipient's rights to such funds.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/984/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 1240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1241-42", "parenthetical": "quoting 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5142" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "674 F.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 6557315, 1150805 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/19/1201-01", "/f2d/674/1201-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 F.2d 1052", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 6561240, 644210, 6560870 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1055", "parenthetical": "third emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/43/1052-01", "/f2d/747/1052-01", "/br/44/1052-01" ] }, { "cite": "898 F.2d 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10530660 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/898/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "816 P.2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10367969, 10367681 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/816/0537-02", "/p2d/816/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 L. Ed. 2d 793", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1087", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6540961, 6540643, 6540612, 6540581, 6540678, 6540841, 6540780, 6540722, 6540893 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1087-09", "/us/434/1087-03", "/us/434/1087-02", "/us/434/1087-01", "/us/434/1087-04", "/us/434/1087-07", "/us/434/1087-06", "/us/434/1087-05", "/us/434/1087-08" ] }, { "cite": "258 N.W.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 B.R. 462", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6112236 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/27/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 B.R. 155", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6540195 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/20/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737744 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 U.S. 66", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3921050 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/290/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176077 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" }, { "page": "611-12" }, { "page": "417" }, { "page": "612", "parenthetical": "noting that section 407 \"is broad enough to include all claimants, including a State\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphases added" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554124 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "43 N.C. App. 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551576 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/43/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 S.W.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10016268 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/763/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.W.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10129135 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526", "parenthetical": "holding that any dispute between parents and payee as to use of dependent's Social Security benefits must be resolved through federal administrative process" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/520/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "953" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 A.D.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3315743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/93/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 A.2d 296", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 3949978 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/137/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.W.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10709239 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "163", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/526/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.C. App. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525066 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/74/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 U.S. 371", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9191134 ], "weight": 18, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" }, { "page": "979" }, { "page": "378-79" }, { "page": "981-82", "parenthetical": "\"The department occasionally departs from this practice,... [a]nd there have ... been exceptional instances in which the department has foregone reimbursement for foster care to conserve a child's resources for expenses anticipated on impending emancipation.\"" }, { "page": "385" }, { "page": "985" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "985" }, { "page": "385" }, { "page": "985" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "982" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "984-85", "parenthetical": "using legal dictionary definitions for \"garnishment\" and \"attachment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/537/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1797", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Cardozo L. Rev.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1798-99", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.2040", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(j)(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 401.5", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 U.S. 502", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507-08" }, { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/368/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080025 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5304859 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555775 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790975 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300854 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "holding that an order denying the release of funds held in escrow, as opposed to an order \"purport[ing] to determine who is entitled to the money,\" is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 809", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525861 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811-12", "parenthetical": "holding that an order denying the release of funds held in escrow, as opposed to an order \"purport[ing] to determine who is entitled to the money,\" is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0809-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E.2d 594", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.C. App. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525325 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/71/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 N.C. 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627081 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/253/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.C. App. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553642, 8553606 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/27/0343-02", "/nc-app/27/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" }, { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560682 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155801 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "quoting Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135780 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192-93", "parenthetical": "quoting Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433839 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795905 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524", "parenthetical": "quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1630, "char_count": 41327, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.462276965554687e-08, "percentile": 0.39834059823565005 }, "sha256": "d1abb2a6af705cb33870a5c82c91c940004cbabfa4081b861479c3e23c55378f", "simhash": "1:b32bc01a1bee4cf5", "word_count": 6815 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:40.090074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: J.G. (a.k.a. J.M.G. and J.M.S.)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nJohn C. (\u201cthe biological father\u201d) and Willie G. (\u201cthe biological mother\u201d) are the parents of the minor child J.G., who was bom on 9 July 1990. The trial court terminated the biological father\u2019s parental rights to J.G., and the biological mother subsequently married Tracy S. (\u201cTracy\u201d) on 16 August 1991. On 15 December 1992, Tracy adopted J.G. as his son, and a week later, the biological mother and Tracy purchased a house from Habitat for Humanity (\u201cthe Habitat home\u201d).\nIn April 1993, the biological mother abandoned Tracy and J.G., and on 27 August 1993, Tracy executed a will in which he devised all of his property \u2014 including the Habitat home \u2014 to a testamentary trust for J.G. Tracy also appointed his girlfriend, Connie Bell (\u201cBell\u201d), as J.G.\u2019s guardian and Dawson Deese (\u201cDeese\u201d), his uncle, as executor and trastee, with Bell as an alternate executrix and trustee.\nOn 5 November 1993, Tracy was granted both a divorce from bed and board from the biological mother and sole and exclusive permanent custody of J.G. The biological mother was divested of all rights in the Habitat home and was denied any visitation rights with J.G. On 14 January 1994, the trial court terminated the biological mother\u2019s parental rights. On 3 February 1994, Tracy died.\nOn 18 March 1994, Bell was appointed J.G.\u2019s general guardian. As Tracy\u2019s legally adopted son, J.G. received Social Security benefits after Tracy\u2019s death, and Bell was responsible for accounting for the Social Security checks, making the payments on the mortgage on the Habitat home (\u201cthe Habitat mortgage\u201d), and taking care of the Habitat home. On 5 December 1994, Habitat for Humanity notified Bell, Deese, and the Clerk of the Guilford County Superior Court that Bell was delinquent in making the mortgage payments. On 17 January 1995, J.G.\u2019s maternal uncle, George Jennings (\u201cJennings\u201d), filed a petition to remove Bell as J.G.\u2019s guardian, alleging that Bell had appropriated J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to her own use. On 7 February 1995, Bell and Jennings entered into a consent order that provided for: (1) J.G. to continue residing with Bell; (2) Deese to be the payee for the Social Security benefits; and (3) Deese to make the mortgage payments to Habitat for Humanity.\nOn 3 October 1997, the Guilford County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) filed a petition to remove J.G. from Bell\u2019s custody, alleging that Bell neglected J.G. and used improper physical discipline on him. J.G. told an employee of the Child Evaluation Clinic that Bell drank and abused him on a daily basis, whipping him with a belt, a coat hanger, and various other items. On 17 December 1997, the trial court adjudicated J.G. as neglected. The guardian ad litem did not agree to a reunification plan with Bell, and the trial court ordered J.G. to remain in the legal and physical custody of DSS pending further investigation.\nOn 6 February 1998, the guardian ad litem reported to the trial court that, notwithstanding Deese\u2019s appointment as J.G.\u2019s general guardian, Bell had resumed converting J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to her own use as of the spring of 1997 and that no payments had been made on the Habitat mortgage since May 1997. The guardian ad litem recommended placing J.G. with a relative that was willing and able to assume custody of J.G. and reside at the Habitat home.\nOn 6 February 1998, the trial court ordered that DSS had the authority to place J.G. in the physical custody of his maternal aunt, Arnita Gibson (\u201cGibson\u201d), and Gibson later informed DSS that she wanted to adopt J.G. Deese, meanwhile, died on 18 October 1998. On 14 May 1999, a social worker reported that J.G., who was in second grade at the time, was exhibiting behavioral problems at school, and on 9 February 2001, DSS again reported that J.G. was exhibiting behavioral problems at home and at school. On 3 August 2001, DSS reported that J.G. was doing better in school, both behaviorally and academically. During the time J.G. was in DSS custody, DSS paid the mortgage on the Habitat home where Gibson and J.G. resided.\nOn 18 March 2003, Gibson adopted J.G. and court supervision ceased. Thereafter, Gibson became the representative payee for J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits, which totaled approximately $571.00 per month. Gibson also received an adoption subsidy of approximately $500.00 per month. The monthly payment on the Habitat mortgage was approximately $221.00.\nOn 11 December 2003, J.G. was adjudicated delinquent for one count of misdemeanor stolen property, one count of simple assault, and one count of second-degree trespass. On 1 March 2004, the trial court placed J.G. on probation for twelve months. On 20 April 2004, Gibson filed a juvenile petition stating that J.G. ran away from home for a period of more than twenty-four hours. On 22 April 2004, a motion for review was filed after J.G. violated the terms of his probation. The court appointed a guardian ad litem on 26 April 2004 and ordered DSS to determine whether a dependency petition should be filed on J.G.\u2019s behalf. On 20 May 2004, J.G. was placed in a group home, and on 27 May 2004, the guardian ad litem reported that J.G. did not wish to return to his adoptive mother\u2019s home. Specifically, J.G. stated that (1) his aunt put him out on the front porch every morning at 4:00 a.m.; (2) he did not have clothes that fit him; (3) he did not get along with his aunt\u2019s boyfriend; and (4) he believed that his aunt only wanted his money. The guardian ad litem also reported that J.G. was concerned both about the condition of the Habitat home and that it could be taken away as a result of delinquent mortgage payments.\nOn 26 July 2004, J.G. again was placed into DSS custody, and the trial court ordered DSS to investigate the status of J.G.\u2019s estate and the best way to preserve it for him. While J.G. was in DSS custody, Gibson and her boyfriend continued to live in the Habitat home. On 28 March 2005, while J.G. still was in the custody of DSS, Gibson relinquished her parental rights to J.G. Thereafter, Gibson and her boyfriend abandoned the Habitat home, which fell into a state of disrepair and was vandalized.\nOn 5 October 2005, the trial court adjudicated J.G. dependent and ordered that he remain in the legal and physical custody of DSS. Thereafter, DSS became the representative payee of J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits. DSS made no payments toward the Habitat mortgage. Instead, DSS applied those funds, which amounted to approximately $538.00 per month, toward the cost of J.G.\u2019s foster care, which amounted to approximately $1,300.00 per month for room and board at a therapeutic foster home. In 2005, the Habitat home was valued at approximately $80,000.00, and Habitat for Humanity held the outstanding mortgage of approximately $27,000.00. Because the mortgage was not being paid, Habitat for Humanity initiated foreclosure proceedings.\nOn 23 November 2005, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to protect J.G.\u2019s reasonably foreseeable needs. By order filed 20 December 2005, the trial court found that DSS\u2019s use of J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to reimburse itself, rather than make the $221.00 monthly Habitat mortgage payment, had not been reasonable. The court reasoned that J.G. will need the Habitat home as a residence when he turns eighteen years old and ages out of the foster care system. The court ordered DSS to use a portion of J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to pay: (1) the monthly mortgage on his home; (2) $2,800.00 for the past-due mortgage payments on the house; and (3) $1,000.00 for repairs to the house. On 21 December 2005, DSS filed notice of appeal.\nPreliminarily, we note that both parties agree that the 20 December 2005 order from which DSS appeals is an interlocutory order. They disagree, however, as to whether the \u201csubstantial right\u201d exception applies in the instant case.\n\u201c \u2018An interlocutory order is one made during'the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u2019 \u201d Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 524, 631 S.E.2d 114, 119 (2006) (quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)). \u201cGenerally, a party cannot immediately appeal from an interlocutory order unless failure to grant immediate review would \u2018affect[] a substantial right\u2019 pursuant to [North Carolina General Statutes,] sections 1-277 and 7A-27(d).\u201d Id. at 524, 631 S.E.2d at 119. \u201cThe burden is on the appellant to establish that a substantial right will be affected unless he is allowed immediate appeal from an interlocutory order.\u201d Embler v. Embler, 143 N.C. App. 162, 166, 545 S.E.2d 259, 262 (2001).\n\u201cThe \u2018substantial right\u2019 test for appealability of interlocutory orders is that \u2018the right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that . . . right must potentially work injury ... if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.\u2019 \u201d Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 353 N.C. 188, 192-93, 540 S.E.2d 324, 327 (2000) (quoting Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990)). Our Supreme Court has \u201cadopted the dictionary definition of \u2018substantial right\u2019: \u2018a legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a [person] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.\u2019 \u201d Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Oestreicher v. Am. Nat\u2019l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976)).\nHere, the right is one of substance as opposed to form. First, the trial court\u2019s order required DSS to pay (1) $2,800.00 to Habitat for Humanity to bring the Habitat mortgage to current status and (2) $1,000.00 toward repairs of the Habitat home. Although this Court has held that an injunction on the use of funds may not rise to the level of a substantial right, see Guy v. Guy, 27 N.C. App. 343, 348, 219 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1975), a substantial right may be affected when a trial court orders the immediate payment of funds. See, e.g., Harrell v. Harrell, 253 N.C. 758, 761, 117 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1961); Miller v. Henderson, 71 N.C. App. 366, 368, 322 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1984); see also State ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. N.C. Rate Bureau, 102 N.C. App. 809, 811-12, 403 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1991) (holding that an order denying the release of funds held in escrow, as opposed to an order \u201cpurport[ing] to determine who is entitled to the money,\u201d is interlocutory and does not affect a substantial right). However, this Court also has held that \u201cno substantial right exists ... [w]hen the sole issue is the payment of money pending the litigation.\u201d Perry v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 176 N.C. App. 123, 130, 625 S.E.2d 790, 795 (2006) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the instant case affects more than just money; it also affects DSS\u2019s right to choose how to dispose of funds that it receives in its capacity as a representative payee properly designated by the Social Security Administration. Its right to use its discretion as representative payee is \u201ca matter of substance as distinguished from [a] matter[] of form.\u201d Oestreicher, 290 N.C. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805. Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s order affects a substantial right.\nAfter determining that the trial court\u2019s order affects a substantial right, we next must determine whether that right will be \u201clost absent immediate review.\u201d McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 282, 624 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2006). In the case sub judice, the substantial right at issue will be lost if the trial court\u2019s order is not immediately reviewed. As DSS correctly contends in its brief, \u201c[i]f DSS is not allowed to appeal until after the juvenile reaches majority age, DSS will never be able to recover the funds it was . . . required to pay pursuant to the Order.\u201d Specifically, DSS accurately notes that it \u201ccannot sue the juvenile, because ... he is not legally responsible for his own foster care costs. Neither can DSS sue the Guardian Ad Litem, because he or she only represents the juvenile and has not spent the money for its own purposes.\u201d Accordingly, as the trial court\u2019s 20 December 2005 order affects a substantial right that will be lost if not reviewed before final judgment, the instant appeal is properly before this Court.\nOn appeal, DSS contends that the trial court: (1) lacked authority to order DSS to use J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to pay the repair costs as well as the delinquent, current, and future mortgage payments on the Habitat home; (2) erred in concluding that DSS is the general guardian of J.G.; and (3) erred in its finding of fact speculating on the impact that might have resulted if both Gibson had been promptly served with the child support complaint and the court had been informed that she was receiving a $500.00 adoption subsidy for J.G., on the grounds that this finding was not supported by competent evidence in the record.\nAs a preliminary matter, we agree with the guardian ad litem that a resolution of DSS\u2019s second and third arguments is not necessary for a resolution of the instant appeal. Notwithstanding the trial court\u2019s finding that DSS functioned as J.G.\u2019s general guardian and that, had DSS acted more diligently, Gibson may have been ordered to pay her adoption subsidy money toward J.G.\u2019s cost of care, the trial court nevertheless ordered DSS in its capacity as J.G.\u2019s representative payee to make payments on the Habitat mortgage on J.G.\u2019s behalf. Specifically, the trial court \u201cordered that the Guilford County Department of Social Services is to use funds from [J.G.]\u2019s social security benefits, for which the Department is representative payee, to pay the monthly mortgage on [J.G.]\u2019s Habitat house . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added). The pivotal issue on appeal is not whether the trial court erred in its findings with respect to guardianship or Gibson\u2019s adoption subsidy, but rather whether the trial court properly ordered DSS, as the representative payee of J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits, to make the payments on J.G.\u2019s Habitat mortgage. Because a resolution of DSS\u2019s second and third arguments is not necessary for our resolution of the appeal, we decline to reach those issues. See, e.g., Champs Convenience Stores, Inc. v. United Chem. Co., Inc., 329 N.C. 446, 452, 406 S.E.2d 856, 859 (1991); State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 326 N.C. 522, 528, 391 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1990).\nFirst, DSS contends that because federal law governs Social Security benefits, North Carolina state courts are preempted and therefore lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter orders affecting such benefits. We disagree.\n\u201cFederal preemption occurs when the federal government\u2019s regulation in an area is comprehensive. State action may be barred upon a showing of congressional intent to occupy the field and prohibit parallel state action.\u201d Hatcher v. Harrah\u2019s N.C. Casino Co., L.L.C., 151 N.C. App. 275, 278, 565 S.E.2d 241, 243 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, as the United States Supreme Court has explained,\n[w]e start with the premise that nothing in the concept of our federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights created by federal law. Concurrent jurisdiction has been a common phenomenon in our judicial history, and exclusive federal court jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law has been the exception rather than the rule.\nCharles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483, 487 (1962).\nTitle 42 of the United States Code, as well as the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Social Security Administration, governs Social Security benefits. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 401 et seq.-, 20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 401.5 el seq. Pursuant to Title 42, section 405, \u201cmisuse of benefits by a representative payee occurs in any case in which the representative payee receives payment under this title for the use and benefit of another person and converts such payment, or any part thereof, to a use other than for the use and benefit of such other person.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405(j)(9). The statute further provides that \u201c[t]he Commissioner of Social Security may prescribe by regulation the meaning of the term \u2018use and benefit\u2019 for purposes of this paragraph.\u201d Id. The Social Security regulations, in turn, state that \u201cpayments ... to a representative payee have been used for the use and benefit of the beneficiary if they are used for the beneficiary\u2019s current maintenance. Current maintenance includes cost[s] incurred in obtaining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort items.\u201d 20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.2040, 416.640.\nIn the instant case, DSS has been appointed representative payee of J.G.\u2019s Social Security payments, and in that capacity, DSS has reimbursed itself for the cost of J.G.\u2019s foster care. As such, DSS contends that it is using, and always has used, J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits for his \u201ccurrent maintenance\u201d as defined by the federal regulations.\nNotwithstanding mixed reviews, DSS\u2019s actions in the instant case have become a common practice by foster care agencies throughout the country:\nAs a part of revenue maximization strategies . . . , foster care agencies are engaged in the systemic practice of converting foster children\u2019s Social Security benefits into a source of state funds. The agencies identify foster children who are disabled or have deceased or disabled parents, apply for Social Security benefits on the children\u2019s behalf, and then take the children\u2019s benefits to reimburse foster care costs for which the children have no legal obligation. The states are using the Social Security benefits as a funding stream in order to reduce state expenditures rather than as a resource to address the children\u2019s unmet needs in the severely broken foster care system. Furthermore, the benefits are not being conserved to aid the children in their forthcoming and difficult transitions from foster care to independence.\nDaniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1797, 1798-99 (2006) (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court upheld such a practice in Washington State Dep\u2019t of Social & Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 154 L. Ed. 2d 972 (2003). Specifically, the Keffeler Court addressed whether a foster care agency\u2019s practice of reimbursing itself violated the anti-alienability provision in the Social Security Act. See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 375, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 979 (\u201cThe question here is whether the State\u2019s use of Social Security benefits to reimburse itself for some of its initial expenditures violates a provision of the Social Security Act protecting benefits from \u2018execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.\u2019 We hold that it does not.\u201d (internal citations omitted)). The issue in Keffeler was narrow, however, and Keffeler alone does not support DSS\u2019s preemption argument.\nAlthough this Court has held that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to direct the Social Security Administration to make payments to someone other than the beneficiary or representative payee, see Brevard v. Brevard, 74 N.C. App. 484, 488, 328 S.E.2d 789, 792 (1985), we note that \u201c[t]he SSA [Social Security Administration] does not resolve disputes between a payee and a beneficiary concerning the use of benefits.\u201d Jahnke v. Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1994). As a result, several courts have held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear disputes between a representative payee and a beneficiary concerning the use of Social Security funds. See, e.g., id. (\u201cAlthough the federal government may prosecute a payee who converts a beneficiary\u2019s funds, there is no federal mechanism to prevent such a conversion from occurring. Moreover, once the SSA pays the benefits to the proper representative payee, it has no liability to the beneficiary for misuse of the payments.\u201d); Ecolono v. Div. of Reimbursements, 769 A.2d 296, 305 (Md. Ct. App. 2001) (\u201c[W]e find nothing in federal law to indicate an intent by Congress to limit interested parties to the federal administrative and judicial review process and to prohibit State courts from exercising jurisdiction, in the case before us, when the relief requested is not the removal of the payee but a reallocation of the benefits.\u201d); In re Kummer, 93 A.D.2d 135, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (\u201c[T]he Federal Government has no interest in the funds properly paid to the DSS and it has no power to inquire into their expenditure other than to ascertain whether to make future payments to the DSS as representative payee. It lacks the power to determine disputes between the representative payee and the beneficiary as to the propriety of expenditures of benefits held in trust by the former because it has no interest in those funds.\u201d (footnotes omitted)); Catlett v. Catlett, 561 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (\u201cWe find that the case at bar involves an issue, i.e., the representative payee\u2019s expenditure of benefits, which is neither an initial determination nor a determination which is not an initial determination as defined by the federal regulations. Jurisdiction over this particular issue has not been exclusively granted to the federal courts by express provision.\u201d). But see Deweese v. Crawford, 520 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that any dispute between parents and payee as to use of dependent\u2019s Social Security benefits must be resolved through federal administrative process), overruled on other grounds by Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989).\nIn Jahnke v. Jahnke, the Iowa Supreme Court, in determining that the state court possessed concurrent jurisdiction in a dispute between a representative payee and an adoptive parent of the beneficiary, noted that \u201c [t]he assumption of state court jurisdiction is based in part on the state\u2019s interest in the welfare of children residing within its borders.\u201d Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d at 163 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the instant case, the guardian ad litem, acting on behalf of J.G., disputed DSS\u2019s use of J.G.\u2019s Social Security funds, and the trial court found that DSS\u2019s use of the funds was not in J.G.\u2019s best interests. Under our Juvenile Code,\n[t]he duties of the guardian ad litem program shall be to make an investigation to determine the facts, the needs of the juvenile, and the available resources within the family and community to meet those needs;... to report to the court when the needs of the juvenile are not being met; and to protect and promote the best interests of the juvenile until formally relieved of the responsibility by the court.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-601 (2005). Additionally, \u201c[i]t is the duty of the court to give each child before it such attention, control and oversight as is in the best interest of the child and the state.\u201d In re Cusson, 43 N.C. App. 333, 337, 258 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing In re Eldridge, 9 N.C. App. 723, 724, 177 S.E.2d 313, 313 (1970)). Here, both the guardian ad litem and the trial court acted consistently with their supervisory roles in seeing to J.G.\u2019s best interests, and J.G.\u2019s best interests were central to the court\u2019s order, which noted that if Habitat for Humanity foreclosed on the Habitat home, J.G. would receive very little money from the sale and would be homeless when he aged out of foster care. See generally Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth\u2019s Substantive Due Process Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol\u2019y 381, 386-89 (2005) (discussing the troubling prevalence of homelessness among former foster care youth). Although DSS implies that it is always proper for it to reimburse itself for the cost of J.G.\u2019s care using J.G.\u2019s Social Security funds, even the Department of Social and Health Services in Keffeler acknowledged that it was not always appropriate to use all of a juvenile\u2019s Social Security funds to reimburse itself, in particular in anticipation of \u201cimpending emancipation.\u201d Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 378-79, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 981-82 (\u201cThe department occasionally departs from this practice,... [a]nd there have ... been exceptional instances in which the department has foregone reimbursement for foster care to conserve a child\u2019s resources for expenses anticipated on impending emancipation.\u201d).\nIn accordance with the greater weight of authority, \u201c[w]e agree with those courts that allow state courts to look into the expenditure of dependent social security benefits when an interested party questions the propriety of those expenditures.\u201d Jahnke, 526 N.W.2d at 163. Further, the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction as part of its supervisory role over J.G., a \u201cchild subject to its jurisdiction.\u201d Eldridge, 9 N.C. App. at 724, 177 S.E.2d at 313. Accordingly, DSS\u2019s assignment of error with respect to subject matter jurisdiction is overruled.\nDSS next contends that the trial court\u2019s order violated the antialienability provision of the Social Security Act, codified at section 407(a) of Title 42 of the United States Code. We disagree.\n\u201cIn general, Social Security benefits are neither assignable nor subject to legal process.\u201d Brevard, 74 N.C. App. at 487, 328 S.E.2d at 791 (citing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407 and Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 34 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1973)). Specifically,\n[t]he right of any person to any future payment under this title [42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 401 et seq.] shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this title shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.\n42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407(a) (emphases added). In the instant case, DSS contends that by entering the order directing DSS to make J.G.\u2019s mortgage payments, the trial court subjected J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to \u201clegal process\u201d in violation of Title 42, section 407(a) of the United States Code.\nIn Keffeler, the United States Supreme Court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of \u201cother legal process\u201d but explained that\n\u201cother legal process\u201d should be understood to be process much like the processes of execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment, and at a minimum, would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism, though not necessarily an elaborate one, by which control over property passes from one person to another in order to discharge or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated liability.\nKeffeler, 537 U.S. at 385, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 985. Using the guidance set forth by the Supreme Court in Keffeler, we must determine whether the trial court\u2019s 20 December 2005 order constitutes \u201cother legal process\u201d with respect to the alienation of J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits.\nIn interpreting section 407(a), we first note that legislative intent controls the construction of a statute. See Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Arenz, 290 U.S. 66, 69, 78 L. Ed. 176, 178 (1933). As our Supreme Court has explained, \u201cin ascertaining this [legislative] intent, a court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish.\u201d Shelton v. Morehead Mem\u2019l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81-82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986).\nAlthough DSS in the case sub judice contends that the trial court\u2019s order directing DSS to make payments on the Habitat mortgage constitutes \u201clegal process\u201d and violates section 407(a), DSS\u2019s \u201cinterpretation of 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407 takes the statute out of context and is an improper attempt to fashion a shield into a sword to be used against the intended beneficiary of the law.\u201d In re French, 20 B.R. 155, 156 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982). It is well-settled that \u201cCongress in enacting 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407 sought to protect Social Security payments which benefit the poor and needy from seizure in legal process against the beneficiaries. Section 407 deals with the rights of social security recipients and seeks to protect their benefits from the reach of creditors.\u201d In re Greene, 27 B.R. 462, 464 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (internal citation omitted); see also Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the purpose underlying section 407(a) \u201cis to protect recipients from losing benefits to creditors\u201d). As such, several state courts have discussed section 407(a) as a limitation upon creditors\u2019 rights, see, e.g., In re Estate of Vary, 258 N.W.2d 11, 17-18 (Mich. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Ivy v. Mich. Dep\u2019t of Treasury, 434 U.S. 1087, 55 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1978); First Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co. v. Arles, 816 P.2d 537, 539 (Okla. 1991), and \u201c[c]ourts have uniformly recognized that the purpose of section 407(a) is to protect social security beneficiaries and their dependents from the claims of creditors.\u201d Fetterusso v. New York, 898 F.2d 322, 327 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Indeed, the anti-alienability provision \u201cspeaks throughout in terms of the rights of social security recipients . . . and the protection of their benefits from the reach of creditors.\u201d Rowan v. Morgan, 747 F.2d 1052, 1055 (6th Cir. 1984) (third emphasis added) (quoting Neavear v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 1201, 1205 (7th Cir. 1982)). We note, however, that \u201c \u2018[Section] 407 does not refer to any \u201cclaim of creditors\u201d; it imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all Social Security benefits.\u2019 \u201d Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 382, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 985 (quoting Philpott, 409 U.S. at 417, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 611-12). Nevertheless, the focus of section 407(a) is to protect Social Security beneficiaries against claimants to Social Security benefits, whether or not such claimants are creditors. See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 417, 34 L. Ed. 2d at 612 (noting that section 407 \u201cis broad enough to include all claimants, including a State\u201d). The congressional intent that section 407(a) protect Social Security beneficiaries against actions brought against them is reflected further in the House Conference Report on the Supplemental Security Income legislation:\n\u201c[I]f the benefits which would be provided under this program are to meet the most basic needs of the poor, the benefits must be protected from seizure in legal processes against the beneficiary. Therefore, any amounts paid or payable under this program would not be subject to levy, garnishment, or other legal process, except the collection of delinquent Federal taxes. Also, entitlement to these benefits would not be transferable or assignable.\u201d\nKerlinsky v. Commonwealth, 459 N.E.2d 1240, 1241-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (quoting 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5142) (emphasis added)). Therefore, we hold that the anti-alienability provision functions as a bar against actions for Social Security benefits brought against Social Security beneficiaries and payees. See Metz v. Metz, 101 P.3d 779, 784 (Nev. 2004) (\u201cUnder 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407, Congress has expressly exempted all Social Security benefits from legal process brought by any creditor, including attachment, garnishment, levy or execution . . . .\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Morris v. Morris, 984 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Ky. 1998) (\u201cThe patent intent of this statute is to prohibit creditors from asserting claims upon SSI funds that take precedence over the SSI recipient\u2019s rights to such funds.\u201d (emphasis added)).\nThis holding comports with the statutory language as well as the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Keffeler. The statute provides that Social Security funds \u201cshall [not] be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407(a). The Keffeler Court further noted that \u201c \u2018other legal process\u2019 should be understood to be process much like the processes of execution, levy, attachment, and garnishment.\u201d Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 985. \u201cThese legal terms of art refer to formal procedures by which one person gains a degree of control over property otherwise subject to the control of another, and generally involve some form of judicial authorization.\u201d Id. at 383, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 984. In the instant case, no other person or entity gained control over J.G.\u2019s funds; DSS continued, as representative payee, to control the funds, but merely was directed by the court in its supervisory role to use a portion of the funds to keep J.G.\u2019s mortgage current \u2014 an action intended for the direct benefit of J.G.\nFurthermore, the actions listed in section 407(a) typically are brought by creditors or other claimants. See, e.g., Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 609 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \u201cexecution\u201d as the \u201c[j Judicial enforcement of a money judgment, [usually] by seizing and selling the judgment debtor\u2019s property\u201d); id. at 926 (defining \u201clevy\u201d as the taking or seizing of \u201cproperty in execution of a judgment\u201d and providing as an example the phrase, \u201cthe judgment creditor may levy on the debtor\u2019s assets\u201d); id. at 136 (defining \u201cattachment\u201d as a \u201cthe seizing of a person\u2019s property to secure a judgment or to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment\u201d); id. at 702 (defining \u201cgarnishment\u201d as \u201c[a] judicial proceeding in which a creditor (or potential creditor) asks the court to order a third party who is indebted to or is bailee for the debtor to turn over to the creditor any of the debtor\u2019s property (such as wages or bank accounts) held by that third party\u201d). Here, there is no creditor, nor is there any claimant.\nIn the case sub judice, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to protect J.G.\u2019s reasonably foreseeable needs, and based upon this motion, the trial court entered its order directing DSS, inter alia, to use a portion of J.G.\u2019s Social Security benefits to keep current the mortgage on the Habitat home. As discussed supra, the legislative intent underlying section 407(a) is to protect Social Security beneficiaries from actions brought by creditors or other claimants. Such was not the case here, and therefore, section 407(a) is inapplicable. Accordingly, DSS\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.\nJudges CALABRIA and GEER concur.\n. Since no mortgage payment was made since January 2005, the past-due amount of $2,800.00 accumulated while J.G. was in DSS custody.\n. See, e.g., Patrick Gardner, Keffeler v. DSHS: Picking the Pockets of America\u2019s Neediest Children, Youth L. News, July-Sept. 2002; Lorraine Ahearn, At Eleventh Hour, Judge Saves Boy in Foreclosure, Greensboro News & Rec., Dec. 18, 2006 (describing J.G.\u2019s situation as \u201ca story of uncommon cruelty, compounded by layer upon layer of bureaucratic incompetence. And finally, no remorse from the only parent the boy, at age 15, has left \u2014 the Department of Social Services.\u201d). But see Tobias J. Kammer, Note, Keffeler v. Department of Social and Health Services: How the Supreme Court of Washington Mistook Caring for Children as Robbing Them Blind, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 877, 878 (2002) (arguing that social services entities \u201cwill not apply to act as representative payee if not permitted to use benefits for the child\u2019s current maintenance due to the application expenses\u201d). representative payee\u201d). However, because such constitutional arguments were not raised at trial, we do not pass upon them on appeal. See State v. Deese, 136 N.C. App. 413, 420, 524 S.E.2d 381, 386 (holding that this Court will not consider constitutional arguments neither asserted nor determined in the trial court), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 476, 543 S.E.2d 499 (2000).\n. We note that there may be viable constitutional objections to the practice employed by DSS in the instant case and used by similar state agencies throughout the country. See generally Hatcher, supra, at 1832-41 (discussing possible objections based upon procedural due process, equal protection, and the Takings Clause). The Keffeler Court acknowledged the existence of a procedural due process claim but declined to rule upon the issue. See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 380 n.4, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 982 (declining to reach the issue because the Washington Supreme Court did not reach the argument, \u201caccepted in the alternative by the trial court, that the department violated procedural due process by failing to provide notice of the \u2018intended result\u2019 of its appointment as\n. Although the Brevard Court also held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to order the representative payee, who was the father of the beneficiaries, to pay over to the mother of the beneficiaries any part of the Social Security benefits he received as representative payee, the holding was based upon Title 42, section 407(a) of the United States Code. See Brevard, 74 N.C. App. at 487-88, 328 S.E.2d at 792 (citing 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 407(a)). As discussed infra, however, section 407(a) applies only to actions brought by claimants or creditors. In Brevard, the action was brought by the mother for an accounting of the Social Security benefits, based upon a prior trial court order directing the father to send the children\u2019s Social Security checks to the mother as child support. See id. at 486, 328 S.E.2d at 791. The case sub judice is distinguishable as the action was brought by the guardian ad litem and not a claimant to the Social Security benefits. Therefore, the trial court here, unlike the court in Brevard, did not violate section 407(a).\n. See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 383, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 984-85 (using legal dictionary definitions for \u201cgarnishment\u201d and \u201cattachment\u201d).\n. Several courts have explained that because section 407(a) functions as a protection for Social Security beneficiaries, beneficiaries may waive that statutory protection. See, e.g., In re Gillespie, 41 B.R. 810, 812 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (noting that a debtor may waive the protections afforded him by section 407(a)); Matavich v. Budak, 447 N.E.2d 1311, 1312-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (same). Because we hold that section 407(a) does not apply, we need not decide whether section 407(a) may be waived.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Office of the Guilford County Attorney, by Deputy County Attorney James A. Dickens, for Guilford County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellant.", "Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.R, by Margaret Rowlett, for Guardian ad Litem; and Legal Aid of N.C., by Attorney Advocate Lewis Pitts, for respondent-juvenile-appellee.", "Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Matthew P. McGuire and Amy L. Keegan, for North Carolina Justice Center, Carolina Legal Assistance, and the Pulpit Forum of Clergy, Greensboro and Vicinity; and Charm M. Nichol, for Governor\u2019s Advocacy Council for Persons with Disabilities, Amici Curiae.", "Edelstein & Payne, by M. Travis Payne; and Sullivan & Worcester LLP, by Patrick P Dinardo, Beth Jacobson, and Jennifer L. Sullivan, for First Star, Amicus Curiae.", "Paul Meyer, for North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, Amicus Curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: J.G. (a.k.a. J.M.G. and J.M.S.)\nNo. COA06-752\n(Filed 6 November 2007)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 use of child\u2019s social security benefits \u2014 substantial right\nAn interlocutory order involving DSS\u2019s use of a child\u2019s Social Security benefits and its failure to make Habitat for Humanity mortgage payments was immediately appealable. A substantial right is affected in that it involves DSS\u2019s right to use its discretion in disposing of funds that it receives in its capacity as a representative payee; that substantial right will be lost without immediate review because the DSS will not be able to recover the funds it was required to pay for the mortgage.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 necessary issue \u2014 other issues not addressed\nThe pivotal issue on an appeal was whether the trial court properly ordered DSS, as the representative payee of a child\u2019s Social Security benefits, to make payments on a Habitat for Humanity mortgage; it was not necessary to resolve other issues concerning the child\u2019s guardianship, the timing of the child support complaint, and an adoption subsidy.\n3. Public Assistance\u2014 Social Security benefits \u2014 DSS expenditure\nThe North Carolina state courts are not preempted from looking into DSS\u2019s expenditure of the Social Security benefits of a child in DSS custody, and the trial court here properly exercised jurisdiction as part of its supervisory role. DSS reimbursed itself for the cost of care and did not make payments on a Habitat for Humanity mortgage for a house which would become the child\u2019s when he ages out of care.\n4. Public Assistance\u2014 Social Security \u2014 anti-alienability\u2014 court ordered mortgage payments\nThe trial court did not violate the anti-alienability provision of the Social Security Act when it ordered DSS to use a part of a dependent child\u2019s Social Security payments for a Habitat for Humanity mortgage. In this case, no other person or entity gained control over the child\u2019s funds; DSS continued to control the funds, but was merely directed by the court in its supervisory role to use a portion of the funds to keep the mortgage current for the direct benefit of the child.\nAppeal by petitioner from order entered 20 December 2005 by Judge Susan E. Bray in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 January 2007.\nOffice of the Guilford County Attorney, by Deputy County Attorney James A. Dickens, for Guilford County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellant.\nSmith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, L.L.R, by Margaret Rowlett, for Guardian ad Litem; and Legal Aid of N.C., by Attorney Advocate Lewis Pitts, for respondent-juvenile-appellee.\nNelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Matthew P. McGuire and Amy L. Keegan, for North Carolina Justice Center, Carolina Legal Assistance, and the Pulpit Forum of Clergy, Greensboro and Vicinity; and Charm M. Nichol, for Governor\u2019s Advocacy Council for Persons with Disabilities, Amici Curiae.\nEdelstein & Payne, by M. Travis Payne; and Sullivan & Worcester LLP, by Patrick P Dinardo, Beth Jacobson, and Jennifer L. Sullivan, for First Star, Amicus Curiae.\nPaul Meyer, for North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, Amicus Curiae." }, "file_name": "0496-01", "first_page_order": 526, "last_page_order": 542 }