{ "id": 8159009, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT J. PETRICK", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Petrick", "decision_date": "2007-11-06", "docket_number": "No. COA07-86", "first_page": "597", "last_page": "606", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "186 N.C. App. 597" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "637 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637286 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "525" }, { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/637/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636648 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634313 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9431 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835, n. 46" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 79", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4682240 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204502 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3736248 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80-81", "parenthetical": "internal quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53843 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305505 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11656784 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145538 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696125 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986)" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524567 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986)" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 L. Ed. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9356447, 9356864, 9356515, 9356644, 9356390, 9356799, 9356683, 9356334, 9356241, 9356982, 9356568, 9356733, 9356926, 9356287 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0997-05", "/us/532/0997-12", "/us/532/0997-06", "/us/532/0997-08", "/us/532/0997-04", "/us/532/0997-11", "/us/532/0997-09", "/us/532/0997-03", "/us/532/0997-01", "/us/532/0997-14", "/us/532/0997-07", "/us/532/0997-10", "/us/532/0997-13", "/us/532/0997-02" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685069 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 L. Ed. 2d 795", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "537 U.S. 1117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9341218, 9341250, 9340869, 9341063, 9341160, 9341421, 9341364, 9340916, 9341110, 9340949, 9340987, 9341309, 9341023 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/537/1117-09", "/us/537/1117-10", "/us/537/1117-01", "/us/537/1117-06", "/us/537/1117-08", "/us/537/1117-13", "/us/537/1117-12", "/us/537/1117-02", "/us/537/1117-07", "/us/537/1117-03", "/us/537/1117-04", "/us/537/1117-11", "/us/537/1117-05" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220016 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465", "parenthetical": "citing White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719603 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "citing White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8996407 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789604, 3788198, 3786695, 3798193, 3793852 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0540-04", "/nc/360/0540-05", "/nc/360/0540-03", "/nc/360/0540-01", "/nc/360/0540-02" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793056, 3795811, 3786620, 3795503 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0488-01", "/nc/360/0488-02", "/nc/360/0488-04", "/nc/360/0488-03" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352756 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 N.C. App. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523983 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/78/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 884, "char_count": 20373, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.36606728809285793 }, "sha256": "e7cfa7f6cd44c3466e6e0e2418b89a4dd67e103934d937d32f624fdd56d4ca16", "simhash": "1:13fadc2775721cf0", "word_count": 3291 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:40.090074+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and ELMORE concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT J. PETRICK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nRobert J. Petrick (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgment entered after a jury found him to be guilty of first-degree murder pursuant N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-17. We find no error.\nI. Background\nOn 22 January 2003, defendant reported his wife, Janine Sutphen (\u201cthe victim\u201d), to be missing after she failed to return home from a practice with the North Carolina Symphony. Officers found the victim\u2019s car parked in a parking deck located across the street from where the North Carolina Symphony had practiced. No signs of a struggle were apparent inside or around the victim\u2019s car.\nFour months later, on 29 May 2003, the victim\u2019s body floated to the surface of Falls Lake wrapped in a sleeping bag and a tarp and sealed with duct tape. Chains were wrapped around the victim\u2019s legs and her body was identified from dental records.\nDefendant was arrested on 30 May 2003. Mark Edwards, Esq. (\u201cAttorney Edwards\u201d) was appointed to represent defendant. Defendant was indicted for the victim\u2019s murder on 2 June 2003. On 20 September 2004, defendant was also indicted as attaining habitual felon status based upon three prior felony convictions in the State of Illinois. On 14 June 2005, defendant moved to dismiss Attorney Edwards and for the appointment of new counsel. The trial court allowed defendant to proceed pro se and ordered Attorney Edwards to remain available as standby counsel.\nOn 11 October 2005, defendant waived his right to all assistance of counsel and stated he desired to represent himself and appear on his own behalf for trial. Defendant\u2019s non-capital trial began on 31 October 2005. On 29 November 2005, a jury returned a verdict finding defendant to be guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appeals.\nII. Issues\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) allowing him to represent himself; (2) admitting evidence concerning certain behaviors of a cadaver dog; (3) admitting statements concerning his attacks on the victim and his and the victim\u2019s financial problems; and (4) admitting his prior crimes, wrongs, or acts into evidence. Defendant also argues that a breakdown occurred in the adversarial process and he is entitled to a new trial.\nIII. Waiver of Counsel\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself pro se at his trial and contends the trial court should have presented him with three options: (1) proceed with appointed, counsel; (2) represent himself pro se; or (3) continue with appointed counsel, who was to defer to defendant\u2019s wishes when he and counsel conflicted on trial strategy. We disagree.\nA defendant may be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial judge makes thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant:\n(1) Has been clearly advised of his right to the assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he is so entitled;\n(2) Understands and appreciates the consequences of this decision; and\n(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 (2005). This statutory inquiry is required in every case where a defendant elects to represent himself without the assistance of counsel. State v. White, 78 N.C. App. 741, 746, 338 S.E.2d 614, 617 (1986).\nIn State v. Hoover, this Court held the trial court did not err in allowing the defendant to waive his right to counsel and permitting defendant to represent himself where the record showed the trial court fully complied with the requirements and stipulations of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242 before defendant was allowed to waive his right to counsel. 174 N.C. App. 596, 600, 621 S.E.2d 303, 306 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 488, 632 S.E.2d 766, appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 540, 634 S.E.2d 543 (2006).\nDefendant filed a written motion to dismiss Attorney Edwards as his appointed counsel and stated his relationship with Edwards had \u201cdegenerate [d] past repair to a degree prejudicial to the conduct of the case for the defense.\u201d At the hearing on the motion, defendant stated, \u201cI would prefer to attempt to represent myself pro se at this point, Your Honor. I understand the caution and that\u2019s the route I choose to go.\u201d The trial judge expressed hesitation, but allowed defendant to proceed pro se and ordered Attorney Edwards to remain as standby counsel. Defendant signed a waiver of right to counsel.\nThe trial court stated after defendant signed the waiver that it found defendant understood the nature of the charges, proceedings, and range of permissible punishments. Defendant reminded the trial judge to be sure that the trial court was satisfied that he had such understanding. The trial court again reviewed the charges and possible punishments with defendant.\nOn 11 October 2005, the trial court again apprised defendant of his rights to court-appointed counsel, self-representation, or hired counsel. The trial court detailed each sentence and punishment defendant could receive and received assurances from him that he understood all possible scenarios. Defendant signed another waiver of his right to counsel.\nOn two separate occasions prior to defendant\u2019s jury trial beginning on 31 October 2005, defendant waived his right to counsel. The trial court in both instances engaged in and applied the appropriate statutory inquiry and safeguards to defendant\u2019s election to proceed pro se. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Cadaver Dos Evidence\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by allowing a cadaver dog handler to testify concerning the significance of various behaviors displayed by the dog. We dismiss this assignment of error.\nA. Standard of Review\nIf alleged error is properly preserved at trial, we review eviden-tiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boston, 165 N.C. App. 214, 218, 598 S.E.2d 163, 166 (2004). \u201cA trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985) (citing White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985)).\nIn criminal cases, a question which was not preserved by objection noted at trial and which is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action, nevertheless may be made the basis of an assignment of error where the judicial action questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.\nN.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (2007). Plain error review applies only to challenges of jury instructions and to evidentiary matters. State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 615, 565 S.E.2d 22, 39-40 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1117, 154 L. Ed. 2d 795 (2003); State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 613, 536 S.E.2d 36, 47 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001). Under plain error analysis, \u201cthe appellate court must be convinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict.\u201d State v. Hartman, 90 N.C. App. 379, 383, 368 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1988) (citing State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986)).\nB. Analysis\nDefendant objected to the introduction of evidence from the cadaver dog by pretrial motion, but failed to preserve the issue by renewing his objection when the evidence was presented at trial. Defendant, in his brief and at oral argument, failed to \u201cspecifically and distinctly contend[]\u201d the admission of this evidence \u201camount[ed] to plain error.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). This assignment of error is dismissed due to defendant\u2019s failure to properly preserve and present it or to request and argue for plain error review. State v. Washington, 134 N.C. App. 479, 485, 518 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1999).\nV. Hearsay\nDefendant argues the trial court erred in allowing witnesses to testify to statements the victim allegedly made to them. We disagree.\n\u201c \u2018Hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2005). \u201cHearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these rules.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802 (2005).\nThe following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:\n(1) Present Sense Impression. \u2014 A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.\n(3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. \u2014 A statement of the declarant\u2019s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition ....\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803 (2005).\nA. Testimony of Margaret Lewis\nDefendant failed to object to the testimony of Margaret Lewis (\u201cLewis\u201d) at trial. Defendant argues the admission of her testimony constitutes plain error.\nLewis testified the victim called her at work \u201ccrying\u201d and \u201cvery upset\u201d and stated that something \u201cvery alarming\u201d and \u201cscary\u201d had \u201cjust happened.\u201d After describing the victim\u2019s initial mental state, Lewis testified that the victim explained to her and defendant\u2019s financial situation and stated defendant choked her after she had confronted him about their finances. The victim told Lewis the choking incident \u201creally scared\u201d her.\nLewis\u2019s testimony consisted of \u201cstatement[s], other than one[s] made by the declarant while testifying at [] trial . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c). Lewis\u2019s hearsay testimony is not excluded by the hearsay rule because the victim\u2019s statements were her \u201cpresent sense impression\u201d of the choking incident. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(1) (2005). \u201cThere is no rigid rule about how long is too long to be \u2018immediately thereafter.\u2019 \u201d State v. Clark, 128 N.C. App. 722, 725, 496 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1998).\nB. Testimony of Donna Putler. Eleanor Hennessey. Cheri Booth. and Ya-Mel Mandeville\nDefendant objected to the testimony of Donna Putler (\u201cPutler\u201d), Eleanor Hennessey (\u201cHennessey\u201d), Cheri Booth (\u201cBooth\u201d), and Ya-Mel Mandeville (\u201cMandeville\u201d) at trial. We review the admission of each of these witnesses\u2019 testimony for an abuse of discretion.\nPutler testified that she had a conversation with the victim concerning \u201cpolyamorous\u201d relationships. Statements concerning the victim\u2019s belief that polyamorous relationships are \u201cjust an excuse [for sex]\u201d are not hearsay. These statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The relevance of Putler\u2019s testimony tended to show defendant\u2019s motive and outweighs its danger of unfair prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2005; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2005).\nPutler also stated the victim had told her she was \u201cdeeply concerned\u201d about defendant\u2019s and her financial situation. Hennessey testified the victim was \u201cvery distraught\u201d after confronting defendant about their financial situation. Hennessey testified the victim called her at work and stated she was afraid that she was going to lose her house and car. The victim told Hennessey she felt \u201cvery foolish\u201d about the situation. Booth testified that the victim was \u201cvery concerned\u201d about not having enough money to buy groceries.\nHennessey and Mandeville both testified the victim expressed her fears to them toward defendant after incidents of domestic violence had occurred. Hennessey stated the victim was \u201cscared\u201d and \u201cconfused\u201d after an incident in which defendant tackled her and tried to crush her with his body. Mandeville testified the victim related an incident where defendant had used a taser on her. Two days after this incident, the victim remained \u201cshocked,\u201d \u201cfrightened,\u201d and \u201cembarrassed\u201d by what defendant had done to her.\n\u201cEvidence tending to show the state of mind of the victim is admissible as long as the declarant\u2019s state of mind is relevant to the case.\u201d State v. Meekins, 326 N.C. 689, 695, 392 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1990) (citing State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990)). Here, evidence of the victim\u2019s state of mind is relevant and bears directly on the victim\u2019s relationship with defendant before she was killed and his motive, intent, plan, or absence of mistake or accident in the victim\u2019s death. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b); see State v. Westbrooks, 345 N.C. 43, 59, 478 S.E.2d 483, 492 (1996) .(The trial court properly admitted statements the victim made about his financial and marital problems, as they indicated the victim\u2019s \u201cmental condition at the time they were made and were not merely a recitation of facts.\u201d)\nThe trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion by allowing the witnesses to testify to the victim\u2019s statements concerning her and defendant\u2019s financial situation and defendant\u2019s alleged acts of domestic violence against the victim. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Admission of Defendant\u2019s Prior Crimes. Wrongs, or Acts\nDefendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his objections to testimony of his prior acts of dishonesty and bad character. Defendant also argues the trial court committed plain error in failing to strike such testimony ex mero mo tu. We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2005) states:\nEvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nHere, the State introduced evidence of defendant\u2019s financial dealings with other people, depletion of the victim\u2019s bank accounts, violent acts toward the victim, and his adulterous relationships. This evidence tended to show defendant\u2019s motive, intent, preparation, plan, absence of mistake, and knowledge. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). The relevancy of this evidence outweighs its danger of unfair prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403. The trial court properly admitted this evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVIL Breakdown of Adversarial Process\nDefendant argues that several rulings made by the trial court \u201csabotaged the adversarial process to the extent that the result of the trial is presumptively unreliable.\u201d We disagree.\nA. Standard of Review\nMatters relating to the actual conduct of a criminal trial are left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge so long as defendant\u2019s rights are scrupulously afforded him. . . . [S]uch discretion is not unlimited and, when abused, is subject to review. To establish that a trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion is reversible error, a defendant must show harmful prejudice as well as clear abuse of discretion. A trial court\u2019s actions constitute abuse of discretion upon a showing that [the] actions are manifestly unsupported by reason and so arbitrary that [they] could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\nState v. Williams, 361 N.C. 78, 80-81, 637 S.E.2d 523, 525 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).\nB. Analysis\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to be held in the county jail during trial; (2) denying his motions for sanctions against the State for failing to timely provide discovery; (3) denying his motion for prior notice of the order in which the State intended to present its witnesses; (4) requiring him to provide the State with information on the searches he intended to perform on certain computers; and (5) ruling that evidence favorable to him was not necessarily \u201cexculpatory.\u201d\nIn the body of his argument, defendant cites United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984), and State v. Colbert, 311 N.C. 283, 316 S.E.2d 79 (1984), for the proposition that the trial court\u2019s rulings \u201csabotaged the adversarial process to the extent that the result of the trial is presumptively unreliable.\u201d Both cases cited by defendant deal with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.\n\u201c[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of \u2018effective assistance of counsel.\u2019 \u201d Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, n. 46, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 581 (1975). Defendant has failed to \u201cshow harmful prejudice [to himself] as well as clear abuse of discretion^\u201d by the trial court. Williams, 361 N.C. at 81, 637 S.E.2d at 525. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVIII. Conclusion\nThe trial court did not err in allowing defendant to proceed pro se with Attorney Edwards as standby counsel after it fully complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1242. Defendant failed to properly preserve and argue the admission of the cadaver dog handler\u2019s testimony concerning the dog\u2019s behaviors and failed to assert plain error. The trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion by allowing the witnesses to testify about statements the victim had made to them.\nEvidence of defendant\u2019s prior acts or wrongs was properly admitted to show proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, absence of mistake, and knowledge by defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). Defendant failed to show several rulings by the trial court resulted in \u201charmful prejudice as well as clear abuse of discretion.\u201d Williams, 361 N.C. at 81, 637 S.E.2d at 525. Defendant received a fair trial, free from the prejudicial errors he preserved, assigned, and argued. Defendant failed to show that, but for any plain errors, \u201cthe jury probably would have reached a different verdict.\u201d Hartman, 90 N.C. App. at 383, 368 S.E.2d at 399. We find no error in the verdict or the judgment entered thereon.\nNo Error.\nJudges McGEE and ELMORE concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John G. \u25a0Barnwell and Assistant Attorney General Daniel P. O\u2019Brien, for the State.", "Mark Montgomery, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT J. PETRICK\nNo. COA07-86\n(Filed 6 November 2007)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 pro se representation \u2014 appropriate safeguards\nThe trial court did not err by allowing defendant to represent himself pro se. The trial court engaged in the appropriate statutory inquiry and safeguards for defendant\u2019s election to proceed pro se.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 objection not renewed \u2014 plain error not argued\nAn assignment of error concerning cadaver dog evidence was dismissed due to defendant\u2019s failure to properly preserve and present it or to request plain error review.\n3. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 murder victim\u2019s statements \u2014 present sense impressions\nThere was no plain error in a murder prosecution in the admission of testimony about a murder victim\u2019s statements concerning her financial situation and that defendant had choked her after she had confronted him about their finances. This was the victim\u2019s present sense impression; there is not a rigid rule about the timing of \u201cimmediately thereafter.\u201d\n4. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 murder victim\u2019s statements \u2014 relevant to relationship with defendant and state of mind\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a murder prosecution by admitting testimony about a murder victim\u2019s statements. The statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter, but were relevant to the victim\u2019s relationship with defendant, defendant\u2019s motive, and the victim\u2019s state of mind.\n5. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 relevancy to motive\nThe trial court properly admitted evidence in a murder prosecution about defendant\u2019s prior acts of dishonesty and bad character. The evidence tended to show defendant\u2019s motive, intent, preparation, plan, absence of mistake, and knowledge. The relevancy outweighs the risk of prejudice.\n6. Criminal Law\u2014 breakdown of adversarial process \u2014 pro se defendant\nAn assignment of error to the breakdown of the adversarial process by a defendant who represented himself was overruled. A defendant who represents himself cannot complain that the quality of his defense amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 29 November 2005 by Judge Orlando F. Hudson, Jr., in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John G. \u25a0Barnwell and Assistant Attorney General Daniel P. O\u2019Brien, for the State.\nMark Montgomery, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0597-01", "first_page_order": 627, "last_page_order": 636 }