{ "id": 8375233, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: M.G., M.B., K.R., J.R.", "name_abbreviation": "In re M.G.", "decision_date": "2007-12-18", "docket_number": "No. COA07-643", "first_page": "536", "last_page": "553", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "187 N.C. App. 536" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638", "parenthetical": "\"Although respondent assigned error to many of the trial court's findings of fact, claiming that they were unsupported by competent evidence, those assignments of error were not brought forward in her brief. They are, therefore, deemed abandoned.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637815 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638424 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" }, { "page": "642" }, { "page": "643" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637852 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 23", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638053 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" }, { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638742 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527741 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561317, 2564525, 2566353, 2562130, 2561211 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0367-01", "/nc/323/0367-04", "/nc/323/0367-05", "/nc/323/0367-02", "/nc/323/0367-03" ] }, { "cite": "369 S.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525371 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "reaffirming this definition of moral turpitude" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778022 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "reaffirming this definition of moral turpitude" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 N.C. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11252113 ], "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/174/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837", "parenthetical": "quoting Jones v. Brinkley, 174 N.C. 23, 27, 93 S.E. 372, 373 (1917)" }, { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "\"We hold as a matter of law that the felony of 'conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana' is a crime involving moral turpitude.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11795195 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "quoting Jones v. Brinkley, 174 N.C. 23, 27, 93 S.E. 372, 373 (1917)" }, { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8205122 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "\"Although respondent assigned error to many of the trial court's findings of fact, claiming that they were unsupported by competent evidence, those assignments of error were not brought forward in her brief. They are, therefore, deemed abandoned.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798267 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376091 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717-18", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8203462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47" }, { "page": "349-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8168761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491494 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080835 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77", "parenthetical": "Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8173231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740209 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "\"North Carolina has adhered to the view that a trial court in assuming jurisdiction of custody matters must make specific findings of fact supporting its action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525171 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "\"North Carolina has adhered to the view that a trial court in assuming jurisdiction of custody matters must make specific findings of fact supporting its action.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796-97", "parenthetical": "vacating and remanding permanency planning order when trial court's findings of fact did not support conclusion, of jurisdiction and record lacked evidence to make the determination" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8897753 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397-98", "parenthetical": "vacating and remanding permanency planning order when trial court's findings of fact did not support conclusion, of jurisdiction and record lacked evidence to make the determination" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "386", "parenthetical": "vacating custody order and remanding for determination of subject matter jurisdiction when basis for assertion of jurisdiction was in error and record lacked sufficient evidence for this Court to determine subject matter jurisdiction existed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0409-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1262, "char_count": 41456, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0385204628437845e-07, "percentile": 0.5501540823422524 }, "sha256": "6391ebef0debf404e4400130f6164f4f4e12526d0acd4b66de53e9a66ac56faa", "simhash": "1:aaea9b6e72ec3f46", "word_count": 6712 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:19:56.575920+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges WYNN and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: M.G., M.B., K.R., J.R." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nRespondent mother is the biological mother of M.G. (\u201cMartin\u201d) and M.B. (\u201cMichelle\u201d). Respondent father is the biological father of K.R. (\u201cKristen\u201d) and J.R. (\u201cJack\u201d). Both respondents appeal from the trial court\u2019s order adjudicating all four children abused and neglected. We hold that the trial court properly concluded that the four children were abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(b) (2005) and neglected as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15). We further affirm the trial court\u2019s determination that Kristen was sexually abused under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(d). Because, however, the trial court improperly allowed petitioner to amend its petition to add allegations of sexual misconduct as to Michelle, we must reverse the portion of the order concluding that Michelle was sexually abused. Moreover, we remand for further findings of fact regarding the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction with respect to Kristen and Jack.\nFacts\nOn 18 May 2006, the Cumberland County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) filed a juvenile petition alleging that Martin, Michelle, Kristen, and Jack were dependent, neglected, and abused children. At the time of the petition, Martin was five years old, Michelle was nine, Kristen was 13, and Jack was 14. That same day, an order for non-secure custody was entered, and the children were placed in the custody of DSS.\nOn 5 December 2006, DSS filed a motion for leave to amend the petition to add allegations, based on recent disclosures by Michelle, that she had been sexually abused by respondent father. A hearing was held on the motion on 4 January 2007, and the court granted the motion on 21 February 2007.\nOn 19 and 20 February 2007, a hearing was held on the juvenile petition. The evidence presented at the hearing indicated the following. Initially, Kristen and Jack had lived with respondent father, but moved to California to live with their biological mother and her husband. When their mother divorced their stepfather, Jack went to live with the stepfather, but Kristen continued to live with their mother. Jack subsequently moved back to North Carolina to live with his father in December 2005 or January 2006. After Jack and Kristen\u2019s mother attempted suicide twice, Kristen also returned to live with her father in February 2006. During Kristen\u2019s first night in North Carolina, respondent father allowed Kristen and Jack to drink beer.\nRespondent father was living with respondent mother and her two children, Martin and Michelle. While all four children were living with respondents, respondent father often drank alcohol, especially beer, to excess. Although sometimes he was playful, other times, he would yell at respondent mother and the children- and chase them. Frequently, Jack would stand up to respondent father on behalf of respondent mother and Kristen. The children became afraid of respondent father when he was drunk \u2014 which the trial court found occurred on a regular and consistent basis.\nRespondent father committed acts of domestic violence on respondent mother in the presence of the children. On one occasion, respondent father demanded that respondent mother accompany him to the bedroom. Kristen heard respondent mother yelling for respondent father to get off of her, and when respondent mother came out of the bedroom, her lip was \u201cbusted\u201d and her arms, legs, and neck were bruised. Respondent mother told Kristen that respondent father had punched and hit her. On another occasion, respondent father hit Jack in the chest with his fist, leaving a bruise.\nIn addition, respondent father inappropriately slapped Kristen on the buttocks and called her \u201cbitch\u201d and \u201cBig Titty McGee.\u201d On one occasion, while drunk, respondent father grabbed Kristen from behind and fondled her breasts, while another time, he inappropriately touched her in the vaginal area. Not only did respondent mother not intervene, she also called Kristen a \u201cbitch\u201d and frequently yelled at her.\nRespondent father walked in on Kristen in the bathroom at least three times when she was taking a shower. Once, while Kristen was taking a shower, Jack and respondent father decided to play a trick on her. Respondent father lit a firecracker and threw it into the bathroom and closed the door.\nOn at least one occasion, respondent father drove with all four children after he had consumed a large quantity of alcoholic beverages. Respondent mother allowed respondent father to take the children, although she stayed behind. Respondent father drove to a relative\u2019s house where he drank more beer. Respondent father said that he had heard that Jack was smoking, pulled out a cigarette, and demanded that Jack smoke the cigarette. Jack refused. Respondent father also began yelling at Kristen and threatened to hit her in the face. He insisted that the children get in the truck to leave. Although they did not want to ride with respondent father, they obeyed. After stopping at a friend\u2019s house, respondent father argued with and yelled at the children as he drove them home.\nOn other occasions, respondent father gave beer to Kristen and Jack and offered them marijuana. Jack drank beer at respondent father\u2019s insistence. Both children watched respondent father roll marijuana cigarettes.\nRespondent father also engaged in sexual activities with Michelle starting when she was eight or nine years old. On one occasion, he placed his penis in her mouth. When \u201cstuff came out\u201d into her mouth, she almost threw up. Another time, respondent father placed his penis in Michelle\u2019s vaginal area, but when Michelle began to cry because it hurt, respondent father said, \u201clet\u2019s quit.\u201d Although Michelle was afraid to tell anyone, she eventually confided in a family friend and to social workers.\nThe trial court found that respondent mother observed many of the incidents in which respondent father consumed alcohol to excess and \u201cact[ed] out upon her and the children.\u201d According to the trial court, despite respondent mother\u2019s knowledge of respondent father\u2019s violent and abusive nature and of his alcohol abuse, she failed to protect the minor children. When DSS called respondent father as a witness regarding the petition\u2019s allegations, he invoked the Fifth Amendment and declined to testify.\nOn 8 March 2007, the trial court concluded that Michelle and Kristen had been sexually abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(d). It further concluded that all four children were abused and neglected as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(b) and -101(15), but dismissed the allegations of dependency. Finally, the court concluded that Kristen and Jack were abused as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(f). After making 36 dispositional findings of fact, the trial court determined that return of the children to respondents would be contrary to their best interests and that custody should remain with DSS. The court further ordered that respondent father have \u201cabsolutely no contact with any of the minor children in this matter.\u201d Both respondents appealed from the trial court\u2019s order.\nI\nRespondent father contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Kristen and Jack because North Carolina did not qualify as Kristen\u2019s and Jack\u2019s home state under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (\u201cUCCJEA\u201d). Under the UCCJEA, a child custody proceeding includes a proceeding for neglect, abuse, dependency, and termination of parental rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(4) (2005). Initial jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding lies in a North Carolina court only if:\n(1) This State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;\n(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208, and:\na. The child and the child\u2019s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than mere physical presence; and\nb. Substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child\u2019s care, protection, training, and personal relationships;\n(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208; or\n(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201(a) (2005). The \u201chome state\u201d is defined as \u201cthe state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child-custody proceeding.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(7).\nNorth Carolina courts may also exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction if it is \u201cnecessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child... is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-204(a) (2005). Further, \u201c[i]f a child-custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-201 through G.S. 50A-203, a child-custody determination made under this section becomes a final determination if it so provides, and this State becomes the home state of the child.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-204(b).\nIn this case, the trial court found as to jurisdiction:\nThe juveniles are less than 18 years of age, are physically present in this State and District and were so at the time the petition was filed, and this State is the home state of the juveniles and was so at the time of the commencement of these proceedings.\nNeither respondent challenges the court\u2019s jurisdiction under the UCCJEA with respect to Martin and Michelle. Respondent father, however, contends that the trial court erred in finding that North Carolina is the \u201chome state\u201d of Kristen and Jack. We agree.\nDSS filed the juvenile petition on 18 May 2006. Kristen came to live with her father in February 2006, and Jack moved to North Carolina only one or two months before Kristen. Thus, at the time the petition was filed, Kristen had been living in North Carolina for three months and Jack for four or five months. Since neither child had lived in North Carolina \u201cfor at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of\u2019 the proceedings, the trial court incorrectly found North Carolina to be their home state. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-102(7).\nWhen \u201cthe trial court\u2019s sole basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction is erroneous, we may review the record to determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists in [the] case.\u201d Foley v. Foley, 156 N.C. App. 409, 412, 576 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003). While N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-201(a) provides three other bases under which a North Carolina court could have jurisdiction, the record does not contain sufficient evidence from which we can determine whether jurisdiction in fact exists. Although the information could have been obtained from respondent father and perhaps from the two children, who were teenagers, no attempt was made to inquire whether there were any prior child custody proceedings.\nDSS and the guardian ad litem seem to argue that the lack of evidence in the record is sufficient to support jurisdiction. They cite no authority in support of this contention. Indeed, under these circumstances, controlling precedent dictates that we vacate the decision below as to Kristen and Jack and remand for a determination of subject matter jurisdiction. See In re J.B., 164 N.C. App. 394, 397-98, 595 S.E.2d 794, 796-97 (2004) (vacating and remanding permanency planning order when trial court\u2019s findings of fact did not support conclusion, of jurisdiction and record lacked evidence to make the determination); Foley, 156 N.C. App. at 413, 576 S.E.2d at 386 (vacating custody order and remanding for determination of subject matter jurisdiction when basis for assertion of jurisdiction was in error and record lacked sufficient evidence for this Court to determine subject matter jurisdiction existed). See also Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 729, 336 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1985) (\u201cNorth Carolina has adhered to the view that a trial court in assuming jurisdiction of custody matters must make specific findings of fact supporting its action.\u201d).\nII\nRespondent mother raises additional arguments regarding the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction as to Kristen and Jack. According to respondent mother, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the affidavit of the status of the minor child required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-209 (2005) inaccurately reported that Kristen and Jack had lived with respondents continuously since 2002, and (2) the petition was not served on either of the two older children. We find neither contention persuasive.\nThe juvenile petition or an affidavit attached to the petition must contain \u201cthe child\u2019s present address or whereabouts, the places where the child has lived during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-209(a). Our Supreme Court has recently held that the failure to comply with \u00a7 50A-209(a) does not prevent the court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile proceeding. In re A.R.G., 361 N.C. 392, 398, 646 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2007).\nIn A.R.G., DSS failed to provide the juvenile\u2019s addresses in the initial petition and failed to attach an affidavit providing such information. Id. at 394, 646 S.E.2d at 350. The Court pointed out that \u201c[n]othing in [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-209] suggests that the information required is jurisdictional\u201d and, in fact, the language of the statute indicated to the contrary. Id. at 399, 646 S.E.2d at 353. The Court further noted that the statute \u201crequires both parties to submit the information\u201d and concluded that \u201c[i]t would defy reason to suggest that a parent could defeat the jurisdiction of a trial court by his or her own noncompliance with the statute.\u201d Id.\nIf a total omission of the address information required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50A-209 does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, then inaccurate information cannot divest the court of jurisdiction. Although respondent mother argues that the information was critical in determining who could have abused the children, the required address information for Kristen and Jack was known to respondents and was provided during the course of the hearing. As the Supreme Court reasoned, to hold that the deficiencies in the DSS petition \u201ccould have prevented the trial court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile action would be to elevate form over substance. Such a holding would additionally impose jurisdictional limitations which the General Assembly clearly never intended when it sought to balance the interests of children with the rights of parents in juvenile actions.\u201d A.R.G., 361 N.C. at 399, 646 S.E.2d at 353.\nWith respect to service of the petition on Kristen and Jack, respondent mother cites no authority requiring such service in an initial adjudication. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-406(a) (2005) provides that in neglect, abuse, and dependency proceedings, only the \u201cparent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker\u201d must be served with a summons attaching a copy of the petition. Accordingly, the failure to serve Kristen and Jack with the petition cannot be a basis for concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.\nIII\nRespondents both contend that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as to all four children because the summons served on each respondent failed to name all four of the juveniles. Although the petition listed all four children, the summons served on respondent mother listed only Martin and Michelle, while the summons served on respondent father listed only Kristen and Jack.\nIn support of their argument, respondents cite In re C.T. & R.S., 182 N.C. App. 472, 475, 643 S.E.2d 23, 25 (2007), in which this Court vacated the portion of an order terminating a mother\u2019s parental rights relating to R.S. when the summons issued \u201creferenced\u201d C.T., but did not \u201cmention or reference\u201d R.S. This Court noted that the controlling statute was N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-1106(a) (2005), which states in pertinent part: \u201cExcept as provided in G.S. 7B-1105, upon the filing of the petition [to terminate parental rights], the court shall cause a summons to be issued. The summons shall be directed to the following persons . . . who shall be named as respondents: (1) The parents of the juvenile . . . .\u201d After noting that the \u201cfailure to issue a summons deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction,\u201d the Court noted that the appellees had not cited \u201cany case holding that subject matter jurisdiction existed where a statutorily required summons was not issued regarding a proceeding concerning a juvenile, a situation different from that presented by technical defects in service of a summons.\u201d In re C.T. & R.S., 182 N.C. App. at 475, 643 S.E.2d at 25. Accordingly, the Court \u201cvacate[d] the order on termination to the extent it terminates the parental rights of respondent in R.S.\u201d Id.\nThis case does not involve the termination of parental rights. The controlling statute is instead N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-406(a), which provides: \u201cImmediately after a petition has been filed alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent, the clerk shall issue a summons to the parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker requiring them to appear for a hearing at the time and place stated in the summons. ... A copy of the petition shall be attached to each summons.\u201d Here, there can be no question that DSS has complied with \u00a7 7B-406(a). DSS filed a petition alleging that all four children were abused, neglected, and dependent; the clerk issued a summons to each of the respondent parents; and the summons attached the petition listing each of the. four children.\nRespondents have pointed to no authority \u2014 and we have found none \u2014 suggesting that the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in an abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding because of a failure to list all of the children on all of the summonses when each child has been listed on the summons for his or her biological parents. It is established that even when a summons is issued to only one parent of a child, the court still has jurisdiction to determine the status of the child in an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding. In re Poole, 151 N.C. App. 472, 476-77, 568 S.E.2d 200, 203 (2002) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (holding that the failure to issue and serve summons on respondent father did not divest court of subject matter jurisdiction to find child dependent when summons was issued and served on mother), adopted per curiam, 357 N.C. 151, 579 S.E.2d 248 (2003). Thus, even assuming without deciding, that C.T. is relevant to \u00a7 7B-406(a) and requires a summons referencing each child, allocation of the names of the children among summonses based on who is the biological parent of the particular child is sufficient to vest the trial court with subject matter jurisdiction over that child.\nFurther, as this Court recently held, in these types of proceedings \u2014 in contrast to termination of parental rights proceedings \u2014 the trial court is not required to determine the culpability of each parent as to each child. In re J.S., 182 N.C. App. 79, 86, 641 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007). The Court explained:\nThe purpose of abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings is for the court to determine whether the juvenile should be adjudicated as having the status of abused, neglected or dependent. . . . The purpose of the adjudication and disposition proceedings should not be morphed on appeal into a question of culpability regarding the conduct of an individual parent.\nId. As a result, there is no need to tie each child to each respondent, especially when the issue is only the caption of a summons that attaches the petition identifying all the children. Accordingly, the nature of the captions of the summonses in this case did not result in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the children.\nIV\nRespondents next contend that the trial court erred in allowing DSS to amend its petition to add allegations regarding the sexual abuse of Michelle. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800 (2005) specifies that \u201c[t]he court may permit a petition to be amended when the amendment does not change the nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based.\u201d Respondents contend that the original petition did not allege that Michelle was sexually abused and, therefore, the amendment necessarily changed \u201cthe conditions\u201d upon which the petition was based as to Michelle. We agree.\nIn In re D.C. & C.C., 183 N.C. App. 344, 346-47, 644 S.E.2d 640, 641 (2007), the initial petition alleged that D.C. was a neglected and dependent juvenile based on a lack of supervision and domestic violence. The respondent mother subsequently gave birth to C.C. and, two weeks later, the petitioner filed a petition alleging that C.C. was dependent. Id. at 346, 644 S.E.2d at 642. At trial, however, the petitioner proceeded on a theory of neglect as to C.C., and the trial court concluded that C.C. was indeed a neglected child. Id. at 349-50, 644 S.E.2d at 643. In reversing the order to the extent that it found C.C. to be neglected, this Court first held that the trial court \u201cessentially amended the juvenile petition by allowing DSS to proceed on a condition not alleged in the petition.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then concluded that adding the ground of neglect when the petition alleged only dependency violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800. Id.\nIn this case, the original petition contained no allegations of sexual abuse as to Michelle, although it contained allegations that Kristen had been sexually abused. The abuse allegations relating to Michelle involved placement of Michelle and Martin with a person who left them in the care of someone whose home \u201cwas deplorable,\u201d respondent father\u2019s use of alcohol and marijuana, and respondents\u2019 domestic violence. Based on the same factual allegations, the petition also alleged that Michelle was a neglected and dependent child. The motion for leave to amend this petition sought to add allegations regarding recent disclosures that respondent father had inappropriate sexual conduct with Michelle that resulted in criminal charges.\nWe hold that adding the allegations of Michelle\u2019s sexual abuse changed the nature of the conditions relied upon in the original petition as to Michelle. Although DSS argued to the trial court and urges on appeal that the petition contained allegations of sexual misconduct with respect to Kristen, this argument ignores the fact that an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding focuses on the status of the child and not on the culpability of the parent. See In re J.S., 182 N.C. App. at 86, 641 S.E.2d at 399. Because the new allegations gave rise to a different status for Michelle than alleged in the original petition, they violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-800, even though the original petition alleged inappropriate sexual conduct by respondent father towards another child. Pursuant to D.C., we must, therefore, vacate that portion of the order concluding that Michelle is a sexually abused juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1)(d). In re D.C. & C.C. 183 N.C. App. at 349-50, 644 S.E.2d at 643.\nV\nRespondents next challenge the merits of the trial court\u2019s determination that the children were neglected and abused. \u201cThe role of this Court in reviewing an initial adjudication of neglect and abuse is to determine (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact.\u201d In re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 715, 717-18, 641 S.E.2d 18, 20 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201c \u2018In a non-jury neglect [and abuse] adjudication, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 717-18, 641 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997)).\nAlthough respondent mother has assigned error to certain of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and listed those assignments of error under the headings of the argument section of her brief, she has provided no argument as to why these findings were not supported by competent evidence. \u201cAssignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (emphasis added). Consequently, respondent mother\u2019s assignments of error as to the findings of fact are deemed abandoned. See In re A.H., 183 N.C. App. 609, 613, 644 S.E.2d 635, 638 (2007) (\u201cAlthough respondent assigned error to many of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, claiming that they were unsupported by competent evidence, those assignments of error were not brought forward in her brief. They are, therefore, deemed abandoned.\u201d).\nWith respect to the court\u2019s conclusion that the minor children were abused, respondent mother argues only that \u201c[i]n this case, [respondent father] is accused of hitting [Jack] and sexually abusing [Michelle] and [Kristen]. The only direct allegation against [respondent mother] is that she hit [Kristen] after [Kristen] was disrespectful. [Jack], [Kristen\u2019s] brother, testified that [Kristen] was a troublemaker.\u201d As we have discussed, however, J.S. confirms that in an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding, the question is whether the children were abused and not whether respondent mother committed the abuse.\nNevertheless, the definition of an abused child includes one whose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker \u201c[c]reates or allows to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by other than accidental means.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(b). The trial court found that respondent mother \u201cknew of [respondent father\u2019s] violent and abusive nature, his. alcohol abuse, and she failed to take the necessary steps to protect the minor children. [Respondent mother] also witnessed many of the incidents where [respondent father] would consume alcohol to excess and act out upon her and the children.\u201d Further, respondent mother allowed respondent father to drive the children after he had consumed a large quantity of alcoholic beverages. These findings of fact are sufficient to support a determination that respondent mother \u201callow[ed] to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by other than accidental means.\u201d Id.\nWith respect to the conclusion that the children were neglected juveniles, respondent mother makes no specific argument as to how the findings of fact fail to meet the following definition of a neglected child:\nA juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile\u2019s welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law. In determining whether a juvenile is a neglected juvenile, it is relevant whether that juvenile lives in a home where another juvenile has died as a result of suspected abuse or neglect or lives in a home where another juvenile has been subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly lives in the home.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(15). Accordingly, respondent mother has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that Martin, Michelle, Kristen, and Jack were abused and neglected juveniles.\nRespondent father also contends that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusion that the children were abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1)(b). He focuses, however, only on the finding of fact that respondent father hit Jack in the chest leaving a bruise. He overlooks the findings of fact regarding his domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and driving the children while intoxicated. Those findings, fully supported by the evidence, in turn provide ample support for the determination that respondent father \u201ccreated a substantial risk of serious physical injury\u201d to the children. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1)(b).\nRespondent father also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Kristen and Jack were abused pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(f), which permits an adjudication of abuse for a child whose parent \u201c[e]ncourages, directs, or approves of delinquent acts involving moral turpitude committed by the juvenile.\u201d The court made the following findings of fact pertinent to this issue:\n20. That [respondent father] gave beer to his children [Kristen] and [Jack] and offered them marijuana. Both of the minor children [Kristen] and [Jack] have observed [respondent father] roll marijuana cigarettes in their presence. [Jack] drank beer at [respondent father\u2019s] request and his insistence.\n21.He told the minor child [Jack] that he heard he had been smoking. He proceeded to pull out a cigarette, put it in front of the minor child and demanded that he smoke it. The minor child [Jack] refused to smoke the cigarette. ...\nRespondent father does not dispute that the record contains evidence to support these findings.\nRespondent father, however, points to testimony by Kristen that her father said \u201cI would rather you come home and before you do your homework you ask me to get high and we\u2019ll go get high and then you can go do your homework, and I don\u2019t want you going out and getting high with your friends and going on the highway and going 90 miles an hour and dying, or getting in a car wreck.\u201d He then argues that he was making \u201can ill-attempted effort to show his children that they would not enjoy these activities\u201d \u2014 conduct he contends may amount to neglect, but does not amount to abuse under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(f).\nThe dispositive question is whether underage drinking, underage smoking, and marijuana use constitute \u201cacts involving moral turpitude.\u201d We have been unable to find any authority and appellees have cited none suggesting that the conduct at issue in this case falls within the traditional definition of acts involving moral turpitude. Crimes involving moral turpitude include \u201c \u2018act[s] of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties that a man owes to his fellowman or to society in general.\u2019 \u201d Dew v. State ex rel. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehicles, 127 N.C. App. 309, 311, 488 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1997) (quoting Jones v. Brinkley, 174 N.C. 23, 27, 93 S.E. 372, 373 (1917)). See also State v. Mann, 317 N.C. 164, 170, 345 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1986) (reaffirming this definition of moral turpitude). Alternatively, moral turpitude is considered \u201c[cjonduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, 1030 (8th ed. 2004).\nThe conduct approved by respondent father is certainly illegal, but our courts have not equated illegality with moral turpitude. While drug dealing would amount to an act involving moral turpitude, see Dew, 127 N.C. App. at 312, 488 S.E.2d at 838 (\u201cWe hold as a matter of law that the felony of \u2018conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana\u2019 is a crime involving moral turpitude.\u201d), we have found no cases suggesting that illegal substance use standing alone rises to the same level. We agree that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact regarding respondent father\u2019s encouragement of smoking, drinking, and marijuana use by Kristen and Jack support a determination that they are neglected children, but hold that the conduct does not constitute abuse as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1)(f). We, therefore, reverse that portion of the order concluding that Kristen and Jack were abused under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1)(f).\nFinally, respondent father contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Kristen is sexually abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(d). Under that subsection, a child is abused if her parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker\n[c]ommits, permits, or encourages the commission of a violation of the following laws by, with, or upon the juvenile: first-degree rape, as provided in G.S. 14-27.2; second degree rape as provided in G.S. 14-27.3; first-degree sexual offense, as provided in G.S. 14-27.4; second degree sexual offense, as provided in G.S. 14-27.5; sexual act by a custodian, as provided in G.S. 14-27.7; crime against nature, as provided in G.S. 14-177; incest, as provided in G.S. 14-178; preparation of obscene photographs, slides, or motion pictures of the juvenile, as provided in G.S. 14-190.5; employing or permitting the juvenile to assist in a violation of the obscenity laws as provided in G.S. 14-190.6; dissemination of obscene material to the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.7 and G.S. 14-190.8; displaying or disseminating material harmful to the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.14 and G.S. 14-190.15; first and second degree sexual exploitation of the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.16 and G.S. 14-190.17; promoting the prostitution of the juvenile as provided in G.S. 14-190.18; and taking indecent liberties with the juvenile, as provided in G.S. 14-202.1.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(1)(d).\nIn this case, the trial court concluded that there had been a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1 (2005), the taking of indecent liberties. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that respondent father \u201cbecame drunk, walked up to the minor child [Kristen], grabbed her from behind and fondled her breasts;\u201d that despite Kristen\u2019s objection, \u201che continued to grope the minor;\u201d and that \u201c[o]n another occasion, [respondent father] inappropriately touched the minor [Kristen] in the vaginal area.\u201d\nRespondent father admits that these findings are supported by Kristen\u2019s testimony, but argues that \u201c[n]othing in the evidence or findings supports that they were made for any sexual gratification.\u201d Our courts have, however, held that such conduct is sufficient to establish a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1. See, e.g., State v. Bruce, 90 N.C. App. 547, 551, 369 S.E.2d 95, 98 (concluding that when evidence indicated that on one occasion, defendant started rubbing victim under her shirt, \u201cjury could properly infer that defendant\u2019s action in rubbing the victim\u2019s breasts was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his sexual desire\u201d and violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1), disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 367, 373 S.E.2d 549 (1988); State v. Slone, 76 N.C. App. 628, 631, 334 S.E.2d 78, 80 (1985) (holding that evidence that defendant placed his hand between victim\u2019s legs and \u201crubbed her vagina with his finger\u201d was sufficient \u201cto warrant the inference that the defendant willfully took indecent liberties with the child for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his sexual desire\u201d within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-202.1). Accordingly, the trial court in this case could properly conclude that Kristen was a sexually abused juvenile.\nConclusion\nWe affirm the order to the extent that it concludes that Martin, Michelle, Kristen, and Jack were neglected juveniles; that Martin, Michelle, Kristen, and Jack were abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(b); and that Kristen was sexually abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(d). We reverse the order to the extent that it concludes that Michelle was sexually abused and that Kristen and Jack were abused as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-101(l)(f). Neither respondent has made any argument regarding the dispositional portion of the order, and, therefore, it is affirmed. Finally, we remand for findings of fact regarding the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA with respect to Kristen and Jack.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded in part.\nJudges WYNN and STEELMAN concur.\n. The pseudonyms Martin, Michelle, Kristen, and Jack are used throughout the opinion to protect the children\u2019s privacy and for ease of reading.\n. The biological father of Martin and Michelle and the biological mother of Kristen and Jack were also respondents to the trial proceedings, but are not parties to this appeal.\n. Respondents have not contended or cited any authority suggesting that this approach denied them notice and an opportunity to be heard or otherwise prejudiced them.\n. Because of this holding, we need not address respondent mother\u2019s contention that she was not properly served with the motion to amend.\n. We address the arguments regarding Kristen and Jack in the interests of expediting review. In the event that the trial court concludes on remand that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Kristen and Jack, then it will be required to dismiss the petition as to those two children.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Elizabeth Kennedy-Gumee for petitioner-appellee.", "Lisa Skinner Leflerfor respondent-appellant mother.", "Annick Lenoir-Peek for respondent-appellant father.", "Beth A. Hall for guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: M.G., M.B., K.R., J.R.\nNo. COA07-643\n(Filed 18 December 2007)\n1. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 home state \u2014 insufficient residence in North Carolina\nThe trial court incorrectly found that North Carolina was the home state of children who were the subject of an abuse and neglect petition where neither child had lived in North Carolina for at least 6 consecutive months immediately before commencement of proceedings. The record contains insufficient evidence to determine whether jurisdiction exists on another basis.\n2. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 addresses of children \u2014 affidavit not accurate \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 not divested\nThe trial court was not deprived of subject matter jurisdic- ' tion in a child neglect and abuse proceeding by an affidavit which inaccurately reported that the children had lived with respondents continuously since 2002.\n3. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 petition \u2014 service on children\u2014 not required\nThere is no authority requiring the service of a neglect and abuse petition on the children who were the subject of the petition, and the failure to serve them cannot be held to be a basis for concluding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.\n4. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\u2014 service on parents\nIn an abuse and neglect proceeding involving a blended family, allocation of the names of the children among summonses based on the biological parentage of the particular child was sufficient to vest subject matter jurisdiction. This was not a termination of parental rights proceeding; the controlling statute is N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-406(a), with which DSS complied.\n5. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 amended petition \u2014 added allegations \u2014 improper\nThe trial court erred by allowing DSS to amend a neglect and abuse petition to add allegations regarding the sexual abuse of one of several children. The added allegations changed the nature of the conditions relied on in the original petition.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 assignments of error \u2014 not supported by argument \u2014 abandoned\nRespondent mother\u2019s assignment df error to findings is deemed abandoned where she provided no argument as to why these findings were not supported by the evidence.\n7. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 focus on children rather than parent \u2014 evidence sufficient\nIn an abuse, neglect, and dependency proceeding, the question is whether the children were abused and not whether respondent mother committed the offense. The mother here witnessed alcohol incidents and allowed the father to drive the children after drinking, which was sufficient to support a determination that respondent mother allowed to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to the juveniles by other than accidental means.\n8. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 serious risk of injury to children \u2014 evidence sufficient \u2014 statements about illegal conduct \u2014 not moral turpitude\nFindings of domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and driving children while intoxicated, supported by the evidence, were sufficient support for a determination that respondent father created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the children. Statements about underage drinking, smoking, and marijuana involves conduct which is illegal, but does not fall within the traditional definition of moral turpitude.\n9. Child Abuse and Neglect\u2014 indecent liberties \u2014 conduct sufficient without intent\nThe trial court correctly concluded that a child had been sexually abused by groping. The father argues that there was no evidence of sexual gratification, but conduct is sufficient to establish the violation.\nAppeal by respondents from order entered 8 March 2007 by Judge Edward A. Pone in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 November 2007.\nElizabeth Kennedy-Gumee for petitioner-appellee.\nLisa Skinner Leflerfor respondent-appellant mother.\nAnnick Lenoir-Peek for respondent-appellant father.\nBeth A. Hall for guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0536-01", "first_page_order": 566, "last_page_order": 583 }