{ "id": 8376287, "name": "KAREN MATTHEWS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Matthews v. Wake Forest University", "decision_date": "2007-12-18", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1549", "first_page": "780", "last_page": "784", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "187 N.C. App. 780" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639160 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted, emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638641 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468908 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212228 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "quotations and citation omitted, emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "holding that \"on appeal, an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court's duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\"" }, { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "quotations, citation, and alteration omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115", "parenthetical": "holding that \"on appeal, an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court's duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\"" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8184791 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "citation and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 580, "char_count": 11276, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.20321493646926905 }, "sha256": "49f3eb42c28dcc3ac0b543b7e544879355d600a5c65c3fdac90100605770a12a", "simhash": "1:2da05b8914fd13f3", "word_count": 1681 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:19:56.575920+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "KAREN MATTHEWS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant-Appellant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nKaren Matthews (plaintiff) worked as a buyer\u2019s assistant for Wake Forest University (defendant). Plaintiff suffered from depression, starting in the 1980s. She had particular difficulty following her parents\u2019 deaths in the 1980s and a burglary of her home in 1998. On 30 June 1999, plaintiff suffered a compensable injury when she tripped over a planter and injured her right knee, left wrist, and right foot.She received treatment and did not miss any work as a result of the injury. On 10 January 2000, plaintiff again tripped over a planter, sustaining injuries to her right knee and right shoulder.\nFollowing the second injury, \u201c[p]laintiff had increasing difficulty managing her physical limitations, chronic pain and medical treatment . . . .\u201d Plaintiff began suffering increased psychological problems, due in part to her son\u2019s impending nuptials. Plaintiff began crying frequently and having trouble maintaining her work load. In addition, plaintiff experienced difficulty adapting to defendant\u2019s shift to a new computer program. Plaintiff met with supervisors several times, who counseled her on her lack of productivity, told her not to bring work home with her, and \u201cthat it was her decision to come to work when she was in pain.\u201d .\nEventually, plaintiff received an opinion that although she was physically able to return to work, she \u201cwas incapable of employment . . . due to depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress and regional pain syndrome in the upper right extremity.\u201d In June, 2002, plaintiff\u2019s doctor concluded that she was \u201cat maximum medical improvement physically,\u201d but stated that \u201che \u2018would not release her to return to work without an agreement from her psychiatrist because of the potential difficulty that she may encounter secondary to her psychiatric history.\u2019 \u201d\nOn 29 October 2004, Deputy Commissioner Lorrie L. Dollar filed an opinion and award in favor of defendant, concluding that plaintiff \u201cfailed to offer competent evidence that her psychiatric condition was materially aggravated by her compensable injuries to an extent that she was incapable of earning wages.\u201d The deputy commissioner rejected \u201cthe medical and psychiatric opinion testimony\u201d plaintiff offered, concluding that it rested \u201con the inaccurate history related by plaintiff, as well as impermissible tampering with medical witnesses during the course of the treatment as well as prior to the depositions.\u201d The deputy commissioner emphasized that plaintiff\u2019s psychiatric condition was not the result of her compensable injuries, nor was it substantially aggravated by them. Rather, her worsened psychiatric condition was the result of her difficulties in learning a new computer program at work and her son\u2019s wedding. The deputy commissioner stressed that \u201c[a]ny testimony to the contrary is simply not credible, particularly when read with [her attorney] Ms. Geraghty\u2019s instruction to her client to make sure [her treating psychiatrist] Dr. [Wayne H.] Denton and [therapist] Mr. [Johnny Marvin] Mullen noted chronic pain as a source of her depression.\u201d The deputy commissioner therefore denied plaintiff benefits based on her psychological problems.\nPlaintiff appealed the decision to the Full Commission, which wholly disregarded the deputy commissioner\u2019s findings and her Opinion and Award. Instead, the Full Commission found as fact that plaintiff\u2019s psychological problems were aggravated by the compensable injuries, and concluded that her psychological problems were therefore also compensable. The Full Commission did not address plaintiff\u2019s alleged tampering of witnesses. Defendant now appeals.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the Full Commission erred in finding that plaintiff was disabled from work as a result of her compensable injury.\nOur review of the Commission\u2019s opinion and award is limited to determining whether competent evidence of record supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact, in turn, support the conclusions of law. If there is any competent evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s findings of fact, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal despite evidence to the contrary. However, the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.\nOxendine v. TWL, Inc., 184 N.C. App. 162, 164, 645 S.E.2d 864, 865 (2007) (citation and quotations omitted). In this case, the Full Commission found that \u201c[a]s a result of her chronic pain and physical restrictions resulting from her compensable January 10, 2000 injury and the aggravation and acceleration of her pre-existing non-disabling psychological condition due to her compensable injury. . .', Plaintiff has been incapable of working in any employment since June 28, 2000.\u201d This finding is supported by the testimony of Dr. Denton and Mr. Mullen. As such, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the Full Commission. See, e.g., Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 552 (2000) (holding that \u201con appeal, an appellate court does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u201d) (citation, quotations, and alterations omitted).\nWe note defendant\u2019s contention that although the Full Commission\u2019s Conclusion of Law no. 2 states that plaintiff was \u201cphysically and mentally\u201d unable to work, her doctors had, in fact, cleared her physically for some work. However, it is well established that one of the ways in which a plaintiff may prove disability is through \u201cthe production of medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a consequence of the work related injury, incapable of work in any employment.\u201d Britt v. Gator Wood, Inc., 185 N.C. App. 677, 681, 648 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2007) (quotations and citation omitted, emphasis added). Either physical or mental incapacity is sufficient. Moreover, we stress that the Full Commission explicitly noted plaintiff\u2019s ability to perform \u201clight-duty work.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s next argument, that the Full Commission failed to determine the competency of plaintiff\u2019s expert witnesses, is likewise to no avail. We find defendant\u2019s allegations that plaintiff\u2019s counsel engaged in impermissible witness tampering troublesome, and we are not at all comforted by plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s assertions that her alleged misconduct was simply zealous advocacy. Notwithstanding our discomfort, however, plaintiff is correct that this issue is not properly before this Court.\nWhether the full Commission conducts a hearing or reviews a cold record, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-85 places the ultimate fact-finding function with the Commission \u2014 not the hearing officer. It is the Commission that ultimately determines credibility, whether from a cold record or from live testimony. Consequently, in reversing the deputy commissioner\u2019s credibility findings, the full Commission is not required to demonstrate that sufficient consideration was paid to the fact that credibility may be best judged by a first-hand observer of the witness when that observation was the only one.\nDeese, 352 N.C. at 115, 530 S.E.2d at 552 (quotations, citation, and alteration omitted). The Full Commission was under no obligation to consider the deputy commissioner\u2019s finding regarding the credibility of plaintiff\u2019s medical experts. Under the law as our Supreme Court has articulated it, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit. Because the Full Commission is the sole arbiter of credibility, defendant\u2019s arguments regarding alleged conflicts between defendant\u2019s doctors\u2019 notes and deposition testimony are also futile.\nFinally, defendant contends that \u201c[t]he Full Commission erred in failing to address and consider Dr. Richard Spencer\u2019s 2001 psychiatric report.\u201d Defendant argues that this Court\u2019s decision in Gutierrez v. GDX Auto., 169 N.C. App. 173, 609 S.E.2d 445 (2005), requires the Full Commission \u201cto enter findings regarding material evidence properly presented to the Commission.\u201d Although we agree with defendant\u2019s assertion generally, we find its argument unpersuasive in the present appeal.\nAs plaintiff notes, the Gutierrez case deals with medical evidence presented by a \u201ctreating physician.\u201d Id. at 176-77, 609 S.E.2d at 448. Dr. Spencer generated his report not as a treating physician, but in the course of an examination pursuant to a determination of plaintiff\u2019s eligibility for disability benefits. Gutierrez is therefore distinguishable.\nAlthough defendant represents that Dr. Spencer \u201cdetermined [plaintiff] had histrionic pain disorder\u201d in its brief, the actual report states only that Dr. Spencer \u201c[s]trongly suspect[ed] somatization disorder, ie [sic], histrionic pain disorder.\u201d Defendant suggests that because \u201c[t]he report was generated during a time plaintiff claimed disability as a result of her work injuries,\u201d it \u201cwas therefore relevant to the exact point in controversy.\u201d However, in the report, Dr. Spencer gives no opinion on the overriding issue in this case: whether plaintiff\u2019s compensable injury aggravated her psychiatric condition. On these facts, we are unwilling to hold that the Full Commission erred in not addressing this evidence.\nHaving conducted a thorough review of the record and briefs, we can discern no error in the Full Commission\u2019s opinion and award. Accordingly, we must affirm.\nAffirmed.\nJudges STEELMAN and STROUD concur.\n. Plaintiff did receive other benefits, not pertinent to this appeal, in the deputy commissioner\u2019s 29 October 2004 Opinion and Award.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Geraghty Law Firm, by Maureen Geraghty, for plaintiff.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Phillip J. Mohr, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KAREN MATTHEWS, Employee, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, Employer, Self-Insured, Defendant-Appellant\nNo. COA06-1549\n(Filed 18 December 2007)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 aggravation of existing psychological condition \u2014 disability\nThe Industrial Commission did not err by finding that plaintiff was disabled as a result of her compensable injury where the Commission found that chronic pain and physical restrictions resulting from plaintiffs compensable injury aggravated her existing non-disabling psychological condition.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 credibility of expert witnesses\u2014 Commission as sole arbiter\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding by not determining the competency of plaintiffs expert witnesses. The Commission is the sole arbiter of credibility, and the Commission here was under no obligation to consider the deputy commissioner\u2019s finding regarding the credibility of plaintiff\u2019s medical experts.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 physician\u2019s report \u2014 not considered \u2014 not treating physician\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding by not addressing and considering a psychiatric report. The physician in this case generated his report in the course of determinating eligibility for benefits rather than as a treating physician. No opinion was given on whether plaintiff\u2019s compensable injury aggravated her psychiatric condition, the overriding issue in this case.\nAppeal by defendant from opinion and award entered 29 June 2006 by the Full Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 August 2007.\nThe Geraghty Law Firm, by Maureen Geraghty, for plaintiff.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Phillip J. Mohr, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0780-01", "first_page_order": 810, "last_page_order": 814 }