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  "name": "CAROLEEN MYERS HAMILTON, Executor of the ESTATE OF RONNIE C. HAMILTON, SR., Deceased, Plaintiff v. THOMASVILLE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. and OSCAR M. BLACKWELL, M.D., Defendants",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hamilton v. Thomasville Medical Associates, Inc.",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges JACKSON and STROUD concur."
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    "parties": [
      "CAROLEEN MYERS HAMILTON, Executor of the ESTATE OF RONNIE C. HAMILTON, SR., Deceased, Plaintiff v. THOMASVILLE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. and OSCAR M. BLACKWELL, M.D., Defendants"
    ],
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      {
        "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nCaroleen Myers Hamilton, Executor of the Estate of Ronnie C. Hamilton, Sr. (\u201cexecutrix\u201d), appeals from an order granting Thomasville Medical Associates, Inc.\u2019s and Dr. Oscar M. Blackwell\u2019s (\u201cDr. Blackwell\u201d) (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d) motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.\nI. Background\nOn 18 March 2003, Ronnie C. Hamilton, Sr. (\u201cMr. Hamilton\u201d) filed a complaint, which alleged claims of medical malpractice, against defendants and several other parties. Mr. Hamilton alleged he would not have suffered a stroke on 1 December 1999 if defendants and several other parties had taken earlier and different actions concerning his medical treatment. All other parties were dismissed from this action. Mr. Hamilton died 10 January 2006 from pancreatic cancer. Executrix was substituted as plaintiff by consent order filed 13 April 2006.\nOn 2 October 2006, the trial court heard arguments on defendants\u2019: (1) motion in limine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s experts\u2019 testimony and (2) motion for summary judgment on the grounds plaintiff had no competent evidence to support the causation element of the medical malpractice claim. In an order entered 3 November 2006, Judge Larry Ford denied defendants\u2019 motion in limine and motion for summary judgment. The case was continued until 12 February 2007.\nOn 1 February 2007, defendants filed a motion in limine to \u201cexclude from evidence a DVD purporting to show [Mr. Hamilton] at various family occasions . ...\u201d On 6 February 2007, defendants filed a notice of hearing on motions in limine and an affidavit of Dr. Travis Jackson, a North Carolina neurologist. On 9 February 2007, defendants filed a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction or mention of certain evidence by plaintiff, her counsel, or any other witnesses.\nIn open court on 12 February 2007, plaintiff filed her \u201cresponse to motion in limine of defendants ... to exclude causation testimony of internist Dr. Michael Williams and neurologist Dr. David Roeltgen and for summary judgment.\u201d On 26 February 2007, the trial court filed its final order, which granted: (1) \u201cdefendants\u2019 motions in lim-ine to exclude causation testimony by plaintiff\u2019s purported expert witnesses . . . .\u201d and (2) \u201cdefendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment ... on the basis that plaintiff has no competent evidence with regard to causation, an essential element of any medical malpractice claim . . . .\u201d The trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s action. Plaintiff appeals.\nII. Issues\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred by: (1) considering and granting defendants\u2019 motion in limine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s experts\u2019 testimony and (2) granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nTTT. Motion in Limine\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred by considering and granting defendants\u2019 motion in limine because \u201cdefendants failed to file and serve upon [] [pjlaintiff any purported motion in limine to exclude [] [p]laintiff\u2019s expert witness testimony on the element of causation between November 2, 2006 and February 12, 2007.\u201d We review these issues separately.\nA. Consideration of Motion in Limine\nA motion in limine seeks pretrial determination of the admissibility of evidence proposed to be introduced at trial, and is recognized in both civil and criminal trials. The trial court has wide discretion in making this advance ruling and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Moreover, the court\u2019s ruling is not a final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence in question, but only interlocutory or preliminary in nature. Therefore, the court\u2019s ruling on a motion in limine is subject to modification during the course of the trial.\nHeatherly v. Industrial Health Council, 130 N.C. App. 616, 619, 504 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998) (emphasis supplied) (internal citations and quotation omitted).\nJudge Ford\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion in limine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s experts\u2019 testimony on 3 November 2006 was \u201csubject to modification during the course of the trial.\u201d Id. The trial court did not err by revisiting and considering defendants\u2019 motion in limine on 12 February 2007. This assignment of error is overruled.\nB. Granting of Motion in Limine\n1. Standard of Review\nIt is well-established that trial courts must decide preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of experts to testify or the admissibility of expert testimony. When making such determinations, trial courts are not bound by the rules of evidence. In this capacity, trial courts are afforded wide latitude of discretion when making a determination about the admissibility of expert testimony. Given such latitude, it follows that a trial court\u2019s ruling on the qualifications of an expert or the admissibility of an expert\u2019s opinion will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\nHowerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004) (emphasis supplied) (internal citations and quotation omitted). \u201cA trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 538, 330 S.E.2d 450, 465 (1985) (citation omitted).\n2. Analysis\nIn State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 461 S.E.2d 631 (1995), our Supreme Court:\nset forth a three-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert\u2019s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert\u2019s testimony relevant?\nHowerton, 358 N.C. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686 (internal citations omitted).\nHere, the trial court found plaintiff\u2019s experts were not qualified as experts in the area of neurosurgery and ruled plaintiff could not forecast evidence of causation. We evaluate this ruling under the second factor of the Goode test. 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640.\nAs our Supreme Court explained in Howerton:\n[i]n the second step of analysis under Goode, the trial court must determine whether the witness is qualified as an expert in the subject area about which that individual intends to testify. 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640. Under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, a witness may qualify as an expert by reason of \u201cknowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,\u201d where such qualification serves as the basis for the expert\u2019s proffered opinion. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702(a). As summarized in Goode,\n\u201cIt is not necessary that an expert be experienced with the identical subject matter at issue or be a specialist, licensed, or even engaged in a specific profession.\" \u201cIt is enough that the expert witness \u2018because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact.\u2019 \u201d\n341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640 (citations omitted). \u201cWhether a witness has the requisite skill to qualify as an expert in a given area is chiefly a question of fact, the determination of which is ordinarily within the exclusive province of the trial court.\u201d State v. Goodwin, 320 N.C. 147, 150, 357 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1987).\n358 N.C. at 461-62, 597 S.E.2d at 688 (emphasis supplied).\nThe record shows plaintiffs tendered expert witnesses included an internist and a neurologist. In an affidavit submitted by defendants, neurologist Dr. Travis Jackson stated:\n4. As a neurologist, I order and interpret films and scans including MRI and other films and scans of the brain. I regularly order and interpret MRI\u2019s of the brain like the one ordered by Dr. Blackwell on November 29, \u00cd999.\n5'. However, and even though I read and interpret these films, I am not a surgeon. If the films show what appears to be a stenotic vessel which may be amenable to surgery then I refer to a surgeon because only a surgeon can determine whether it is a stenotic vessel amenable to the surgical procedure known as carotid endarterectomy (assuming the patient is otherwise an appropriate candidate for surgery).\nPlaintiffs expert witnesses are in a better position than the trier of fact to have an opinion on the subject of whether Mr. Hamilton would have suffered a stroke but for Dr. Blackwell\u2019s failure to read the 29 November 1999 MRI. Goode, 341 N.C. at 529, 461 S.E.2d at 640.\nThe trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion in limine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s experts\u2019 testimony regarding causation. Because the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion in limine, the trial court also erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the basis that \u201cplaintiff has no competent evidence with regard to causation, an essential element of any medical malpractice claim . . . .\u201d\nIV. Conclusion\nThe trial court did not err by revisiting defendants\u2019 motion in limine. The trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion in lim-ine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s experts. Id. The trial court also erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. Id. The trial court\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 motion in limine and motion for summary judgment is reversed. This case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nReversed and Remanded.\nJudges JACKSON and STROUD concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "TYSON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Charles Peed and Associates, P.A., by Charles O. Peed, Jr., and J. William Snyder, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Elizabeth Horton, for defendants-appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CAROLEEN MYERS HAMILTON, Executor of the ESTATE OF RONNIE C. HAMILTON, SR., Deceased, Plaintiff v. THOMASVILLE MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. and OSCAR M. BLACKWELL, M.D., Defendants\nNo. COA07-583\n(Filed 18 December 2007)\n1. Evidence\u2014 motion in limine \u2014 subject to modification during trial\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a medical malpractice case by revisiting and considering defendants\u2019 motion in limine on 12 February 2007 even though plaintiff contends defendants failed to file and serve upon plaintiff any purported motion in limine to exclude plaintiffs expert witness testimony on the element of causation between 2 November 2006 and 12 February 2007, because: (1) the court\u2019s ruling on a motion in lim-ine is not a final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence in question, but only interlocutory or preliminary in nature; and (2) the trial court\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion in limine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s expert testimony on 3 November 2006 was subject to modification during the course of the trial.\n2. Witnesses\u2014 qualifications \u2014 causation\u2014better position to have opinion on subject than trier of fact\nThe trial court erred in a medical malpractice case by granting defendants\u2019 motion in limine to exclude plaintiff\u2019s expert testimony regarding causation based on its determination that the witnesses were not qualified as experts in the area of neurosurgery, and thus also erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff has no competent evidence with regard to causation, because: (1) it is not necessary that an expert be experienced with the identical subject matter at issue or be a specialist, licensed, or even engaged in a specific profession as long as the expert witness, based on his expertise, is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact; and (2) plaintiff\u2019s tendered expert witnesses included an internist and a neurologist, and the witnesses were in a better position than the trier of fact to have an opinion on the subject of whether decedent would have suffered a stroke but for a doctor\u2019s failure to read the 29 November 1999 MRI.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 26 February 2007 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Davidson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 November 2007.\nCharles Peed and Associates, P.A., by Charles O. Peed, Jr., and J. William Snyder, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nElizabeth Horton, for defendants-appellees."
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