{ "id": 4155902, "name": "STEVE McINTYRE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. VICKI McINTYRE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "McIntyre v. McIntyre", "decision_date": "2008-01-15", "docket_number": "No. COA07-235", "first_page": "26", "last_page": "42", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 N.C. App. 26" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "605 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632087 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/605/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411073, 12632087 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/167/0250-01", "/se2d/605/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638317 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246-47", "parenthetical": "citing Harris for the proposition that \"[t]his Court cannot consider an appeal of denial of [a] summary judgment motion [once] a final judgment on the merits has been made\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634754 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517981 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement where each party waived all rights or claims regarding \"the property, real, personal and mixed, now owned, or hereafter acquired by the [other party]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524255 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781-82", "parenthetical": "finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement where each party waived all rights or claims regarding \"the property, real, personal and mixed, now owned, or hereafter acquired by the [other party]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement in which each party \"forever waive[d], release[d] and relinquishefd] any right or claim that he or she now has, or may hereafter acquire, pursuant to the provisions of [Chapter 50 of the General Statutes]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440726 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11438508 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "\"It is only pre-marital agreements that fully dispose of the parties' property rights that bar subsequent actions under the equitable distribution statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11649437 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255", "parenthetical": "\"It is only pre-marital agreements that fully dispose of the parties' property rights that bar subsequent actions under the equitable distribution statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. App. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525721 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" }, { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/109/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624699 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"principles of construction applicable to contracts also apply to premarital agreements\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307491, 5309577, 5305754, 5307317, 5307610 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"principles of construction applicable to contracts also apply to premarital agreements\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0482-02", "/nc/326/0482-01", "/nc/326/0482-05", "/nc/326/0482-04", "/nc/326/0482-03" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523387 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E.2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. App. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546909 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/28/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 24, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "288, 293" }, { "page": "231, 233-34" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "291" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "293-94" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "295" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "stating that because the parties' separation agreement did not specifically refer to equitable distribution rights, the Court \"must consider whether the language nonetheless sufficiently encompasses this right to be a valid release of it\"" }, { "page": "233-34" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "233-34" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement in which each party waived \"all other rights arising out of the marriage relation in and to any and all property now owned by the [other spouse], or which may be hereafter acquired by [the other spouse]\"" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741751 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" }, { "page": "294" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "290-91" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "288" }, { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "providing procedures governing equitable distribution of marital and divisible property" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8202792 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "citing Harris for the proposition that \"[t]his Court cannot consider an appeal of denial of [a] summary judgment motion [once] a final judgment on the merits has been made\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694301 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352703 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633472, 12633473, 12633471 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0234-02", "/se2d/616/0234-03", "/se2d/616/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 S.E. 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. 399", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271875 ], "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/160/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.E.2d 613", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3800229, 3793893, 3794537, 3799052, 3804845, 3795663, 3804149, 3798264, 3796825 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0631-01", "/nc/359/0631-07", "/nc/359/0631-05", "/nc/359/0631-04", "/nc/359/0631-08", "/nc/359/0631-03", "/nc/359/0631-06", "/nc/359/0631-02", "/nc/359/0631-09" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468479 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307491, 5309577, 5305754, 5307317, 5307610 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0482-02", "/nc/326/0482-01", "/nc/326/0482-05", "/nc/326/0482-04", "/nc/326/0482-03" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523387 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" }, { "page": "295" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0287-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1077, "char_count": 37354, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3894556371072857e-07, "percentile": 0.7977073180714397 }, "sha256": "23f0934c6eddf3aff1b7fbf959ae0f6b43eaea67576476f82a6ba6f0361f10b4", "simhash": "1:3f78d03ea31c9a50", "word_count": 5929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:30.605877+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ELMORE concurs.", "Judge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part with a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STEVE McINTYRE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. VICKI McINTYRE, Defendant-Appellee" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nSteve McIntyre (Plaintiff) and Vicki McIntyre (Defendant) were married on 17 July 1986. A number of hours before their wedding, Plaintiff and Defendant executed a prenuptial agreement (the Agreement) that provided, in pertinent part:\nTHAT WHEREAS, said parties have agreed to be married, each to the other; and WHEREAS said parties each own property; and WHEREAS said parties, deeming the same to be just and fair to the other party, have mutually agreed as herein set out:\nNOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of said contemplated marriage and of the covenants hereby entered into, the parties mutually agree as follows:\nFIRST: STEVE A. McINTYRE hereby releases, renounces and forever quitclaims to VICKIE [sic] GAIL TRUELL all right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever including all marital rights in the real estate and personal property of VICKIE [sic] GAIL TRUELL and agrees that VICKIE [sic] GAIL TRUELL may at all times hereafter purchase, acquire, own[,] hold, possess, encumber, dispose of and convey any and all kinds and classes of property, both real and personal, as though still unmarried and without the consent, joinder or interference of the party of STEVE A. McINTYRE.\nSECOND: VICKIE [sic] GAIL TRUELL hereby releases, renounces and forever quitclaims to STEVE A. McINTYRE all right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever including all marital rights in the real estate and personal property of STEVE A. McINTYRE and agrees that STEVE A. McINTYRE may at all times hereafter purchase, acq\u00fcire, own, hold, possess, encumber, dispose of and convey any and all kinds and classes of property, both real and personal, as though still unmarried and without the consent, joinder or interference of VICKIE [sic] GAIL TRUELL.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint in Forsyth County District Court on 24 August 1999 seeking a divorce from bed and board and equitable distribution of the marital estate. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim on 25 October 1999 seeking post-separation support, alimony, equitable distribution of the marital estate, and other relief. Plaintiff replied on 4 November 1999 and pled the Agreement as an affirmative defense to Defendant\u2019s counterclaim for equitable distribution.\nPlaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to Defendant\u2019s counterclaim for equitable distribution on 27 April 2000, arguing that the Agreement barred Defendant\u2019s claim. Defendant responded to Plaintiff\u2019s motion and claimed that the Agreement was invalid for reasons of undue influence, duress, unconscionability, and lack of adequate disclosure. The trial court denied Plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on 27 June 2000. Plaintiff dismissed his own claim for equitable distribution on 1 March 2001. Defendant amended her answer and counterclaim on 20 April 2001 to address certain issues regarding the validity and enforceability of the Agreement.\nThe case proceeded to trial on 6 July 2001 on the issues of the validity of the Agreement and its effect on Defendant\u2019s claim for equitable distribution. The trial court entered an order on 31 July 2001 concluding, inter alia, that: (1) Defendant was not unduly influenced, coerced, or under duress when she executed the Agreement; (2) the Agreement was valid as between the parties; and (3) the terms of the Agreement did not waive either party\u2019s right to equitable distribution of marital property. The trial court held equitable distribution hearings on 20 April 2004, 17-18 May 2004, and 21 June 2004, and entered an equitable distribution judgment and order on 3 December 2004. Both parties appealed various orders of the trial court, but our Court dismissed the appeals as interlocutory due to an outstanding issue concerning alimony. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 175 N.C. App. 558, 623 S.E.2d 828 (2006).\nThe trial court entered an alimony order on 6 October 2006. With no issues remaining before the trial court, Plaintiff now appeals: (1) the trial court\u2019s order of 27 June 2000 denying Plaintiff\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment; (2) the trial court\u2019s order of 31 July 2001 finding the Agreement valid but not preclusive with respect to Defendant\u2019s request for equitable distribution; and (3) the trial court\u2019s order of 3 December 2004 ordering equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital property. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nI.\nPlaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss Defendant\u2019s claim for equitable distribution. This Court is unable to review Plaintiff\u2019s argument. Our Supreme Court has previously held:\nImproper denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reversible error when the case has proceeded to trial and has been determined on the merits by the trier of the facts, either judge or jury.\n... To grant a review of the denial of the summary judgment motion after a final judgment on the merits . . . would mean that a party who prevailed at trial after a complete presentation of evidence by both sides with cross-examination could be deprived of a favorable verdict. This would allow a verdict reached after the presentation of all the evidence to be overcome by a limited forecast of the evidence. In order to avoid such an anomalous result, we hold that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable during appeal from a final judgment rendered in a trial on the merits.\nHarris v. Walden, 314 N.C. 284, 286, 333 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1985). See also WRI/Raleigh, L.P. v. Shaikh, 183 N.C. App. 249, 252, 644 S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (2007) (citing Harris for the proposition that \u201c[t]his Court cannot consider an appeal of denial of [a] summary judgment motion [once] a final judgment on the merits has been made\u201d). Therefore, we do not address Plaintiffs first argument.\nII.\nPlaintiff next argues the trial court erred by allowing the equitable distribution of property acquired by the parties during their marriage. Plaintiff argues that the Agreement waived the parties\u2019 rights to equitable distribution, and that the trial court erred by interpreting the Agreement to the contrary. We disagree.\nNorth Carolina law provides that upon separation, a party to a marriage may institute an action for equitable distribution of the marital estate. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20 (2005) (providing procedures governing equitable distribution of marital and divisible property). However, \u201cparties to a marriage may forego equitable distribution and decide themselves how their marital estate will be divided upon divorce.\u201d Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 290, 354 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1987). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-20(d) (2005), \u201c[b]efore, during or after marriage the parties may by written agreement . . . provide for distribution of the marital property or divisible property, or both, in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the parties.\u201d Likewise, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52-10(a) (2005):\nContracts between husband and wife not inconsistent with public policy are valid, and any persons of full age about to be married and married persons may, with or without a valuable consideration, release and quitclaim such rights which they might respectively acquire or may have acquired by marriage in the property of each other; and such releases may be pleaded in bar of any action or proceeding for the recovery of the rights and estate so released.\nOur Court has previously noted that \u201c[a]ntenuptial contracts are not against public policy and should be enforced as written.\u201d Harden v. Bank, 28 N.C. App. 75, 78, 220 S.E.2d 136, 138 (1975).\nPremarital agreements are contracts, and thus are to be construed in the same manner as other contracts. See Howell v. Landry, 96 N.C. App. 516, 525, 386 S.E.2d 610, 615 (1989), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 482, 392 S.E.2d 90 (1990) (\u201cprinciples of construction applicable to contracts also apply to premarital agreements\u201d). Under well-settled principles of legal construction, if \u201cthe language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law for the court.\u201d Hagler, 319 N.C. at 294, 354 S.E.2d at 234. Further, \u201c[i]t must be presumed the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the contract must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean.\u201d Indemnity Co. v. Hood, 226 N.C. 706, 710, 40 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1946) (internal citations omitted). However, if the language of a contract \u201cis ambiguous and the intention of the parties is unclear, interpretation of the contract is for the jury.\u201d Glover v. First Union National Bank, 109 N.C. App. 451, 456, 428 S.E.2d 206, 209 (1993).\nA.\nIn the present case, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement constitutes a clear and unambiguous waiver of the parties\u2019 rights to equitable distribution. In support of this contention, Plaintiff first notes that our Supreme Court has previously recognized that \u201cthe very existence of [a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement] evinces an intention by the parties to determine for themselves what their property division should be and what their future relationship is to be, rather than to leave these decisions to a court of law.\u201d Hagler, 319 N.C. at 293, 354 S.E.2d at 233. Against this backdrop, Plaintiff relies on Hagler to demonstrate that the Agreement does, in fact, explicitly preclude equitable distribution. In Hagler, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement that dealt with the marital residence, alimony, child support and custody, acquisition of property, and also provided for distribution of existing property and obligations. Id. at 288, 293, 354 S.E.2d at 231, 233-34. In addition, the separation agreement contained the following reciprocal release provision:\n[Each spouse] does hereby release and relinquish unto [the other spouse] ... all right of future support. . . and all right of [dower or courtesy], inheritance, descent and distribution, and any and all other' rights arising out of the marriage relation in and to any and all property now owned by the [other spouse], or which may be hereafter acquired by [the other spouse] [.]\nId. at 288, 354 S.E.2d at 231. The husband pled the separation agreement as a bar to the wife\u2019s request for equitable distribution of the marital estate. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the husband, finding that the separation agreement was a bar to equitable distribution. Id.\nOn appeal, our Supreme Court noted that since the language of the release provision \u201cdoes not refer specifically to the right of equitable distribution, we must consider whether the language nonetheless sufficiently encompasses this right to be a valid release of it.\u201d Id. at 291, 354 S.E.2d at 232. Noting the breadth of the separation agreement, the Court \u201cconclude[d] from [its] reading of the entire agreement that the parties intended to completely dispose of the marital estate and effectuate a complete waiver of claims by one party against the other.\u201d Id. at 293, 354 S.E.2d at 234. Focusing specifically on the language of the release provision, the Court found that the parties\u2019 waiver of \u201call other rights arising out of the marriage relation\u201d clearly encompassed the right to equitable distribution. Given that the separation agreement had already covered rights such as support, dower, inheritance, descent, and distribution, it was unclear what rights other than equitable distribution the parties could have intended to come within the \u201call other rights\u201d waiver. Id. at 293-94, 354 S.E.2d at 234. The Court therefore concluded that the separation agreement clearly and unambiguously \u201cdisposed of the parties\u2019 property rights arising out of the marriage and thus acts as a bar to equitable distribution.\u201d Id. at 295, 354 S.E.2d at 235.\nIn the present case, Plaintiff notes the similarities between the release provision in Hagler and the Agreement signed by Plaintiff and Defendant. As in Hagler, the Agreement in the present case specifically provides that each party \u201creleases\u201d certain rights, including \u201call marital rights in the real estate and personal property\u201d of the other spouse. Plaintiff maintains that, under Hagler, such language clearly and unambiguously encompasses the parties\u2019 rights to equitable distribution.\nLike Plaintiff, Defendant also maintains that the Agreement is clear and unambiguous. However, Defendant claims that, rather than constituting an equitable distribution waiver, the Agreement is a mere \u201cfree trader\u201d agreement that allowed each spouse to buy and sell property without the consent or interference of the other during marriage. Defendant first recognizes that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50-20(d) allows future spouses to waive their rights to equitable distribution, but notes that the Agreement in the present case does not contain an express waiver of equitable distribution rights. According to Defendant, under Hagler, if a prenuptial agreement does not expressly waive equitable distribution rights, then the parties may still waive such rights impliedly, so long as the agreement contains language constituting a complete relinquishment of all property rights following marriage. See Hagler, 319 N.C. at 290-91, 354 S.E.2d at 232 (stating that because the parties\u2019 separation agreement did not specifically refer to equitable distribution rights, the Court \u201cmust consider whether the language nonetheless sufficiently encompasses this right to be a valid release of it\u201d); McKissick v. McKissick, 129 N.C. App. 252, 255, 497 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1998) (\u201cIt is only pre-marital agreements that fully dispose of the parties\u2019 property rights that bar subsequent actions under the equitable distribution statute.\u201d). Defendant contends that the Agreement in the present case did not fully dispose of the parties\u2019 property rights, and thus did not impliedly waive the parties\u2019 equitable distribution rights.\nDefendant notes that the separation agreement in Hagler was a comprehensive, fifteen-paragraph settlement that addressed alimony, child support, the marital residence, property acquisition, and distribution of existing property. Hagler, 319 N.C. at 293, 354 S.E.2d at 233-34. Thus, because the agreement was \u201ca comprehensive settlement. .. dealing with all aspects of the marital estate, including the division of property,\u201d the additional language waiving \u201call other rights arising out of the marriage relationship\u201d indicated that the parties intended \u201cto completely dispose of the marital estate and effectuate a complete waiver of claims by one party against the other,\u201d including claims for equitable distribution. Id. at 293, 354 S.E.2d at 233-34. See also Anderson v. Anderson, 145 N.C. App. 453, 458-59, 550 S.E.2d 266, 270 (2001) (holding that where a separation agreement expressly purported to \u201csettle by agreement all of [the parties\u2019] marital affairs with respect to property,\u201d and did in fact \u201cprovide[] a section expressly for the division of property,\u201d the agreement \u201cserve[d] as the sole and complete division of the marital estate\u201d and precluded a claim for equitable distribution). In contrast, according to Defendant, the Agreement in the present case is a short document that contains \u201cfree-trader\u201d language and does not actually distribute any property between the parties. As such, with no express waiver of equitable distribution and no actual division of property, the Agreement merely set out rules regarding how the parties were able to own, buy, and sell property once married. Therefore, Defendant argues that the presumption in Hagler \u2014 that \u201cthe very existence of [a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement] evinces an intention by the parties to determine for themselves what their property division should be\u201d \u2014 should not apply in the present case. See Hagler, 319 N.C. at 293, 354 S.E.2d at 233.\nFinally, Defendant notes that the Agreement only references \u201cmarital rights in the real estate and personal property\u201d of each spouse (emphasis added). According to Defendant, this language was only meant to encompass rights in property owned by the parties at the time they entered into the Agreement. If the parties had intended for the Agreement to constitute a waiver of rights in property acquired during marriage, they would have expressly extended its coverage to property later acquired by the parties. In support of this argument, Defendant notes that in prior cases finding equitable distribution barred by a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement, such agreements clearly referenced property to be acquired. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 141 N.C. App. 236, 240, 541 S.E.2d 209, 212 (2000) (finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement in which each party \u201cforever waive[d], release[d] and relinquishefd] any right or claim that he or she now has, or may hereafter acquire, pursuant to the provisions of [Chapter 50 of the General Statutes]\u201d); Prevatte v. Prevatte, 104 N.C. App. 777, 781-82, 411 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1991) (finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement where each party waived all rights or claims regarding \u201cthe property, real, personal and mixed, now owned, or hereafter acquired by the [other party]\u201d); Hagler, 319 N.C. at 288, 354 S.E.2d at 231 (finding equitable distribution precluded based on agreement in which each party waived \u201call other rights arising out of the marriage relation in and to any and all property now owned by the [other spouse], or which may be hereafter acquired by [the other spouse]\u201d).\nAs set out above, if \u201cthe language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law for the court.\u201d Hagler, 319 N.C. at 294, 354 S.E.2d at 234. However, if the language of a contract \u201cis ambiguous and the intention of the parties is unclear, interpretation of the contract is for the jury.\u201d Glover, 109 N.C. App. at 456, 428 S.E.2d at 209. An ambiguity exists where the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible to either of the differing interpretations proffered by the parties. Id. Further, \u201c \u2018[t]he fact that a dispute has arisen as to the parties\u2019 interpretation of the contract is some indication that the language of the contract is, at best, ambiguous.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Freeman-White Assoc., Inc., 322 N.C. 77, 83, 366 S.E.2d 480, 484 (1988)). While both Plaintiff and Defendant' assert that the language of the Agreement is clearly and unambiguously in their favor, we find that both parties have offered reasonable interpretations of the Agreement. It is true that the Agreement does state that the parties waive \u201call marital rights\u201d in each others\u2019 property. However, unlike other agreements that have been found to waive equitable distribution rights, the Agreement in the present case does not specifically reference property that might be acquired during marriage, nor does it contain an express waiver of equitable distribution rights. Further, the Agreement does not otherwise distribute property between the parties in the event of divorce. While there is some reasonable indication that the parties intended the Agreement to preclude equitable distribution, the Agreement may also reasonably be interpreted as a mere \u201cfree trader\u201d agreement. We find the Agreement is ambiguous, and therefore do not interpret the Agreement as a matter of law.\nB.\nDue to the ambiguity of the Agreement, its interpretation was properly for the finder of fact. Glover, 109 N.C. App. at 456, 428 S.E.2d at 209. Our review is therefore limited to whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, and whether the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law were proper in light of those facts. Lee v. Lee, 167 N.C. App. 250, 253, 605 S.E.2d 222, 224 (2004).\nPlaintiff\u2019s evidence at trial tended to demonstrate that the parties may have intended for the Agreement to bar equitable distribution. Plaintiff testified that before his marriage to Defendant, Defendant had agreed to sign a prenuptial agreement to protect both parties\u2019 financial interests. Plaintiff then retained an attorney, Charles Harp (Mr. Harp), to draft the Agreement. Plaintiff told Mr. Harp that he wanted to protect his financial interests after marriage in case of divorce, and that he wanted to be able to buy, sell, and trade property as if single during the marriage. Mr. Harp testified that he had only prepared three prenuptial agreements during his entire legal career, and that he \u201cprobably\u201d prepared the prenuptial agreement by using language from a Douglas Forms book. Mr. Harp also testified that he had never drafted a \u201cfree-trader\u201d document during his legal career. However, neither Plaintiff nor Mr. Harp could recall if they had ever specifically discussed whether the prenuptial agreement was to contain language barring equitable distribution.\nFurther, Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored the fact that after he and Defendant separated, they entered into a separation agreement containing a \u201cfree-trader provision.\u201d According to Plaintiff, had the original Agreement truly been a mere free-trader agreement, there would have been no need for the parties to enter into another free-trader agreement after they separated.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that Plaintiff presented Defendant with the Agreement just hours before the wedding and told Defendant that the wedding would be cancelled unless she signed the document. Defendant testified that she did not understand the document and signed it without reading it. Defendant and Plaintiff never discussed equitable distribution. Defendant maintains, however, that the trial court properly considered the language of the Agreement as clear evidence that the Agreement was a mere \u201cfree-trader\u201d agreement, given that the Agreement never specifically referenced equitable distribution rights, did not otherwise dispose of property in the event of divorce, and did not reference the parties\u2019 rights to property acquired during marriage. Finally, Defendant notes that in Plaintiff\u2019s original August 1999 complaint for divorce from bed and board, Plaintiff also sought equitable distribution of the marital estate. Plaintiff did not dismiss his own equitable distribution claim until March 2001, after having pled the Agreement as a bar to Defendant\u2019s counterclaim for equitable distribution. Defendant argues that the fact that Plaintiff originally sought equitable distribution demonstrates that he too believed that equitable distribution was not barred by the Agreement.\nBased on this evidence, and after its own review of the Agreement\u2019s language, the trial court found, in pertinent part:\nXVII. The Court finds that the Plaintiff, at the time of the execution of the Agreement, desired to protect his financial interest and retain the ability to buy and sell property without the consent or interference of the Defendant.\nXVIII. The Court finds that the language set out in [the Agreement] does allow the Plaintiff to conduct himself as a \u201cfree trader\u201d and allows him, in-fact, to do exactly what he desired, that is, to buy and sell property without the consent or interference of the Defendant.\nXIX. The Court finds that [the Agreement] specifically releases all right, title and interest in the real estate owned by Plaintiff at the time of his marriage to the Defendant on July 17, 1986.\nXX. The Court finds that the provision of [the Agreement] which referred to \u201cthe\u201d real estate and personal property of the parties refers to property owned at the time of the parties\u2019 marriage and does not apply to property acquired during the course of the parties\u2019 marriage.\nXXI. The Court therefore finds that although [the Agreement] is valid, the terms of the Agreement distinguish the property that the parties owned at the time of their marriage rather than property acquired after their marriage and that further, the document simply provided that the Plaintiff and the Defendant were \u201cfree traders\u201d.\nXXII. The Court finds that [the Agreement] does not bar the Defendant\u2019s claim for Equitable Distribution (emphases in original).\nWhile Plaintiff certainly introduced evidence to the contrary, we find that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence in the record. Based on Plaintiff\u2019s stated intentions regarding the creation of the Agreement, his discussions with Mr. Harp, and the actual language of the Agreement, the trial court could properly find that the Agreement constituted a \u201cfree trader\u201d agreement that did not waive the parties\u2019 rights to equitable distribution.\nBased on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded, in pertinent part:\nIII. [T]he terms and conditions of [the Agreement] did not waive either party\u2019s right to an Equitable Distribution of property nor does said Agreement determine the property interest of the parties as to property acquired following their marriage on July 17, 1986.\nWe find that the trial court\u2019s conclusion was proper in light of its findings of fact. Therefore, the trial court did not err by allowing equitable distribution to proceed, as the Agreement did not waive the parties\u2019 claims to equitable distribution.\nIII.\nPlaintiff next argues the trial court erred by relying on certain evidence not properly before the trial court. When rendering its decision regarding the interpretation of the Agreement at a 13 July 2001 hearing, the trial court stated:\nThe Court having looked at other Douglas Forms found a prenuptial agreement wherein the parties gave up, released, renounced and quitclaim \u2014 they use all the terms \u2014 but, anyway, all rights to real property, personal property. In this case, they did the year\u2019s allowance and, more importantly \u2014 now I quote \u2014 \u201cas to property now owned by him and property hereafter acquired,\u201d end quotation.\nThe Court notes that that language is not present in the prenuptial agreement that I have just read. The Court further finds that the word \u201cthe\u201d is the most significant word in the prenuptial agreement; and I, therefore, interpret the words \u201cthe real estate and personal property of [Plaintiff] to mean that property that he owned at the time of the marriage.\nThe Court, therefore, finds the prenuptial agreement is valid. The Court has stated its interpretation of it.\nAt trial, Mr. Harp testified that he \u201cprobably prepared [the Agreement] from Douglas Forms, just using the form book.\u201d Mr. Harp was never certain whether he used a Douglas Forms book, nor did he testify as to what edition of the Douglas Forms book he might have used. Further, no Douglas Forms book was admitted into evidence. Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly relied on the Douglas Forms book because: (1) no such book was admitted into evidence; (2) the book was irrelevant because Mr. Harp stated that he was not certain whether he relied on a Douglas Forms book; and (3) the book was irrelevant because Mr. Harp could not identify the particular version of the Douglas Forms book on which he might have relied, and the trial court did not state the version of the Douglas Forms book on which it relied.\nAssuming arguendo that the trial court erred by relying on a Douglas Forms book, Plaintiff must still demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result of the trial court\u2019s actions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 61 (2005) (\u201cNo error in . . . the admission ... of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order ... is ground for .. . disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action amounts to the denial of a substantial right.\u201d). Plaintiff argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s reliance on a Douglas Forms book because the trial court admittedly relied upon the allegedly incompetent evidence to interpret the Agreement. We disagree. While the trial court did reference a Douglas Forms prenuptial agreement to emphasize the lack of \u201chereafter acquired\u201d language in the Agreement in the present case, the trial court could have drawn the same comparison by relying on Hagler and other cases interpreting prenuptial or post-nuptial agreements containing similar language. Further, when making the findings of fact and conclusions of law in its 31 July 2001 order, the trial court never referenced a Douglas Forms book. This demonstrates that the trial court believed it had sufficient competent evidence from other sources to support its findings of fact. As set out in Part II, we have reviewed the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and have held that they are supported by competent evidence that does not include a Douglas Forms book. Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s allegedly improper reliance on a Douglas Forms book.\nIV.\nFinally, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by classifying Plaintiff\u2019s separate property as marital property, where the Agreement provided that such property was Plaintiff\u2019s separate property. Plaintiff argues that because the trial court in its 31 July 2001 order erroneously found that the parties did not waive their equitable distribution rights, the. trial court also erred by actually carrying out the equitable distribution of the parties\u2019 marital property in its 3 December 2004 order. Because we find that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the Agreement, Plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nIn light of the foregoing, we do not address Defendant\u2019s cross-assignments of error.\nAffirmed.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nJudge TYSON concurs in part and dissents in part with a separate opinion.\n. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 52B-1 et seq. (2005), provides specific rules governing premarital agreements. The UPAA became effective on 1 July 1987 and only applies to premarital agreements executed on or after that date. See 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 473, \u00a7 3. The UPAA is therefore not applicable in the current case.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." }, { "text": "TYSON, Judge\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nThe majority\u2019s opinion holds: (1) this Court cannot consider plaintiff\u2019s first argument challenging denial of summary judgment because a final judgment on the merits has been made; (2) the trial court did not err by allowing equitable distribution to proceed; (3) plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s allegedly improper reliance on a Douglas Forms book; and (4) the trial court did not err by classifying plaintiff\u2019s separate property as marital property. I concur in that portion of the majority\u2019s opinion holding this Court cannot review a denial of a motion for summary judgment once a final judgment on the merits has been entered.\nI disagree with the majority\u2019s holding that the trial court properly allowed equitable distribution to proceed in contravention to a valid prenuptial agreement and properly classified plaintiff\u2019s separate property as marital property. I vote to reverse and respectfully dissent.\nI. Analysis\nPlaintiff argues the parties\u2019 prenuptial agreement waived the parties\u2019 rights to equitable distribution and the trial court erred when it allowed equitable distribution and classified property acquired by the parties individually during their marriage as marital property. I agree.\nThe parties\u2019 prenuptial agreement expressly states that each party \u201creleases . . . all marital rights in the real estate and personal property . . . .\u201d of the other spouse. (Emphasis supplied). The trial court specifically and correctly concluded: (1) defendant was not unduly influenced, coerced, or under duress when she signed the prenuptial agreement and (2) the prenuptial agreement was valid. Defendant did not cross-appeal any error in either of these conclusions and does not argue the invalidity of either conclusion.\n\u201c[T]he very existence of the [prenuptial] agreement evinces an' intention by the parties to determine for themselves what their property division should be . . . rather than to leave th[is] decision[] to a court of law.\u201d Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 293, 354 S.E.2d 228, 233 (1987). \u201cThe value of such agreement[] lies in the ability to have [it] enforced in the courts.\u201d Id. at 295, 354 S.E.2d at 235.\n\u201cPremarital agreements, like all contracts, must be interpreted according to the intent of the parties.\u201d Howell v. Landry, 96 N.C. App. 516, 532, 386 S.E.2d 610, 619 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 482, 392 S.E.2d 90 (1990).\nWhen the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law for the court.\nIt is a well-settled principle of legal construction that it must be presumed the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the contract must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean.\nHagler, 319 N.C. at 294, 354 S.E.2d at 234 (internal citations and quotation omitted).\nThe unambiguous language of the parties\u2019 prenuptial agreement clearly established the parties\u2019 intention to fully resolve \u201call marital rights in the real estate and personal property . . . .\u201d\nWhere the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, the construction of the agreement is a matter of law; and the court may not ignore or delete any of its provisions, nor insert words into it, but must construe the contract as written, in the light of the undisputed evidence as to the custom, usage, and meaning of its terms. If the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract.\nHemric v. Groce, 169 N.C. App. 69, 76, 609 S.E.2d 276, 282 (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 631, 616 S.E.2d 234 (2005).\n\u201c[T]he object of all interpretation is to arrive at the intent and purpose expressed in the writing, looking at the instrument from its four corners, and to effectuate this intent and purpose unless at variance with some rule of law or contrary to public policy.\u201d Bank v. Corl, 225 N.C. 96, 102, 33 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1945). \u201cCourts are not at liberty to rewrite contracts for the parties. We are not their guardians, but the interpreters of their words. We must, therefore, determine what they meant by what they have said-what their contract is, and not what it should have been.\u201d Penn v. Insurance Co., 160 N.C. 399, 402, 76 S.E. 262, 263 (1912).\nThe language the parties used in the prenuptial agreement is clear and unambiguous. The trial court erred when it concluded the prenuptial agreement did not waive \u201call marital rights....\u201d of the parties and allowed an equitable distribution of property.\nII. Conclusion\nThe parties\u2019 intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the unambiguous and valid written agreement. Corl, 225 N.C. at 102, 33 S.E.2d at 616. The plain and unambiguous language of the prenuptial agreement entered into by the parties fully disposed of \u201call marital rights . . . .\u201d and bars equitable distribution. This Court cannot under the guise of judicial construction divine a different intent than that shown by the express terms of the binding agreement. Id.\nI vote to reverse the trial court\u2019s 31 July 2001 judgment that found the parties did not waive \u201call marital rights . ...\u201d to an equitable distribution of their property and to vacate the trial court\u2019s equitable distribution order entered 3 December 2004.1 respectfully dissent.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "TYSON, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Task & Kurtz, PLLC, by Jon B. Kurtz, for Plaintiff-Appellant.", "Bell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Robin J. Stinson, for DefendantAppellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEVE McINTYRE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. VICKI McINTYRE, Defendant-Appellee\nNo. COA07-235\n(Filed 15 January 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 denial of partial summary judgment \u2014 trial and judgment\nThe denial of partial summary judgment was not addressed in an appeal after a trial and a judgment on the merits.\n2. Husband and Wife\u2014 prenuptial agreement \u2014 waiver of equitable distribution \u2014 ambiguous\nA prenuptial agreement was not interpreted as a matter of law on the question of whether it waived equitable distribution where the agreement was ambiguous.\n3. Husband and Wife\u2014 prenuptial agreement \u2014 equitable distribution \u2014 free traders\nThere was competent evidence, even though there was evidence to the contrary, to support the trial court\u2019s findings that a prenuptial agreement allowed plaintiff and defendant to be \u201cfree traders,\u201d but did not bar defendant\u2019s equitable distribution claim.\n4. Husband and Wife\u2014 prenuptial agreement \u2014 interpretation \u2014 reliance on evidence not admitted \u2014 no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice in an action involving a prenuptial agreement where the court referred to a form book not admitted into evidence when discussing the language of the agreement. The reference was not included in the findings and conclusions, which were supported by competent evidence, and the court could have drawn the same comparison by relying on cases involving agreements with similar language.\n5. Divorce\u2014 prenuptial agreement \u2014 classification of property as marital\nThe trial court did not err in its classification of property as marital in an action involving the interpretation of a prenuptial agreement.\nJudge TYSON concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from order entered 27 June 2000 by Judge Victoria L. Roemer in District Court, Forsyth County; and from order entered 31 July 2001 and judgment entered 3 December 2004 by Judge Chester C. Davis in District Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 September 2007.\nTask & Kurtz, PLLC, by Jon B. Kurtz, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nBell, Davis & Pitt, P.A., by Robin J. Stinson, for DefendantAppellee." }, "file_name": "0026-01", "first_page_order": 56, "last_page_order": 72 }