{ "id": 4156167, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFONZA DAWNTA COLTRANE, aka ALFENZA DAWNTA COLTRANE, aka ALFONZ DWANTE COLTRANE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Coltrane", "decision_date": "2008-02-05", "docket_number": "No. COA07-486", "first_page": "498", "last_page": "508", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 N.C. App. 498" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638625 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" }, { "parenthetical": "omission in original" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639148, 12639149 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0851-01", "/se2d/648/0851-02" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636291 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631478 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/599/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635852 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "\"The mere fact that a statute is directed at recidivism does not prevent the statute from establishing a substantive offense.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638976 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "\"Defendant was not prosecuted nor punished again for the underlying ... [felony] conviction ...; rather he was convicted and punished for his subsequent act of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/647/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637418, 12637419, 12637420 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0907-01", "/se2d/638/0907-02", "/se2d/638/0907-03" ] }, { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634314 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560821 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621023 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "quoting Little v. Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 689, 700 (1960)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11092059 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111-12", "parenthetical": "quoting Little v. Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 689, 700 (1960)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)" }, { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986601 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8184632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553295 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "\"To sustain the charge against [defendant for driving while license revoked,] the State had to prove that (1) [defendant] operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while his operator's license was suspended or revoked, and (4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 N.C. App. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525201 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578", "parenthetical": "\"To sustain the charge against [defendant for driving while license revoked,] the State had to prove that (1) [defendant] operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while his operator's license was suspended or revoked, and (4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/102/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440957 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0302-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564024 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E.2d 822 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741158 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E.2d 822 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 L. Ed. 2d 819", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "542 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5858979, 5860228, 5865990, 2530022, 5864072, 5857257, 5861128, 5859851, 5865196, 5867083, 5856146, 5860538, 2526397, 5856415 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/542/0941-07", "/us/542/0941-06", "/us/542/0941-11", "/us/542/0941-05", "/us/542/0941-10", "/us/542/0941-14", "/us/542/0941-01", "/us/542/0941-02", "/us/542/0941-13", "/us/542/0941-04", "/us/542/0941-03", "/us/542/0941-08", "/us/542/0941-09", "/us/542/0941-12" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491509 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 357 N.C. 604, 615-16, 588 S.E.2d 453, 461 (2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 941, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8470857 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 357 N.C. 604, 615-16, 588 S.E.2d 453, 461 (2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 941, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3742630, 3740424, 3744077, 3743373, 3746933, 3738461 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0431-02", "/nc/361/0431-06", "/nc/361/0431-04", "/nc/361/0431-01", "/nc/361/0431-03", "/nc/361/0431-05" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8379962 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571368, 8571436, 8571396, 8571336 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0724-02", "/nc/301/0724-04", "/nc/301/0724-03", "/nc/301/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733-34", "parenthetical": "\"A previous conviction for one of a group of enumerated felonies is an essential element of the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, and thus in the absence of a prior conviction, there is no offense at all.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 N.C. App. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552673 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666", "parenthetical": "\"A previous conviction for one of a group of enumerated felonies is an essential element of the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, and thus in the absence of a prior conviction, there is no offense at all.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/48/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 285", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting U.S. Const. amend. V; see also N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "544 U.S. 909", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5883840, 5894978, 5878466, 5901510, 5894599, 3537800, 5880967, 5898989, 5864815, 5911695, 5900303, 5911316, 5867098, 5893946 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "quoting U.S. Const. amend. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8302274 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "\"The mere fact that a statute is directed at recidivism does not prevent the statute from establishing a substantive offense.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3735905, 3743043, 3746508, 3743410, 3738611, 3744404, 3735988, 3737112, 3740671 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0703-04", "/nc/361/0703-05", "/nc/361/0703-03", "/nc/361/0703-06", "/nc/361/0703-07", "/nc/361/0703-09", "/nc/361/0703-01", "/nc/361/0703-02", "/nc/361/0703-08" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8209211 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756963 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "324" }, { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916457 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284-85" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787808, 3793442, 3790828, 3795150, 3793998, 3797936, 3792754, 3791351, 3796858, 3790044 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0652-05", "/nc/360/0652-06", "/nc/360/0652-10", "/nc/360/0652-08", "/nc/360/0652-03", "/nc/360/0652-02", "/nc/360/0652-04", "/nc/360/0652-01", "/nc/360/0652-07", "/nc/360/0652-09" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352646 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358046 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cameron, 83 N.C. App. 69, 72, 349 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1986)" }, { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Cameron, 83 N.C. App. 69, 72, 349 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1986)" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2396898 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574594, 8574566, 8574510, 8574546, 8574524 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0737-05", "/nc/294/0737-04", "/nc/294/0737-01", "/nc/294/0737-03", "/nc/294/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547131 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53, 240 S.E.2d 475, disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 737, 244 S.E.2d 155 (1978)" }, { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "824" }, { "page": "824", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552042 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53, 240 S.E.2d 475, disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 737, 244 S.E.2d 155 (1978)" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0764-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 983, "char_count": 24238, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.737328906212902e-08, "percentile": 0.3593661252065275 }, "sha256": "524230a957a63e05f076f6deda0b6a1c4f0867ce54601b244852ac86076cba76", "simhash": "1:e7095de3747f681a", "word_count": 4059 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:30.605877+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFONZA DAWNTA COLTRANE, aka ALFENZA DAWNTA COLTRANE, aka ALFONZ DWANTE COLTRANE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nAlfonza Dawnta Coltrane (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from judgments entered upon jury verdicts in 05 CRS 052926-27 finding him guilty of one count of driving while license revoked pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-28(a), one count of resisting a public officer pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-223, and one count of felonious possession of a firearm by a felon pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1. On 8 November 2006, defendant was sentenced to a consolidated term of 20 to 24 months imprisonment to commence at the expiration of sentences which defendant was already obligated to serve.\nDefendant\u2019s 8 November 2006 convictions arose out of events that occurred on 25 April 2005 in Randolph County. On 10 November 2005, defendant appeared in Randolph County District Court and was found guilty of driving while license revoked pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-28(a) and resisting a public officer pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-223. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 45 days imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal to Randolph County Superior Court. On 10 April 2006, the Randolph County Grand Jury issued an indictment for the Class G felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1. On 7-8 November 2006, a jury heard and decided the case against defendant for the charges in 05 CRS 052926-27 of driving while license revoked, resisting a public officer, and felonious possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant gave notice of appeal to this Court on 8 November 2006 in open court.\nThe record on appeal contains one hundred one assignments of error. In his brief, however, defendant presented arguments in support of only twenty-four of those assignments of error. The remaining assignments of error are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. R 28(a) (2008) (\u201cQuestions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned.\u201d).\nI.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the 10 April 2006 indictment charging him with possession of a firearm by a felon. The State was permitted to amend the indictment to correct: (A) the date of the offense, and (B) the county in which defendant was convicted of the underlying felony. Defendant argues that, because of these errors, the indictment was defective and so the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. We disagree.\nA.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-923(e) provides that \u201c[a] bill of indictment may not be amended.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-923(e) (2007). \u201cThis statute, however, has been construed to mean only that an indictment may not be amended in a way which \u2018would substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.\u2019 \u201d State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 767, 448 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1994) (quoting State v. Carrington, 35 N.C. App. 53, 240 S.E.2d 475, disc. review denied, 294 N.C. 737, 244 S.E.2d 155 (1978)). \u201cThus, for example, where time is not an essential element of the crime, an amendment relating to the date of the offense is permissible since the amendment would not \u2018substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596, 598-99, 313 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1984)); see also State v. Locklear, 117 N.C. App. 255, 260, 450 S.E.2d 516, 519 (1994) (quoting State v. Cameron, 83 N.C. App. 69, 72, 349 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1986)) (\u201c \u2018Ordinarily, the date alleged in the indictment is neither an essential nor a substantial fact, and therefore the State may prove that the offense was actually committed on some date other than that alleged in the indictment without the necessity of a motion to change the bill.\u2019 \u201d).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(a) provides, in part: \u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or have in his custody, care, or control any firearm or any weapon of mass death and destruction as defined in G.S. 14-288.8(c).\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(a) (2007). Thus, the date of the offense is not an essential element of the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. Therefore, \u201c \u2018[t]he failure to state accurately the date or time an offense is alleged to have occurred does not invalidate a bill of indictment nor does it justify reversal of a conviction obtained thereon.\u2019 \u201d Locklear, 117 N.C. App. at 260, 450 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting Cameron, 83 N.C. App. at 72, 349 S.E.2d at 329).\nIn the present case, the 10 April 2006 indictment returned against defendant stated that the alleged offense occurred \u201con or about the 9th day of December, 2004.\u201d The State moved to amend this date to 25 April 2005, which the trial court granted over defendant\u2019s objection. Since the date of the offense is not an essential element of possession of a firearm by a felon, amending this date did not \u201csubstantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment,\u201d Brinson, 337 N.C. at 767, 448 S.E.2d at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted), and we find no error.\nB.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(c) provides, in part:\nAn indictment which charges the person with violation of this section must set forth the date that the prior offense was committed, the type of offense and the penalty therefor, and the date that the defendant was convicted or plead guilty to such offense, the identity of the court in which the conviction or plea of guilty took place and the verdict and judgment rendered therein.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(c) (emphasis added). However, \u201c[e]ven where a statute requires a particular allegation, the omission of such an allegation from an indictment is not necessarily fatal to jurisdiction.\u201d State v. Inman, 174 N.C. App. 567, 569, 621 S.E.2d 306, 308 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 652, 638 S.E.2d 907 (2006).\nIn State v. Lewis, 162 N.C. App. 277, 590 S.E.2d 318 (2004), this Court held that the State could amend a habitual felon indictment pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.3 which \u201ccorrectly stated the type of offense for which defendant was convicted and the date of that offense,\u201d but \u201cincorrectly stated the date and county of defendant\u2019s conviction.\u201d Lewis, 162 N.C. App. at 284-85, 590 S.E.2d at 324 (emphasis added). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.3 includes language almost identical to that in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(c) regarding the \u201cidentity of the court,\u201d providing:\nAn indictment which charges a person with being a[] habitual felon must set forth the date that prior felony offenses were committed, the name of the state or other sovereign against whom said felony offenses were committed, the dates that pleas of guilty were entered to or convictions returned in said felony offenses, and the identity of the court wherein said pleas or convictions took place.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-7.3 (2007) (emphasis added). Again, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(c) provides, in part, that the indictment charging the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon \u201cmust set forth . . . the identity of the court in which the conviction or plea of guilty took place.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-415.1(c). In Lewis, this Court concluded that \u201c[t]he indictment at issue sufficiently notified defendant of the particular conviction that was being used to support his status as a[] habitual felon,\u201d in spite of errors in both the date and county of defendant\u2019s prior conviction. See Lewis, 162 N.C. App. at 285, 590 S.E.2d at 324. Although, unlike the present case, defendant in Lewis also \u201cpreviously stipulated to [his prior] conviction and did not argue he lacked notice of the hearing at trial,\u201d we do not believe that this Court\u2019s conclusion in Lewis was contingent upon defendant\u2019s stipulation. See id.\nIn the present case, the 10 April 2006 indictment stated that defendant\u2019s underlying felony conviction occurred \u201cin Montgomery County Superior Court.\u201d The State moved to amend this designation to Guilford County Superior Court, which the trial court granted over defendant\u2019s objection. The indictment correctly identified all of the other allegations required pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1(c) regarding defendant\u2019s prior felony conviction, including: (1) the date on which defendant\u2019s prior felony was committed (\u201con or about October 31, 2003\u201d); (2) the type of offense for which defendant was convicted (\u201cfleeing to elude arrest, a felony\u201d); (3) the penalty for that offense (\u201csentenced to a term of 14-17 months (consolidated with another sentence), suspended, with 36 months probation\u201d); (4) the date of defendant\u2019s prior conviction (\u201con or about June 8, 2004\u201d); and (5) the verdict rendered (\u201cfound guilty\u201d). At the time of the 10 April 2006 indictment, defendant had prior convictions for the felony of fleeing to elude arrest in Guilford County (03 CRS 102696) and Randolph County (04 CRS 058421) entered on 8 June 2004 and 1 February 2006, respectively, but had no record of any convictions for any offenses in Montgomery County.\nJust as this Court held in Lewis that an indictment which \u201cincorrectly stated the date and county of defendant\u2019s conviction\u201d sufficiently notified defendant of the prior conviction referenced therein, see id. at 284, 590 S.E.2d at 324, we conclude that the 10 April 2006 indictment in the present case sufficiently notified defendant that the prior felony conviction referenced was his 8 June 2004 conviction for fleeing to elude arrest, which occurred in Guilford County. Since the State\u2019s amendment to the identity of the court in the indictment neither frustrated the purpose of the indictment.\" \u2018to inform a party so that he may learn with reasonable certainty the nature of the crime of which he is accused,\u2019 \u201d Brinson, 337 N.C. at 768, 448 S.E.2d at 824 (quoting State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 437, 323 S.E.2d 343, 347 (1984)), nor \u201csubstantially alter[ed] the charge set forth in the indictment,\u201d id. at 767, 448 S.E.2d at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted), we find no error.\nII.\nDefendant next contends that his 8 November 2006 conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1 must be vacated because possession of a firearm by a felon is \u201cnot a crime.\u201d Defendant argues that possession of a firearm by a felon is a recidivist offense, and urges this Court to follow defendant\u2019s argument in State v. Wood, 185 N.C. App. 227, 647 S.E.2d 679 (2007), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 703, - S.E.2d - (2007). We disagree.\nAfter defendant\u2019s brief was filed in the present case, this Court concluded in Wood that, \u201c[w]hile N.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 14-415.1 has characteristics of a recidivist statute, a plain reading of the statute shows it creates a new substantive offense.\u201d Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 236, 647 S.E.2d at 687; see also State v. Bowden, 177 N.C. App. 718, 725, 630 S.E.2d 208, 213 (2006) (\u201cThe mere fact that a statute is directed at recidivism does not prevent the statute from establishing a substantive offense.\u201d). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1 \u201ccreates a substantive offense to which the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies, and not a sentencing requirement aimed at reducing recidivism.\u201d Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 236, 647 S.E.2d at 687. Therefore, we overrule defendant\u2019s assignment of error.\nIII.\nDefendant also contends that his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon subjects him to double jeopardy for his 8 June 2004 felony conviction of fleeing to elude arrest. We disagree.\n\u201cThe Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person shall \u2018be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.\u2019 \u201d State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 578, 599 S.E.2d 515, 534 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 909, 161 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2005) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V; see also N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 19). \u201cThe Clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.\u201d Id.\n\u201c[U]nder N.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 14-415.1, it is the prior conviction that is an element which must be proved by the State.\u201d Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 236, 647 S.E.2d at 687; see also State v. Jeffers, 48 N.C. App. 663, 666, 269 S.E.2d 731, 733-34 (1980) (\u201cA previous conviction for one of a group of enumerated felonies is an essential element of the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, and thus in the absence of a prior conviction, there is no offense at all.\u201d), cert. denied, 301 N.C. 724, 276 S.E.2d 285 (1981). However,,\u201c[w]hile proving the prior conviction will necessarily establish that defendant was guilty of committing the prior crime, N.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 14-415.1 does not impose any punishment solely for defendant\u2019s commission of the prior crime, but instead requires the State further prove the additional element of possession of a firearm.\u201d Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 236, 647 S.E.2d at 687. \u201cThus the prior conviction constitutes a part of an entirely new offense.\u201d Id. \u201cTherefore, defendant\u2019s prior conviction ... is not an \u2018offense\u2019 within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause when construed with his conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon.\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, when defendant \u201cpossessed a firearm in violation of [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1], he was again convicted and pun ished \u2014 not a second time for the ... [8 June 2004 felony conviction of fleeing to elude arrest], but for the first time for this new offense under \u00a7 14-415.1(a).\u201d State v. Crump, 178 N.C. App. 717, 722, 632 S.E.2d 233, 236 (2006) (emphasis added), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 431, 648 S.E.2d 851 (2007); see also Wood, 185 N.C. App. at 236, 647 S.E.2d at 687 (\u201cDefendant was not prosecuted nor punished again for the underlying ... [felony] conviction ...; rather he was convicted and punished for his subsequent act of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.\u201d). Therefore, we again overrule defendant\u2019s assignment of error.\nIV.\nDefendant next asserts as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge in 05 CRS 052926 of driving while license revoked due to the insufficiency of the evidence.\nOur standard of review of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to dismiss is well established. \u201c \u2018When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine whether the prosecution has presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime.\u2019 \u201d State v. Tedder, 169 N.C. App. 446, 450, 610 S.E.2d 774, 777 (2005) (quoting State v. Smith, 357 N.C. 604, 615-16, 588 S.E.2d 453, 461 (2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 941, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004)). \u201c \u2018Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u2019 \u201d Id. The trial court \u201cmust [then] view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [S]tate, giving the [S]tate the benefit of every reasonable inference that might be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673, 681 (1987) (citing State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E.2d 822 (1977)).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-28(a) provides, in part, that \u201cany person whose driver[\u2019]s license has been revoked who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of the State while the license is revoked is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-28(a) (2007). \u201cTo convict a person of the crime of driving with a revoked license, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was on notice that his driver\u2019s license was revoked.\u201d State v. Funchess, 141 N.C. App. 302, 311, 540 S.E.2d 435, 440 (2000); see also State v. Woody, 102 N.C. App. 576, 578, 402 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1991) (\u201cTo sustain the charge against [defendant for driving while license revoked,] the State had to prove that (1) [defendant] operated a motor vehicle, (2) on a public highway, (3) while his operator\u2019s license was suspended or revoked, and (4) had knowledge of the suspension or revocation.\u201d) (emphasis added).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-48(a) provides, in part:\nWhenever the Division [of Motor Vehicles] is authorized or required to give any notice under this Chapter or other law regulating the operation of vehicles, unless a different method of giving such notice is otherwise expressly prescribed, such notice shall be given either by personal delivery thereof to the person to be so notified or by deposit in the United States mail of such notice in an envelope with postage prepaid, addressed to such person at his address as shown by the records of the Division. ... A copy of the Division\u2019s records sent under the authority of this section is admissible as evidence in any court or administrative agency and is sufficient evidence to discharge the burden of the person presenting the record that notice was sent to the person named in the record, at the address indicated in the record, and for the purpose indicated in the record.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-48(a) (2007). Thus, the State satisfies its burden that defendant had knowledge his license was revoked \u201cwhen, nothing else appearing, it has offered evidence of compliance with the notice requirements of G.S. 20-48 because of the presumption that he received notice and had such knowledge.\u201d State v. Chester, 30 N.C. App. 224, 227, 226 S.E.2d 524, 526 (1976).\nIn the present case, the State presented evidence of eighteen official notice letters sent from the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (\u201cDMV\u201d) to defendant between the years of 2001 and 2006, all of which were included in the record on appeal. Each of the letters was addressed to defendant by name and sent to a post office box in Liberty, North Carolina. However, the certified report of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license record indicates defendant\u2019s address as 7922 County Line Road in Liberty, North Carolina, and does not list any other address for defendant. In other words, the \u201caddress as shown by the records of the [DMV]\u201d does not appear to be the address to which the notice of defendant\u2019s license revocation was sent in the present case.\nHowever, in State v. Coltrane, 184 N.C. App. 140, 645 S.E.2d 793 (2007), appeal docketed, No. 348A07 (N.C. July 21, 2007), this defendant similarly argued to this Court that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of driving while license suspended in 04 CRS 58421 due to the insufficiency of the evidence. See Coltrane, 184 N.C. App. at 144, 645 S.E.2d at 795. In that matter, this Court found that the State produced a certified document from an employee of the DMV stating that the employee \u201cdeposited notice of suspension in the United States mail in a postage paid envelope, addressed to the address . . . shown by the records of the Division as defendant\u2019s address.\u201d Id. (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant argued then, as he does now, that the DMV sent the revocation notice to an address different from the address \u201cshown by the records of the [DMV].\u201d See id. However, this Court found that the State \u201craised prima facie presumption of receipt, and defendant was obligated to rebut the presumption.\u201d Id. Since defendant there, as here, \u201cchose not to present any evidence at trial[, this Court concluded that] . . . the presumption was clearly not rebutted,\u201d and held that \u201cthe State met its burden of producing substantial evidence on each element of the crime.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\u201c[A] well-established rule of appellate law . . . [provides that,] \u2018[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u2019 \u201d State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 473, 487, 598 S.E.2d 125, 133 (2004) (quoting In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989)). \u201cWhile... a panel of the Court of Appeals may disagree with, or even find error in, an opinion by a prior panel and may duly note its disagreement or point out that error in its opinion, the panel is bound by that prior decision until it is overturned by a higher court.\u201d Id. at 487, 598 S.E.2d at 134.\nColtrane COA06-895 included a dissenting opinion, thus giving defendant an appeal of right to the Supreme Court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-30 (2007) (\u201c[A]n appeal lies of right to the Supreme Gourt from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case . . . [i]n which there is a dissent.\u201d). Defendant filed his notice of appeal in Coltrane COA06-895 to the Supreme Court on 21 July 2007. Since defendant\u2019s appeal in that case is still pending, the panel in the present case remains bound by the decision of this Court under Coltrane COA06-895 on the issue of whether sufficient evidence was presented by the State to prove the essential elements of driving while license revoked.\nV.\nFinally, defendant requests that the present case be remanded for resentencing if the North Carolina Supreme Court vacates his two prior Class H convictions for felony speeding to elude arrest in Randolph County on 1 February 2006 (04 CRS 058421) and 12 April 2006 (02 CRS 058478), each currently under appeal in the Supreme Court and docketed as 348A07 and 428P07, respectively.\n\u201c \u2018[T]he courts have no jurisdiction to determine matters purely speculative, enter anticipatory judgments, . . . deal with theoretical problems, give advisory opinions,... provide for contingencies which may hereafter arise, or give abstract opinions.\u2019 \u201d In re Wright, 137 N.C. App. 104, 111-12, 527 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2000) (quoting Little v. Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 689, 700 (1960)) (omission in original). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is \u201cnot a question ripe for review because it will arise, if at all, only if\u2019 defendant\u2019s convictions are overturned by the Supreme Court sometime in the future. See Simmons v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 307 N.C. 122, 123, 296 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1982) (per curiam). Therefore, defendant\u2019s arguments are not properly before us and we may not consider them.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by John R Barkley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Anne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFONZA DAWNTA COLTRANE, aka ALFENZA DAWNTA COLTRANE, aka ALFONZ DWANTE COLTRANE\nNo. COA07-486\n(Filed 5 February 2008)\n1. Indictment and Information\u2014 amendment \u2014 date of offense \u2014 not a substantial alteration\nAlteration of an indictment for possession of a firearm by a felon to change the date of the offense did not substantially alter the charge, as the date of the offense is not a substantial element of the charge.\n2. Indictment and Information\u2014 amendment \u2014 possession of firearm by felon \u2014 county of underlying offense\nThe trial court did not err by allowing the State to amend an indictment for possession of a firearm by a felon by changing the county of the underlying felony conviction. The indictment sufficiently notified defendant of the prior felony conviction.\n3. Firearms and Other Weapons\u2014 possession by felon \u2014 new offense\nThe possession of a firearm by a felon statute creates a new substantive offense, even though it is directed at recidivism. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-415.1.\n4. Constitutional Law\u2014 possession of firearm by felon \u2014 not double jeopardy\nA conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon was not double jeopardy. While the prior conviction is a part of the new offense, the punishment is for the new element of possessing a firearm.\n5. Motor Vehicles\u2014 driving with revoked license \u2014 notice of revocation\nThe evidence was sufficient for a charge of driving with a revoked license where the notice of revocation did not go to the address shown for defendant in DMV records. However, pursuant to a prior Court of Appeals opinion, the State raised prima facie evidence of receipt and defendant did not rebut the presumption, so that the evidence was sufficient.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 anticipatory judgment \u2014 not considered\nAn argument that the Court of Appeals should remand defendant\u2019s case for resentencing if the Supreme Court vacates his prior convictions was not ripe for review and was not properly before the Court of Appeals.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 November 2006 by Judge Jerry Cash Martin in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 November 2007.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by John R Barkley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nAnne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0498-01", "first_page_order": 528, "last_page_order": 538 }