{ "id": 4155169, "name": "MICHAEL W. PATRICK, GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF J.D., MINOR CHILD, Plaintiff v. WAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, a North Carolina Agency; MARIA SPAULDING, In Her Official Capacity as Director of Wake County Department of Human Services; JOHN WEBSTER, In His Capacity as Child Protective Services Supervisor for Wake County Department of Human Services; V. ANDERSON KING, In Her Capacity as Child Protective Services Supervisor for Wake County Department of Human Services; Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Patrick v. Wake County Department of Human Services", "decision_date": "2008-02-05", "docket_number": "No. COA07-824", "first_page": "592", "last_page": "598", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 N.C. App. 592" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639270 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798906 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914119 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571908 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2500804, 2502310, 2498824, 2501097, 2497115 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0557-04", "/nc/331/0557-03", "/nc/331/0557-05", "/nc/331/0557-02", "/nc/331/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314228 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267", "parenthetical": "quoting State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoyle, 106 N.C. App. 199, 201-02, 415 S.E.2d 764, 765, disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 557, 417 S.E.2d 803 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 N.C. App. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11865106 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "quoting State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoyle, 106 N.C. App. 199, 201-02, 415 S.E.2d 764, 765, disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 557, 417 S.E.2d 803 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/125/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491483 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564079 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding the purchase of liability insurance does not waive sovereign immunity because the exclusion in the policy excludes coverage for plaintiff s claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9191523 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding the purchase of liability insurance does not waive sovereign immunity because the exclusion in the policy excludes coverage for plaintiff s claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2495648, 2499943, 2496788, 2493082, 2500123 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0634-02", "/nc/327/0634-03", "/nc/327/0634-04", "/nc/327/0634-05", "/nc/327/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524694 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220104, 220114, 220155, 220004 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0284-03", "/nc/355/0284-01", "/nc/355/0284-04", "/nc/355/0284-02" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "127", "parenthetical": "\"[B]ecause the insurance policy does not indemnify defendant against the negligent acts alleged in plaintiffs complaint, defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433222 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551263 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 1221548 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/259/0447-02" ] }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538080, 2538689, 2537376, 2537868, 2537009 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0615-05", "/nc/336/0615-01", "/nc/336/0615-04", "/nc/336/0615-02", "/nc/336/0615-03" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523743 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212179 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "internal citations and quotations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 744, "char_count": 14603, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8920600801735802e-07, "percentile": 0.7291096894066025 }, "sha256": "64906691ce30a609c98fa1d3ee76ba7a7b077b3ceef8143e94ef923495b636d1", "simhash": "1:553866ba06592e04", "word_count": 2255 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:30.605877+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges JACKSON- and ARROWOOD concur." ], "parties": [ "MICHAEL W. PATRICK, GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF J.D., MINOR CHILD, Plaintiff v. WAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, a North Carolina Agency; MARIA SPAULDING, In Her Official Capacity as Director of Wake County Department of Human Services; JOHN WEBSTER, In His Capacity as Child Protective Services Supervisor for Wake County Department of Human Services; V. ANDERSON KING, In Her Capacity as Child Protective Services Supervisor for Wake County Department of Human Services; Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nJ.D., through her Guardian ad litem Michael Patrick (\u201cplaintiff\u2019), appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting Wake County Department of Human Services, Maria Spaulding, John Webster, and V. Anderson King\u2019s (collectively \u201cdefendants\u201d) motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel discovery. We affirm.\nI. Background\nOn 23 August 2001, a physician reported a case of suspected child abuse to defendants regarding J.D., a twelve year old girl, by James McDaniel Webb (\u201cWebb\u201d). The physician stated to defendants that Webb had contacted his office to inquire about a possible castration because he was having inappropriate sexual thoughts about J.D. The physician gave defendants J.D.\u2019s name and Webb\u2019s name, address, and telephone number.\nOn 24 August 2001, defendants opened an investigation regarding the 23 August report. On 26 August 2001, a caseworker conducted a home visit and interviewed Webb and J.D. During the home visit, Webb stated to the caseworker that he was single and in the process of adopting J.D.\nOn 28 August 2001, a second physician contacted defendants concerning J.D. Plaintiff alleged the second physician told defendants that Webb became upset when the physician conducted a full physical examination of J.D. and Webb stated to the physician that J.D. had a history of reporting sexual abuse. Defendants denied they were given Webb\u2019s name in the second report. In January 2002, the investigation was closed as unsubstantiated. From November 2001 to January 2003, Webb repeatedly sexually assaulted J.D. In January 2003, Webb was arrested and charged with numerous counts of sexual assault.\nOn 25 August 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants alleging negligence, institutional negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged defendants had failed to properly and thoroughly investigate two separate and independent reports of suspected child abuse of J.D. by Webb.\nOn 17 October 2006, defendants filed their answer and asserted as their fifth defense: \u201c[a]ll claims of Plaintiff against all Defendants are barred by sovereign immunity as there has been no waiver of immunity by the purchase of insurance.\u201d Defendants also filed and served a motion asserting entitlement to summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity. Additionally, defendants filed and served a motion for protective order and objection to discovery until final disposition of their motion for summary judgment. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery responses and gave notice of deposition.\nOn 23 March 2007, the trial court entered an order: (1) granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment; (2) granting defendants\u2019 motion for protective order; and (3) denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel. Plaintiff appeals.\nII.Issues\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred by: (1) granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity and (2) denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel discovery and to continue the summary judgment hearing.\nIII.Motion to Dismiss\nDefendants moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal for failure to comply with the provisions of Rules 28 and 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Plaintiff subsequently obtained leave to file and filed an amended brief which corrected the prior rule violations. In our discretion, we decline to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s appeal and review the merits of the case.\nIV.Summary Judgment, and Motion to Comnel\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. We disagree.\nA. Standards of Review\n1. Summary Judgment\nSummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The party moving for summary judgment ultimately has the burden of establishing the lack of any triable issue of fact.\nA defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by (1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff\u2019s case is nonexistent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense. Summary judgment is not appropriate where matters of credibility and determining the weight of the evidence exist.\nOnce the party seeking summary judgment makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating specific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that he can at least establish a prima facie case at trial.\nWe review an order allowing summary judgment de novo. If the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\nWilkins v. Safran, 185 N.C. App. 668, 672, 649 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).\n2. Motion to Compel\n\u201cWhether or not the party\u2019s motion to compel discovery should be granted or denied is within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Wagoner v. Elkin City Schools\u2019 Bd. of Education, 113 N.C. App. 579, 585, 440 S.E.2d 119, 123, disc. rev. denied, 336 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 414 (1994). A trial court\u2019s actions constitute an abuse of discretion \u201cupon a showing that a court\u2019s actions \u2018are manifestly unsupported by reason\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018so arbitrary that [they] could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503, 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (quoting White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985)).\nB. Sovereign Immunity\nPlaintiff argues defendants\u2019 purchase of liability coverage partially waived its sovereign immunity and the trial court erred by granting defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment based on this defense. We disagree.\n\u201cSovereign immunity bars claims brought against the state or its counties, where the entity sued is being sued for the performance of a governmental, rather than a proprietary, function.\u201d Doe v. Jenkins, 144 N.C. App. 131, 134, 547 S.E.2d 124, 126 (2001) (internal citation and quotation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 284, 560 S.E.2d 799 (2002). This Court has established that \u201c[investigations by a social service agency of allegations of child sexual abuse are in the nature of governmental functions .... Thus a county normally would be immune from liability for injuries caused by negligent social services employees working in the course of their duties.\u201d Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. App. 693, 699, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235, disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 634, 399 S.E.2d 121 (1990).\nSovereign immunity may be waived by the purchase of liability insurance. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-435 (2005) (\u201cPurchase of insurance pursuant to this subsection waives the county\u2019s governmental immunity, to the extent of insurance coverage, for any act or omission occurring in the exercise of a governmental function.\u201d). A governmental entity does not waive sovereign immunity if the action brought against them is excluded from coverage under their insurance policy. See Norton v. SMC Bldg. Inc., 156 N.C. App. 564, 577 S.E.2d 310 (2003) (holding the purchase of liability insurance does not waive sovereign immunity because the exclusion in the policy excludes coverage for plaintiff s claim); Doe, 144 N.C. App. at 135, 547 S.E.2d at 127 (\u201c[B]ecause the insurance policy does not indemnify defendant against the negligent acts alleged in plaintiffs complaint, defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity . . . .\u201d). Further, \u201c[wjaiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.\u201d Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983).\nHere, defendants acknowledge the purchase of liability insurance, but argue the policy excludes any coverage for plaintiffs claim of negligence and negligent infliction of, emotional distress. Defendants\u2019 liability insurance policy includes a provision titled \u201cGovernmental Immunity Endorsement.\u201d This provision states:\nThis policy is not intended by the insured to waive its governmental immunity as allowed by North Carolina General Statutes Sec. 153A-435. Accordingly, subject to this policy and the Limits of Liability shown on the Declarations, this policy provides coverage only for occurrences or wrongful acts for which the defense of governmental immunity is clearly not applicable or for which, after the defenses is asserted, a court of competent jurisdiction determines the defense of governmental immunity not to be applicable.\n(Emphasis supplied).\nC. Construing Insurance Policies\nPlaintiff argues the language of the endorsement does not expressly and unambiguously exclude or limit coverage. We disagree.\n\u201cOur courts have long followed the traditional rules of contract construction when interpreting insurance policies.\u201d Dawes v. Nash County, 357 N.C. 442, 448, 584 S.E.2d 760, 764 (2003) (citation omitted). \u201cIf the language in an exclusionary clause contained in a policy is ambiguous, the clause is \u2018to be strictly construed in favor of coverage.\u2019 \u201d Daniel v. City of Morganton, 125 N.C. App. 47, 53, 479 S.E.2d 263, 267 (1997) (quoting State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoyle, 106 N.C. App. 199, 201-02, 415 S.E.2d 764, 765, disc. rev. denied, 331 N.C. 557, 417 S.E.2d 803 (1992)). \u201cIf the meaning of the policy is clear and only one reasonable interpretation exists, the courts must enforce the contract as written; they may not, under the guise of construing an ambiguous term, rewrite the contract or impose liabilities on the parties not bargained for and found therein.\u201d Dawes, 357 N.C. at 449, 584 S.E.2d at 764 (citation and quotation omitted).\nHere, defendants\u2019 insurance policy unambiguously states, \u201cthis policy provides coverage only for occurrences or wrongful acts for which the defense of governmental immunity is clearly not applicable . ...\u201d A county is immune from liability for injuries caused by negligent social services employees working in the course of their duties absent a waiver of that immunity. Hare, 99 N.C. App. at 699, 394 S.E.2d at 235. Furthermore, \u201can action against government personnel in their official capacities is one against the State for the purpose of applying the doctrine of sovereign immunity.\u201d Id. at 701, 394 S.E.2d at 237 (citation omitted). Defendants\u2019 insurance policy excludes coverage for plaintiff\u2019s action for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants did not waive sovereign immunity through the purchase of this policy and properly asserted this affirmative defense in their answer. The defense of sovereign immunity clearly applies to bar plaintiff\u2019s claims. The trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. This assignment of error is overruled.\nD. Motion to Compel Discovery\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erred by denying its motion to compel discovery and to continue the summary judgment hearing. We disagree.\n\u201cOrdinarily it is error for a court to hear and rule on a motion for summary judgment when discovery procedures, which might lead to the production of evidence relevant to the motion, are still pending and the party seeking discovery has not been dilatory in doing so.\u201d Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 512, 256 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1979). However, \u201c[a] trial court is not barred in every case from granting summary judgment before discovery is completed.\u201d N.C. Council of Churches v. State of North Carolina, 120 N.C. App. 84, 92, 461 S.E.2d 354, 360 (1995), aff\u2019d, 343 N.C. 117, 468 S.E.2d 58 (1996).\nBecause we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, it is unnecessary to address plaintiff\u2019s assertion that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff\u2019s motion to compel discovery.\nV. Conclusion\nDefendants did not waive the asserted affirmative defense of sovereign immunity. Plaintiff\u2019s claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress brought against defendants are excluded from coverage under their insurance policy. The trial court properly granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nIn light of our decision, it is unnecessary to examine plaintiff\u2019s remaining assignment of error regarding the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion to compel discovery. The trial court\u2019s order is affirmed.\nAlthough this Court holds that plaintiff is legally barred from asserting this action against defendants based on sovereign immunity, we express grave concern over defendants\u2019 alleged lack of investigation into and monitoring of independent reports by two medical doctors occurring within days of each other alleging sexual abuse against a child. Allowing a minor child to remain in the unsubstantiated custody of a single adult, who had no known relationship to the child and who was an alleged convicted felon, in light of such reports is an egregious failure to act in the best interest of the child.\nAffirmed.\nJudges JACKSON- and ARROWOOD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Holtkamp Law Firm, by Lynne M. Holtkamp, plaintiff-appellant.", "Wake County Attorney\u2019s Office, by Scott W. Warren and Corinne G. Russell, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MICHAEL W. PATRICK, GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE OF J.D., MINOR CHILD, Plaintiff v. WAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, a North Carolina Agency; MARIA SPAULDING, In Her Official Capacity as Director of Wake County Department of Human Services; JOHN WEBSTER, In His Capacity as Child Protective Services Supervisor for Wake County Department of Human Services; V. ANDERSON KING, In Her Capacity as Child Protective Services Supervisor for Wake County Department of Human Services; Defendants\nNo. COA07-824\n(Filed 5 February 2008)\nImmunity\u2014 sovereign \u2014 insurance policy exclusions \u2014 negligence and emotional distress\nSummary judgment was properly granted for defendant county department of human services based on sovereign immunity in a negligence and emotional distress action arising from defendant\u2019s alleged failure to investigate reports of sexual abuse of a child. Defendants\u2019 insurance policy excluded claims for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress and so did not waive immunity.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 23 March 2007 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 January 2008.\nHoltkamp Law Firm, by Lynne M. Holtkamp, plaintiff-appellant.\nWake County Attorney\u2019s Office, by Scott W. Warren and Corinne G. Russell, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0592-01", "first_page_order": 622, "last_page_order": 628 }