{ "id": 4156256, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LENAIR CAMPBELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Campbell", "decision_date": "2008-02-19", "docket_number": "No. COA07-903", "first_page": "701", "last_page": "712", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "188 N.C. App. 701" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634843 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "\"Any subject, however, that is open to reasonable debate is not appropriate for judicial notice.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638933 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e find probable cause based on the same factors in which we found reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory seizure.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/647/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 940", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 353383, 353703, 351911, 351755, 353869, 354797, 354381, 354546, 354291, 352566, 353431, 354873, 351866, 352734 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/0940-12", "/us/535/0940-09", "/us/535/0940-01", "/us/535/0940-13", "/us/535/0940-11", "/us/535/0940-04", "/us/535/0940-05", "/us/535/0940-02", "/us/535/0940-14", "/us/535/0940-06", "/us/535/0940-07", "/us/535/0940-03", "/us/535/0940-10", "/us/535/0940-08" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 973", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5881665, 5967938, 5896547, 5942565, 5869029, 3435079, 5878790, 5870342, 5902859, 5936622, 5878321, 5901688, 5925914, 5910459, 5869181, 5968479 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0973-12", "/us/543/0973-02", "/us/543/0973-11", "/us/543/0973-03", "/us/543/0973-13", "/us/543/0973-16", "/us/543/0973-10", "/us/543/0973-01", "/us/543/0973-04", "/us/543/0973-08", "/us/543/0973-07", "/us/543/0973-14", "/us/543/0973-15", "/us/543/0973-09", "/us/543/0973-05", "/us/543/0973-06" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1069", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4832, 5057, 5314, 5251, 5282, 4931, 5063, 5001, 5101, 5042, 4819, 5138, 5335, 4792, 5208 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1069-15", "/us/494/1069-04", "/us/494/1069-12", "/us/494/1069-06", "/us/494/1069-09", "/us/494/1069-13", "/us/494/1069-10", "/us/494/1069-02", "/us/494/1069-11", "/us/494/1069-05", "/us/494/1069-01", "/us/494/1069-07", "/us/494/1069-08", "/us/494/1069-03", "/us/494/1069-14" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600288, 600321, 601442, 600551, 602025, 600394, 599818, 599501, 600856, 599603, 600212, 601110, 600024, 600824 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0965-07", "/us/484/0965-09", "/us/484/0965-14", "/us/484/0965-10", "/us/484/0965-03", "/us/484/0965-06", "/us/484/0965-04", "/us/484/0965-12", "/us/484/0965-11", "/us/484/0965-13", "/us/484/0965-01", "/us/484/0965-02", "/us/484/0965-05", "/us/484/0965-08" ] }, { "cite": "610 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632550 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/610/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3801765, 3804487, 3799722, 12632555, 12632556, 3798897, 12632561, 3803379, 3804087, 3795738, 3799903 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0283-05", "/nc/359/0283-08", "/nc/359/0283-07", "/se2d/610/0375-01", "/se2d/610/0375-02", "/nc/359/0283-04", "/se2d/610/0377-02", "/nc/359/0283-06", "/nc/359/0283-03", "/nc/359/0283-01", "/nc/359/0283-02" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639271 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669", "parenthetical": "holding that proximity to a crime scene, without more, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637747, 12637748 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0059-01", "/se2d/640/0059-02" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636088 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9788992, 9787808, 9789122, 9788188, 9787934, 9788430, 9788718, 9787538, 9789235, 9788565, 9788309, 9788053, 9788860, 9787676, 9787422 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1167-13", "/us/531/1167-04", "/us/531/1167-14", "/us/531/1167-07", "/us/531/1167-05", "/us/531/1167-09", "/us/531/1167-11", "/us/531/1167-02", "/us/531/1167-15", "/us/531/1167-10", "/us/531/1167-08", "/us/531/1167-06", "/us/531/1167-12", "/us/531/1167-03", "/us/531/1167-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634615 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9783616, 9783489, 9784512, 9784931, 9785068, 9784364, 9784238, 9784782, 9785236, 9783863, 9783992, 9784122, 9784638 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1165-02", "/us/531/1165-01", "/us/531/1165-08", "/us/531/1165-11", "/us/531/1165-12", "/us/531/1165-07", "/us/531/1165-06", "/us/531/1165-10", "/us/531/1165-13", "/us/531/1165-03", "/us/531/1165-04", "/us/531/1165-05", "/us/531/1165-09" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 464", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352433 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "\"Any subject, however, that is open to reasonable debate is not appropriate for judicial notice.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0464-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 A. 439", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1903, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 A. 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1902, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.W.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665-66", "parenthetical": "\"The ordinary and common usage of the word 'vicinity' is a relative term, synonymous with such words as 'neighborhood', 'community' or 'locality', 'not remote', 'nearness', and describes a state of being near.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot, ' even if the officer lacks probable cause.\" (emphasis added" }, { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot, ' even if the officer lacks probable cause.\" (emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 F. Supp. 1294", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7397049 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/722/1294-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959006 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8187030 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e find probable cause based on the same factors in which we found reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory seizure.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561037 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564851 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 N.C. App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552821 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/13/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-55", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 L. Ed. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138343 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 L. Ed. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 F.3d 942", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9270280 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/363/0942-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "889 F.2d 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3475958, 10527975 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "\"The amount of force used to carry out the stop and search must be reasonable, but may include using handcuffs or forcing the detainee to lie down to prevent flight.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/281/0266-01", "/f2d/889/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "925 P.2d 1347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1505971 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1351" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/186/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 L. Ed. 2d 1129", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "550 U.S. 956", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "458 F.3d 1295", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3386660 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1306", "parenthetical": "listing examples from the Eleventh Circuit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/458/1295-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 L. Ed. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "549 U.S. 1272", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 F.3d 903", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3463808 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "listing examples from the Eighth Circuit when handcuffs were permitted in investigative detentions" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/462/0903-01" ] }, { "cite": "924 A.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 4111563 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/399/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 U.S. 491", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6195479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/460/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831", "parenthetical": "citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9368144 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "817 F.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1670951 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1106" }, { "page": "1108", "parenthetical": "\"The circumstances surrounding the stop support the officer's belief that a further frisk for weapons was warranted. The hour was late, the street was dark, the officer was alone, and the suspected crime was a burglary, a felony that often involves the use of weapons.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/817/1105-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920", "parenthetical": "approximately 1:35 a.m." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574927 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "approximately 1:35 a.m." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S.W.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8511777 ], "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844", "parenthetical": "\"The word 'vicinity' is a relative term, and there is nothing erroneous or inaccurate in referring to a spring or a home situated two miles from a railroad station as being in the vicinity of such station.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn-app/21/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132206, 132024, 132216, 132057, 132222 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0846-01", "/nc/350/0846-03", "/nc/350/0846-05", "/nc/350/0846-02", "/nc/350/0846-04" ] }, { "cite": "513 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 N.C. App. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435754 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/144/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9108176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "\"The court's evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the 'totality of the circumstances,' as our cases have understood that phrase.\"" }, { "page": "750", "parenthetical": "\"The court's evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the 'totality of the circumstances,' as our cases have understood that phrase.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18", "parenthetical": "noting that \"activity at an unusual hour\" may be considered but is not sufficient by itself to establish reasonable suspicion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8995726 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "noting that \"activity at an unusual hour\" may be considered but is not sufficient by itself to establish reasonable suspicion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154860 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "holding that proximity to a crime scene, without more, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "labeling 3:00 a.m. an \"unusual hour\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3742650, 3740178, 3737844, 3741058 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0177-02", "/nc/361/0177-04", "/nc/361/0177-01", "/nc/361/0177-03" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8377534 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685065 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352074 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 992", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "532 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "502", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685022 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "498-99" }, { "page": "498-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1283, "char_count": 29775, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.091536381751845e-07, "percentile": 0.8586684011307223 }, "sha256": "50ea5f3dbf5f12c7f7568284211c7c5df507f1ea7eeed050745a79a12f9adc36", "simhash": "1:6ff26c4a76f7ad64", "word_count": 4857 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:34:30.605877+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LENAIR CAMPBELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nAnthony Lenair Campbell (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from his convictions entered upon guilty pleas for possession of burglary tools and possession of drug paraphernalia. Specifically, he appeals from an order of the trial court denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nAt approximately 3:40 a.m. on 24 July 2006, Officer Thomas Coyle (\u201cOfficer Coyle\u201d) of the Carrboro Police Department responded to a report of a breaking and entering in progress at 109 South Peak Drive in Carrboro, North Carolina. Coyle was the first to respond and arrived within three minutes of the call. While driving toward the location of the alleged breaking and entering, Officer Coyle turned onto Old Pittsboro Road and observed someone riding a bicycle on the road. Old Pittsboro Road does not intersect with South Peak Drive, but is connected to it via Daffodil Lane, and Officer Coyle testified that Old Pittsboro Road is \u201cclose\u201d to South Peak Drive. Officer Coyle observed that the rear of the bicycle had a flashing red light. At the time, Officer Coyle and the bicycle rider were within a quarter of a mile of the location of the alleged breaking and entering, and the trial court found that the bicyclist \u201cwas in the vicinity of 109 S[outh] Peak Drive.\u201d Officer Coyle did not observe anyone else in the area. He radioed other officers about the bicycle rider \u201c[i]n case that person may be involved with the breaking and entering,\u201d and proceeded to the house at 109 South Peak Drive. During his investigation at the residence at 109 South Peak Drive, Officer Coyle observed that a window had been opened with \u201ca small, flathead screwdriver or a pry tool,\u201d and he notified other officers of that information.\nOfficer Michelle Gandy (\u201cOfficer Gandy\u201d) of the Carrboro Police Department testified that she was on patrol in her police vehicle when she responded to the call concerning the alleged breaking and entering in progress at 109 South Peak Drive. Officer Gandy also received Officer Coyle\u2019s call concerning the bicyclist, and she observed defendant riding on a bicycle and turning from Old Pittsboro Road onto South Greensboro Street. Defendant had an illuminated light on his cap, and the bicycle had a headlight and two flashing rear reflectors. Officer Gandy testified that she recognized defendant \u201cby face[,] not name.\u201d Officer Gandy drove past defendant, turned around, drove back past defendant, and pulled off the road into a parking lot. Officer Gandy watched as defendant took a right turn onto the uphill on-ramp of Highway 54 West Bypass. Defendant stopped at the top of hill, and Officer Gandy turned on her overhead lights and spotlights. She observed that defendant was wearing a backpack and was \u201cplaying with something in his backpack.\u201d Officer Gandy testified that she stopped defendant because he was \u201ccoming from the area that the burglary came out of.\u201d\nAs defendant stood with his bicycle, Officer Gandy exited her vehicle and approached defendant. Officer Gandy asked defendant for his name and identification, and he complied. Lieutenant Rodney Taylor (\u201cLieutenant Taylor\u201d) of the Carrboro Police Department then arrived at the scene. Lieutenant Taylor recognized defendant and \u201cknew that he had an extensive history of breaking and enterings [sic] and crimes of that nature as well as being a substance abuser.\u201d Officer Gandy asked defendant \u201cwhere he was coming from,\u201d and defendant replied that he was coming from a friend\u2019s house on Laurel Avenue. Officer Gandy was aware that Laurel Avenue is off of Jones Ferry Road.\nOfficer Gandy asked defendant to step off of the bicycle, and Lieutenant Taylor instructed Officer Gandy to place defendant in investigative detention because he knew defendant had \u201crun before and things of that nature.\u201d Officer Gandy and defendant walked to the front of the patrol car, where she handcuffed him and frisked him for \u201cofficer safety.\u201d Officer Gandy testified that defendant had not done anything to make her feel nervous or scared, but noted that defendant could have been \u201ccarrying anything from a pen that has a knife enclosed in it to a small handgun.\u201d Lieutenant Taylor moved defendant\u2019s bicycle off of the road, and during the frisk, \u201cOfficer Coyle advised [Officer Gandy] and Lieutenant Taylor that it appeared that some type of screwdriver had been used to pry the window open.\u201d Officer Gandy noticed that defendant was wearing two pairs of shorts \u2014 a \u201csports\u201d pair on top without pockets and another pair underneath that had pockets. She felt items in his pockets and asked what they were. Defendant told Officer Gandy to take the items out, and Officer Gandy observed that the items were \u201c[a] small flashlight and a Swiss Army-type knife.\u201d No evidence was introduced about the size or shape of the knife, or whether or not the instrument could have be used for prying, but Officer Gandy testified that she \u201cbelieved that he [defendant] could have used at least part of that Swiss Army knife to open that window.\u201d Upon Lieutenant Taylor\u2019s instruction, Officer Gandy placed defendant under arrest. While conducting a search incident to arrest, Lieutenant Taylor found in defendant\u2019s backpack \u201c[a] lot of different things from jewelry to tools.\u201d Specifically, the officers seized from the backpack multiple tools, two crack pipes, rolling papers, a crowbar, and screwdrivers.\nOn 30 October 2006, defendant was indicted for first-degree burglary, possession of burglary tools, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized during his arrest, and on 15 December 2006, the trial court entered an order denying his motion. Defendant gave notice of his intent to appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant then pled guilty to possession of burglary tools and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court consolidated the convictions and sentenced defendant as a prior record level IV offender to seven to nine months imprisonment.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion on the grounds that (1) Officer Gandy stopped defendant without reasonable suspicion in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the officers unreasonably seized and searched defendant after they stopped him in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) the officers arrested defendant without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.\n\u201cIt is well established that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting State v. Brewington, 352 N.C. 489, 498, 532 S.E.2d 496, 501 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992 (2001)). In addition, findings of fact to which defendant failed to assign error are binding on appeal. See State v. Lacey, 175 N.C. App. 370, 376, 623 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2006). \u201c \u2018Once this Court concludes that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the evidence, then this Court\u2019s next task \u201cis to determine whether the trial court\u2019s conclusion[s] of law [are] supported by the findings.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Brewington, 352 N.C. at 498-99, 532 S.E.2d at 502 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 237, 536 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2001)). \u201c[T]he trial court\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and must be legally correct.\u201d State v. Pickard, 178 N.C. App. 330, 334, 631 S.E.2d 203, 206, appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 177, 640 S.E.2d 59 (2006).\nDefendant first contends that the evidence should have been suppressed because Officer Gandy lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. We disagree.\nThe Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1994). This protection \u201capplies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory detentions.\u201d Id. As our Supreme Court has explained,\n[o]nly unreasonable investigatory stops are unconstitutional. An investigatory stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.\nA court must consider the totality of the circumstances \u2014 the whole picture [ \u2014 ] in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists. The stop must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training. The only requirement is a minimal level of objective justification, something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch.\nId. at 441-42, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is well-settled that the standard for reasonable suspicion is \u201cless demanding than that for probable cause.\u201d Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 10.\nIn the instant case, defendant contends that he was stopped without reasonable suspicion and offers various factors tending to diminish the State\u2019s assertion of reasonable suspicion. Specifically, defendant contends that the evidence demonstrates that (1) Officer Gandy had received no specific information about the alleged burglar or burglary; (2) defendant\u2019s conduct and appearance were not suspicious or unusual, and he would not have had so many lights on his bicycle if he had just committed a burglary; (3) the location was not in a high-crime, suspicious, or isolated area; (4) defendant\u2019s reaction was not suspicious, and he did hot attempt to avoid the police; and (5) Officer Gandy recognized defendant\u2019s face but there is no evidence that Officer Gandy knew any specifics about defendant or his prior criminal record. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact include some of these factors, and the record supports several of the other factors asserted by defendant. The record also includes facts not specifically found by the trial court that would tend to support a showing of reasonable suspicion. For example, before Officer Gandy stopped defendant, he had stopped on the highway on-ramp and was \u201cplaying with something in his backpack\u201d until \u201che turned around and looked at [Officer Gandy].\u201d Such activity \u2014 particularly when viewed in connection with the time of day, absence of other persons in the area, and proximity to the scene of the crime \u2014 could be considered suspicious. Nevertheless, this Court\u2019s task is not to review the record de novo for every fact that may tend to support or defeat a showing of reasonable suspicion. Instead, our role is simply to determine whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether those findings support the court\u2019s conclusions of law. See Brewington, 352 N.C. at 498-99, 532 S.E.2d at 502.\nDefendant attempts to refute the facts found by the trial court that tend to support a finding of reasonable suspicion, to wit: (1) proximity to the alleged burglary; (2) time of day; and (3) the absence of any other persons in the area.\nFirst, defendant argues that proximity to a crime scene, time of day, and the absence of other persons in the vicinity of a crime scene are insufficient, in and of themselves, to establish reasonable suspicion. We agree. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 186 N.C. App. 100, 107, 649 S.E.2d 664, 669 (2007) (holding that proximity to a crime scene, without more, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion); State v. Blackstock, 165 N.C. App. 50, 58, 598 S.E.2d 412, 417-18 (2004) (noting that \u201cactivity at an unusual hour\u201d may be considered but is not sufficient by itself to establish reasonable suspicion), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005).\nHowever, it is well-settled that factors supporting reasonable suspicion are not to be viewed in isolation. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 750 (2002) (\u201cThe court\u2019s evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the \u2018totality of the circumstances,\u2019 as our cases have understood that phrase.\u201d). The proximity to a crime scene, the time of day, or the absence of other persons in and of themselves may be insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but taken together, such factors certainly may suffice. See State v. Crenshaw, 144 N.C. App. 574, 577, 551 S.E.2d 147, 150 (2001) (\u201c [Individually, any of the factors cited [in articulating reasonable suspicion] might not justify a search, but one cannot piecemeal this analysis. One piece of sand may not make a beach, but courts will not be made to look at each grain in isolation and conclude there is no seashore.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\nDefendant next argues that he was seen approximately a quarter of a mile away from, as opposed to at or immediately near, 109 South Peak Drive. Defendant, therefore, contends that the trial court\u2019s findings that he was seen \u201cin the vicinity of 109 South Peak Drive\u201d and \u201ccoming from the area of the burglary\u201d are not supported by the evidence. \u201cVicinity,\u201d however, is a relative term, and under the circumstances of this case, the trial court\u2019s use of the word \u201cvicinity\u201d to describe a distance of a quarter of a mile is not unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. Reaves, 132 N.C. App. 615, 617, 513 S.E.2d 562, 564 (using the word \u201cvicinity\u201d to describe a distance of one-half mile), disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 846, 539 S.E.2d 4 (1999); see also Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Sutton, 104 S.W.2d 834, 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936) (\u201cThe word \u2018vicinity\u2019 is a relative term, and there is nothing erroneous or inaccurate in referring to a spring or a home situated two miles from a railroad station as being in the vicinity of such station.\u201d). Furthermore, although the evidence does not establish that defendant was seen coming from 109 South Peak Drive, the evidence does demonstrate that defendant was seen \u201ccoming from the area\u201d of 109 South Peak Drive. Defendant was riding on Old Pittsboro Road\u2014 which Officer Coyle described as \u201cclose\u201d to South Peak Drive \u2014 in a direction heading away from South Peak Drive. Defendant\u2019s contention that he \u201cwas no more \u2018coming from\u2019 South Peak Drive than he was coming from any other location in Carrboro\u201d is without merit.\nDefendant also attempts to diminish the significance of the time of the stop. Specifically, defendant contends in his brief that \u201c[r]iding a bicycle at 3:40 a.m. in Carrboro, especially on a late summer night in clear weather, is not suspicious,\u201d and in his reply brief, defendant argues that \u201c[e]veryone knows this hour is not unusually late in Carrboro. Further the stop occurred on a July summer night in clear weather, a perfect time for a bicycle ride home in this late-night bohemian college town.\u201d However, defendant\u2019s description of Carrboro in the early morning hours is belied by the trial court\u2019s finding of fact, to which defendant did not assign error, that \u201cOfficer Coyle observed no one else in the vicinity of 109 S[outh] Peak Drive at that time.\u201d (Emphasis added). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has described a similar time of day as \u201can unusual hour for persons to be going about their business.\u201d State v. Rinck, 303 N.C. 551, 560, 280 S.E.2d 912, 920 (1981) (approximately 1:35 a.m.); see also Watkins, 337 N.C. at 442, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (labeling 3:00 a.m. an \u201cunusual hour\u201d).\nFinally, defendant contends that the \u201cofficers\u2019 failure to see anyone else in the vicinity is not [a] reasonable justification to stop defendant.\u201d Although this factor alone may not be a sufficient justification for a stop, the absence of other individuals in the vicinity is a valid factor for officers to use in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to stop an individual. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1106 (4th Cir.) (noting that \u201c[t]he area was otherwise deserted.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 98 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1987).\nAccordingly, contrary to defendant\u2019s contentions, the trial court\u2019s findings \u2014 specifically, with respect to his proximity to 109 South Peak Drive, the time of day, and the absence of other persons in the area \u2014 are supported by competent evidence. These findings, in turn, support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported Officer Gandy\u2019s stop of defendant. Therefore, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the evidence should have been suppressed because, even assuming that Officer Gandy had reasonable suspicion to stop him, Officer Gandy and Lieutenant Taylor escalated the stop and unreasonably seized and searched him without justification. We disagree.\nDuring an investigative stop, the investigative methods employed by police should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See State v. Allison, 148 N.C. App. 702, 706, 559 S.E.2d 828, 831 (2002) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983)). Nevertheless, when conducting investigative stops, police officers are \u201cauthorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.\u201d Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 616. As Maryland\u2019s high court recently noted,\nthe permissible scope of a Terry stop has expanded in the past few decades, allowing police officers to neutralize dangerous suspects during an investigative detention using measures of force such as placing handcuffs on suspects, placing the suspect in the back of police cruisers, drawing weapons, and other forms of force typically used during an arrest. .\nLongshore v. State, 924 A.2d 1129, 1142 (Md. 2007); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 907 (8th Cir. 2006) (listing examples from the Eighth Circuit when handcuffs were permitted in investigative detentions), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1272, 167 L. Ed. 2d 241 (2007); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) (listing examples from the Eleventh Circuit), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 956, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1129 (2007).\nIn the instant case, the trial court found that there were \u201cprior occasions in which the Defendant had fled from law enforcement.\u201d This finding is supported by Lieutenant Taylor\u2019s testimony that he recognized defendant and believed that defendant posed a risk of flight. Specifically, Lieutenant Taylor testified, \u201cI know that he [defendant] has run before and things of that nature.\u201d Further, although defendant cooperated with Officer Gandy and Lieutenant Taylor, his cooperation did not necessarily eliminate the risk of flight. See State v. Blackmore, 925 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Ariz. 1996) (declining to find \u201cthat defendant\u2019s subsequent cooperation should have dispelled any reasonable concerns that he posed a flight risk\u201d and further noting that, as in the instant case, \u201c[t]he burglary victims had not seen the perpetrator and therefore did not know if he or she was armed. As a result, [the investigating officer] could not know whether defendant, whom he reasonably suspected of committing the burglary, was armed.\u201d). By handcuffing defendant, Officer Gandy and Lieutenant Taylor sought \u201cto maintain the status quo\u201d of the situation, Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 616, and therefore, their handcuffing of defendant was reasonable under the circumstances. See United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (\u201cThe amount of force used to carry out the stop and search must be reasonable, but may include using handcuffs or forcing the detainee to lie down to prevent flight.\u201d), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1069, 108 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1990); accord United States v. Nava, 363 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 973, 160 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2004).\nIn addition to the use of handcuffs, we hold that the officers were justified in frisking defendant based upon the late hour and the nature of the crime committed. See Moore, 817 F.2d at 1108 (\u201cThe circumstances surrounding the stop support the officer\u2019s belief that a further frisk for weapons was warranted. The hour was late, the street was dark, the officer was alone, and the suspected crime was a burglary, a felony that often involves the use of weapons.\u201d). As Officer Gandy noted, although defendant may not have displayed a weapon, he could have been \u201ccarrying anything from a pen that has a knife enclosed in it to a small handgun.\u201d Therefore, the frisk was justified based upon the circumstances with which Officer Gandy and Lieutenant Taylor were presented.\nAccordingly, the trial court\u2019s conclusion that, \u201cfor officer safety,\u201d the officers were justified in temporarily detaining and frisking defendant was supported by the findings of fact, which, in turn, were supported by the evidence. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error, therefore, is overruled.\nFinally, defendant argues that even if Officer Gandy had reasonable suspicion to stop him and even if the detention and search were reasonable, Officer Gandy lacked probable cause to arrest him for possession of burglary tools. We disagree.\nAs our Supreme Court has explained,\n[p]robable cause for an arrest has been defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the accused to be guilty. To establish probable cause the evidence need not amount to proof of guilt, or even to prima facie evidence of guilt, but it must be such as would actuate a reasonable man acting in good faith. Probable cause deals with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.\nState v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 10, 550 S.E.2d 482, 488 (2001) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 152 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2002).\nPursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-55, \u201c[i]f any person . . . shall be found having in his possession, without lawful excuse, any picklock, key, bit, or other implement of housebreaking . . . , such person shall be punished as a Class I felon.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-55 (2005). \u201cThe essential elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged are (1) the possession of an implement of housebreaking (2) without lawful excuse, and the State has the burden of proving both of these elements.\u201d State v. Stockton, 13 N.C. App. 287, 290, 185 S.E.2d 459, 461-62 (1971). Although the statute \u201cdoes not require proof of any specific intent to.break into a particular building at a particular time and place,\u201d the statute does require \u201cthat the defendant possessed the article in question with a general intent to use it at some time for the purpose of facilitating a breaking.\u201d State v. Bagley, 300 N.C. 736, 740-41, 268 S.E.2d 77, 79-80 (1980).\nIn the case sub judice, Officer Gandy testified that during the Terry frisk, she \u201ccould feel items in [defendant\u2019s] pockets\u201d and \u201casked him what was in the pocket that I was touching.\u201d Defendant told Officer Gandy \u201cto go ahead and take it out,\u201d whereupon Officer Gandy emptied defendant\u2019s pockets and discovered \u201c[a] small flashlight and a Swiss Army-type knife.\u201d Meanwhile, \u201c[d]uring the frisk, Officer Coyle advised [Officer Gandy] and Lieutenant Taylor that it appeared that some type of screwdriver had been used to pry the window [at 109 South Peak Drive] open.\u201d Although, as defendant notes and the trial court found, \u201c[n]o evidence was introduced about the size or shape of the knife, or whether or not there were other tools, such as a pry tool or screwdriver, in the swiss army-style knife,\u201d Officer Gandy expressly testified, \u201cAt that point I believed he could have used at least part of that Swiss Army knife to open that window.\u201d Following the discovery of the flashlight and knife, the officers placed defendant under arrest.\nQuoting from our Supreme Court, defendant first contends, correctly, that \u201cflashlights . . . are not breaking tools.\u201d State v. Morgan, 268 N.C. 214, 220, 150 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1966). However, based upon Officer Coyle\u2019s description of the type of instrument likely used on the window at 109 South Peak Drive, Officer Gandy determined that defendant \u201ccould have used at least part of that Swiss Army knife to open that window.\u201d In addition to the knife and her belief that it could have been used to open a window, Officer Gandy\u2019s suspicion that defendant possessed implements of housebreaking was supported by (1) defendant\u2019s possession of the flashlight; (2) defendant\u2019s possession of the backpack containing unknown items; and (3) all of the factors supporting the finding of reasonable suspicion for the initial stop of defendant. See In re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 587, 647 S.E.2d 129, 136 (2007) (\u201c[W]e find probable cause based on the same factors in which we found reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory seizure.\u201d). The trial court, therefore, properly concluded that \u201c[t]here was probable cause to arrest the Defendant in this case for possession of burglary tools.\u201d Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant has failed to present argument in his brief with respect to assignments of error numbers 2, 4 through 8, and 15. Accordingly, these assignments of error are deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006).\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur.\n. \u201c[Shopping a car and detaining its occupants constitute^] a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,\u201d United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 610 (1985), and the principle applies to stopping and detaining a person riding a bicycle. See Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (E.D.N.C. 1989).\n. Although defendant argues that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard by concluding that \u201ccriminal activity was afoot,\u201d the trial court\u2019s conclusion tracks the language used by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989) (\u201c[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity \u2018may be afoot, \u2019 even if the officer lacks probable cause.\u201d (emphasis added) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968))).\n. See State v. Stumbo, 111 N.W.2d 664, 665-66 (Iowa 1961) (\u201cThe ordinary and common usage of the word \u2018vicinity\u2019 is a relative term, synonymous with such words as \u2018neighborhood\u2019, \u2018community\u2019 or \u2018locality\u2019, \u2018not remote\u2019, \u2018nearness\u2019, and describes a state of being near.\u201d (citations omitted)). In Stumbo, the Iowa Supreme Court also noted that \u201cthe word \u2018vicinity\u2019 is derived from \u2018vicus\u2019, a village, and signifies a place which does not exceed in distance the extent of a village.\u201d Id. at 666 (citing Borough of Madison v. Morristown Gaslight Co., 52 A. 158, 159 (N.J. Ch. 1902), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 54 A. 439 (N.J. 1903)).\n. We must caution defense counsel against arguing facts not in the record. There was no evidence introduced relating to typical bicycle traffic in Carrboro under similar conditions, and such a subject is inappropriate for judicial notice. See Greer v. Greer, 175 N.C. App. 464, 472, 624 S.E.2d 423, 428 (2006) (\u201cAny subject, however, that is open to reasonable debate is not appropriate for judicial notice.\u201d).\n. We note that defendant disputes the State\u2019s contention that his handcuffing was for officer safety but did not assign error to the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201cOfficer Gandy . . . frisked the defendant for officer safety.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTHONY LENAIR CAMPBELL\nNo. COA07-903\n(Filed 19 February 2008)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 investigatory stop \u2014 reasonable suspicion \u2014 scope\u2014handcuffs\u2014frisking\u2014probable cause for arrest\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress physical evidence found on defendant\u2019s person and in his backpack at the time of his investigatory stop and subsequent arrest where: (a) an officer had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity so that her investigatory stop of defendant was lawful when she saw him riding his bicycle in the vicinity of a reported burglary at 3:40 a.m. and saw no other persons in the area; (2) the officers\u2019 act of handcuffing defendant and searching his person did not constitute an unreasonable seizure where one officer recognized defendant and believed that defendant posed a risk of flight, and a frisk of defendant for weapons was justified in light of the late hour and nature of the crime that, had been committed; and (3) officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of burglary tools when, during the frisk of defendant, an officer discovered a small flashlight and a Swiss army-type knife, an officer at the burglary scene reported that a window had been pried open with some type of screwdriver, the arresting officer believed that a part of that knife could have been used to open a window, and defendant had a backpack with him that contained unknown items.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 15 December 2006 by Judge R. Allen Baddour in Orange County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 December 2007.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel R. Pollitt, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0701-01", "first_page_order": 731, "last_page_order": 742 }