{ "id": 4156773, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD RAY HARRIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harris", "decision_date": "2008-03-04", "docket_number": "No. COA07-383", "first_page": "49", "last_page": "65", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 N.C. App. 49" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740457 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640067 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637517 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 1095", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11763812, 11763325, 11763389, 11764040, 11763592, 11763659, 11763533, 11764109, 11763185, 11764180, 11763893, 11763451, 11763260, 11763741, 11763966 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/1095-10", "/us/519/1095-03", "/us/519/1095-04", "/us/519/1095-13", "/us/519/1095-07", "/us/519/1095-08", "/us/519/1095-06", "/us/519/1095-14", "/us/519/1095-01", "/us/519/1095-15", "/us/519/1095-11", "/us/519/1095-05", "/us/519/1095-02", "/us/519/1095-09", "/us/519/1095-12" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12001440, 12001636, 12000708, 12000837, 12000970, 12001711, 12001073, 12001394, 12001300, 12001559, 12000604, 12001500, 12001183 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0915-09", "/us/506/0915-12", "/us/506/0915-02", "/us/506/0915-03", "/us/506/0915-04", "/us/506/0915-13", "/us/506/0915-05", "/us/506/0915-08", "/us/506/0915-07", "/us/506/0915-11", "/us/506/0915-01", "/us/506/0915-10", "/us/506/0915-06" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637634 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "holding that admission of the declarants' prior out-of-court statements did not violate Crawford because the declarants testified at trial and were available for cross-examination" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 838", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9117696, 9117635, 9117539, 9117510, 9117672, 9117610, 9117586, 9117779, 9117716, 9117653, 9117492, 9117559, 9117528, 9117750 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0838-11", "/us/534/0838-08", "/us/534/0838-04", "/us/534/0838-02", "/us/534/0838-10", "/us/534/0838-07", "/us/534/0838-06", "/us/534/0838-14", "/us/534/0838-12", "/us/534/0838-09", "/us/534/0838-01", "/us/534/0838-05", "/us/534/0838-03", "/us/534/0838-13" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "punishing as a felon \"[a]ny person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)", "parenthetical": "defining the crime of first-degree sexual offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)", "parenthetical": "defining the crime of first-degree rape" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625524 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "211-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding that testimony regarding \"[the] defendant's drug addiction was improper under Rule 608(b) because extrinsic evidence of drug addiction, standing alone, is not probative of [a] defendant's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562800 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding that testimony regarding \"[the] defendant's drug addiction was improper under Rule 608(b) because extrinsic evidence of drug addiction, standing alone, is not probative of [a] defendant's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "concluding that testimony regarding \"[the] defendant's drug addiction was improper under Rule 608(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522308 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "concluding that testimony regarding \"[the] defendant's drug addiction was improper under Rule 608(b" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 S.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 N.C. App. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526727 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/69/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915232 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 L. Ed. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 1111", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11657832, 11657874, 11657855 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/1111-01", "/us/520/1111-03", "/us/520/1111-02" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "473 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798937 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "690" }, { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. Ed. 2d 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502533, 2498248, 2500400, 2499516, 2497727 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0290-01", "/nc/331/0290-04", "/nc/331/0290-05", "/nc/331/0290-02", "/nc/331/0290-03" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.C. App. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8524176 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/104/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249770 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763204, 4760983, 4764155, 4760764, 4759869 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0463-03", "/nc/309/0463-01", "/nc/309/0463-02", "/nc/309/0463-04", "/nc/309/0463-05" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523179 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serous injury, the Court held that \"hands and fists may be considered deadly weapons, given the manner in which they were used and the relative size and condition of the parties involved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "569 S.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249135 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574086 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155670 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" }, { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732391 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "holding that where the trial court instructed the jury that a witness's prior consistent statements were to be considered \"solely as corroborative evidence, there was no error\"" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525664 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67", "parenthetical": "holding that where the trial court instructed the jury that a witness's prior consistent statements were to be considered \"solely as corroborative evidence, there was no error\"" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that \"[corroborative testimony may contain additional information when it strengthens or adds credibility to the testimony in which it corroborates but it may not contradict trial testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491396, 491839, 491752, 491593, 491723, 491412, 491485, 491647 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that \"[corroborative testimony may contain additional information when it strengthens or adds credibility to the testimony in which it corroborates but it may not contradict trial testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0168-04", "/nc/357/0168-02", "/nc/357/0168-08", "/nc/357/0168-01", "/nc/357/0168-07", "/nc/357/0168-05", "/nc/357/0168-03", "/nc/357/0168-06" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250983 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561442 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571687 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659713, 1659914, 1659691, 1659965 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0508-02", "/nc/348/0508-04", "/nc/348/0508-03", "/nc/348/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11648065 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371819 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "holding that admission of the declarants' prior out-of-court statements did not violate Crawford because the declarants testified at trial and were available for cross-examination" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 L. Ed. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11768993, 11768609, 11768259, 11768294, 11768199, 11768841, 11768523, 11768781, 11768078, 11768143, 11768690, 11768915, 11768376, 11768027, 11768447 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1123-15", "/us/517/1123-10", "/us/517/1123-05", "/us/517/1123-06", "/us/517/1123-04", "/us/517/1123-13", "/us/517/1123-09", "/us/517/1123-12", "/us/517/1123-02", "/us/517/1123-03", "/us/517/1123-11", "/us/517/1123-14", "/us/517/1123-07", "/us/517/1123-01", "/us/517/1123-08" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793157 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135728 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3740457 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0207-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1329, "char_count": 41100, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.089932936244171e-08, "percentile": 0.42641269819205674 }, "sha256": "e7fb8b96fee8e30bff78cc26a55f45feb62be9ef869e52164a73e86069769091", "simhash": "1:172fda3e277f8d79", "word_count": 6690 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:52.494477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "No error.", "Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD RAY HARRIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McGEE, Judge.\nA jury found Harold Ray Harris (Defendant) guilty of one count of first-degree sexual offense and one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injuries on 3 November 2006. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 months to 297 months in prison on the first-degree sexual offense charge, and to a consecutive term of twenty-five months to thirty months in prison on the assault charge. Defendant appeals.\nThe evidence presented at trial tended to show the following: Defendant and K.L. went to a motel together on the evening of 6 November 2005. According to K.L., Defendant had told K.L. that they were going to the motel to attend a birthday party for one of Defendant\u2019s coworkers. K.L. testified that when she walked into the motel room, she picked up a remote control to turn on the television and felt a blow to the back of her head. K.L. was thrown onto the tile bathroom floor, and she remembered \u201cfists coming at me at my face.\u201d The next thing K.L. remembered was sitting in a restaurant with Defendant the following day. K.L. also remembered speaking with a police officer a short time later and telling the officer the name \u201cHarold.\u201d\nJamesie Gentry (Ms. Gentry) was the owner of the restaurant where K.L. and Defendant ate on 7 November 2005. Ms. Gentry testified that Defendant and K.L. came into her restaurant around 11:00 a.m., and K.L. was having difficulty walking. KL.\u2019s hair was matted, her shirt was dirty and bloody, and her face was badly swollen. Ms. Gentry also observed a shoe print on K.L.\u2019s back. Ms. Gentry called police and told them that K.L. needed immediate assistance.\nOfficer Franklin Blake Potter (Officer Potter) with the Chadbourn Police Department testified that on the morning of 7 November 2005, he responded to a call at a restaurant near the police department. When Officer Potter entered the restaurant, he immediately noticed K.L. sitting with Defendant. According to Officer Potter, K.L. \u201chad very swollen lips. Her eyes were swollen shut. She was bent over, holding her abdominal area, taking slow, faint breaths, and unable to move.\u201d Defendant informed Officer Potter that K.L. had recently had tooth surgery and could not talk, and Defendant would answer any questions Officer Potter had. Officer Potter took K.L. outside the restaurant to speak with her privately, and Defendant instructed K.L., \u201c[d]on\u2019t tell him anything.\u201d Once outside, Officer Potter asked K.L. who had hurt her. K.L. responded, \u201cHarold,\u201d and identified \u201cHarold\u201d as Defendant. Officer Potter called an ambulance for K.L. and took Defendant into custody.\nDr. Andrew John Hutchinson (Dr. Hutchinson) treated K.L. when she arrived at the emergency room on 7 November 2005. Dr. Hutchinson testified that K.L. had handprints on her arms, thighs, buttocks, and neck. KL.\u2019s face was scratched, bruised, and swollen. Dr. Hutchinson ordered a CAT scan of K.L.\u2019s head, which revealed massive soft tissue swelling of K.L.\u2019s head, face, and neck. Dr. Hutchinson testified that KL.\u2019s injuries could have been caused by blunt trauma to her head and face, such as being hit with fists. Dr. Hutchinson also ordered a CAT scan of KL.\u2019s abdomen, which revealed that K.L. had air in her abdomen caused by a hole in one of her organs. Doctors immediately prepared K.L. for surgery. Once in the operating room, Dr. Hutchinson noticed that K.L. had sustained bruises and cuts to her genital area, and was bleeding from her rec-turn. Dr. Hutchinson also saw more bruising and handprints on the backs of KL.\u2019s thighs and buttocks. During surgery, doctors found a large hole in KL.\u2019s colon and repaired the damage. Dr. Hutchinson testified that KL.\u2019s colon injury was consistent with a foreign body being inserted into K.L.\u2019s rectum.\nFloyd Ray Watts (Mr. Watts) had been acquainted with Defendant for a number of years. Mr. Watts testified at trial that Defendant visited him at his house around 7:00 a.m. or 8:00 a.m. on 7 November 2005. According to Mr. Watts, Defendant stated that \u201che had blackened [K.L.]\u2019s eye and busted her lip\u201d because K.L. \u201chad been sleeping with a Black man.\u201d Defendant then left Mr. Watts\u2019 house.\nDefendant also testified at trial. According to Defendant, K.L. had been taking Xanax, Valium, and Soma pills the night of the assault. Defendant testified that he and K.L. arrived at the motel around 8:00 p.m. Two hours later, K.L. asked Defendant to go purchase some cigarettes. Defendant left the motel, bought cigarettes, went to see a friend, and returned to the motel shortly after midnight. When Defendant entered the motel room, he saw K.L. lying on the bed. Her underwear was next to her on the bed and was stained with blood. Defendant asked K.L. what had happened, and K.L. responded, \u201cI left some people in the room. It\u2019s my body, I\u2019ll do what I want to with it.\u201d Defendant claimed that he attempted to call paramedics for K.L., but K.L. refused assistance. Defendant did not notice that K.L.\u2019s face was bruised and swollen until the following morning. That morning, K.L. dressed herself and insisted that Defendant take her to eat at a restaurant. Defendant and K.L. left the motel around 11:00 a.m. and went to a diner, where they were approached by police. Defendant denied having visited Mr. Watts early that morning before leaving the motel with K.L.\nA jury convicted Defendant of one count of first degree sexual offense and one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injuries. Defendant appeals and argues that the trial court erred by: allowing witnesses to testify as to KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements; refusing to dismiss the charges against Defendant due to insufficiency of the evidence; and refusing to allow Defendant to question K.L. regarding certain topics on cross-examination.\nI.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred by allowing police officers to testify at trial to allegedly inadmissible out-of-court statements K.L. made to police following her assault and surgery. Defendant argues that this evidence was inadmissible under both federal and state law.\nA.\nOfficer Potter testified at Defendant\u2019s trial regarding the conversation he had with K.L. after he first saw her at the restaurant on 7 November 2005. In addition, Lieutenant Harold Dion Hayes (Lieutenant Hayes) of the Chadbourn Police Department testified about K.L.\u2019s responses to both written and oral questions he asked of K.L. while K.L. was hospitalized. Defendant contends that the trial court should have excluded the officers\u2019 testimony pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement made by an unavailable declarant who did not testify at trial and who was not previously available for cross-examination by the defendant. According to Defendant, K.L.\u2019s out-of-court statements were inadmissible because (a) her statements were testimonial, and (b) although K.L. testified at trial, there was no indication that she was available for the remainder of the trial to be examined again by defense counsel.\nWe find that Defendant has not preserved this argument for appellate review. Defendant objected to the officers\u2019 testimony at trial on state evidentiary grounds alone and did not raise a federal constitutional objection. Our Courts have consistently held that constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be considered for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 61, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001). Further, Defendant is not entitled to plain error review because he has not asked this Court to review the admission of K.L.\u2019s out-of-court statements for plain error. See, e.g., State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496, 461 S.E.2d 664, 677 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996); N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\nEven were this Court to review Defendant\u2019s constitutional challenge, Defendant\u2019s Crawford argument is without merit. The Supreme Court in Crawford clearly stated that \u201cwhen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of [the declarant\u2019s] prior testimonial statements.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197-98 n.9 (emphasis added). The rale in Crawford therefore does not apply when the declarant is subject to cross-examination at trial. See State v. Burgess, 181 N.C. App. 27, 34, 639 S.E.2d 68, 74 (2007) (holding that admission of the declarants\u2019 prior out-of-court statements did not violate Crawford because the declarants testified at trial and were available for cross-examination). K.L. was subject to cross-examination at trial, and therefore Crawford is inapplicable here. In addition, Defendant\u2019s argument that K.L. was unavailable to be recalled for further examination by defense counsel is likewise without merit. Defendant cites no evidence in the record that defense counsel ever attempted to recall K.L. and cross-examine her further regarding her out-of-court statements, or that K.L. would have been unavailable for further cross-examination.\nB.\nDefendant also argues that KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements were inadmissible because they went beyond mere corroboration of KL.\u2019s own trial testimony. In State v. Swindler, 129 N.C. App. 1, 497 S.E.2d 318, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 508, 510 S.E.2d 670, aff\u2019d per curiam, 349 N.C. 347, 507 S.E.2d 284 (1998), our Court held that \u201c[p]rior consistent statements of a witness are admissible for purposes of corroboration,\u201d and \u201c[w]hen so offered, evidence of a prior consistent statement must in fact corroborate a witness\u2019s later testimony.\u201d Id. at 4-5, 497 S.E.2d at 320. Defendant argues that KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements introduced by Officer Potter and Lieutenant Hayes included new and different hearsay testimony that went beyond merely corroborating KL.\u2019s trial testimony. We disagree.\nAs noted above, K.L. testified at trial that she and Defendant were alone in a motel room when she was assaulted. K.L. also remembered being at a restaurant with Defendant the following day and giving Defendant\u2019s name to a police officer. Officer Potter testified that once outside the restaurant, he asked K.L. who had assaulted her, and K.L. responded, \u201cHarold.\u201d K.L. then identified Defendant as \u201cHarold,\u201d and told police that she had been assaulted the previous night at a motel. We find nothing in Officer Potter\u2019s testimony regarding KL.\u2019s out-of-court statement that does not corroborate KL.\u2019s trial testimony or that introduces new hearsay on a different subject. While K.L.\u2019s testimony and out-of-court statements are not completely identical, our Courts have held that \u201c \u2018[s]light variances in the corroborative testimony do not render it inadmissible.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 5, 497 S.E.2d at 321 (quoting State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 337, 226 S.E.2d 629, 646 (1976)).\nLieutenant Hayes testified that he gave K.L. a series of written questions while K.L. was in the hospital on 10 November 2005. According to Lieutenant Hayes, K.L. wrote that her name was \u201c[K.N.],\u201d that her birth date was \u201c3/6/74,\u201d and that the day of the week was \u201cThursday.\u201d K.L. also wrote that \u201cHarold Harris\u201d had assaulted her. Defendant argues that these statements differed significantly from K.L.\u2019s trial testimony and were not corroborative. We disagree. K.L. testified at trial that her maiden name was \u201c[K.F.N.]\u201d and that she was thirty-two years old. These slight variances in K.L.\u2019s in-court and out-of-court statements do not render her out-of-court statements inadmissible. Further, K.L.\u2019s statement that Defendant had assaulted her was generally corroborative of her in-court testimony that she was assaulted while alone in the motel room with Defendant. See State v. Love, 152 N.C. App. 608, 616, 568 S.E.2d 320, 325-26 (2002), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 168, 581 S.E.2d 66 (2003) (stating that \u201c[corroborative testimony may contain additional information when it strengthens or adds credibility to the testimony in which it corroborates but it may not contradict trial testimony\u201d). Even if KL.\u2019s out-of-court statement identifying Defendant as her attacker went beyond merely corroborating her in-court testimony that she was attacked while alone with Defendant, the trial court later explicitly instructed the jury:\nLadies and gentlemen, the testimony of [Lieutenant Hayes] about what [K.L.] wrote down on the piece of paper when he asked her questions was received for the purpose of corroborating [K.L.]\u2019s testimony. Whether or not it does, again, is for you, the jury, to determine. We will receive it for that purpose only.\nBecause the trial court\u2019s instruction ensured that the jury considered KL.\u2019s out-of-court statement only for its proper corroborative purpose, and not as substantive evidence, there was no error. See State v. Daniels, 59 N.C. App. 63, 67, 295 S.E.2d 508, 511 (1982) (holding that where the trial court instructed the jury that a witness\u2019s prior consistent statements were to be considered \u201csolely as corroborative evidence, there was no error\u201d).\nLieutenant Hayes also testified that he spoke with K.L. in the hospital on 15 November 2005. According to Lieutenant Hayes, K.L. said during that interview that: Defendant had a crush on her; she and Defendant were friends who took drugs together; she and Defendant had not been drinking and did not have sex on 6 November 2005 prior to the assault; she did not remember Defendant giving her any medication; she went to the motel with Defendant of her own free will; Defendant had lied about where they were going that night; she remembered being hit on the head with something similar to a tire iron, and remembered being thrown on the bathroom floor and being hit in the face; she was attacked and sodomized by Defendant, although she did not remember it; Defendant threatened to harm her if she told anyone what happened; and Defendant helped her to get into a car and into the restaurant. Defendant contends that KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements to Lieutenant Hayes differed greatly from K.L.\u2019s trial testimony. We disagree. K.L. testified at trial that: she and Defendant were friends, but Defendant wanted to be romantically involved; she had abused prescription drugs in the past; she had agreed to go with Defendant to the motel; Defendant had told her they were going to the motel for a birthday party; and she remembered feeling a blow to the back of her head, being thrown to the bathroom floor, and being punched in the face. Admittedly, portions of KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements to Lieutenant Hayes contained information that K.L. did not include in her in-court testimony. However, the differences between K.L.\u2019s in-court and out-of-court statements are not contradictory. Rather, KL.\u2019s trial testimony was simply a less-complete statement of the events than her out-of-court statement to Lieutenant Hayes. See State v. Ramey, 318 N.C. 457, 470, 349 S.E.2d 566, 574 (1986) (holding that although \u201c[t]he victim\u2019s prior oral and written statements . . . includfed] additional facts not referred to in his testimony,\u201d the victim\u2019s prior statements \u201ctended to strengthen and add credibility to his trial testimony. They were, therefore, admissible as corroborative evidence.\u201d). Further, the trial court explicitly instructed the jury to consider KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements for corroboration purposes only, which ensured that Defendant would not be prejudiced by the variations in KL.\u2019s statements. See Daniels, 59 N.C. App. at 67, 295 S.E.2d at 511.\nFinally, we find that even if the trial court erred by admitting certain portions of Officer Potter\u2019s and Lieutenant Hayes\u2019s testimony, Defendant was not prejudiced by such error. See State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 291, 523 S.E.2d 663, 672 (2000) (stating that \u201c[t]he erroneous admission of hearsay \u2018is not always so prejudicial as to require a new trial.\u2019 Rather, [the] defendant must show \u2018a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at. . . trial[.]\u2019 \u201d (quoting Ramey, 318 N.C. at 470, 349 S.E.2d at 574; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1999)). Defendant does not argue in his brief that the result at trial would have been different if the trial court had not admitted the contested portions of the officers\u2019 testimony. Further, as discussed below, we find that even excluding the contested portions of KL.\u2019s out-of-court statements, the State introduced sufficient evidence to support a finding of Defendant\u2019s guilt on both charges. Therefore, Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him due 'to the insufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence. To survive a motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence, the State must present \u201csubstantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of [the] defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense.\u201d State v Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). Substantial evidence exists if, considered in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence \u201cgives rise to a reasonable inference of guilt.\u201d State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 504, 279 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1981). However, a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss must be granted \u201c[i]f the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it[.]\u201d Powell, 299 N.C. at 98, 261 S.E.2d at 117.\nA.\nDefendant first argues that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injuries. Defendant contends that the State did not introduce substantial evidence that Defendant was the perpetrator of the crime committed. Defendant claims that the only evidence presented by the State regarding the identity of K.L.\u2019s attacker was K.L.\u2019s testimony that she was struck in the back of the head, but never actually saw her attacker. According to Defendant, this evidence only raises conjecture and speculation regarding Defendant\u2019s role in the assault. We disagree with Defendant\u2019s characterization of the State\u2019s evidence. K.L. testified that she and Defendant went alone to a motel room. She was assaulted immediately after entering the room, and by the following morning, had sustained serious physical injuries. K.L.\u2019s statements to police corroborated her testimony that she had been alone with Defendant when she was assaulted. Defendant testified that he knew K.L. was bleeding and had been injured, but he never sought medical assistance for her. In fact, Defendant attempted to keep Officer Potter from asking K.L. how she had been hurt. Officer Potter testified that Defendant explicitly instructed K.L. not to say anything to police. Further, Mr. Watts testified that Defendant stated that he had assaulted K.L. Although K.L. testified that she did not see her attacker, and although Defendant denied any involvement in the assault, we find that the evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, gives rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant was KL.\u2019s assailant.\nDefendant also contends that the State did not introduce substantial evidence that he assaulted K.L. with a deadly weapon. We disagree. Our Courts have previously held that under certain conditions, an assailant\u2019s hands and feet may be considered \u201cdeadly weapons\u201d for the purpose of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 153 N.C. App. 203, 211, 569 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2002), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 168, 581 S.E.2d 442 (2003) (where the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serous injury, the Court held that \u201chands and fists may be considered deadly weapons, given the manner in which they were used and the relative size and condition of the parties involved\u201d); State v. Jacobs, 61 N.C. App. 610, 611, 301 S.E.2d 429, 430, disc. review denied, 309 N.C. 463, 307 S.E.2d 429 (1983) (holding that where the thirty-nine-year-old, 210-pound male defendant hit the sixty-year-old female victim in her head and stomach with his fists, \u201c[t]he defendant\u2019s fists could have been a deadly weapon given the manner in which they were used and the relative size and condition of the parties\u201d). Whether an assailant\u2019s hands and feet are used as deadly weapons is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. State v. Hunt, 153 N.C. App. 316, 318-19, 569 S.E.2d 709, 710-11 (2002).\nIn the current case, the evidence tended to show that Defendant weighed 175 pounds and K.L. weighed 110 pounds. Ms. Gentry testified that when Defendant and K.L. came into her restaurant, K.L. had a shoe print on her back. Dr. Hutchinson testified that K.L. had handprint bruises on her arms, thighs, and buttocks. In addition, K.L. had handprints on her neck, which Dr. Hutchinson noted were consistent with a choke hold. Dr. Hutchinson also testified that the hand-prints on K.L.\u2019s neck could have been responsible for swelling in KL.\u2019s mouth, tongue, and throat. Under these circumstances, the jury was properly allowed to determine whether Defendant\u2019s hands and feet constituted deadly weapons. Compare State v. Grumbles, 104 N.C. App. 766, 411 S.E.2d 407 (1991) (where the evidence showed that the 175-pound male defendant hit and choked the 107-pound female victim, leaving marks on her neck and causing her facial swelling and a broken jaw, the Court held that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the issue of whether the defendant\u2019s hands were deadly weapons, given the size and strength disparity between the defendant and the victim, as well as the \u201cdevastating physical effect\u201d of the assault).\nWe find that the State introduced substantial evidence that Defendant assaulted K.L., and that Defendant assaulted K.L. using a deadly weapon. Any weakness in the State\u2019s evidence or discrepancy between the State\u2019s evidence and Defendant\u2019s testimony was for the jury to consider. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injuries.\nB.\nDefendant next argues that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence on the charge of first-degree sexual offense. Defendant contends that the State did not introduce substantial evidence that Defendant was the perpetrator of the crime committed. We disagree. As noted above, we have found that the State introduced substantial evidence identifying Defendant as the person responsible for KL.\u2019s injuries.\nDefendant also contends that the State did not introduce substantial evidence that Defendant committed a \u201csexual act\u201d on K.L. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.4(a)(2) (defining first-degree sexual offense as \u201cengag[ing] in a sexual act . . . [w]ith another person by force and against the will of the other person, and . . . [i]nflict[ing] serious personal injury upon the victim\u201d). \u201cThe term \u2018sexual act\u2019 as used in this statute means cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse. It also means the penetration, however slight, by any object into the genital or anal opening of another person\u2019s body.\u201d State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 764, 340 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1986).\nDefendant notes that rape kits prepared while K.L. was at the hospital showed no evidence of Defendant\u2019s pubic hair, semen, saliva, or other bodily fluids. Defendant argues that the State\u2019s only evidence of a sexual act was Dr. Hutchinson\u2019s speculation that the intrusion of an object into KL.\u2019s rectum could have resulted in the injury to her colon. Defendant contends that this does not amount to substantial evidence that Defendant committed a sexual act on K.L. We disagree. Dr. Hutchinson testified that a hole in a person\u2019s colon could be caused in two different ways. First, a hole could be caused by a certain type of disease, and Dr. Hutchinson found no evidence that K.L. was suffering from that disease. Second, the hole could have been caused by the insertion of a body part or other foreign object into KL.\u2019s rectum. When considered with the evidence that K.L. also suffered extensive damage to her outer genital and rectal areas, the State\u2019s evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference that KL.\u2019s colon injury was the result of the penetration of an object into her rectum. We find that the State introduced substantial evidence on the charge of first-degree sexual offense, and therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nIII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence related to K.L.\u2019s delinquent child support payments, prior drag abuse, and prior sexual activity with Defendant and with other people. \u201cA trial court\u2019s rulings on relevancy . . . are given great deference on appeal.\u201d State v. Wallace, 104 N.C. App. 498, 502, 410 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1991), disc. review denied, 331 N.C. 290, 416 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915, 121 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1992). Further, the decision whether to exclude relevant evidence as unfairly prejudicial under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 \u201cis a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed upon a showing that the trial court\u2019s ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason or was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 690, 473 S.E.2d 291, 304 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1095, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719, reh\u2019g denied, 520 U.S. 1111, 137 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1997).\nDefendant first asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of KL.\u2019s allegedly delinquent child support payments. However, Defendant only references this argument in the heading for section III of his brief. Defendant never provides a reason, argument, or authority to support his claim. Defendant has therefore abandoned his argument under N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence regarding K.L.\u2019s prior sexual history. Defendant testified on voir dire that on multiple occasions, he had seen K.L. offer to have sex with other people in exchange for drags. The State objected to Defendant\u2019s testimony, and the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection. The trial court did not state the basis of its decision, but it appears that the trial court believed the evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under our rape shield statute. Defendant contends that this evidence was admissible under an exception to the rape shield:\n[T]he sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such behavior . . . [i]s evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely resembling the defendant\u2019s version of the alleged encounter with the complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(3) (2007). Defendant contends that the contested evidence demonstrated a distinctive pattern in KL.\u2019s behavior that resembles Defendant\u2019s version of the assault: that K.L. was assaulted when she attempted to trade sex for drugs with another person while Defendant was absent from the motel room. We disagree with Defendant\u2019s contention. Rule 412(b)(3) provides that such evidence is only relevant on the issue of consent between a complainant and a defendant. Defendant has never argued that he had a consensual sexual encounter with K.L. on 6 November 2005; to the contrary, he has repeatedly denied having such an encounter, consensual or otherwise. Thus, this exception to the rape shield does not apply, rendering the contested evidence irrelevant under Rule 412(b). The trial court therefore did not err in excluding evidence of K.L.\u2019s prior sexual behavior with persons other than Defendant.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence regarding his own sexual history with K.L. Defendant testified on voir dire that K.L. had offered to have sex with him on \u201ca couple of hundred\u201d occasions in exchange for drugs. The State objected to Defendant\u2019s testimony, and the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection. Again, the basis of the trial court\u2019s ruling was not entirely clear, but it appears that the trial court believed the testimony was irrelevant. Defendant contends that this evidence was admissible under another exception to the rape shield: \u201c[T]he sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such behavior . . . [w]as between the complainant and the defendant!.]\" N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(1). We disagree with Defendant\u2019s contention. Rule 412(b)(1) does not exclude evidence of prior sexual behavior between a complainant and a defendant because \u201cprior consent from a complainant to the defendant on trial is relevant to the complainant\u2019s subsequent consent to that defendant[.]\u201d State v. Ginyard, 122 N.C. App. 25, 31-32, 468 S.E.2d 525, 530 (1996). As noted above, Defendant denied having a sexual encounter with K.L. on 6 November 2005, and has not raised KL.\u2019s consent as a defense. Thus, this exception to the rape shield does not apply, rendering Defendant\u2019s testimony irrelevant under Rule 412(b) and therefore inadmissible. The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of KL.\u2019s prior sexual behavior with Defendant.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence regarding K.L. and Defendant\u2019s prior motel stays. During Defendant\u2019s cross-examination of K.L., K.L. testified during voir dire that she and Defendant had rented motel rooms together on a number of previous occasions. The State objected to this testimony, and the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403, on the basis that the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative benefit. Defendant contends that this evidence was relevant and admissible under Rule 412(b)(1) because it implied a prior course of sexual behavior between Defendant and K.L. We disagree. Again, as Defendant has not raised K.L.\u2019s consent as a defense, this exception to the rape shield is inapplicable. Further, the trial court excluded this evidence not because it was inadmissible under the rape shield, but rather because it was unfairly prejudicial. Given the questionable relevance of this evidence and its likely prejudicial effect on the remainder of K.L.\u2019s testimony, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s Rule 403 ruling \u201cwas manifestly unsupported by reason or was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Womble, 343 N.C. at 690, 473 S.E.2d at 304. Therefore, the trial court did not err by excluding evidence of K.L. and Defendant\u2019s prior motel stays.\nFinally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding certain evidence regarding K.L.\u2019s prior drug use. Early in the trial, the trial court ruled that Defendant could question K.L. regarding her drug use on the day of the assault, as well as her ongoing addiction to prescription drugs. Defendant did in fact elicit testimony from K.L. on these topics, and K.L. admitted that she had drug addiction problems, and could not recall whether she had taken drugs the day of the assault. Later at trial, Defendant testified that when he returned to the motel room to find K.L. injured, K.L. asked Defendant not to call the police because \u201cthe first thing they will do whenever they take me to the hospital is take me to Lumberton, because they\u2019ll try to dry me out.\u201d Defendant then added, \u201c[s]he had been two times before.\u201d The State objected to Defendant\u2019s last statement. The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection and instructed the jury not to consider Defendant\u2019s answer. The State did not offer the grounds for its objection, and the trial court did not state the basis of its ruling.\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding this evidence because K.L.\u2019s drug addiction and possible drug use the night of the assault was relevant to the jury\u2019s assessment of KL.\u2019s credibility. We disagree. \u201cWhen a general objection is sustained it will generally be upheld if there is any reason to exclude the evidence.\u201d Chapman v. Pollock, 69 N.C. App. 588, 592, 317 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1984). We find that Defendant\u2019s testimony could have been excluded under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b), because the fact of KL.\u2019s prior placement in a drug rehabilitation program was not probative of her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See, e.g., State v. Rowland, 89 N.C. App. 372, 382, 366 S.E.2d 550, 555, disc. review improvidently allowed, 323 N.C. 619, 374 S.E.2d 116 (1988) (concluding that testimony regarding \u201c[the] defendant\u2019s drug addiction was improper under Rule 608(b) because extrinsic evidence of drug addiction, standing alone, is not probative of [a] defendant\u2019s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness\u201d). While Defendant is correct that KL.\u2019s drug use on the evening of 6 November 2005 may have been relevant in assessing the credibility of KL.\u2019s version of the assault, evidence of KL.\u2019s prior drug rehabilitation had no bearing on this issue. Further, Defendant could not have been prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s exclusion of his testimony, because K.L. had previously admitted her prior drug use and drug addiction problems when cross-examined by Defendant. We find that the trial court did not err by excluding Defendant\u2019s testimony regarding KL.\u2019s prior experience in a drug rehabilitation program.\nNo error.\nJudges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.\n. Our Courts have recently held that hands cannot be considered \u201cdangerous weapons\u201d for the purposes of certain other crimes containing a \u201cdangerous weapon\u201d element. In State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207, 639 S.E.2d 437 (2007), our Supreme Court held \u00a1that hands are not \u201cdangerous weapons\u201d for the purposes of the crime of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-87(a) (2007), \u201c[a]ny person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another\u201d is guilty of a class D felony. Our Supreme Court found that \u201cthe purpose of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-87 is to provide for more severe punishment when the robbery is committed with the \u2018use or threatened use of firearms or other dangerous weapons,\u2019 \u201d and concluded that \u201cthe General Assembly intended to require the State to prove that a defendant used an external dangerous weapon[.]\u201d Id. at 211-12, 639 S.E.2d at 440 (quoting State v. Jones, 227 N.C. 402, 405, 42 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1947)). In addition, our own Court has relied on Hinton to reach a similar conclusion regarding the crimes of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense, each of which contain the element of \u201c[e]mploy[ing] or display[ing] a dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the [victim] reasonably believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon].]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(2) (2007) (defining the crime of first-degree rape); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-27.4(a)(2) (2007) (defining the crime of first-degree sexual offense). See State v. Adams, 187 N.C. App. -, 654 S.E.2d 711 (2007).\nOur Supreme Court in Hinton, however, expressly declined to read N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-87 in pari materia with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-33(c)(l), which criminalizes misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon. Hinton, 361 N.C. at 211, 639 S.E.2d at 440. The Court distinguished N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-87, in part, because unlike the assault statute, it referred specifically to \u201cfirearmjs]\u201d or other \u201cimplements]\u201d in describing the \u201ctypes of weapons that suffice under the statute to increase a defendant\u2019s sentence!.]\u201d Id. at 212, 639 S.E.2d at 440. According to the Court, this language \u201cindicates that a defendant must use an external weapon to be convicted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-87.\u201d Id. The Court did not address or distinguish the felony assault with a deadly weapon statute under which Defendant here was convicted. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-32(b) (2007) (punishing as a felon \u201c[a]ny person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury\u201d). However, given that the Court did not apply its new rule to the misdemeanor assault statute, and likewise did not overrule cases such as Rogers or Jacobs that allowed the hands-as-deadly-weapons question to go to the jury in felony assault cases, we find that Hinton does not control our decision in the current case.", "type": "majority", "author": "McGEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kevin Anderson, for the State.", "Irving Joyner for Defendant-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. HAROLD RAY HARRIS\nNo. COA07-383\n(Filed 4 March 2008)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 right of confrontation \u2014 victim\u2019s statements \u2014 victim subject to cross-examination\nThere was no error in the admission of testimony from police officers about statements made by a sexual offense and assault victim where defendant argued a violation of the Confrontation Clause, but had objected at trial only on evidentiary grounds and did not request plain error review at trial. Even so, the victim was subject to cross-examination at trial, and defendant cited no evidence that defense counsel ever attempted to recall the victim to cross-examine her further, or that she would have been unavailable.\n2. Evidence\u2014 victim\u2019s out-of-court statements \u2014 corroborative \u2014 slight variances with trial testimony\nA sexual offense and assault victim\u2019s out-of-court statements to officers were admissible even though defendant contended that the statements went beyond corroboration of trial testimony. Slight variances do not render the testimony inadmissible; moreover, there was a limiting instruction and the result would not have been different without this evidence.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 identify of attacker \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury where defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he had assaulted the victim. Although the victim testified that she did not see her attacker, the evidence in the light most favorable to the State gives rise to a reasonable inference that defendant was the assailant.\n4. Assault\u2014 deadly weapon \u2014 hands and feet\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury where defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that the victim had been assaulted with a deadly weapon. State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207, does not control this case: the jury was properly allowed to determine whether defendant\u2019s hands and feet constituted deadly weapons given the evidence of the disparity in size between defendant and the victim, the marks on her body, and her injuries.\n5. Sexual Offenses\u2014 first-degree \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\u2014 sexual act\nThere was sufficient evidence of a first-degree sexual offense where defendant contended that there was not sufficient evidence of a sexual act, but a doctor testified that the hole in the victim\u2019s colon could have come from disease, of which there was no evidence, or the insertion of a foreign body, and there was evidence of extensive damage to the victim\u2019s outer genital and rectal areas.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to provide argument or authority\nDefendant abandoned his argument concerning the admissibility of an assault victim\u2019s failure to pay child support by not providing a reason, argument, or authority to support his claim.\n7. Evidence\u2014 prior conduct by victim \u2014 rape shield exceptions inapplicable\nThe trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual history and motel stays by defendant and the victim of a sexual offense and assault. Although defendant contended that the evidence implied a prior course of sexual behavior between the two, these exceptions to the rape shield statute were not applicable.\n8. Evidence\u2014 victim\u2019s prior drug rehabilitation \u2014 not admissible\nThe trial court did not err by excluding defendant\u2019s testimony regarding a sexual offense and assault victim\u2019s prior experience in a drug rehabilitation program. While the victim\u2019s drug use on the evening of the assault may have been relevant in assessing her credibility, evidence of prior rehabilitation had no bearing on the issue. Furthermore, there was no prejudice because the victim herself had admitted her prior drug use and addiction on cross-examination.\nAppeal by Defendant from judgments entered 3 November 2006 by Judge B. Craig Ellis in Superior Court, Columbus County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 October 2007.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kevin Anderson, for the State.\nIrving Joyner for Defendant-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0049-01", "first_page_order": 81, "last_page_order": 97 }