{ "id": 4156998, "name": "IN RE: ADVANCE AMERICA, CASH ADVANCE CENTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "In re Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of North Carolina, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-03-04", "docket_number": "No. COA06-1576", "first_page": "115", "last_page": "123", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 N.C. App. 115" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636280, 12636281, 12636282 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0176-01", "/se2d/632/0176-02", "/se2d/632/0176-03" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635088 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0852-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634820 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "\"The first consideration in determining legislative intent is the words chosen by the legislature.\"" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90-14.8", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "holding that when statute is clear, \"[w]e have no power to add to or subtract from the language of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597493 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57", "parenthetical": "holding that when statute is clear, \"[w]e have no power to add to or subtract from the language of the statute\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572766 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "holding that appeal was properly dismissed when plaintiff failed to pay costs to appeal within 20 days of judgment as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527749 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "holding that appeal was properly dismissed when plaintiff failed to pay costs to appeal within 20 days of judgment as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554719 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/1/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793098, 3792339, 3789013, 3795127, 3791577, 3795453 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0482-01", "/nc/360/0482-02", "/nc/360/0482-04", "/nc/360/0482-03", "/nc/360/0482-05", "/nc/360/0482-06" ] }, { "cite": "232 S.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558677 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300954 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616725 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "670-71", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558370 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he plain meaning of words\" in a statute may be construed by reference to standard, nonlegal dictionaries" }, { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "holding that, in construing statute, \"[w]here appropriate, including earlier in this opinion, this Court has consulted Black's Law Dictionary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[t]he plain meaning of words\" in a statute may be construed by reference to standard, nonlegal dictionaries" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794819 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267-68", "parenthetical": "\"The first consideration in determining legislative intent is the words chosen by the legislature.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 16, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-164", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 20777, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.011620893327796e-08, "percentile": 0.3730001247176959 }, "sha256": "6f1455223e59183962672e2c8b448a3e377117f3422be5af3e0877c7efccd891", "simhash": "1:38492354deda289a", "word_count": 3462 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:52.494477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN RE: ADVANCE AMERICA, CASH ADVANCE CENTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nAdvance America, Cash Advance Centers of North Carolina, Inc. (\u201cAdvance America\u201d) appeals from the superior court\u2019s dismissal of its appeal from a final decision of the Banking Commission. Advance America argues that it fully complied with the statutory requirement for appeals from the Commission by submitting a notice of appeal to the Commissioner of Banks within 20 days of the order. The Banking Commission, however, asserts that Advance America was required to file a petition for judicial review in superior court within the 20-day deadline. Because the plain language of the statute does not include the requirements that the Commission seeks to impose, we agree with Advance America and reverse the order dismissing its appeal.\nFacts\nOn 1 February 2005, the Consumer Finance Division of the Office of the Commissioner of Banks commenced a contested case against Advance America, alleging that the company was unlawfully engaging in the business of payday lending in violation of the Consumer Finance Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-164 et seq. (2005). After the parties conducted discovery, they submitted to the Commissioner stipulations of fact, written expert testimony, and documentary evidence. By agreement, no evidentiary hearing was held.\nOn 19 December 2005, the Commissioner first issued an order addressing the admissibility and confidentiality of certain evidence. Then, in an order dated 22 December 2005, the Commissioner addressed the merits of the case, concluding (1) federal law did not preempt the Consumer Finance Act, (2) Advance America was not exempt from the Consumer Finance Act, (3) Advance America had violated the Consumer Finance Act, and (4) the Attorney General and Commissioner of Banks were not estopped from enforcing the Consumer Finance Act against Advance America. The Commissioner ordered Advance America to \u201ccease and desist from the further operation of its payday advance centers in North Carolina, to the extent that they make payday loans . . . .\u201d This order also specified the procedure for appealing the order to the State Banking Commission pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) (2005).\nOn 27 December 2005, Advance America timely appealed the 19 and 22 December 2005 orders to the Banking Commission by submitting a written notice of appeal to the Commissioner. On 24 May 2006, the Commission issued a final agency decision affirming both orders. The decision contained no reference to the procedure for appealing the decision to superior court.\nOn 13 June 2006, Advance America delivered a notice of appeal to the Banking Commission stating that it was appealing the Commission\u2019s final agency decision pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d). Advance America also filed a petition for judicial review with the Wake County Superior Court on 23 June 2006, explaining that although the company believed N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) set forth the proper procedure for appealing an order of the Banking Commission, \u201cout of an abundance of caution in ensuring its right to judicial review, [Advance America] files this Petition seeking judicial review of the Final Agency Decision pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 150B-45 and 150B-46.\u201d\nOn 28 June 2006, the Banking Commission moved to dismiss the petition for judicial review as being untimely filed. The trial court entered an order dismissing Advance America\u2019s appeal and petition for judicial review on 24 August 2006. The court stated:\n1. The Banking Commission rendered a Final Agency Decision in this cause on 24 May 2006. \u2022\n2. G.S. \u00a7 53-92(d) requires a party seeking to appeal from a final decision of the Banking Commission to appeal to Wake County Superior Court within 20 days.\n3. [Advance America] did not file or otherwise notice an appeal with this Court until it filed a Petition for Judicial Review on 23 June 2006.\n4. [Advance America\u2019s] appeal was not timely filed, and the Banking Commission\u2019s motion should be allowed.\nAdvance America timely appealed to this Court from that order.\nDiscussion\nAdvance America contends that its appeal to superior court was timely because it complied with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) (2007), which provides:\n(d) The Banking Commission is hereby vested with full power and authority to supervise, direct and review the exercise by the Commissioner of Banks of all powers, \u2022 duties, and functions now vested in or exercised by the Commissioner of Banks under the banking laws of this State. Upon an appeal to the Banking Commission by any party from an order entered by the Commissioner of Banks following an administrative hearing pursuant to Article 3A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, the Administrative Procedure Act, the chairman of the Commission may appoint an appellate review panel of not less than five members to review the record on appeal, hear oral arguments, and make a recommended decision to the Commission. Unless another time period for appeals is provided by this Chapter, any party to an order by the Commissioner of Banks may, within 20 days after the order and upon written notice to the Commissioner, appeal the Commissioner\u2019s order to the Banking Commission for review. Upon notice of an appeal, the Commissioner of Banks shall, within 30 days of the notice, certify to the Commission the record on appeal. Any party to a proceeding before the Banking Commission may, within 20 days after final order of said Commission and by written notice to the Commissioner of. Banks, appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County for a final determination of any question of law which may be involved. The cause shall be entitled \u201cState of North Carolina on Relation of the Banking Commission against (here insert name of appellant).\u201d It shall be placed on the civil issue docket of such court and shall have precedence over other civil actions. In the event of an appeal the Commissioner shall certify the record to the Clerk of Superior Court of Wake County within 15 days thereafter.\n(Emphasis added.) Advance America argues that the plain language of this statute requires a party, in order to appeal to superior court, only to give written notice to the Commissioner of Banks within 20 days of the final order of the Commission. We agree.\nAs our Supreme Court has emphasized, when construing a statute, \u201cour primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished.\u201d Elec. Supply Co. of Durham, Inc. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). In performing this function, \u201c[legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute.\u201d Id. See also O & M Indus. v. Smith Eng\u2019g Co., 360 N.C. 263, 267-68, 624 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2006) (\u201cThe first consideration in determining legislative intent is the words chosen by the legislature.\u201d). When the words are unambiguous, \u201cthey are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings.\u201d Id. at 268, 624 S.E.2d at 348.\nThe statute specifically sets forth the procedure for a party to follow when appealing an order of the Banking Commission. It provides that a party may appeal to the Wake County Superior Court \u201cby written notice to the Commissioner of Banks\u201d within 20 days of the final order. Once the party has appealed, the Commissioner must, within 15 days, certify the record to the clerk of court. The statute further specifies the caption to be used in the superior court and mandates that the appeal shall have precedence over all other civil cases on the court\u2019s docket.\nThere is no dispute that Advance America filed a written notice of appeal with the Commissioner of Banks within the 20-day limit. The Commission, however, argues that this action was not sufficient and that Advance America was required to file a petition for judicial review with the superior court within 20 days. According to the' Commission, \u201c[t]he statute requires a party to \u2018appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County\u2019 and to provide written notice to the Commissioner within 20 days of the final order of the Commission.\u201d (Emphasis original; quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d).) In other words, the Commission argues that the statute requires two filings: (1) an \u201cappeal to Superior Court,\u201d with (2) separate written notice to the Commissioner.\nNothing in the statute, however, can be read as imposing a two-step filing requirement. The statute specifies: \u201cAny party to a proceeding before the Banking Commission may, within 20 days after final order of said Commission and by written notice to the Commissioner of Banks, appeal to the Superior Court of Wake County....\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) (emphasis added). The statute thus refers to only one filing by the appealing party and directs that this filing be made with the Commissioner of Banks.\nThe Commission glosses over the emphasized language, which states that the appeal shall be \u201cby\u201d written notice to the Commissioner rather than, as the Commission urges, \u201cwith\u201d written notice. The ordinary meaning of the word \u201cby\u201d in this type of context is \u201cthrough the means or instrumentality of.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New Int\u2019l Dictionary 307 (1968). Thus, using the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in \u00a7 53-92(d), the appeal to Wake County Superior Court shall be through the means or instrumentality of written notice to the Commissioner of Banks. See State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 97, 591 S.E.2d 505, 511 (2004) (holding that \u201c[t]he plain meaning of words\u201d in a statute may be construed by reference to standard, nonlegal dictionaries).\n\u2022 Moreover, the Commission is asking this Court to read the word \u201cappeal\u201d as referring to a document constituting an appeal. The Commission has, however, cited to no authority suggesting that the word \u201cappeal\u201d is ordinarily understood to be some type of document. Indeed, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 105 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added) explains that the customary meaning of \u201cappeal\u201d is \u201c[a] proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher authority . . . .\u201d See Webb, 358 N.C. at 97, 591 S.E.2d at 511 (holding that, in construing statute, \u201c[w]here appropriate, including earlier in this opinion, this Court has consulted Black\u2019s Law Dictionary\u201d).\nThe procedure established by the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) is hardly unusual. All appeals to this Court are commenced by the filing of a notice of appeal in the forum rendering the decision being appealed. See N.C.R. App. R 3(a) (\u201cAny party entitled by law to appeal from a judgment or order of a superior or district court rendered in a civil action or special proceeding may take appeal by filing notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court and serving Copies thereof upon all other parties within the time prescribed by subdivision (c) of this rule.\u201d); N.C.R. App. P. 4(a) (providing that in criminal actions, any party entitled to appeal may do so by giving oral notice of appeal at trial or \u201cfiling notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court\u201d); N.C.R. App. P. 18(a) (providing that appeals of right from administrative agencies, boards, or commissions to appellate division \u201cshall be in accordance with the procedures provided in these rules for appeals of right from the courts of the trial divisions\u201d). While other procedures exist for pursuing appellate review in other contexts, we cannot dismiss \u00a7 53-92(d)\u2019s plain language as contrary to the General Assembly\u2019s intent when it comports with one form of established appellate procedure.\nThe Commission, however, argues that the statute should be construed in pari materia with the Administrative.Procedure Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 150B-1 et seq. (2007) (\u201cAPA\u201d). More specifically, the Commission asserts that \u00a7 53-92(d) should be read jointly with the APA to require the filing of a petition for judicial review in superior court (pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-45) within 20 days of the order (pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d)).\nWhile \u201c [i]t is true . . . that when statutes deal with the same subject matter, they must be construed in pari materia and harmonized to give effect to each, . . . [w]hen, however, the section dealing with a specific matter is clear and understandable on its face, it requires no construction.\u201d State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 260, 166 S.E.2d 663, 670 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has stressed, \u201c[i]n such case, the Court is without power to interpolate or superimpose conditions and limitations which the statutory exception does not of itself contain.\u201d Id., 166 S.E.2d at 670-71 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) is unambiguous, we cannot, under Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., add conditions \u2014 such as the filing of a petition for judicial review \u2014 not contained in \u00a7 53-92(d) itself.\nEven if the statute were ambiguous, the Commission is not asking that we construe the statute in pari materia with the APA, but rather is urging that we apply both the APA and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) to appeals from the Banking Commission. Such an approach cannot be reconciled with the APA itself.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43 provides: \u201cAny person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the decision under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by another statute, in which case the review shall be under such other statute.\u201d (Emphasis added.) If the procedure in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) is adequate within the meaning of \u00a7 150B-43, then review shall be under \u00a7 53-92(d), and the provisions of the APA are immaterial. On the other hand, if the procedure under \u00a7 53-92(d) is deemed inadequate, then Advance America would be \u201centitled to judicial review of the decision under [the APA].\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-43. Because of the terms of \u00a7 150B-43, we cannot accept the Commission\u2019s suggestion that we incorporate the procedures and requirements of the APA into \u00a7 53-92(d).\nWe further note that the Commission asserts, citing Young v. Roberts, 252 N.C. 9, 17, 112 S.E.2d 758, 765 (1960), that our Supreme Court has already concluded that N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92 provides an adequate procedure for judicial review of the Commission\u2019s decisions and, therefore, in the Commission\u2019s own words, \u201cprovide[s] the mandatory process for review of the Commissioner\u2019s decision.\u201d Since the procedure under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) is adequate, its provisions \u2014 and not the provisions of the APA \u2014 control this appeal. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d) contains no requirement of the filing of a petition for judicial review within 20 days with the superior court, and we are not free to borrow such a requirement from the APA.\nThe Commission, however, also claims that it has been the practice customarily followed by parties to Commission proceedings to file a petition for judicial review in superior court within 20 days together with written notice to the Commission. It urges that this practice should control. As this Court recently stressed, however, the plain meaning of a statute \u201c \u2018may not be evaded by an administrative body or a court under the guise of construction.\u2019 \u201d Navistar Fin. Corp. v. Tolson, 176 N.C. App. 217, 221, 625 S.E.2d 852, 855 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451, 465, 232 S.E.2d 184, 192 (1977)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 482, 632 S.E.2d 176 (2006). We cannot look at custom or practice when the statute is unambiguous and clear.\nFinally, the Commission argues hyperbolically that this approach would require \u201cthe Commissioner to perfect [Advance America\u2019s] appeal by carrying [Advance America\u2019s] notice of appeal to the courthouse, drafting and filing a petition for judicial review of his own order, and paying the filing fee for [Advance America\u2019s] benefit.\u201d To the contrary, no one is required to file a petition for judicial review.\nBased on the language of \u00a7 53-92(d), once the Commissioner receives the notice of appeal from the appealing party, he or she has 15 days to certify the record to the Clerk of Superior Court of Wake County. Once that certification is received, the matter \u201cshall be placed on the civil issue docket of such court and shall have precedence over other civil actions.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d). With respect to the filing fee, that amount can be assessed and collected from Advance America by the Wake County Clerk of Superior Court. Compare Porter v. Cahill, 1 N.C. App. 579, 581, 162 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1968) (holding that when plaintiff gave notice of appeal in open court, as required by statute, it was duty of clerk to place action on civil issue docket regardless of payment of filing fees; if filing fees not subsequently paid by plaintiff, defendant-appellee could make motion for notice to appellant to pay fees or suffer dismissal of appeal) with Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 114 N.C. App. 494, 496, 442 S.E.2d 85, 86 (1994) (holding that appeal was properly dismissed when plaintiff failed to pay costs to appeal within 20 days of judgment as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-228(b)).\nIn any event, even if the statute\u2019s plain language \u2014 added in 1953, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1209, sec. 5 \u2014 gives rise to some procedural problems, we do not have authority to rewrite that statute. As our Supreme Court has emphasized: \u201cThe duty of a court is to construe a statute as it is written. It is not the duty of a court to determine whether the legislation is wise or unwise, appropriate or inappropriate, or necessary or unnecessary.\u201d Campbell v. First Baptist Church of the City of Durham, 298 N.C. 476, 482, 259 S.E.2d 558, 563 (1979); see also Ferguson v. Riddle, 233 N.C. 54, 57, 62 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1950) (holding that when statute is clear, \u201c[w]e have no power to add to or subtract from the language of the statute\u201d).\nTherefore, based on the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 53-92(d), we hold that in order to timely appeal the Commission\u2019s final agency decision, Advance America was required to give written notice of appeal to the Commissioner of Banks within 20 days of the Commission\u2019s final decision. Since there is no dispute that Advance America did so, its appeal was timely, and we must reverse the trial court\u2019s order dismissing Advance America\u2019s appeal.\nIn conclusion, we observe that it may be time for the General Assembly to review this 50-year-old language. The legislature may conclude that additional provisions are necessary in light of current court practices. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 90-14.8, -14.9 (2007) (providing that physician may appeal from Medical Board decision to revoke or suspend license by filing notice of appeal with secretary of Board within 20 days, but further providing that \u201cperson seeking the review shall file with the clerk of the reviewing court a copy of the notice of appeal and an appeal bond of two hundred dollars ($200.00) at the same time the notice of appeal is filed with the Board\u201d). Until any amendment, however, the statute must be enforced as written.\nReversed.\nJudges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.\n. The APA requires that the petition for judicial review be filed within SO days of service of a written copy of the decision for which review is sought. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 150B-45(a).\n. We observe that, if the APA permitted it, it would be more reasonable to read the two statutes in conjunction to require a notice of appeal within 20 days and a petition .for judicial review within 30 days rather than selectively importing provisions from the APA into \u00a7 53-92(d). Significantly, if we were to adopt such an approach, Advance America\u2019s appeal also would be timely.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Johnny M. Loper, Donald C. Lampe, and Christopher W. Jones, for Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of North Carolina, Inc., Appellant.", "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by L. McNeil Chestnut, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney General, for the North Carolina State Banking Commission, Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE: ADVANCE AMERICA, CASH ADVANCE CENTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, INC.\nNo. COA06-1576\n(Filed 4 March 2008)\n. Banks and Banking\u2014 appeal from Bank Commission\u2014 requirements\nTimely appeal from a Bank Commission final decision to the superior court required only written notice of appeal to the Commissioner of Banks within 20 days of the Commission\u2019s final decision. There is no dispute that Advance America did so here, and its appeal was timely.\nAppeal by Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of North Carolina, Inc. from order entered 24 August 2006 by Judge J. B. Allen, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 August 2007.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Johnny M. Loper, Donald C. Lampe, and Christopher W. Jones, for Advance America, Cash Advance Centers of North Carolina, Inc., Appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by L. McNeil Chestnut, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Philip A. Lehman, Assistant Attorney General, for the North Carolina State Banking Commission, Appellee." }, "file_name": "0115-01", "first_page_order": 147, "last_page_order": 155 }