{ "id": 4156196, "name": "TIMOTHY RAPER, Employee, Plaintiff v. MANSFIELD SYSTEMS, INC. and FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Raper v. Mansfield Systems, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-03-18", "docket_number": "No. COA07-681", "first_page": "277", "last_page": "289", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 N.C. App. 277" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637939, 12637940, 12637941 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0801-01", "/se2d/641/0801-02", "/se2d/641/0801-03" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739778, 3739170, 3745188, 3739087, 3746672, 3742097, 3742770, 3737919 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0227-05", "/nc/361/0227-07", "/nc/361/0227-03", "/nc/361/0227-08", "/nc/361/0227-06", "/nc/361/0227-02", "/nc/361/0227-01", "/nc/361/0227-04" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637060 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "quoting Futrell v. Resinall Corp., 151 N.C. App. 456, 460, 566 S.E.2d 181, 184 (2002), aff'd, 357 N.C. 158, 579 S.E.2d 269 (2003) (per curiam)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640029 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634750 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" }, { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632931 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633952 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 821", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636495 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "quoting Searsey v. Perry M. Alexander Constr. Co., 35 N.C. App. 78, 79-80, 239 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1978)" }, { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639956 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 495", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633954, 12633955 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0495-01", "/se2d/619/0495-02" ] }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640613, 12640614, 12640615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0273-01", "/se2d/658/0273-02", "/se2d/658/0273-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640561, 12640460 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0667-01", "/se2d/657/0373-02" ] }, { "cite": "640 S.E.2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637758 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/640/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639160 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" }, { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0917-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638857 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491416 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080773 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787177 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "quoting Futrell v. Resinall Corp., 151 N.C. App. 456, 460, 566 S.E.2d 181, 184 (2002), aff'd, 357 N.C. 158, 579 S.E.2d 269 (2003) (per curiam)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4709088, 4704449, 4705709, 4709456, 4706517 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0190-03", "/nc/308/0190-02", "/nc/308/0190-04", "/nc/308/0190-05", "/nc/308/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520841 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8375801 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8352722 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798760, 798832, 798902, 798938, 798973 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0516-04", "/nc/343/0516-03", "/nc/343/0516-05", "/nc/343/0516-02", "/nc/343/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525056 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "quoting Beam v. Floyd's Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.C. App. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11915261 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "quoting Beam v. Floyd's Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/121/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9005932 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/170/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 677", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527213 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920", "parenthetical": "quoting Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24, 33, 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145160 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "quoting Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24, 33, 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1990)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 454", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.C. App. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525626 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/108/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572767 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779801 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788691 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491525, 491719, 491562, 491535, 491445, 491421, 491454, 491551 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0164-03", "/nc/357/0164-06", "/nc/357/0164-07", "/nc/357/0164-05", "/nc/357/0164-01", "/nc/357/0164-08", "/nc/357/0164-04", "/nc/357/0164-02" ] }, { "cite": "575 S.E.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9189937 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523384 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511542 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "discussing similar symptoms in terms of a back injury compensable upon a showing of a causal relation to a specific traumatic incident" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9381469 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" }, { "page": "753-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525497 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794917, 3786735, 3786064, 3791731, 3792312 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0535-03", "/nc/360/0535-02", "/nc/360/0535-04", "/nc/360/0535-01", "/nc/360/0535-05" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547247 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8319230 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "quoting Searsey v. Perry M. Alexander Constr. Co., 35 N.C. App. 78, 79-80, 239 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1978)" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254-55", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11712737 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. 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Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155778, 1155688, 1155729, 1155570, 1155866 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0473-01", "/nc/351/0473-05", "/nc/351/0473-04", "/nc/351/0473-02", "/nc/351/0473-03" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239575 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139458, 139363, 139469, 139548, 139613 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0546-05", "/nc/346/0546-03", "/nc/346/0546-04", "/nc/346/0546-02", "/nc/346/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C. App. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11710610 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/126/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987216 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0701-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1261, "char_count": 31023, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.745654131974477e-08, "percentile": 0.40882518633325726 }, "sha256": "7ab1e4251506e2be109a801f042614db928950dfcc24a2b20fe6bb1d8ed07746", "simhash": "1:2540e8ca547b0043", "word_count": 4921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:52.494477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur." ], "parties": [ "TIMOTHY RAPER, Employee, Plaintiff v. MANSFIELD SYSTEMS, INC. and FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nTimothy Raper (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) and Mansfield Systems, Inc. (\u201cdefendant-employer\u201d), along with its insurance carrier, Federated Mutual Insurance Co. (collectively, \u201cdefendants\u201d), appeal from an Opinion and Award of the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (\u201cFull Commission\u201d) filed 2 February 2007. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and remand in part.\nPlaintiff was employed by defendant-employer as a driver of gasoline tankers. On 28 May 2003, after filling a gasoline storage tank in his usual manner, plaintiff reached down to pick up the hose and, when he was approximately fifty percent upright, experienced a snapping sensation in his right shoulder area. Upon feeling the snapping sensation, instead of placing the hose in the trough in his usual manner, plaintiff threw the hose onto the trough to avoid dropping it and the possibility of not being able to pick it up again. Plaintiff described the trough as being higher than his shoulders.\nThereafter, plaintiff reported the incident to defendant-employer, and was instructed to seek treatment at Smithfield Urgent Care (\u201cthe Urgent Care\u201d). At the time, plaintiff\u2019s symptoms included pain extending from the right side of his neck down into his right shoulder and hand. Plaintiff also experienced numbness and tingling of the second, third, and fourth digits on his right hand as well as weakness in his right arm. Previously, plaintiff had presented to the Urgent Care, but plaintiff\u2019s medical records from the Urgent Care disclosed no prior pain in his neck, right shoulder, or right hand and no prior numbness or tingling in the fingers on his right hand.\nOn 29 May 2003, plaintiff presented to the Urgent Care, and medical records from that date describe plaintiff\u2019s symptoms in his right trapezius muscle and cervical spine, with the right side being worse than the left. The medical records also indicate that plaintiff was able to rotate his neck and head only half as much as normal. On 2 June 2003, plaintiff returned to the Urgent Care, and was diagnosed as having sustained a cervical sprain and injury to his trapezius muscle. On 9 June 2003, plaintiff again presented to the Urgent Care, and was diagnosed as having cervical radiculopathy.\nOn 26 September 2003, plaintiff presented to Dr. Carol B. Siegel (\u201cDr. Siegel\u201d) at Raleigh Orthopaedic Clinic, who noted that plaintiff was experiencing numbness and tingling in the fingers on his right hand. Dr. Siegel conducted numerous diagnostic tests, including an electromyography and nerve conduction studies of plaintiff\u2019s right upper extremity, and diagnosed plaintiff as having right carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Siegel recorded that because plaintiff denied having hand and finger symptoms prior to 28 May 2003, she could attribute his carpal tunnel syndrome only to the injury occurring on that date.\nOn 3 May 2004, plaintiff presented to Dr. Josephus T. Bloem (\u201cDr. Bloem\u201d), stating that he was experiencing constant discomfort in his right shoulder and pain in his right wrist. Following his examination, Dr. Bloem diagnosed plaintiff as having right carpal tunnel syndrome and a likely rotator cuff tear. Dr. Bloem stated that there was no manner available to determine the extent of any rotator cuff tear without performing surgery, but with respect to plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome, Dr. Bloem recommended that plaintiff attempt conservative therapies before considering surgery. Dr. Bloem opined that plaintiff\u2019s right carpal tunnel syndrome was likely the result of a wrist sprain that occurred when plaintiff threw the tanker hose onto the trough on 28 May 2003. Additionally, while acknowledging that plaintiff has diabetes, and the potential relationship between diabetes and carpal tunnel syndrome, Dr. Bloem opined that the trauma of 28 May 2003 was a more likely cause given that plaintiff had symptoms only in his right hand.\nDr. Bloem opined that performing the duties associated with plaintiff\u2019s position with defendant-employer would be problematic for plaintiff. H\u00e9 assigned plaintiff restrictions on the use of his right arm, including limitations on over-head work, lifting, pushing, and pulling. Dr. Bloem ultimately assigned plaintiff a ten percent permanent partial impairment rating to his right arm due to the shoulder injury and carpal tunnel syndrome, and he opined that plaintiff has reached maximum medical improvement.\nPlaintiff originally filed his claim for the 28 May 2003 injury against Mansfield Oil Co. (\u201cMansfield Oil\u201d) and St. Paul Travelers Insurance Co. (\u201cTravelers\u201d). Travelers initially paid indemnity and medical compensation through 1 October 2003, but on 12 November 2003, Travelers denied compensability of plaintiffs claim on the grounds that plaintiff was not an employee of Mansfield Oil at the time of the accident but instead was an employee of defendant-employer. Plaintiff amended his request for hearing, properly identifying defendants as parties. Defendants filed a response, admitting the employment relationship but denying plaintiffs claim, contending that because Travelers had accepted plaintiffs claim, Travelers was estopped from denying further responsibility for plaintiffs injury. After defendants\u2019 response but prior to the hearing, plaintiff reached a settlement with Mansfield Oil and Travelers in the amount of $8,000.00, and this settlement was approved by Deputy Commissioner Bradley W. Houser (\u201cDeputy Commissioner Houser\u201d) on 17 August 2005.\nA hearing was held before Deputy Commissioner Houser on 28 October 2005, and Deputy Commissioner Houser entered an Opinion and Award in plaintiff\u2019s favor on 6 February 2006. Defendants filed notice of appeal to the Full Commission. By Opinion and Award entered 2 February 2007, the Full Commission affirmed with modifications Deputy Commissioner Houser\u2019s Opinion and Award; Commissioner Thomas J. Bolch dissented without written opinion. In its Opinion and Award, the Full Commission found that on 28 May 2003, plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer in the form of a specific traumatic incident to his cervical spine. The Full Commission .also found that plaintiff sustained a compensable injury when he threw the hose and sprained his wrist, resulting in carpal tunnel syndrome. With respect to plaintiff\u2019s shoulder injury, however, the Full Commission found that (1) the medical evidence failed to show that plaintiff\u2019s right shoulder injury was related to the injury by accident or the specific traumatic incident that occurred on 28 May 2003; and (2) the shoulder injury was not the result of an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Thereafter, both plaintiff and defendants filed timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, defendants contend that the Full Commission erred by concluding that plaintiff\u2019s right carpel tunnel syndrome is compensable, and plaintiff contends that the Full Commission erred by (1) finding that plaintiff did not suffer a shoulder injury as a result of the 28 May 2003 incident; (2) denying plaintiff disability benefits after 3 May 2004; and (3) failing to award plaintiff attorneys\u2019 fees as a result of defendants\u2019 unreasonable defense of his claim.\n\u201c[A]ppellate review of an award from the Commission is generally limited to two issues: (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions of law are justified by the findings of fact.\u201d Johnson v. S. Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 705, 599 S.E.2d 508, 512 (2004). \u201cIn weighing the evidence, the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, and the Commission may reject entirely any testimony which it disbelieves.\u201d Hedrick v. PPG Indus., 126 N.C. App. 354, 357, 484 S.E.2d 853, 856, disc. rev. denied, 346 N.C. 546, 488 S.E.2d 801 (1997). \u201cThe findings of the Commission are conclusive on appeal when such competent evidence exists, even if there is plenary evidence for contrary findings.\u201d Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 351, 353, 524 S.E.2d 368, 371, disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 473, 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000). \u201cThis Court \u2018does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u2019 \u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)), reh\u2019g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). Additionally, \u201cfailure to assign error to the Commission\u2019s findings of fact renders them binding on appellate review.\u201d Estate of Gainey v. S. Flooring & Acoustical Co., Inc., 184 N.C. App. 497, 501, 646 S.E.2d 604, 607 (2007). \u201cThis Court reviews the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law de novo.\u201d Britt v. Gator Wood, Inc., 185 N.C. App. 677, 681, 648 S.E.2d 917, 920 (2007).\nIn their sole argument on appeal, defendants contend that Dr. Siegel\u2019s and Dr. Bloem\u2019s opinions as to the causation of plaintiff\u2019s right carpal tunnel syndrome constituted incompetent evidence and that the Full Commission, therefore, erred in awarding workers\u2019 compensation benefits for plaintiff\u2019s right carpal tunnel syndrome. We disagree.\n\u201cA claimant in a workers\u2019 compensation case bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a causal relationship between the injury and the claimant\u2019s employment.\u201d Legette v. Scotland Mem\u2019l Hosp., 181 N.C. App. 437, 455, 640 S.E.2d 744, 756 (2007), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 177, 658 S.E.2d 273 (2008). When the causation of a particular \u201c \u2018injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980)). Expert testimony based upon speculation and conjecture \u201cis not sufficiently reliable to qualify as competent evidence on issues of medical causation.\u201d Young v. Hickory Bus. Furniture, 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000). Therefore,\nthe Supreme Court has allowed \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d expert testimony as probative and competent evidence to prove causation. However, \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d expert testimony is insufficient to support a causal connection when there is additional evidence or testimony showing the expert\u2019s opinion to be a guess or mere speculation. An expert witness\u2019 testimony is insufficient to establish causation where the expert witness is unable to express an opinion to any degree of medical certainty as to the cause of an illness. Likewise, where an expert witness expressly bases his opinion as to causation of a complex medical condition solely on the maxim post hoc ergo propter hoc (after it, therefore because of it), the witness provides insufficient evidence of causation.\nAdams v. Metals USA, 168 N.C. App. 469, 476, 608 S.E.2d 357, 362 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted), aff\u2019d, 360 N.C. 54, 619 S.E.2d 495 (2005) (per curiam).\nIn the instant case, defendants contend that Dr. Bloem\u2019s testimony as to causation was incompetent on the grounds that it was based upon (1) the maxim post hoc ergo propter hoc and (2) facts not in evidence, specifically, the existence of a wrist sprain suffered by plaintiff when he threw the tanker hose onto the trough.\nIn formulating his opinion, Dr. Bloem considered electrodiagnostic tests performed by Dr. Siegel as well as plaintiff\u2019s description of the symptoms and mechanism of the injury. As this Court has stated previously, \u201c[a] physician\u2019s diagnosis often depends on the patient\u2019s subjective complaints, and this does not render the physician\u2019s opinion incompetent as a matter of law.\u201d Jenkins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 134 N.C. App. 405, 410, 518 S.E.2d 6, 9 (1999), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds and disc. rev. improvidently allowed in part, 351 N.C. 341, 524 S.E.2d 805 (2000) (per curiam). Based upon the tests and plaintiff\u2019s accounts, Dr. Bloem confirmed Dr. Siegel\u2019s diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome, and on appeal, defendants have disputed only the issue of causation, not the diagnosis itself.\nIn discussing the issue of causation, Dr. Bloem noted that plaintiff may have suffered a sprain, and that such a sprain, more than likely, would have caused plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome. The Full Commission found that plaintiff was injured when he \u201csprained his wrist, resulting in carpal tunnel syndrome,\u201d but as defendants correctly argue, the record contains no evidence that plaintiff, in fact, experienced a wrist sprain. Dr. Bloem also acknowledged that plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome could have been caused by his diabetes or by the repetitive vibrations he experienced while driving trucks. Ultimately, the record fails to contain evidence that precisely identifies the initial cause of plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome.\nNevertheless, the record does contain evidence that, even if plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome was a pre-existing condition, the carpal tunnel syndrome was aggravated by the 28 May 2003 injury. Dr. Bloem testified that plaintiff may have \u201chad silent carpal tunnel surgery [sic] based on his diabetes, maybe. Well, maybe, but if so then it was aggravated by the injury and you\u2019re still back at the injury that\u2019s doing it.\" (Emphasis added). It is well-established that \u201c [aggravation of a pre-existing condition caused by a work-related injury is compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d Moore v. Fed. Express, 162 N.C. App. 292, 297, 590 S.E.2d 461, 465 (2004). Dr. Bloem did not base his opinion solely upon facts not in evidence or the maxim post hoc ergo propter hoc. Whether caused by a wrist sprain, diabetes, or vibrations experienced while driving trucks, competent evidence supports the Full Commission\u2019s award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits for plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome.\nBecause we hold that Dr. Bloem\u2019s testimony constituted competent evidence to support the Full Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s 28 May 2003 injury caused his carpal tunnel syndrome, we need not reach plaintiff\u2019s arguments concerning the competency of Dr. Siegel\u2019s opinions as to causation. See Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 42, 653 S.E.2d 400, 410 (2007) (\u201cSince appellate courts are \u2018limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law,\u2019 our review must stop there.\u201d (quoting Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000))). Accordingly, defendants\u2019 assignments of error are overruled.\nWith respect to plaintiff\u2019s appeal, plaintiff first contends that the Full Commission erred by finding that plaintiff did not suffer a shoulder injury as a result of the incident of 28 May 2003. We disagree.\nPursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 97-2(6), a compensable injury \u201cshall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. . . .\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2005). It is well-established that\n[a]n accident is an unlooked for event and implies a result produced by a fortuitous cause. If an employee is injured while carrying on his usual tasks in the usual way the injury does not arise by accident. However, if an interruption of the work routine occurs introducing unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences, an accidental cause will be inferred.\nLineback v. Wake County Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 126 N.C. App. 678, 681, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254-55 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As this Court has explained,\n\u201c[a]n \u2018accident\u2019 is not established by the mere fact of injury but is to be considered as a separate event preceding and causing the injury. No matter how great the injury, if it is caused by an event that involves both an employee\u2019s normal work routine and normal working conditions it will not be considered to have been caused by accident.\u201d\nRenfro v. Richardson Sports Ltd. Partners, 172 N.C. App. 176, 180, 616 S.E.2d 317, 322 (2005) (quoting Searsey v. Perry M. Alexander Constr. Co., 35 N.C. App. 78, 79-80, 239 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1978)), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 535, 633 S.E.2d 821 (2006).\nSection 97-2(6) provides a different test for back injuries:\n[W]here injury to the back arises out of and in the course of the employment and is the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned, \u201cinjury by accident\u201d shall be construed to include any disabling physical injury to the back arising out of and causally related to such incident.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2005). Therefore, the \u201cstatute provides two theories on which a back injury claimant can proceed: (1) that claimant was injured by accident; or (2) that the injury arose from a specific traumatic incident.\u201d Fish v. Steelcase, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 703, 707, 449 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 650 (1995). \u201c[T]o prove a \u2018specific traumatic incident,\u2019 a worker must only show that the injury occurred at a \u2018judicially cognizable\u2019 point in time.\u201d Zimmerman v. Eagle Elec. Mfg. Co., 147 N.C. App. 748, 754, 556 S.E.2d 678, 681 (2001), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 356 N.C. 425, 571 S.E.2d 587 (2002) (per curiam). As this Court observed, by providing the separate definition of \u201cinjury by accident,\u201d \u201cthe General Assembly intended to relax the requirement that there be some unusual circumstance that accompanied the [back] injury.\u201d Bradley v. E.B. Sportswear, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 450, 452, 335 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1985).\nIn the case sub judice, Dr. Bloem testified and plaintiff\u2019s medical records demonstrate that plaintiff experienced, inter alia, a trapezius strain and a cervical strain. Defendants concede that plaintiff\u2019s injury to his cervical spine was a back injury and, therefore, compensable as an injury \u201carising out of and causally related to [a specific traumatic] incident.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2005); see also Zimmerman, 147 N.C. App. at 753-54, 556 S.E.2d at 681 (discussing similar symptoms in terms of a back injury compensable upon a showing of a causal relation to a specific traumatic incident). Plaintiff\u2019s trapezius strain, however, was a \u201cneck injury and/or shoulder injury,\u201d as the trapezius \u201cis the muscle between the neck and the shoulder that makes the flare of the neck.\u201d Although plaintiff argues in his brief that \u201c[t]he only medical evidence of record demonstrates that Plaintiff\u2019s shoulder injury is, indeed, related to the specific traumatic incident of May 28, 2003,\u201d (emphasis in original), the \u201cspecific traumatic incident\u201d test only applies to back injuries, not to shoulder injuries. Therefore, plaintiff was required to show that his trapezius strain was caused by an accident and not \u201can event that involves both an employee\u2019s normal work routine and normal working conditions.\u201d Renfro, 172 N.C. App. at 180, 616 S.E.2d at 322 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nHere, the evidence demonstrated that plaintiff\u2019s trapezius strain was caused by his shoulder injury and. that his shoulder injury, in turn, occurred while performing his normal work routine under normal working conditions. Specifically, plaintiff, while lifting a hose in a standard fashion after unloading gasoline, felt a snapping sensation in his shoulder, which Dr. Bloem explained resulted in irritation of plaintiff\u2019s labrum and, likely, a rotator cuff tear. Only after feeling the snapping sensation did plaintiff throw the hose in an unusual manner. Although Dr. Bloem testified that plaintiff\u2019s \u201chaving to throw [the hose] back on the trough in an unusual manner\u201d more likely than not caused plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome, there is no evidence that this caused or aggravated plaintiff\u2019s shoulder injury. Instead, the shoulder injury appears to have occurred while plaintiff was lifting the hose in a normal manner, and therefore, the Full Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s shoulder injury was not the result of an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d as defined in section 97-2(6) is supported by competent evidence. This finding, in turn, supports the conclusion that plaintiff did not sustain a compensable injury to his shoulder. See, e.g., Harrison v. Lucent Techs., 156 N.C. App. 147, 153, 575 S.E.2d 825, 829, disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 164, 580 S.E.2d 365 (2003). Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nPlaintiff next contends that the Full Commission erred by denying plaintiff disability benefits after 3 May 2004. We hold that the Full Commission failed to make sufficient findings on this issue, and therefore, we remand for additional findings of fact.\n\u201c \u2018Disability,\u2019 within the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, \u2018means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.\u2019 \u201d Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 493 (2005) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(9)). The burden of proving a disability as well as the extent of the disability lies with the employee seeking compensation under the Act. See id. (citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 185, 345 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1986)). In order for a plaintiff to establish a claim for disability, whether temporary or permanent, under the Act,\nthe Commission must find: (1) that plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in the same employment, (2) that plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment, and (3) that this individual\u2019s incapacity to earn was caused by plaintiff\u2019s injury.\nHilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982). This Court has explained that\n[t]he employee may meet this burden in one of four ways: (1) the production of medical evidence that he is physically or mentally, as a consequence of the work related injury, incapable of work in any employment; (2) the production of evidence that he is capable of some work, but that he has, after a reasonable effort on his part, been unsuccessful in his effort to obtain employment; (3) the production of evidence that he is capable of some work but that it would be futile because of preexisting conditions, i.e., age, inexperience, lack of education, to seek other employment; or (4) the production of evidence that he has obtained other employment at a wage less than that earned prior to the injury.\nRussell v. Lowes Prod. Distrib., 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993) (internal citations omitted). \u201cIf an employee presents substantial evidence he or she is incapable of earning wages, the employer must then \u2018come forward with evidence to show not only that suitable jobs are available, but also that the plaintiff is capable of getting one, taking into account both physical and vocational limitations.\u2019 \u201d Barber v. Going W. Transp. Inc., 134 N.C. App. 428, 435, 517 S.E.2d 914, 920 (1999) (quoting Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Med. Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24, 33, 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1990)).\nIn the case sub judice, plaintiff has confined his argument to the second and third prongs of the Russell test. Dr. Bloem testified that plaintiff\u2019s \u201ccervical spine injury . . . had resolved by the time [he] examined [plaintiff] on May 3rd, 2004,\u201d and that \u201cthere was no permanent impairment associated with that cervical spine injury.\u201d Although Dr. Bloem assigned plaintiff certain work restrictions, the record demonstrates that plaintiff was capable of at least some work after 3 May 2004. Therefore, for plaintiff to demonstrate disability beyond 3 May 2004, plaintiff must have satisfied his burden under the balance of the second and third prongs of the Russell test \u2014 specifically, plaintiff must have demonstrated either that (1) he made a reasonable effort to obtain employment but was unsuccessful, or (2) any effort to obtain employment would have been futile because of preexisting conditions. See Russell, 108 N.C. App. at 765, 425 S.E.2d at 457. In its Opinion and Award, however, \u201cthe Commission made no findings regarding either of these two factors. Plaintiff argues he presented evidence that he sought employment, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a job. The Commission entered no findings of fact on this evidence.\u201d Workman v. Rutherford Elec. Membership Corp., 170 N.C. App. 481, 490, 613 S.E.2d 243, 250 (2005). Accordingly, we must remand to the Full Commission to make findings concerning plaintiff\u2019s disability, pursuant to the second and third prongs of the Russell test, for the period following 3 May 2004. See Britt, 185 N.C. App. at 685, 648 S.E.2d at 922.\nFinally, plaintiff contends that the Full Commission erred by failing to award plaintiff attorneys\u2019 fees as a result of defendants\u2019 unreasonable defense of his claim. We disagree.\nPursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 97-88.1, \u201c[i]f the Industrial Commission shall determine that any hearing has been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings including reasonable fees for defendant\u2019s attorney or plaintiff\u2019s attorney upon the party who has brought or defended them.\u201d N.C. Gem.Stat. \u00a7 97-88.1 (2005). \u201cThe purpose of this section is to prevent \u2018stubborn, unfounded litigiousness which is inharmonious with the primary purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to provide compensation to injured employees.\u2019 \u201d Troutman v. White & Simpson, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 48, 54, 464 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1995) (quoting Beam v. Floyd\u2019s Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 768, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990)), disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C. 516, 472 S.E.2d 26 (1996). \u201cThe decision whether to award or deny attorney\u2019s fees rests within the sound discretion of the Commission and will not be overturned absent a showing that the decision was manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d Thompson v. Fed. Express Ground, 175 N.C. App. 564, 570, 623 S.E.2d 811, 815 (2006).\nIn the instant case, the deputy commissioner found that defendants\u2019 defense of the claim was unreasonable and awarded attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to section 97-88.1. The Full Commission, however, is not bound by a deputy commissioner\u2019s findings and award, see Strezinski v. City of Greensboro, 187 N.C. App. 703, 709, 654 S.E.2d 263, 267 (2007), and here, the Full Commission disagreed with the deputy commissioner and found that defendants did \u201cnot engage [] in stubborn, unfounded litigiousness during the course of defending this claim.\u201d The Full Commission, therefore, properly concluded that \u201cdefendants are not subject to sanctions in the form of attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d On appeal, plaintiff has failed to cite any authority supporting his contention that defendants\u2019 defense was unreasonable or that the Commission\u2019s decision was an abuse of discretion, see N.C. R. App. P 28(b)(6) (2006), and \u201c[o]ur review of th\u00e9 record fails to disclose an abuse of discretion\u201d on the issue of attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to section 97-88.1. Thompson, 175 N.C. App. at 570, 623 S.E.2d at 815; accord Donnell v. Cone Mills Corp., 60 N.C. App. 338, 344, 299 S.E.2d 436, 439, disc. rev. denied, 308 N.C. 190, 302 S.E.2d 243 (1983). Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nAccordingly, we remand the instant'matter to the Full Commission for findings and conclusions as to the second and third prongs of the Russell test with respect to plaintiffs alleged disability following 3 May 2004, and we affirm the remainder of the Full Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award.\nAffirmed in part; Remanded in part.\nJudges TYSON and ARROWOOD concur.\n. Our Supreme Court recently held that \u201c \u2018evidence tending to show that the employment simply aggravated or contributed to the employee\u2019s condition goes only to the issue of causation\u2019 \u201d and an employee still must \u201c \u2018establish!] that the employment placed him at a greater risk for contracting the condition than the general public.\u2019 \u201d Chambers v. Transit Mgmt., 360 N.C. 609, 613, 636 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2006) (quoting Futrell v. Resinall Corp., 151 N.C. App. 456, 460, 566 S.E.2d 181, 184 (2002), aff\u2019d, 357 N.C. 158, 579 S.E.2d 269 (2003) (per curiam)), reh\u2019g denied, 361 N.C. 227, 641 S.E.2d 801 (2007). As noted supra, however, defendants have'confined their argument to the issue of causation, and therefore, we limit our analysis accordingly.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Anderson Law Firm, by Michael J. Anderson, for plaintiff-appellant/'appellee.", "Hedrick, Batman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Tonya D. Davis, for defendants-appellants/appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TIMOTHY RAPER, Employee, Plaintiff v. MANSFIELD SYSTEMS, INC. and FEDERATED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA07-681\n(Filed 18 March 2008)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 carpal tunnel syndrome \u2014 evidence of causation \u2014 sufficiency\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by awarding benefits for plaintiff\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome where the evidence was that the syndrome, even if preexisting, was aggravated by his work-related injury.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 initial injury \u2014 not an injury by accident\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff did not suffer a compensable shoulder injury where, as the driver of a gasoline tanker, he felt a snap in his shoulder as he lifted a hose used for filling a storage tank in the usual way and then threw the hose into a trough instead of placing it. While there were other injuries, there was no evidence that lifting the hose in the normal manner caused or aggravated plaintiff\u2019s shoulder injury.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 continuing disability \u2014 ability to do some work \u2014 findings not sufficient\nThe Industrial Commission did not make sufficient findings in a workers\u2019 compensation case when denying disability benefits after the date that plaintiff was capable of some work. The matter was remanded for findings about whether plaintiff had made a reasonable effort to obtain employment or that any effort to obtain employment would have been futile because of preexisting conditions.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 attorney fees denied \u2014 no abuse of discretion\nThe Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in a workers\u2019 compensation case by not awarding plaintiff attorney fees. The Commission found that defendants did not engage in stubborn, unfounded litigiousness and plaintiff did not cite any authority supporting his contention that defendants\u2019 defense was unreasonable or that the Commission abused its discretion.\nAppeal by defendants and cross-appeal by plaintiff from Opinion and Award of the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission entered 2 February 2007 by Commissioner Dianne C. Sellers. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 2007.\nAnderson Law Firm, by Michael J. Anderson, for plaintiff-appellant/'appellee.\nHedrick, Batman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Tonya D. Davis, for defendants-appellants/appellees." }, "file_name": "0277-01", "first_page_order": 309, "last_page_order": 321 }