{ "id": 4157141, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff v. THADDIUS RAEFIELD WRIGHT, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Wright", "decision_date": "2008-03-18", "docket_number": "No. COA07-611", "first_page": "346", "last_page": "354", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 N.C. App. 346" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 140", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631406, 12631407 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/598/0140-02", "/se2d/598/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631371, 12631372, 12631373, 12631405, 12631406, 12631376, 12631377 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/597/0770-02", "/se2d/597/0770-01", "/se2d/597/0771-03", "/se2d/598/0139-01", "/se2d/598/0140-02", "/se2d/597/0772-02", "/se2d/597/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12632629 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/611/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 1061", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11733984, 11734498, 11734115, 11734436, 11734231, 11734281, 11734633, 11734377, 11734060, 11734783, 11734711, 11734330, 11734173, 11734559 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 93, 443 S.E.2d 306, 312 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/1061-01", "/us/519/1061-10", "/us/519/1061-03", "/us/519/1061-09", "/us/519/1061-05", "/us/519/1061-06", "/us/519/1061-12", "/us/519/1061-08", "/us/519/1061-02", "/us/519/1061-14", "/us/519/1061-13", "/us/519/1061-07", "/us/519/1061-04", "/us/519/1061-11" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 894", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11650948, 11650856, 11650697, 11651114, 11650987, 11650666, 11651023, 11650767, 11651059, 11651156, 11650904, 11650809, 11651194, 11650716 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8917014 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8473360 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535633 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 618", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 93, 443 S.E.2d 306, 312 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "471 S.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" }, { "page": "386" }, { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798972 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 U.S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223686 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/500/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. 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Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11319062 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "87-88" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828-29" }, { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "826-27" }, { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. App. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11649601 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/129/0268-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 751, "char_count": 18647, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.257588604483631e-08, "percentile": 0.38620900291870297 }, "sha256": "eea862b1dd61ec7cd8dbf779dcb18424cee2c96d7e55ef08c553cc9edb0439a8", "simhash": "1:c173150c0936a5fa", "word_count": 3144 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:52.494477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and CALABRIA concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff v. THADDIUS RAEFIELD WRIGHT, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendant was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting'serious injury and first degree burglary. Defendant appeals. The dispositive question before this Court is whether the trial court erred by finding the State had not engaged in purposeful discrimination when the State did not provide a race-neutral explanation for each African-American whom it had removed from the jury by peremptory challenge. For the following reasons, we grant a new trial.\nI. Background\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 17 November 2004, Ruben Alvin David Garnett (\u201cGarnett\u201d) was at home at Foxfire Apartments with his paralyzed cousin Demoris Wall (\u201cWall\u201d), and his cousin\u2019s girlfriend, Akeisha Judd (\u201cJudd\u201d). Garnett awoke to \u201ca kick on the door and somebody yelling \u2018police\u2019.\u201d Garnett got up to open the door and was shot four to five times. Garnett went back into the room he had been in and \u201cplayed dead.\u201d Garnett heard someone come in and then passed out. Judd heard gunshots at her bedroom door, and Wall called the police. When Garnett awoke he found Jigger, the dog, dead and the front door off of its hinges.\nOfficer Douglas Rausch (\u201cOfficer Rausch\u201d), a police officer with the City of Durham was on his way home when he received a call for a shooting on Wyldewood. Officer Rausch\nspotted a vehicle [(\u201csuspect vehicle\u201d)] coming out of the Wyldewood area, turning right onto Stadium, which would make it come straight at [him]. And as [Officer Rausch] passed, there were three occupants in the [suspect vehicle], and they gave, in [his] terms, a million-mile stare, which meant [they] had seen [Officer Rausch].\nAs Officer Rausch turned around the suspect vehicle picked up speed. Officer Rausch \u201cgave the other officers that were coming to the scene the description of the [suspect] vehicle, license plate, and told them to be on the lookout[.]\u201d Approximately six to eight vehicles joined in the chase. Defendant and two others engaged the police in a chase which lasted approximately an hour and ended when the suspect vehicle collided with another vehicle. Three firearms were recovered \u2014 one in the front passenger seat of the suspect vehicle, one on the curb by the suspect vehicle, and one on Rowemont Street, a street on the chase route. On or about 7 March 2005, defendant was indicted for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (hereinafter referred to as \u201cAWDWIKISI\u201d), first degree burglary, three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon, felonious speeding to elude arrest, and cruelty to animals. Trial was held on 23-27 October 2007. After jury selection, defendant\u2019s counsel \u201coffer[ed] an objection based on Batson [because] every single person the State dismissed from [the] jury panel happened to be of the African-American persuasion[,] the same race as the defendant.\u201d The following dialogue took place:\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: If we go back through it, Juror Number One that was originally in the box that was dismissed by the State was Ms. Mack. She was a black female. Juror Number Two that was dismissed by the State was a black male \u2014 sorry, had to look back through my notes. He was a black male. Juror Number Seven was a black male. That was Mr. Williams. Juror Number Nine was a black male. That was Mr. Stevenson, who got confused with \u2014 Mr. Stevens got confused with Mr. Stevenson.\nTHE COURT: He was a white male.\nMS. ELLIS: He was a white male.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: Okay. Now, Mr. Stevens was the white male. All right.\nTHE COURT: Both were white males.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: Juror Number One\u2014\nTHE COURT: Stevens and Stevenson were both white males.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: No, sir. I would beg to disagree with the Court.\nTHE COURT: Ms. Baker-Harrell, you may disagree with me, but you\u2019re wrong. Both Mr. Stevens and Mr. Stevenson were both white males.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: Okay. Okay. Your Honor, I \u2014 I respectfully disagree, but I\u2019ll just point out that Juror Number Nine was the gentleman who was married, and who pointed out\u2014\nTHE COURT: Oh, I\u2019m sorry. It was Mr. Johnson.\nMS. ELLIS: Your Honor, yes. Mr. Stevenson is a black man that has the DWI.\nTHE COURT: That\u2019s correct.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: Oh, I apologize to you.\nMS. ELLIS: I did the same thing; I pulled up Mr. Johnson.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m sorry. That was Mr. Johnson.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: Yes, sir. And again, sir, I wasn\u2019t trying to be rude, but I did note it\u2014\nTHE COURT: Make your points.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: \u2014on there that he was a black male, sir.\nJuror Number 12, Ms. Reeves, was excused by the State. She was a preschool teacher. She was a black female. The next person \u2014 I\u2019m trying to find her \u2014 excused by the State was seated in Mr. Johnson\u2019s spot, which was Juror Number Ten, and she became Juror Number Ten. Her name was Ms. Miller. That was a black female, Alberta Miller.\nTHE COURT: That was in number nine.\nMS. ELLIS: Nine.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Stevenson\u2019s seat.\nMS. BAKER-HARRELL: Okay. I\u2019m sorry. I switched my notes when I was \u2014 when you told me it wasn\u2019t, and I said, no, I got it. I apologize. I got them in the wrong spot. But again though, she was dismissed by the State. She was a black female, and then in going to the alternate juror that was presented to the Court, Ms. Robin Evans, she was a black female, Your Honor, and you know, if you look at \u2014 that\u2019s why I\u2019m pointing out to the Court that everybody that\u2019s been dismissed by the State have been of African-American persuasion, which happens \u2014 so happens to be the race of my client.\nTHE COURT: All right.\nMs. Ellis, do you wish to respond?\nMS. ELLIS: Yes, Your Honor. Going through each of them, Ms. Brown, who was also a black female, was the first to be impanelled [sic], seat number six. She was left on the panel. Ms. Mary Bass was left on the panel. The reasons why that the others were dismissed \u2014 the alternate juror had no pets. That\u2019s one of the things that we were looking for were pets, not necessarily color. Your Honor, Mr. Stevenson was dismissed. He had a DWI, 72 hours of jail time. I mean, can go on and on with each of the jurors. There are reasons why that they were picked. It wasn\u2019t picked because of their race or anything like that.\nThe jurors that she stated, one of them stated that he had been pulled over several times and had bad feelings towards the police for being pulled over. One of them was a retired schoolteacher. The other one, Mr. Williams, who actually knew the officer, had spoken with the officer; and the investigator stated that he had a lot of interaction with that juror because of his son being tutored by him, and I should also like to put on the record that the investigator in this case is black.\nYour Honor, the reasons why each of these jurors were eliminated were not because of their race, were not because of their \u2014 it was because of their background. Your Honor, it was because of their background that they were dismissed, not because of their race. The State has left several black persons on the list. I mean, she has basically argued a Batson motion when I have left many and passed many panels of jurors that had included several black people on it.\nTHE COURT: The Court,- in considering the Motion for a Batson challenge, you\u2019re not challenging the original panel, I presume. You\u2019re simply challenging those that the district attorney has used in terms of making peremptory challenges towards those jurors. The Court finds that there were valid reasons for excusing \u2014 I won\u2019t go over every one, but valid reasons for excusing peremptorily several of the members of the jury panel.\nThe Court notes that both the plaintiff and \u2014 or the State and the defendant exercised every challenge they had, including the additional challenge for the alternate juror, and that the jury panel as it is presently consisted, is an accurate reflection of the community, and the Court does not find that the peremptory challenges exercised by the State, there being no challenges for cause that were granted by the Court, that any of the peremptory challenges were based solely on race.\nThe trial judge later dismissed the possession of a firearm by a felon charges. On or about 27 October 2006, defendant was found not guilty of speeding to elude arrest or cruelty to animals and was convicted of AWDWIKISI and first degree burglary. Defendant appeals.\nII. Peremptory Challenges\nDefendant argues that \u201cthe trial court committed reversible error by finding that the State had not engaged in purposeful discrimination when it used all of its peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors and did not provide race-neutral explanations for each juror.\u201d For the following reasons, we agree, and thus grant a new trial. \u201cThe \u2018clear error\u2019 standard is a federal standard of review adopted by our courts for appellate review of the Batson inquiry.\u201d State v. Cofield, 129 N.C. App. 268, 276 n.1, 498 S.E.2d 823, 829 n.1 (1998).\nIn Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court established a three-step test to determine whether the State\u2019s peremptory challenges of prospective jurors are purposefully discriminatory. Under Batson, the defendant must first successfully establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88. If the prima facie case is not established, it follows that the peremptory challenges are allowed. If the prima facie case is established, however, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue. Id. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88. If the prosecutor fails to rebut the prima facie case of racial discrimination with race-neutral explanations, it follows that the peremptory challenges are not allowed.\nCofield at 274-75, 498 S.E.2d at 828-29. \u201cFinally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination.\u201d State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 11, 468 S.E.2d 204, 208, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991)).\nIf the pros\u00e9cutor volunteers his reasons for the peremptory challenges in question before the trial court rules whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing or if the trial court requires the prosecutor to give his reasons without ruling on the question of a prima facie showing, the question of whether the defendant has made aprima facie showing becomes moot, and it becomes the responsibility of the trial court to make appropriate findings on whether the stated reasons are a credible, nondiscriminatory basis for the challenges or simply pretext.\nState v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 359, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1061, 136 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1997) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 93, 443 S.E.2d 306, 312 (1994)).\nWhether defendant established a prima facie case is moot as the prosecutor here \u201cvolunteered] his reasons for the peremptory challenges\u201d; the question now before us is whether the prosecutor has met its burden of \u201coffer[ing] a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue.\u201d Cofield at 275, 498 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added); see Williams at 359, 471 S.E.2d at 386. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201ceach\u201d as \u201c[a] distributive adjective pronoun, which denotes or refers to every one of the persons or things mentioned; every one of two or more persons or things, composing the whole, separately considered.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 455 (5th ed. 1979).\nSeveral North Carolina cases have addressed issues raised by a Batson motion; however, in all of these cases, unlike the case before us, the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation for each and every one of the challenged jurors. See State v. Carmon, 169 N.C. App. 750, 756, 611 S.E.2d 211, 215 (2005); State v. Matthews, 162 N.C. App. 339, 340-41, 595 S.E.2d 446, 447-48, disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 379, 598 S.E.2d 140 (2004); State v. White, 131 N.C. App. 734, 739-40, 509 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1998); Cofield at 270-72, 498 S.E.2d at 826-27; Lyons at 11-13, 468 S.E.2d at 208-09.\nIn the present case defendant\u2019s counsel brought all seven of the State\u2019s peremptory challenges to the court\u2019s attention because they were all used on African-American members of the jury pool, including, (1) juror number one, Ms. Mack, (2) juror number two, Ms. Pettiford, (3) juror number seven, Mr. Williams, (4) juror number nine, Mr. Stevenson, (5) juror number twelve, Ms. Reeves, (6) juror number nine in Mr. Stevenson\u2019s seat, Ms. Miller, and (7) the alternate juror, Ms. Evans. At most the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for five of the seven aforementioned jurors. The prosecution responded,\n[(1)] the alternate juror had no pets. . . .[(2)] Mr. Stevenson was dismissed. He had a DWI, 72 hours of jail time.... The jurors that she stated, [(3)] one of them stated that he had been pulled over several times and had bad feelings towards the police for being pulled over. [(4)] One of them was a retired schoolteacher. [(5)] The other one, Mr. Williams, who actually knew the officer, had spoken with the officer; and the investigator stated that he had a lot of interaction with that juror because of his son being tutored by him[.]\nThe prosecution also stated,\nI mean, can go on and on with each of the jurors. There are reasons why that they were picked. It wasn\u2019t picked because of their race or anything like that. . . . Your Honor, the reasons why each of these jurors were eliminated were not because of their race, were not because of their \u2014 it was because of their background. Your Honor, it was because of their background that they were dismissed, not because of their race.\nHere the prosecutor has failed to \u201coffer a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue.\u201d Cofield at 275, 498 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added). The prosecutor gave race-neutral explanations for its use of peremptory challenges on five of the jurors; however, two jurors are not specifically mentioned at all. The plain language of this Court requires the prosecution to \u201coffer a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). \u201cEach\u201d denotes or refers to \u201cevery one of the persons or things mentioned; every one of two or more persons or things, composing the whole, separately considered.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 455. The prosecutor here failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for \u201cevery one\u201d of the jurors mentioned by the defendant. See id. Though the prosecutor speaks of the group as a whole, the prosecutor did not, in her language to the court, \u201cseparately consider []\u201d each juror mentioned by defense counsel. See id.\nIt was \u201cthe responsibility of the trial court to make appropriate findings on whether the stated reasons are a credible, nondiscriminatory basis for the challenges or simply pretext.\u201d Williams at 359, 471 S.E.2d at 386. Although the trial court stated its finding \u201cthat there were valid reasons for excusing \u2014 I won\u2019t go over every one, but valid reasons for excusing peremptorily several of the members of the jury panel,\u201d the trial court could not and did not make findings as to each juror, as the prosecutor had not even offered any explanation as to two jurors. The State thus failed to meet its burden in response to defendant\u2019s showing of a Batson violation, and the trial court erred in makings its \u201cfindings on whether the stated reasons are a credible, nondiscriminatory basis for the challenges or simply pretext\u201d as there was no explanation offered for two of the jurors. See id. We appreciate the challenges faced by the prosecutor and the trial court in attempting to comply with the requirements of Batson; however, we are duty bound to follow the plain language of the law. As the prosecutor failed to provide a race-neutral explanation as to each challenged juror mentioned by the defendant the trial court clearly erred in not granting defendant\u2019s Batson motion. Cofield at 275, 498 S.E.2d at 828.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we grant a new trial, and thus defendant\u2019s other assignments of-error need not be addressed as they are not likely to arise at a new trial.\nNEW TRIAL.\nJudges HUNTER and CALABRIA concur.\n. From the record before us it appears that Mr. Stevens was a white male and Mr. Stevenson was a black male. During jury selection the State said it would like to excuse Mr. Stevens. However, from the record it appears Mr. Stevenson was actually excused and Mr. Stevens remained on the jury. The practical effect of this means that the State used all seven of its peremptory challenges on African-Americans. However, assuming. arguendo, that the State did excuse Mr. Stevens and Mr. Stevenson did remain on the jury, the State still provided race-neutral explanations for only five of the six jurors mentioned by defendant\u2019s counsel.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Tina A. Krasner, for the State.", "Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kristen L. Todd, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff v. THADDIUS RAEFIELD WRIGHT, Defendant\nNo. COA07-611\n(Filed 18 March 2008)\nJury\u2014 selection \u2014 Batson challenge \u2014 failure to provide race-neutral explanations for each peremptory challenge used on African-Americans\nThe trial court erred in an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and first-degree burglary case by finding the State had not engaged in purposeful discrimination when the State did not provide a race-neutral explanation for each African-American it removed from the jury by peremptory challenge, and defendant is granted a new trial, because: (1) defendant\u2019s counsel brought all seven of the State\u2019s peremptory challenges to the court\u2019s attention since they were all used on African-American members of the jury pool; (2) at most, the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for five of the seven pertinent potential jurors; and (3) the State failed to meet its burden to offer a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge at issue, and the trial court could not have made a finding of a valid excuse for each of those jurors when the prosecutor had not even offered any explanation as to two of the jurors.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 27 October 2006 by Judge Kenneth C. Titus in Superior Court, Durham County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November 2007.\nAttorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Tina A. Krasner, for the State.\nAppellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kristen L. Todd, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0346-01", "first_page_order": 378, "last_page_order": 386 }