{ "id": 4157014, "name": "CYNTHIA ANN FREY, Plaintiff v. JOHN P. BEST, JR., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Frey v. Best", "decision_date": "2008-04-15", "docket_number": "No. COA07-703", "first_page": "622", "last_page": "639", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "189 N.C. App. 622" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798", "parenthetical": "citing Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131998 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 S.E.2d 223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "citing Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999)" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241018 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581", "parenthetical": "citing Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999)" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 S.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9132982 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574089 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 647", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "citing N.C.R. App. P. 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11143141 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "citing N.C.R. App. P. 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "921" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "921" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597424 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" }, { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527143 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" }, { "page": "580" }, { "page": "579-80" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11078803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/138/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491698 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "914-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080119 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 809", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "citing LaValley v. LaValley, 151 N.C. App. 290, 292, 564 S.E.2d 913, 914-15 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8958235 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "citing LaValley v. LaValley, 151 N.C. App. 290, 292, 564 S.E.2d 913, 914-15 (2002)" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "citing Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975)" }, { "page": "170" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "\"[The trial judge] has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552199 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "\"[The trial judge] has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" }, { "page": "833" }, { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "16 N.C. App. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548648 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/16/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659910 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11655711 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572341 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522402 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. App. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552246, 8552287 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/25/0213-01", "/nc-app/25/0213-02" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E.2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564644 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "712" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 N.C. App. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549928 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/40/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8555154 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571060 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" }, { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549118 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4686660, 4695653, 4695471, 4689718, 4689592 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0331-03", "/nc/314/0331-01", "/nc/314/0331-05", "/nc/314/0331-02", "/nc/314/0331-04" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567141 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "406", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53936 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "436" }, { "page": "439" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559378 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801", "parenthetical": "citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)" }, { "page": "801" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "801", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "802" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528031 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1374, "char_count": 41552, "ocr_confidence": 0.734, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0982802537693693e-07, "percentile": 0.5674039297271771 }, "sha256": "e6bbabcc320c4b202aadb252ec4d39bd637849988b4adb4eec6156915bd27284", "simhash": "1:d5b274c2684fbc56", "word_count": 6913 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:47:52.494477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur." ], "parties": [ "CYNTHIA ANN FREY, Plaintiff v. JOHN P. BEST, JR., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Judge.\nPlaintiff Cynthia Ann Frey (\u201cwife\u201d) and defendant John P. Best, Jr. (\u201chusband\u201d) were married on 4 April 1998 and separated on 13 September 2002. Three children were born to the parties during the course of their marriage; at the time the parties separated, the ages of the children were four years, two years, and six months. On 8 October 2002, the parties executed a Separation, Child Custody, and Family Support Agreement. In May 2003, wife filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the parties\u2019 October 2002 Family Support Agreement, as well as sole custody of the minor children, child support, post-separation support, alimony, equitable distribution, issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent waste of a named marital asset, and attorney\u2019s fees. On 20 June 2003, husband filed his Answer, Counterclaim, and Motions seeking joint custody of the minor children and praying for the court to set the amount of child support according to the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines. Wife filed her Reply to husband\u2019s counterclaims on 21 July 2003. The record on appeal referenced more than eighteen motions subsequently filed by both parties; those motions and orders relevant to the issues before this Court are identified below.\nOn 26 June 2003, the parties agreed in a consent order that husband would pay $1,150.00 per month in child support and $1,150.00 per month in alimony, in addition to other costs including health insurance for wife and the minor children, as well as $5,500.00 in arrearages accrued under the parties\u2019 October 2002 Family Support Agreement. On 10 July 2003, the court entered an order incorporating the parties\u2019 Parenting Agreement which established that the minor children would reside with wife and would visit with husband on specified days and times.\nOn 12 March 2004, husband filed a motion to modify alimony and child support based on a substantial change in circumstances. On 14 June 2004, wife filed a motion praying for the court to deviate from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines in the event that the court determined there had been a substantial change in circumstances when considering husband\u2019s 12 March motion. On 10 September 2004, the court entered an Amended Order dismissing wife\u2019s motion to deviate from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines and reducing husband\u2019s child support obligation to $964.95 per month. The amount of alimony payable to wife remained $1,150.00 per month based on the court\u2019s findings regarding wife\u2019s actual monthly needs and its conclusions regarding husband\u2019s continued ability to pay. The court also ordered husband to pay arrearages accrued in child support, alimony, and unreimbursed medical expenses for the minor children, as well as wife\u2019s attorney\u2019s fees. On 4 November 2004 and 28 March 2006, the court ordered husband to be held in Durham County Jail after finding him in contempt for continued nonpayment of child support and alimony.\nOn 28 June 2006, wife filed a motion to amend the current parenting agreement between the parties to allow her to relocate with the minor children to Olympia, Washington. On 11 July 2006, the court entered a pretrial conference order signed by wife (pro s\u00e9), husband\u2019s counsel, and the presiding judge setting the hearing on the issue of child custody for 21-22 September 2006. On 11 August 2006, husband filed and served a motion to modify child custody, child support, and alimony based upon a material and substantial change in circumstances. A hearing on wife\u2019s motion to permit relocating the children to the State of Washington was held on 14-15 September 2006. At that time, the court indicated its intent to also hear husband\u2019s 11 August 2006 motion to \u201cmodify the existing custodial, child support and alimony orders, which are in effect.\u201d Wife\u2019s counsel asked to continue the matters of child support and alimony because she was not aware that those issues were set for court on that day and was \u201cnot prepared to go forward.\u201d Nevertheless, the court decided to \u201cjust hear all issues pending.\u201d\nOn 28 September 2006, the court entered an order denying wife\u2019s motion to relocate with the minor children, reducing husband\u2019s alimony payments to $0, and reducing husband\u2019s child support payments to $720.00 per month. Husband was also ordered to pay a total of $43,412.30 in arrearages arising from amounts due for alimony, child support, medical bills, child care, and attorney\u2019s fees. Due to a finding that husband \u201cha[d real anger] problems that if left unchecked could have an adverse effect on his sons,\u201d husband was also ordered to attend an anger management assessment within .90 days from the order entry date, and to complete the treatment recommended, if any. By consent of the parties, all of whom were residents of Wake County at the time of the September 2006 hearing, the case was transferred to Wake County.\nThe record on appeal contains forty-five assignments of error. Those assignments of error for which wife failed to present arguments are not discussed below and are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (2008) (\u201cQuestions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned.\u201d).\nI.\nWife first contends that the trial court erred by reducing husband\u2019s alimony obligation to zero dollars ($0.00) without making findings of fact regarding wife\u2019s reasonable needs or husband\u2019s ability to pay alimony. We agree.\n\u201cAn order of a court of this State for alimony or postseparation support, whether contested or entered by consent, may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9(a) (2007). \u201cThis power to modify includes the power to terminate alimony altogether.\u201d Self v. Self 93 N.C. App. 323, 325, 377 S.E.2d 800, 801 (1989) (citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)).\nOn 26 June 2003, the parties in this case agreed in a consent order that husband would pay wife $1,150.00 per month in alimony. \u201c[W]hen alimony is part of a private agreement between the parties and is then incorporated into a court order such as a divorce decree[,] . . . the agreement is treated as a court order for purposes of modification.\u201d Cunningham v. Cunningham, 345 N.C. 430, 434, 480 S.E.2d 403, 405 (1997). Therefore, for the trial court to have the authority to modify the 2003 alimony order in the present case, it must have determined that there was \u201ca showing of changed circumstances.\u201d See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-16.9(a).\n\u201c \u2018As a general rule, the changed circumstances necessary for modification of an alimony order must relate to the financial needs of the dependent spouse or the supporting spouse\u2019s ability to pay.\u2019 \u201d Cunningham, 345 N.C. at 436, 480 S.E.2d at 406 (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 187, 287 S.E.2d 840, 846 (1982), disc. review denied, 314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 489 (1985)). However, \u201cit [i]s error for a court to modify an alimony award based only on a change in the parties\u2019 earnings.\u201d Self, 93 N.C. App. at 326, 377 S.E.2d at 801. \u201cThe significant inquiry is how [a] change in income affects a supporting spouse\u2019s ability to pay or a dependent spouse\u2019s need for support.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court is required to \u201cfind specific ultimate facts to support [its] judgment [that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances to support a modification of an alimony order], and the facts found must be sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.\u201d Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 156-57, 231 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1977).\nA.\nWhen determining a dependent spouse\u2019s need for support, \u201c[t]he trial court should .. . consider[] the ratio of [the dependent spouse\u2019s] earnings to the funds necessary to maintain [his or] her accustomed standard of living . . . .\u201d Self, 93 N.C. App. at 326, 377 S.E.2d at 801 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has held that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s failure [to consider or] to make any findings regarding [the dependent spouse\u2019s] reasonable current financial needs and expenses and the ratio of those needs and expenses to [his or] her income constitutefs] error.\u201d See id. at 326-27, 377 S.E.2d at 802.\nIn the present case, the court concluded there had been \u201ca substantial and material change in circumstances\u201d affecting husband\u2019s obligation to pay alimony to wife based on the following findings of fact:\n17. When the parties entered into the consent order on June 26, 2003 setting the alimony payments at $1150.00 per month[, wife] was employed part time and had monthly gross earnings of $200.00 and the youngest child was 6 months old. [Husband] has filed a motion to decrease his alimony payments.\n18. [Wife] is currently employed as a CPA. She works 35 hours per week and makes $25.00 per hour and has a monthly gross income of $3788.00. This constitutes a substantial and material change in circumstances and the alimony award is reduced to zero. However[, husband] is still responsible for the alimony arrearages [in the amount of] $29,350.12 ....\nIn other words, as the basis for its determination that there was a \u201csubstantial and material change in circumstances\u201d sufficient to allow modification of the alimony award, the trial court found only that wife\u2019s income had increased since the entry of the original alimony order. However, an \u201cincrease in [wife\u2019s] income . . . alone is not a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a modification\u201d of the alimony order. See Cunningham, 345 N.C. at 439, 480 S.E.2d at 408. Therefore, \u201c[w]e find error in the trial court\u2019s failure to make any findings as to [wife\u2019s] current reasonable expenses and her income and earning capacity and the ratio between them.\u201d See Self, 93 N.C. App. at 327, 377 S.E.2d at 802.\nB.\n\u201c[T]he ability of the supporting spouse to pay [alimony] is ordinarily determined by his or her income at the time the award is made.\u201d Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 453, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982). \u201cIf the supporting spouse is deliberately depressing income or engaged in excessive spending [because of a disregard of the marital obligation to provide support for the dependent spouse], then capacity to earn, instead of actual income, may be the basis of the award.\u201d Id. Absent findings of fact to indicate whether the trial court believed that the supporting spouse was \u201cdeliberately depressing his or her income or indulging in excessive spending . . . [in] disregard of the marital obligation to provide support for the dependent spouse, the ability of the supporting spouse to pay alimony is ordinarily determined by his or her income at the time the award is made.\u201d Id.\nHere, the court made the following findings of fact regarding husband\u2019s income:\n20. At the time of the June 2004 hearing [in which husband\u2019s child support obligation was first reduced, the] . . . court found [husband\u2019s] monthly gross income to be $5618.00 from his three jobs. He received $1020.00 per month from the City of Durham as a Councilman, $870.00 per month from Bennett Pointe Grill as a bartender, and $3720.00 per month from his business JP Ryan\u2019s Party Rentals. [Husband] is no longer a Councilman. He lost the election last fall. He no longer works for Bennett Pointe Grill. It was a mutual decision between the owner and [husband].\n21. [Husband] is working only with his business JP Ryan\u2019s Party Rentals at this time. He has for years worked second and even third jobs. As with most self employed persons],] it is difficult to determine exactly what [husband\u2019s] income is from his business since there is evidence he pays personal expenses from the business he claims as business expenses and there was evidence that he does not always claim all income[,] especially that paid in cash.\n22. The court finds that [husband] is capable of earning at least as much as he was earning in June 2004 minus the amount he earned as a city councilman. The court therefore finds his gross monthly income for the purpose of calculating child support to be $4600.00.\nThe court found that husband was only working with his business JP Ryan\u2019s Party Rentals at the time the court\u2019s modified alimony award was made, and found that husband earned $3,720.00 from that business in June 2004. However, the trial court made no findings about his actual income from that business at the time of the award. The court also found husband \u201ccapable of earning\u201d $4,600.00 \u201cfor the purpose of calculating child support\u201d based on husband\u2019s earnings \u201cin June 2004 minus the amount he earned as a city councilman.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, unless the trial court makes findings of fact that husband was \u201cdeliberately depressing his . . . income or indulging in excessive spending because of a disregard of [his] marital obligation to provide support for [his] dependent spouse,\u201d see Quick, 305 N.C. at 453, 290 S.E.2d at 658, the court may not use husband\u2019s \u201ccapacity to earn\u201d as the basis for its alimony award.\nAdditionally, where the alimony order originates from a private agreement between the parties, as it does here, \u201cdetermining whether there has been a material change in the parties\u2019 circumstances sufficient to justify a modification . . . may require the trial court to make findings of fact as to what the original circumstances or factors were in addition to what the current circumstances or factors are.\u201d Cunningham, 345 N.C. at 436, 480 S.E.2d at 406 (emphasis added).\nTherefore, \u201c[w]e conclude that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are insufficient for us to determine as a matter of law whether there has been a change of circumstances sufficient to require a modification or termination of the alimony order.\u201d See id. at 438, 480 S.E.2d at 408. Thus, we vacate the portion of the judgment reducing husband\u2019s alimony obligation to zero and remand to the trial court so that it may make further findings and conclusions with respect to this issue, consistent with this opinion.\nn.\nWife next contends the trial court erred by reducing husband\u2019s child support obligation without making sufficient findings of fact that there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor children. Again, we agree.\n\u201c[A]n order of a court of this State for support of a minor child may be modified or vacated at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party or anyone interested.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.7(a) (2007). \u201cThe changed circumstances with which the courts are concerned are those which relate to child-oriented expenses.\u201d Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 563, 257 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1979). \u201cThe burden is upon the party seeking the modification to establish the requisite change in circumstances.\u201d Id.\n\u201cThe modification of the order must be supported by findings of fact, based upon competent evidence, that there has been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.\u201d Ebron v. Ebron, 40 N.C. App. 270, 271, 252 S.E.2d 235, 236 (1979). The findings of facts must be \u201cspecific enough to indicate to the appellate court that the judge below took due regard of the particular estates, earnings, conditions, [and] accustomed standard of living of both the child and the parents.\u201d Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cIn the absence of such findings, this Court has no means of determining whether the order is adequately supported by competent evidence.\u201d Id.\nA.\nWife first argues that it was \u201cimproper for the trial court to consider the birth of [husband\u2019s] child with his new wife as a change in circumstances\u201d sufficient to permit a modification of his child support obligation to the parties\u2019 minor children. \u201c[P]ayment of support for a child of a former marriage may not be avoided merely because the husband has remarried and thereby voluntarily assumed additional obligations.\u201d Shipman v. Shipman, 25 N.C. App. 213, 215, 212 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1975) (citing Sayland v. Sayland, 267 N.C. 378, 148 S.E.2d 218 (1966)). \u201c[I]ncreases in expenses [that] were voluntarily assumed additional obligations], including entering into another marital and family relationship,] . . . although they may render the child support payments more burdensome, do not justify a reduction in such payments.\u201d Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. at 564, 257 S.E.2d at 119. Nevertheless, the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines allow the use of a deduction from a parent\u2019s gross income for natural or adopted children \u201c(other than children for whom child support is being determined)\u201d when those other children \u201ccurrently reside with the parent\u201d who is a party to the support action. See N.C. Child Support Guidelines, AOC-A-162, at 4 (2002) (amended 1 Oct. 2006). However, the Guidelines do not permit the use of that deduction to \u201cbe the sole basis for modifying an existing [child support] order.\u201d Id.\nIn the present case, the trial court found that, \u201c[s]ince the parties separated], husband] remarried and had another son who is two years old and is the half brother of the three sons bom of these parties. . . . [Husband] and his second wife are separated and he has this son approximately half the time.\u201d While husband might have been eligible to receive a deduction in his monthly gross income for the purpose of calculating child support if it was determined that the minor child from his second marriage was residing with him, this deduction cannot be the \u201csole basis\u201d for the court\u2019s determination that there had been \u201csubstantial and material changes in circumstances regarding the amount of child support.\u201d However, it is not clear from the court\u2019s order whether this finding was the \u201csole basis\u201d for the court\u2019s decision to modify child support.\nB.\nWife next argues that the trial court erred by modifying child support without finding that husband voluntarily left employment opportunities in bad faith and in disregard of his financial obligations to support their minor children. \u201c[A parent\u2019s] ability to pay child support is normally determined by his actual income at the time the award is made or modified.\u201d Goodhouse v. DeFravio, 57 N.C. App. 124, 127, 290 S.E.2d 751, 753 (1982). \u201cIf, however, there is a finding that the [parent] is deliberately depressing his income or otherwise acting in deliberate disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his child, his capacity to earn may be made the basis of the award.\" Id. (emphasis added). But \u201c[t]he imposition of the earnings capacity rule must be based on evidence that tends to show the husband\u2019s actions resulting in reduction of his income were not taken in good faith.\u201d Id. at 127-28, 290 S.E.2d at 753-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).\nIn the findings of fact excerpted in Section I above, the trial court found that husband was only working with his business JP Ryan\u2019s Party Rentals at the time the 28 September 2006 order was entered. The court also found that husband \u201cno longer work[ed] for Bennett Pointe Grill\u201d as a result of a \u201cmutual decision between the owner and [husband].\u201d So, the trial court found that husband was \u201ccapable of earning at least\u201d $4,600.00 \u201cfor the purpose of calculating child support\u201d based on his earnings \u201cin June 2004 minus the amount he earned as a city councilman.\u201d However, the trial court made no findings about husband\u2019s actual income at the time of the award, and made no findings that husband left his job at Bennett Pointe Grill in bad faith or otherwise tried to deliberately minimize his child support obligation.\nThe welfare of the child is \u201cthe \u2018polar star\u2019 in the matters of custody and maintenance, yet common sense and common justice dictate that the ultimate object in such matters is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the child and the ability of the [supporting parent] to meet the need.\u201d Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 237, 158 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1967). In the absence of findings of fact showing bad faith, child support orders may be modified upon a showing of substantial change in circumstances\n[which] may be shown in any of several ways [including]: a substantial increase or decrease in the child\u2019s needs; a- substantial and involuntary decrease in the income of the. non-custodial parent even though the child\u2019s needs are unchanged; [or] a voluntary decrease in income of either supporting parent, absent bad faith, upon a showing of changed circumstances relating to child oriented expenses.\nWiggs v. Wiggs, 128 N.C. App. 512, 515, 495 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1998) (citations omitted), disapproved of on other grounds, Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998). However, without sufficient findings to establish any of these factors or to support the trial court\u2019s use of husband\u2019s earning capacity to calculate his monthly gross income in lieu of his actual earnings at the time of the award, we cannot determine whether the court\u2019s conclusion to modify husband\u2019s September 2004 child support obligation was based on a substantial change in circumstances supported by competent evidence. See Coble, 300 N.C. at 712, 268 S.E.2d at 189. Accordingly, we must vacate the portion of the September 2006 judgment reducing husband\u2019s child support obligation to $720.00 per month and remand so that the trial court may make further findings and conclusions with respect to this issue, consistent with this opinion.\nIII.\nNext, wife contends that the trial court erred by denying her request to modify the parties\u2019 parenting agreement to allow her to relocate with the children to the State of Washington. After careful consideration of her arguments, we must disagree.\n\u201cIn granting visitation privileges, as well as in awarding primary custody of minor children, necessarily a wide discretion is vested in the trial judge.\u201d Shamel v. Shamel, 16 N.C. App. 65, 66, 190 S.E.2d 856, 857 (1972). \u201cIt is well established that where matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985); see also In re Custody of Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211, 212, 162 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1968) (\u201c[The trial judge] has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d). \u201cA trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d White, 312 N.C. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833. Thus, absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s \u201cfindings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is [substantial] evidence to support them, even if evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.\u201d Everette v. Collins, 176 N.C. App. 168, 170, 625 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2006) (citing Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975)).\n\u201c[T]he court may not make any modifications to [a final or permanent child custody or visitation] order without first determining that there has been a \u2018substantial change in circumstances\u2019 \u201d affecting the welfare of the child. Simmons v. Arriola, 160 N.C. App. 671, 674, 586 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2003) (citing LaValley v. LaValley, 151 N.C. App. 290, 292, 564 S.E.2d 913, 914-15 (2002)). \u201c[I]f the trial court does indeed determine that a substantial change in circumstances affects the welfare of the child, it may only modify the existing custody order if it further concludes that a change in custody is in the child\u2019s best interests.\u201d Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003).\nThis Court has stated that, \u201c[i]n evaluating the best interests of a child in a proposed relocation, the trial court may appropriately consider several factors.\u201d Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 142, 530 S.E.2d 576, 580 (2000). Those factors include:\n[t]he advantages of the relocation in terms of its capacity to improve the life of the child; the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move; the likelihood that the custodial parent will comply with visitation orders when he or she is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of North Carolina; the integrity of the noncustodial parent in resisting the relocation; and the likelihood that a realistic visitation schedule can be arranged which will preserve and foster the parental relationship with the noncustodial parent.\nId. (quoting Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 80, 418 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1992), disapproved of on other grounds, Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998)). However, although the trial court \u201cmay appropriately consider\u201d these factors, \u201c \u2018[t]he court\u2019s primary concern is the furtherance of the welfare and best interests of the child and its placement in the home environment that will be most conducive to the full development of its physical, mental and moral faculties.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 141, 530 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Griffith v. Griffith, 240 N.C. 271, 275, 81 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1954)). \u201c \u2018All other factors, including visitorial rights of the other applicant, will be deferred or subordinated to these considerations, and if the child\u2019s welfare and best interests will be better promoted by granting permission to remove the child from the State, the court should not hesitate to do so.\u2019 \u201d Id. (emphasis added). \u201cNaturally, no hard and fast rule can be laid down for making this determination, but each case must be determined upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances.\u201d Griffith, 240 N.C. at 275, 81 S.E.2d at 921.\nIn the present case, the trial court concluded in its Conclusion of Law 2 that \u201c[wife\u2019s] plan to move the three minor sons to ... Olympia, Washington],] is a substantial and material change in circumstances regarding the welfare of said sons.\u201d Wife did not assign error to this conclusion of law. The North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure require that \u201c[t]he appellant must assign error to each conclusion [of law] it believes is not supported by the evidence.\u201d Fran\u2019s Pecans, Inc. v. Greene, 134 N.C. App. 110, 112, 516 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1999) (citing N.C.R. App. P. 10). \u201cFailure to do so constitutes an acceptance of the conclusion and a waiver of the right to challenge said conclusion as unsupported by the facts.\u201d Id. Thus, wife waived her right to challenge this conclusion of law. Instead, wife contends that the court\u2019s findings of fact do not support its Conclusions of Law 3 and 4:\n3. This proposed move across the country would have an adverse effect on the sons and is not in the best interest of the parties\u2019 three sons who are ages 4, 6, and 8 because the children have a close and loving relationship with their father .... They also have close relationships with extended family members of both parties who live in the area.\n4. It is not in the best interest of the minor sons to be uprooted from the area where they have spent their entire life and be separated from their father and their extended family members in the area.\nIn support of these conclusions, the trial court made the following findings of fact:\n6. The court finds that [husband] has regularly had his three sons in his care on a consistent and regular basis and that he and his sons have a good, loving and close relationship.\n7. The oldest son, JP, for a time was very angry and did not want to be with [husband]. The court finds that this has changed. The aunt of [wife] testified that [husband] picks up and delivers the boys to her home each time he has them and that the boys are glad to see [husband] and are pretty much happy to go with him and the court so finds.\n9. Since the parties separated], husband] remarried and had another son who is two years old and is the half brother of the three sons born of these parties. All four of these children have a close relationship. [Husband] and his second wife are separated and he has this son approximately half the time.\n. 10. [Wife] and [husband] have always lived in the Raleigh/Durham area, as have all of their sons. [Wife\u2019s] parents previously lived in Raleigh. She has a brother and sister-in-law in this area and an uncle and aunt who live in Raleigh. [Husband\u2019s] parents live in the Durham area. The sons have close relationships with all of these extended family members.\n11. [Wife\u2019s] parents and her other brothers and sisters and their families live in the Olympia, Washington area. [Wife] wants to relocate there and take her three sons with her so she will have the moral support of her family and help with the boys. She owns a townhouse in Raleigh, the two older boys go to school in Raleigh, she works as a CPA, and she has not remarried and does not have a job transfer or a job in Washington. She does have the promise of a job there. As a CPA she can earn the financial support she needs either here or in Washington.\n13. It is [husband\u2019s] increasing anger over the last [1.5] years and his lack of payments that have made [wife\u2019s] life increasingly unpleasant and has encouraged her to want to be closer to her parents.\n15. [Wife] has not taken advantage of the help she could have from [husband\u2019s] family. She has rebuffed their offers to see and keep the children by declaring that they can see the children on [husband\u2019s] time. Yet she testified that she allows others to care for the children when she needs help and the court so finds.\nIn Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 530 S.E.2d 576 (2000), when the trial court \u201cfound that the proposed relocation would adversely affect the relationship between the father and his child], but] . . . made no findings of fact indicating the effect of the . . . relocation on the child himself [and did not]... discuss the impact of the proposed move on the child,\u201d id. at 141, 530 S.E.2d at 579-80, this Court con: eluded that \u201cthe facts found d[id] not support the conclusions that there ha[d] been a substantial change in circumstances and that it [wa]s in the best interest of the child that the custody decree be amended.\u201d Id. at 142, 530 S.E.2d at 580. However, in this case, the trial court not only made findings regarding the improving relationship between the children and their father, but also regarding the close relationships the children share with their half brother from husband\u2019s second marriage, maternal aunt and uncle, maternal great aunt and uncle, and paternal grandparents who all live in the area. Husband testified that his parents and stepparents, as well as numerous cousins, aunts, and uncles, all live in the Raleigh/Durham area, and his children see them \u201con a regular occasion\u201d like holidays, birthdays, and other special events, \u201cat least once a month, at the minimum\u201d averaged over a year. Wife\u2019s best friend further testified that her children and wife\u2019s children have grown up together and are best friends and see each other daily.\nBoth parties presented evidence that the parties\u2019 children were actively involved in soccer, swimming, baseball, basketball, and karate, and their oldest son was active in the Cub Scouts. Wife\u2019s best friend testified that the oldest son took second place honors in the Cub Scout-sponsored Pinewood Derby with his maternal great uncle, where they built, painted, and raced a car made out of a block of pinewood, and testified that husband was also present at the event, cheering on his son. Husband, who has joint custody of the minor child from his second marriage, testified that the four children all play well together. He also testified that the parties\u2019 three children enjoy building forts, playing laser tag, and riding bikes when they are in his care.\nIn support of her request to move to Washington, wife testified that her personal Internet research indicated that the average SAT scores of the schools in the State of Washington were about fifty points above North Carolina\u2019s average scores, and almost forty points above the national SAT average scores. Wife also testified that the same activities in which the children currently participate, including Cub Scouts, karate, and other sports-oriented programs, are offered in the community in which she and the children would live in Olympia, Washington. Wife also argues that \u201cone of the reasons [she] wanted to leave North Carolina was to put some distance between her and [husband] and defray some of the acrimony that existed.\u201d The trial court found that wife\u2019s motive in seeking to relocate to Washington was \u201cso she will have the moral support of her family and help with the boys.\" (Emphasis added.) Wife\u2019s mother testified about her willingness to assist her daughter with the children, and identified immediate family members near her home in Olympia, Washington, who would also be available to support wife to look after the children. However, wife did not assign error to the court\u2019s finding that she \u201chas not taken advantage of the help she could have from [husband\u2019s] family,\u201d (emphasis added), and \u201crebuffed their offers to see and keep the children by declaring that [husband\u2019s family] can see the children on [husband\u2019s] time.\u201d\nSince the trial court\u2019s \u201cfindings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even if evidence might sustain findings to the contrary,\u201d Everette, 176 N.C. App. at 170, 625 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Williams, 288 N.C. at 342, 218 S.E.2d at 371), we hold that the trial court\u2019s denial of wife\u2019s motion to relocate with the children was not an abuse of discretion \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason.\u201d See White, 312 N.C. at 777, 324 S.E.2d at 833.\nIV.\nFinally, wife contends that the trial court erred by increasing husband\u2019s visitation time with the minor children without sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion. We agree.\n\u201cThe same standards that apply to changes in custody determinations are also applied to changes in visitation determinations.\u201d Simmons, 160 N.C. App. at 674, 586 S.E.2d at 811 (citing Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 575-76, 243 S.E.2d 129, 142 (1978)). \u201cIn a custody modification action, . . . the existing child custody order cannot be modified [unless] . . . the party seeking a modification [first shows] that there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child....\u201d Johnson v. Adolf, 149 N.C. App. 876, 878, 561 S.E.2d 588, 589 (2002). The moving party must prove a \u201cnexus\u201d between the changed circumstances and the welfare of the child in order for the trial court to determine that a child support order may be modified, see Shipman, 357 N.C. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255-56 (citing 3 Suzanne Reynolds, Lee's North Carolina Family Law \u00a7 13.103 (5th rev. ed. 2002)), \u201cand flowing from that prerequisite is the requirement that the trial court make findings of fact regarding that connection.\u201d Id. at 478, 586 S.E.2d at 255.\nHere, in support of its conclusion that \u201c[t]here have been substantial and material changes in circumstances regarding [husband\u2019s] custodial time with the minor sons since the entry of the order approving the parenting agreement in this case on July 10, 2003,\u201d the trial court made the following findings of fact:\n5. The parties hereto entered into a parenting agreement that became an order of the court July 9, 2003. According to the agreement the three sons are to be in [husband\u2019s] care for a period of time each weekend and every Tuesday from 3:30 p.'m. until 6:00 p.m. Due to [husband\u2019s] work schedule at the time the parties agreed in October 2003 to a modification of this schedule eliminating the Friday night every other weekend. In March of 2006 the parties further modified the schedule and [husband] began having his sons in his care every other weekend from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until late on Sunday afternoon and every Tuesday. In addition there is some holiday time and three weeks in the summer. [Husband] has not exercised all of his three weeks in the summer but he has exercised the other times. This past summer he used two weeks of his time.\n8. Since the entry of the order approving the Parenting Agreement and the oral agreement modifying it there has been a substantial change in circumstances in that [husband] no longer works on Friday nights and rents a three-bedroom townhouse instead of a one-bedroom apartment. The children are older now as they were only 6 months, 2 years and 4 years when the parties separated.\nAs a result of these findings, the trial court ordered an increase in husband\u2019s visitation with the minor children.\n\u201cEffective appellate review of an order entered by a trial court sitting without a jury is largely dependent upon the specificity by which the order\u2019s rationale is articulated.\u201d Coble, 300 N.C. at 714, 268 S.E.2d at 190. The \u201clink in the chain of reasoning [between findings of fact and conclusions of law] must appear in the order itself. Where there is a gap, it cannot be determined on appeal whether the trial court correctly exercised its function to find the facts and apply the law thereto.\u201d Id. Here, the court\u2019s conclusion that there had been a substantial change in circumstances regarding husband\u2019s \u201ccustodial time\u201d is not supported by findings of fact which indicate that those changes affected the welfare of the parties\u2019 minor children. Accordingly, we must vacate the portion of the judgment increasing husband\u2019s visitation with the parties\u2019 minor children and remand to the trial court so that it may make further findings and conclusions consistent with this opinion.\nOur decision to remand this matter for additional proceedings with respect to the issues of alimony and child support render it unnecessary to address wife\u2019s contention that she did not receive proper notice from the court that the issues of child support and alimony raised in husband\u2019s 11 August motion would be heard at the 14-15 September 2006 hearing.\nIn closing, we are constrained to remind counsel that \u201c[t]he Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory; an appellant\u2019s failure to observe the rules frustrates the process of appellate review and subjects the appeal to dismissal.\u201d May v. City of Durham, 136 N.C. App. 578, 581, 525 S.E.2d 223, 227 (2000) (citing Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999)); see also Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., Inc., No. 303A07 (N.C. Mar. 7, 2008) (\u201c[R]ules of procedure are necessary ... in order to enable the courts properly to discharge their dut[y] of resolving disputes. It necessarily follows that failure of the parties to comply with the rules, and failure of the appellate courts to demand compliance therewith, may impede the administration of justice.\u201d) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, our review of the issues raised by this appeal has been impeded and prolonged by a multitude of appellate rules violations, both in the record and in the appellant\u2019s brief. While, in this case, \u201cwe elect[ed] to exercise the discretion accorded us by N.C.R. App. P 2 to consider this appeal on its merits despite appellant\u2019s violations of the Appellate Rules,\u201d see May, 136 N.C. App. at 581, 525 S.E.2d at 227, counsel is admonished to observe the rules in the future.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.\nJudges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sandlin & Davidian, P.A., by Deborah Sandlin, for plaintiff - appellant.", "No brief, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CYNTHIA ANN FREY, Plaintiff v. JOHN P. BEST, JR., Defendant\nNo. COA07-703\n(Filed 15 April 2008)\n1. Divorce\u2014 alimony \u2014 reduction\u2014findings\nThe trial court erred by reducing a husband\u2019s alimony obligation to zero without making findings regarding the wife\u2019s reasonable needs or the husband\u2019s ability to pay. A finding that the wife\u2019s income increased is not alone sufficient to warrant modification of an alimony order, and the court may not use the husband\u2019s capacity to earn as the basis of its alimony award unless it finds that he deliberately depressed his income or indulged in excessive spending.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 child support\u2014 reduction \u2014 findings\nThe trial court\u2019s findings were not sufficient to reduce a husband\u2019s child support obligation where the husband had remarried and had another child (that alone is not sufficient) and findings about the husband\u2019s decreased income were not sufficient to determine whether the modification of support was based on a substantial change in circumstances supported by competent evidence.\n3. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 moving out of state \u2014 findings conclusive on appeal\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a wife\u2019s request to modify the parenting agreement to allow her to relocate with the children to the State of Washington. The court\u2019s findings are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even if the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.\n4. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 visitation increased \u2014 findings\nThe trial court erred by increasing a husband\u2019s visitation with the minor children without sufficient findings to support its conclusion. The conclusion about the husband\u2019s custodial time was not supported by findings of fact indicating that those changes affected the welfare of the parties\u2019 minor children.\nAppeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 28 September 2006 by Judge Lillian Jordan in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 February 2008.\nSandlin & Davidian, P.A., by Deborah Sandlin, for plaintiff - appellant.\nNo brief, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0622-01", "first_page_order": 654, "last_page_order": 671 }