{
  "id": 8550075,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD EARL STEPPE",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Steppe",
  "decision_date": "1973-07-25",
  "docket_number": "No. 7326SC509",
  "first_page": "63",
  "last_page": "66",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "19 N.C. App. 63"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.",
    "id": 14983,
    "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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    {
      "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 71",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "282 N.C. 334",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8565099
      ],
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/282/0334-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 104",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "280 N.C. 642",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8573153
      ],
      "year": 1972,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/280/0642-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:34.966448+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Judges Hedkick and Baley concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD EARL STEPPE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "CAMPBELL, Judge.\nDefendant assigns as error the in-court identification by-Kirkland and contends particularly that the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law on voir dire are improper as the findings of fact are not based entirely on voir dire testimony. The record does indicate that the only witness to testify on voir dire was Kirkland, but that the court\u2019s findings of fact include facts testified to by police officers, whose testimony was taken before the jury after the voir dire examination had been concluded. While the court\u2019s findings based on the voir dire are not entirely proper, still there has been committed no prejudicial error.\nEarly in his testimony, after having described the events taking place in his driveway and garage, Kirkland testified without objection that: \u201cThe man that I saw in the window and the man that was tugging on the other side of the door from me raising and lowering it is in the Courtroom at this time. The defendant, the man in the blue shirt to the left is that man.\u201d As Kirkland was about to relate some conversation that he heard, defendant\u2019s counsel objected on the ground that it had not been established whether the speaker was the defendant, or the other man still unidentified. In response to questioning by the court, Kirkland again testified without objection that the defendant was the man he saw at the garage door.\nAbsent a timely objection to the identification testimony and request for a voir dire hearing thereon, it is not error for the trial court to receive such testimony and proceed with the trial. State v. Cook, 280 N.C. 642, 187 S.E. 2d 104 (1972). Nevertheless, there is evidence that the witness had ample opportunity to observe the defendant, and there is no evidence showing a possibility of misidentification through suggestiveness of pretrial photographic identification. The evidence is proper and quite sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury.\nThere was no error in the court\u2019s allowing the witness to stand in front of the defendant to show how far from the defendant he was at the time of the garage door scuffle. See State v. Cook, supra, in which the prosecuting witness was allowed to identify the defendant by placing her hand on his shoulder.\nDefendant\u2019s wife testified on his behalf to the effect that on the morning of 25 January he had not driven the Cadillac. The State was allowed to put into evidence rebuttal testimony of a police officer who had spoken to defendant\u2019s wife on the morning of the 25th of January that she had stated that her husband had driven the Cadillac on that morning.\nThis rebuttal testimony was properly admitted with limiting instructions. The testimony related to matter pertinent and material to the inquiry, the defendant\u2019s alibi. State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E. 2d 71 (1972).\nWith respect to defendant\u2019s other assignments of error, we find no merit. Defendant has had a fair trial free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\nJudges Hedkick and Baley concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "CAMPBELL, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney Emerson D. Wall for the State.",
      "Whitfield and McNeely by Richard P. McNeely for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EDWARD EARL STEPPE\nNo. 7326SC509\n(Filed 25 July 1973)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 66 \u2014 identification of defendant \u2014 in-court identification proper despite improper conclusion on voir dire\nThough the trial court\u2019s- conclusions based on a voir dire examination were not entirely proper as the findings of fact were not based exclusively on voir dire testimony, still there was no prejudicial error in allowing a witness\u2019s in-court identification of defendant, since there was evidence that the witness had ample opportunity to observe defendant at the crime scene and there was no evidence showing a possibility of misidentification through suggestiveness of pretrial photographic identification.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 66 \u2014 identification of defendant \u2014 witness standing in front of defendant\nTrial court in a breaking and entering case did not err in allowing a witness to stand in front of defendant to show how far from defendant he was at the scene of the' crime.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 89 \u2014 prior inconsistent statement of witness \u2014 admissibility\nTrial court properly admitted, with limiting instructions, evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness relating to a matter pertinent and material to the inquiry, the defendant\u2019s alibi.-\nOn certiorari to review the order of Wood, Special Judge, 13 November 1972 Session of Mecklenburg County Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried on a proper bill of indictment charging him with felonious breaking- and entering and larceny. The jury found him to be guilty of both offenses, \u25a0 and he was sentenced to two concurrent terms of imprisonment for 7 to 10 years.\nThe State presented evidence to the effect that on the morning of 25 January 1972 at about 8:30 a.m. Mr. Ben Kirkland locked his home in Charlotte, North Carolina,' and drove to his place of employment. Upon returning to his home at about 10:45 he noticed something move inside his garage, the doors to which were closed. Through a window in the garage door Kirkland saw a face looking at him; inside the garage was a tan-colored Cadillac which was not Kirkland\u2019s automobile.\nWhen the person inside the garage attempted to open the garage door, Kirkland, from the outside, attempted to hold the door closed. Kirkland was overpowered, the door opened, and a second man started the Cadillac backing out of the garage. The man at the door of the garage made some threatening gestures toward Kirkland, jumped into the Cadillac, which then backed down the driveway, and left.\nA window on the back door of the house had been broken, drawers inside the house were in disarray, and Kirkland discovered missing two cameras.\nKirkland had an opportunity to view the man at the garage door, but not the driver of the automobile. He also recorded the license number of the automobile. On the afternoon of 25 January Kirkland was shown by police officers photographs of 15 to 20 individuals whose physical descriptions generally were similar to that of the person he saw at his home. The police made no suggestion with respect to any of the photographs, and Kirkland picked out the defendant\u2019s picture. Additionally, the license number of the automobile in Kirkland\u2019s garage was registered to defendant\u2019s tan Cadillac.\nAttorney General Robert Morgan by Associate Attorney Emerson D. Wall for the State.\nWhitfield and McNeely by Richard P. McNeely for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0063-01",
  "first_page_order": 87,
  "last_page_order": 90
}