{ "id": 8555320, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM R. HALTOM", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Haltom", "decision_date": "1973-10-24", "docket_number": "No. 7320SC596", "first_page": "646", "last_page": "650", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "19 N.C. App. 646" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569459 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572631 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572439 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574497 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 300", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174244 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624329 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 108", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6165107 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 N.C. App. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554864 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/17/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571880 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557682 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546822 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0051-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 510, "char_count": 10552, "ocr_confidence": 0.53, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.126788755897762e-07, "percentile": 0.9388555085643989 }, "sha256": "402c2376578d4cbfe005c6370e3e84f43c3002134c3824eb04a68c82619bb96f", "simhash": "1:8ae8bce21cdb1ce1", "word_count": 1796 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:32:34.966448+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges Campbell and Parker concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM R. HALTOM" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MORRIS, Judge.\nAppellant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion for a change of venue on the ground that a recent rock festival in Richmond County had stirred up public outrage against the use of marijuana to the extent that it would be impossible for him to get a fair trial from any jury panel in the county, A motion to remove pursuant to G.S. 1-84 is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Patrick v. Hurdle, 6 N.C. App. 51, 169 S.E. 2d 239 (1969). When such a motion is made, the facts upon which the motion is based must be stated with particularity and detail in the affidavit pursuant to G.S. 1-85. Patrick v. Hurdle, supra. Nowhere in the record does it appear that defendant has set forth the facts on which his motion was based in any detail; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.\nAppellant also contends that the trial court erred in its denial of his motion for continuance prior to the trial. The basis of this motion is the fact that the panel from which the jury was selected was in the audience at the trial of the case immediately preceding the present one, and they heard arguments made by counsel on voir dire on issues identical to those of the present case that were heard outside the presence of the jury. Like the motion for removal, this motion is the subject of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, and is not subject to review absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Robinson, 283 N.C. 71, 194 S.E. 2d 811 (1973); State v. Stepney, 280 N.C. 306, 185 S.E. 2d 844 (1972); State v. Cameron, 17 N.C. App. 229, 193 S.E. 2d 485 (1972).\nThe crux of appellant\u2019s case is his contention that the various items of evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should have been suppressed because of the invalidity of the search warrant. However, the search warrant and supporting affidavit do not appear in the record, and there is no indication of their contents other than the testimony of Agent Parker on voir dire. We are, therefore, precluded from reviewing the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the search warrant was properly granted, the search properly conducted and the evidence seized pursuant thereto admissible.\nWe are of the opinion, nevertheless, that the trial court\u2019s conclusions were correct inasmuch as they are supported by the testimony of Agent Parker on voir dire. According to Agent Parker, he had two informants \u2014 one of whom had been reliable in the past, and one who had not previously furnished information. The information furnished by the informant who had not proven reliable in the past was corroborated by the previously reliable informant. Thus, we feel that the standard for probable cause as established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed. 2d 723 (1964), has been satisfied.\nWe cannot sustain appellant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to ascertain the identity of one of the informants. The right of the State to confidentiality of its informants is well established. State v. Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 97 S.E. 2d 476 (1957); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed. 2d 62 (1968); Aguilar v. Texas, supra.\nThere has been no prejudice to defendant in allowing the jury to compare the unanalyzed substances to the packages previously analyzed as containing marijuana. As we have noted, the substance identified as marijuana was 52.2 grams \u2014 well above the statutory requirement of 5 grams. Inasmuch as there was 52.2 grams of marijuana introduced into evidence, State\u2019s case was sufficient to go to the jury, and appellant\u2019s assignment of error to the denial of the motion for nonsuit cannot be sustained.\nThe trial court\u2019s charge to the jury appears to be free from prejudicial error. Even if defendant had been prejudiced thereby, his broadside exception cannot be sustained. An assignment of error to the charge as a whole that specifies no additional charges deemed to be required is ineffective to bring up any portion of the charge for review. Investment Properties v. Allen, 281 N.C. 174, 188 S.E. 2d 441 (1972).\nAppellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take the State\u2019s evidence into the jury room. Assuming, arguendo, that this was error; appellant has nevertheless failed to sustain his burden upon appeal. It is not sufficient that he show error; he must make it appear that the error .was prejudicial to him and that a different result would likely'have ensued absent the error. State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E. 2d 384 (1972); State v. Crump, 280 N.C. 491, 186 S.E. 2d 369 (1972).\nThe final assignment of error is to the denial of appellant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict of the jury. Such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable on appeal. State v. Mason, 279 N.C. 435, 183 S.E. 2d 661 (1971).\nNo error.\nJudges Campbell and Parker concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "MORRIS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorneys General Melvin and Ray for the State.", "heath, Bynum and Kitchin, by Henry L. Kitchin, for defendant a/ppellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM R. HALTOM\nNo. 7320SC596\n(Filed 24 October 1973)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 15 \u2014 possession of marijuana \u2014 motion for change of venue \u2014 public outrage caused by rock festival\nThe trial court in a prosecution for possession of more than five grams of marijuana did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s motion for a change of venue on the ground that a recent rock festival in the county had stirred up public outrage against the use of marijuana to the extent that it would be impossible for defendant to receive a fair trial in the county where defendant did not set forth the facts upon which the motion was based in any detail. G.S. 1-85.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 91 \u2014 motion for continuance \u2014 jury hearing of voir dire arguments in previous case\nThe trial court in a prosecution for possession of marijuana did not abuse its discretion in the denial of defendant\u2019s motion for continuance made on the ground that the jury panel was in the audience in the preceding case and heard arguments made by defendant\u2019s counsel on voir dire on issues identical to those heard in the present case in the absence of the jury.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 158; Searches and Seizures \u00a7 3 \u2014 validity of warrant \u2014 omission of warrant from record\nThe appellate court cannot review the trial court\u2019s conclusion that a search warrant was valid where the warrant and supporting affidavit are not in the record on appeal.\n4. Searches and Seizures \u00a7 3 \u2014 validity of warrant \u2014 information from informants\nTrial court\u2019s conclusion that a warrant to search for marijuana was valid was supported by the voir dire testimony of the SBI agent who obtained the warrant that he received information that defendant had marijuana in his, possession from an informant who had proven reliable in the past and from a second informant who had not previously furnished information, since the information furnished by the second informant was corroborated by the previously reliable informant.\n5. Constitutional Law \u00a7 31 \u2014 identity of confidential informant\nThe trial court did not err in refusing to require the State to reveal the identity of a confidential informant.\n6. Narcotics \u00a7 3 \u2014 unanalyzed packages \u2014 comparison with analyzed substances\nIn this prosecution for possession of more than five grams of marijuana, the trial court did not err in permitting the jury visually to compare substances in packages seized from defendant which had not been analyzed with other seized packages analyzed as containing 52.2 grams of marijuana.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 101 \u2014 permitting jury to take evidence into jury room\nThe trial court in a prosecution for possession of marijuana did not commit prejudicial error in permitting the jury to take the State\u2019s evidence into the jury room.\nAppeal from Webb, Special Judge, 29 January 1973 Session of Richmond County Superior Court.\nDefendant was convicted by a jury of wilful possession of a controlled substance, i.e., more than five grams of marijuana in contravention of the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act and was sentenced to the statutory maximum of five years\u2019 imprisonment.\nPrior to the trial of the case, defendant moved for a change of venue on the grounds that a recent rock festival in Richmond County had caused a great deal of public outrage concerning the use of marijuana, and that it would be impossible for him to receive a fair trial. In addition, he moved for a continuance on the grounds that the jury panel had been in the audience in the immediately preceding case, where defendant\u2019s counsel had represented another defendant on a marijuana charge. Thus, they were able to hear arguments made by counsel on voir dire concerning search warrants, suppression of evidence, etc., in the preceding case. Both motions were denied.\nSBI Special Agent Van Parker testified that he was informed by two informants that Bill Haltom had in his possession a quantity of marijuana and that one of the informants had purchased marijuana from Haltom. With this information, Agent Parker obtained a search warrant and went to the poolroom owned by Haltom where he and two other SBI agents discovered approximately 20 plastic bags containing a green vegetable substanc\u00e9, a quantity of copper tubing, and a quantity of \u201crolling paper.\u201d\nOf the total number of packages, only two were analyzed by the SBI laboratory as marijuana. They totalled 52.2 grams. The packages not so analyzed were admitted into evidence over the objection of defendant and the jury was permitted to compare them visually with the packages analyzed as marijuana.\nAt the close of State\u2019s evidence, defendant\u2019s motions for mistrial and dismissal of the charges were overruled.\n. Defendant thereupon took the stand in his own behalf. He testified that the area from which Agent Parker seized the plastic bags and other material was not restricted or inaccessible to anyone who was in the poolroom. The only item he had seen prior to the seizure was State\u2019s Exhibit 7A which he had placed inside the candy counter. He testified that he had taken it from his son, and he had placed it in the candy counter in an attempt to find the individual who had sold it to his son. He had also seen the copper tubing when someone brought it, in from the street and left it on the counter.\nAt the close of defendant\u2019s evidence and again following State\u2019s rebuttal evidence, defendant\u2019s motion for dismissal was overruled. Following the jury\u2019s verdict of guilty, defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict was denied.\nAttorney General Morgan, by Assistant Attorneys General Melvin and Ray for the State.\nheath, Bynum and Kitchin, by Henry L. Kitchin, for defendant a/ppellant." }, "file_name": "0646-01", "first_page_order": 670, "last_page_order": 674 }