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  "name": "WAKE CARES, INC., PATRICE LEE, individually and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, IAN LEE, DELANEY LEE, MARGARET LEE and BAILEY LEE; KATHLEEN BRENNAN, individually and as guardian ad litem of her minor child, ELIZABETH BRENNAN; SCOTT P. HAVILAND and GIHAN I. EL-HABBAL, individually and as guardians ad LITEM OF THEIR CHILDREN, AHMED HAVILAND, AYAH HAVILAND and IMAN HAVILAND; MICHAEL JOHN STANTON and ANGELA MARIE STANTON, individually and as guardians ad litem of their children, JACOB STANTON, ALEXIS STANTON, DANIELLE STANTON, DALLAS STANTON and JORDAN STANTON; and KIMBERLY SINNOTT and JOHN NADASKY, individually and as guardians ad litem of their children, REID NADASKY, SEAN NADASKY, and JAMES NADASKY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and LORI MILBERG, HORACE J. TART, CAROL PARKER, ROSA GILL, SUSAN PARRY, PATTIE HEAD, ELEANOR GOETTEE, RON MARGIOTTA, and BEVERLEY CLARK, in their official capacity as members of the WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges McCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur."
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      "WAKE CARES, INC., PATRICE LEE, individually and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, IAN LEE, DELANEY LEE, MARGARET LEE and BAILEY LEE; KATHLEEN BRENNAN, individually and as guardian ad litem of her minor child, ELIZABETH BRENNAN; SCOTT P. HAVILAND and GIHAN I. EL-HABBAL, individually and as guardians ad LITEM OF THEIR CHILDREN, AHMED HAVILAND, AYAH HAVILAND and IMAN HAVILAND; MICHAEL JOHN STANTON and ANGELA MARIE STANTON, individually and as guardians ad litem of their children, JACOB STANTON, ALEXIS STANTON, DANIELLE STANTON, DALLAS STANTON and JORDAN STANTON; and KIMBERLY SINNOTT and JOHN NADASKY, individually and as guardians ad litem of their children, REID NADASKY, SEAN NADASKY, and JAMES NADASKY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and LORI MILBERG, HORACE J. TART, CAROL PARKER, ROSA GILL, SUSAN PARRY, PATTIE HEAD, ELEANOR GOETTEE, RON MARGIOTTA, and BEVERLEY CLARK, in their official capacity as members of the WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants"
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      {
        "text": "GEER, Judge.\nDefendant Wake County Board of Education (\u201cthe Board\u201d) appeals from the trial court\u2019s order concluding that the Board \u201clacks the statutory authority to convert traditional calendar schools to mandatory year round schools,\u201d but ruling that the Board \u201cis authorized by law to operate, on a voluntary consensual basis, year round calendar schools,\u201d so long as it obtains \u201cinformed parental consent,\u201d (Emphasis original.) Based, however, upon our review of the controlling statutes, we hold that the Board is authorized by the General Assembly to establish year-round schools and to assign students to attend those schools without obtaining their parents\u2019 prior consent. We, therefore, reverse the decision below.\nFacts\nThe facts in this case are essentially undisputed. The Wake County Public School System (\u201cWCPSS\u201d or \u201cthe school system\u201d) is one of the fastest growing public school systems in the n\u00e1tion. In recent years, its student population has increased more than 30 percent from 98,000 students in 2000 to over 128,000 students in school year 2006-2007. The Wake County Planning Department estimated that the school system would add another 8,000 students in the 2007-2008 school year and an additional 65,000 students by 2015. Since July 2000, the Board has opened more than 33 new schools and renovated others to deal with the burgeoning student population.\nThe Board\u2019s building plan has not, however, been able to keep pace with the influx of students. Many schools are overcrowded and use cafeterias, libraries, auditoriums, offices, common areas, teacher lounges, and converted storage rooms as classrooms. In addition, there are more than 1,100 mobile classrooms being used, as compared to 584 mobile units used in the 2002-2003 school year. The 1,100 mobile classrooms seat 25,300 students. Almost one fourth of WCPSS elementary school students are educated in mobile classrooms, a situation that overtaxes facilities such as restrooms, media centers, and cafeterias. At several WCPSS elementary schools, the first lunch period begins as early as 10:30 a.m., while other students end their lunch period just before going home for the day.\nBeginning in late 2005, the Board worked with the Wake County Board of County Commissioners and county staff to develop a long-term construction plan that would address the school. system\u2019s increasing facility needs. The overall plan included five different alternatives, each varying in cost' based on the level of construction. All five scenarios contemplated converting some existing schools to a year-round calendar and building new schools that would also operate on a year-round calendar. In developing this plan, the Board considered information from school staff, the results of community surveys, input from county commissioners, and communications from parents, teachers, and community members. It was apparent that a majority of the community would not support a school bond for construction and renovation of schools that exceeded $1 billion.\nPresently, the WCPSS has approximately 147 public schools. The schools have three different calendars: a traditional calendar, a multitrack year-round calendar, or a modified calendar (a single-track year-round calendar). All calendars have a total of 180 school days. The traditional calendar begins school in late August and continues until a summer vacation in early June. The modified calendar begins in late July and ends in late May. In the multi-track year-round schools, students are divided into four tracks, each with its own class schedule. Track schedules are then staggered so that three tracks are in school and one track is on break at all times. With the multi-track year-round calendar, 1,000 students can be assigned to a school that would have a traditional-calendar capacity of only 750 students.\nAs of the 2006-2007 school year, WCPSS operated 16 year-round elementary schools and four year-round middle schools. In that school year, 91,426 students were enrolled in WCPSS elementary and middle schools with 17,174 attending year-round schools. Although most of the year-round schools were considered \u201cvoluntary,\u201d and students had to apply to attend them, each year-round school has had a portion of students involuntarily assigned to it since 2003. For the 2006-2007 school year, there were 6,929 students involuntarily assigned to a year-round school. In addition to the multi-track year-round schools, WCPSS operates six magnet schools on the single-track, year-round calendar. For the 2006-2007 school year, there were 1,320 students involuntarily assigned to magnet schools.\nIn September 2006, the Board voted to convert 19 elementary-and 3 middle schools to a year-round calendar starting in the 2007-2008 school year, adding approximately 5,000 seats. In making this decision, the Board weighed the risk of a failed bond referendum against a preference for more expensive traditional calendar schools. On 7 November 2006, Wake County voters approved a $970 million bond to fund the Board\u2019s capital improvement plan. Beginning on 8 December 2006, the Board began considering proposals for student assignments for the 2007-2008 school year based on its capital improvement plan.\nPrior to approving a final assignment plan, the Board notified the parents of potentially affected students that their child could be assigned to a mandatory year-round school and gave them the opportunity to select which \u201ctrack\u201d they preferred for their child\u2019s schedule. On 6 February 2007, after holding three public hearings, the Board approved its final student assignment plan for the 2007-2008 school year. Under that plan, 20,717 students were assigned to newly-converted or newly-built year-round schools. 17,855 of those students had previously been assigned to traditional calendar schools.\nOn 13 March 2007, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Wake County Superior Court challenging the Board\u2019s plan. The plaintiffs include Wake Cares, Inc., a non-profit organization, and eight parents of WCPSS students, individually and as guardians ad litem for their children. No class was certified prior to the trial court\u2019s final order. In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that the Board lacked the constitutional and statutory authority to convert traditional calendar schools to year-round schools and then assign WCPSS students to those schools on a mandatory basis. Plaintiffs further claimed that the Board\u2019s plan to establish mandatory year-round schools for some students while maintaining traditional calendar schools for other students violated plaintiffs\u2019 federal due process and equal protection rights; violated plaintiffs\u2019 fundamental right to a \u201cuniform and regular education on equal terms\u201d as protected by the North Carolina Constitution and Chapter 115C of the General Statutes; and violated plaintiffs\u2019 right to procedural due process. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment as well as an injunction prohibiting the Board from implementing its plan.\nOn 4 April 2007, the Board moved to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure based on a lack of standing, failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, mootness, and failure to state a claim for relief. Because the trial court chose to consider affidavits submitted by the Board in opposition to plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction, the court converted the Board\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.\nAfter rejecting the Board\u2019s arguments regarding standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and mootness, the trial court concluded that \u201cthe Wake County Board of Education is authorized by law to operate, on a voluntary consensual basis, year round calendar schools, modified year round calendar schools, and magnet schools operating as modified or year round calendar schools.\u201d According to the trial court, however, the Board \u201clacks the legal authority from the General Assembly to force children to attend mandatory year round schools.\u201d Specifically, the court concluded \u201c[t]hat'the Wake County Board of Education may not require the attendance of students at year round calendar schools without informed parental consent.\" (Emphasis original.) Finally, the court asserted: \u201cHaving made the legal determination that mandatory year round schools are not authorized under the law, there is no need to go further.\u201d The court, therefore, entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, but left for the Board \u201c[t]he nuts and bolts of obtaining informed parental consent, determining how many Wake County students and families are willing to accept assignment to the newly converted and formerly mandatory year round assignments^] and the aftermath of such determinations . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe Board timely appealed to this Court. Plaintiffs did not cross-assign error to any portion of the trial court\u2019s order. On 25 July 2007, however, plaintiffs filed with the Supreme Court a petition for by-pass of the Court of Appeals pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-31 (2007) and N.C.R. App. P. 15. That petition was denied on 8 November 2007.\nI\nWe first address the jurisdictional issues raised by the Board. The Board claims that the trial court should have dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint based on (1) lack of standing, (2) a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and (3) mootness. While we agree that Wake Cares lacks standing, and the motion to dismiss should have been granted as to that organization, we hold that the trial court properly denied the motion as to the Board\u2019s remaining arguments.\nA. Standing\nWith respect to Wake Cares\u2019 standing, the trial court stated: \u201cWake Cares, Inc., a non-profit organization, has standing to assert the claims which its members and constituents might have asserted.\u201d It is undisputed that Wake Cares in fact has no \u201cmembers.\u201d The Board contends that controlling authority, which does not address \u201cconstituents,\u201d requires dismissal of Wake Cares as a plaintiff.\nAn association may have standing to sue \u201c \u2018in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself,\u2019 \u201d River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 129, 388 S.E.2d 538, 555 (1990) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 362, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2211-12 (1975)), or may assert associational standing to seek relief \u201con behalf of its members.\u201d Id. at 130, 388 S.E.2d at 555. With respect to associational standing, our Supreme Court has held:\n\u201c[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization\u2019s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.\u201d\nId. (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm\u2019n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (1977)).\nIn this case, the trial court did not base its conclusion that Wake Cares had standing on any injury to Wake Cares itself, but instead relied solely upon associational standing. Yet, it is undisputed that Wake Cares has no members and, thus, it could not be seeking relief \u201con behalf of its members.\u201d Id.\nNevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in Hunt recognized a form of associational standing that would permit an organization \u201cto assert the claims of its constituents.\u201d 432 U.S. at 345, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 395, 97 S. Ct. at 2442. In Hunt, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, a state agency, did not have \u201cmembers,\u201d but the Court concluded that it still had standing to \u201cassert[] the claims of the Washington apple growers and dealers who form its constituency,\u201d id. at 344, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 395, 97 S. Ct. at 2442, because these growers and dealers \u201cpossess [ed] all of the indicia of membership in an organization.\u201d Id.\nNeither the parties nor the trial court specifically address Hunt\u2019s constituency basis for standing, which has also not been previously addressed by North Carolina\u2019s appellate courts. See Goldston v. State, 361 N.C. 26, 35, 637 S.E.2d 876, 882 (2006) (\u201cWhile federal standing doctrine can be instructive as to general principles . . . and for comparative analysis, the nuts and bolts of North, Carolina standing doctrine are not coincident with federal standing doctrine.\u201d).\nWe need not, however, decide whether North Carolina should adopt Hunt\u2019s constituency basis for standing because even assuming, without deciding, that Hunt\u2019s test should apply to a private organization like Wake Cares, Wake Cares has made no attempt to show that it meets that test. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2000) (\u201cIn evaluating the Commission\u2019s claim of standing, the Hunt Court listed a number of ways in which the Commission functioned effectively as a membership organization.\u201d); Washington Legal Found, v. Leavitt, 477 F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.D.C. 2007) (setting forth test that must be met for organization to be deemed \u201cfunctional equivalent]\u201d of traditional membership organizations). Since Wake Cares has not demonstrated that it would qualify as an organization entitled to represent its constituents, it cannot rely on that theory as a basis for establishing standing, and its claims must be dismissed. See Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d at 196 (dismissing appeal of organization for lack of standing because organization \u201cha[d] not provided any information that would indicate whether it meets these requirements\u201d of Hunt).\nAlthough plaintiffs propose additional theories of standing for Wake Cares, the trial court did not address any theory other than associational standing, and plaintiffs have not cross-assigned error to the court\u2019s failure to find standing on those bases. Consequently, those contentions are not properly before this Court. See Harllee v. Harllee, 151 N.C. App. 40, 51, 565 S.E.2d 678, 685 (2002) (\u201c[P]laintiff failed to cross-assign error pursuant to Rule 10(d) to the trial court\u2019s failure to render judgment on these alternative grounds. Therefore, plaintiff has not properly preserved for appellate review these alternative grounds.\u201d). We, therefore, hold that the trial court erred in not granting the Board\u2019s motion to dismiss Wake Cares\u2019 claims for lack of standing.\nThe Board also argues that the individual plaintiffs lack standing to sue, contending that none of the plaintiffs have taxpayer standing and that five of the children and three of the parents cannot establish an injury in fact. The trial court did not specifically analyze whether the individual plaintiffs had standing, stating only: \u201cThe Court has considered all other arguments in relation to the [Board] \u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction and standing and rejects those arguments without further discussion.\u201d We hold that the individual plaintiffs have sufficiently established their standing to bring a declaratory judgment action.\nIn pertinent part, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides:\nAny person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise, and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-254 (2007). Thus, \u201c[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act permits any person affected by a statute or municipal ordinance to obtain a declaration of his rights thereunder.\u201d Bland v. City of Wilmington, 278 N.C. 657, 659, 180 S.E.2d 813, 815 (1971).\nOur Supreme Court has further specified that \u201c[a]n action may not be. maintained under the Declaratory Judgment Act to determine rights, status, or other relations unless the action involves a present actual controversy between the parties.\u201d Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 645-46, 360 S.E.2d 756, 760 (1987). \u201cA declaratory judgment may be used to determine the construction and validity of a statute,\u201d id. at 646, 360 S.E.2d at 760, but the plaintiff must be \u201cdirectly and adversely affected\u201d by the statute, id. Most recently, our Supreme Court has explained that a declaratory judgment should issue \u201c \u2018(1) when [it] will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations at issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Goldston, 361 N.C. at 33, 637 S.E.2d at 881 (quoting Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 588, 573 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2002)).\nIn this case, the individual plaintiffs challenge the Board\u2019s authority to require students to attend year-round schools. Each of the students involved in this action was initially assigned to a year-round school. The individual plaintiffs were, therefore, directly affected by the action of the Board. While some of the students were ultimately re-assigned to attend traditional calendar schools for the calendar year 2007-2008, they may still be assigned to year-round schools in the future. As a result, an actual controversy still exists, and a declaratory judgment as to the authority of the Board and the rights of the parents and students would terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy currently existing. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 336 N.C. 200, 214, 443 S.E.2d 716, 725 (1994) (plaintiffs could seek declaratory judgment that Industrial Commission\u2019s rule limiting amounts paid hospital was unlawful even though rule allowed plaintiffs to seek exception from rule because plaintiffs were \u201cnot required to sustain actual losses in order to make a test case\u201d). Accordingly, the individual plaintiffs have standing to seek a declaratory judgment.\nBecause of our disposition of this appeal, we need not address whether plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief. We also are not required to address whether the individual plaintiffs have taxpayer standing as set forth in Goldston.\nB. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies\nThe Board next contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint based on plaintiffs\u2019 failure to exhaust their administrative remedies under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369 (2007). If a plaintiff has failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the action must be dismissed. Shell Island Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217, 220, 517 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1999).\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369(a) provides:\nThe parent or guardian of any child, or the person standing in loco parentis to any child, who is dissatisfied with the assignment made by a local board of education may, within 10 days after notification of the assignment, or the last publication thereof, apply in writing to the local board of education for the reassignment of the child to a different public school. ... If the application for reassignment is disapproved, the local board of education shall give notice to the applicant by registered or certified mail, and the applicant may within five days after receipt of such notice apply to the local board for a hearing. The applicant shall be entitled to a prompt and fair hearing on the question of reassignment of such child to a different school.\n(Emphasis added.) The local board of education at the hearing \u201cshall consider the best interest of the child, the orderly and efficient administration of the public schools, the proper administration of the school to which reassignment is requested and the instruction, health, and safety of the pupils there enrolled, and shall assign said child in accordance with such factors.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369(c).\nWe believe that this case is analogous to Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 336 N.C. at 209, 443 S.E.2d at 722, in which the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a rule of the Industrial Commission regarding reimbursement of hospitals was invalid. The defendants contended that because the General Assembly had provided a remedy by which any matter, including charges for hospital services, could be resolved in the Industrial Commission, the plaintiff hospitals had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not first pursuing that avenue. Id.\nThe Supreme Court confirmed that even in a declaratory judgment action, \u201c \u2018[wjhen an effective administrative remedy exists, that remedy is exclusive.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 428, 251 S.E.2d 843, 852 (1979)). Nonetheless, it pointed out:\nPlaintiff hospitals, however, do not seek review of an award of any specific claims for compensation before defendant Commission; rather, they seek a declaratory ruling that the per diem reimbursement rule is invalid, and injunctive relief therefrom. [The statutes] only provide for hearings, awards, and review of awards in disputes between employees and employers with respect to specific claims for compensation, and do not address challenges to rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to the [Workers\u2019 Compensation] Act.\nId. at 209-10, 443 S.E.2d at 722. Because the General Assembly had not provided any procedures to challenge a rule or regulation of the Commission, it had \u201cnot provided, within the Act, an adequate remedy for plaintiffs.\u201d Id. at 211, 443 S.E.2d at 723. The Court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff hospitals were not barred from proceeding for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id.\nIn this case, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint did not simply address the assignment of individual students. The complaint challenges the \u201c2007-2008 Growth Management Plan\u201d adopted by the Board that, according to plaintiffs, shifts from using year-round schools as a \u201cstop-gap measure\u201d on an emergency basis for overcrowding to using it as part of \u201ca long range \u2018plan for growth.\u2019 \u201d Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that this plan \u201ccreat[es] a structural defect in the operation of [the local school system] which, once implemented, cannot be readily changed by operation of normal political processes, nor which other branches of government can correct.\u201d In their request for declaratory relief, plaintiffs seek a declaration regarding the validity of the Board\u2019s plan \u201cand other associated regulations which, if implemented, will assign its members or children of its members to mandatory year-round schools and will expend funds in such a manner so that traditional schools will not be reasonably available now or in the future to its members.\u201d Further, plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to injunctive relief prohibiting implementation of the plan.\nThese claims regarding the validity of the Board\u2019s plan to use year-round schools to alleviate overcrowding do not fall within the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369. Plaintiffs are not challenging specific assignment decisions, but rather an overall plan and accompanying regulations. The question presented by this case is thus not the reassignment of a particular child from one school to another school, as set forth in \u00a7 115C-369(a), and none of the factors specified in \u00a7 115C-369(c) for consideration by the Board in making a decision under this statute would address the issues regarding the validity of the plan.\nThe Board, however, asserts that Cameron v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 36 N.C. App. 547, 244 S.E.2d 497 (1978), dictates the outcome in this case. In Cameron, the plaintiffs filed a class action against the Wake County Board of Education, seeking a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the 1977-1978 student assignment plan and a declaratory judgment that the plan was unconstitutional on the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 547, 244 S.E.2d at 497-98. The named plaintiffs alleged \u201cthat the defendant has abdicated its student assignment responsibilities to federal bureaucrats, should have made its assignments on the basis of the welfare of the pupils, and since this was not done, the court should act on behalf of the plaintiffs.\u201d Id. at 550, 244 S.E.2d at 499.\nIn concluding that the plaintiffs had improperly failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, this Court held that plaintiffs could not disregard the predecessor statute to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369 by failing to request reassignment and \u201ctak[e] a route wholly inconsistent with the statutes enacted by the General Assembly.\u201d Id. at 551, 244 S.E.2d at 500. Significantly, however, the reassignment statute would have provided precisely the relief sought by the plaintiffs: determination by the Board, and not any federal entity, of \u201c \u2018the best interests of the child\u2019 \u201d regarding school assignment. Id. at 549, 244 S.E.2d at 499 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115-178).\nIn this case, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369 provides no means for determining whether a plan for mandatory year-round schools is statutorily or constitutionally permitted. The statute focuses on the individual assignment of a student and would not supply the relief sought in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint regarding the Board\u2019s plan and regulations. Since the Board has not pointed to any other statute that would provide an administrative remedy encompassing that sought by plaintiffs, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. controls, and the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.\nC. Mootness\nFinally, the Board argues that plaintiffs\u2019 challenge to its plan to assign WCPSS students to year-round schools on a mandatory basis has been rendered moot due to the fact that all the plaintiffs who were initially assigned to a year-round school under its 2007-2008 assignment plan and subsequently applied for transfer have been reassigned to a traditional calendar or magnet school. \u201c[A]ctions filed under the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 1-253 through -267 (2005), are subject to traditional mootness analysis.\u201d Citizens Addressing Reassignment & Educ., Inc. v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 182 N.C. App. 241, 246, 641 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2007), disc, review denied, 362 N.C. 234, 659 S.E.2d 438, (2008). \u201cA case is considered moot when \u2018a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.\u2019 \u201d Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 647, 588 S.E.2d 877, 879 (2003) (quoting Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass\u2019n, 344 N.C. 394, 398-99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996)). \u201cCourts will not entertain such cases because it is not the responsibility of courts to decide abstract propositions of law.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). \u201cConversely, when a court\u2019s determination can have a practical effect on a controversy, the court may not dismiss the case as moot.\u201d Id.\nIn determining whether plaintiffs\u2019 claims may be considered moot, we are bound by Goldston. Because we hold that plaintiffs have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment regarding the Board\u2019s authority to establish year-round schools and to assign students to those schools on a mandatory basis, the fact that individual plaintiffs have been reassigned does not address the unsettled controversy concerning the Board\u2019s authority. See Goldston, 361 N.C. at 34-35, 637 S.E.2d at 882 (holding \u201cdeclaratory judgment remains an appropriate remedy\u201d despite plaintiffs\u2019 abandoning their claim \u201cto compel return of the challenged assets\u201d because \u201c[i]f plaintiffs ultimately prevail, their point is made\u201d). Stated differently, the plaintiffs\u2019 individual reassignments do not \u201cterminate the uncertainty and controversy giving rise to th[is] action\u201d as would a declaration that the Board does, or does not, have the authority to implement its plan. Id. at 34, 637 S.E.2d at 881. As a consequence, plaintiffs\u2019 claims are not moot.\nII\nWe now turn to the trial court\u2019s decision on the merits. We first note that plaintiffs, in arguing that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed, couch their contentions in the rhetoric of constitutional rights. The trial court, however, based its decision solely on the Board\u2019s lack of \u201cstatutory authority\u201d and its conclusion \u201cthat mandatory year round schools are not authorized under the law.\u201d It then concluded that \u201cthere is no need to go further.\u201d The court did not address plaintiffs\u2019 state and federal constitutional claims. Since plaintiffs have not cross-assigned error on the grounds that those arguments present alternative bases for upholding the trial court\u2019s decision, they are not properly before us. Harllee, 151 N.C. App. at 51, 565 S.E.2d at 685.\nThe trial court identified the merits issue as \u201cwhether or not the Wake County Board of Education, or for that matter, any Board of Education, has the legal authority to establish mandatory year round schools? This is the critical determination in this case.\u201d We believe that the trial court\u2019s articulation of the issue actually presents two questions: (1) Does the Board have authority to establish year-round schools, and (2) does the Board have authority to assign students to such schools without their parents\u2019 consent?\nWith respect to the authority of the Board to establish year-round schools, the trial court\u2019s order ultimately seems to conclude that the Board does have such authority. The court specifically concluded that the Board is \u201cauthorized by law to operate, on a voluntary consensual basis, year round calendar schools . . . .\u201d Even plaintiffs, in their brief to this Court, assert that the Board \u201cmisstate [s] Plaintiffs\u2019 position as an argument that school boards do not have authority to operate year-round schools . . . .\u201d The trial court\u2019s order, however, appears to base its requirement that attendance at such schools be only on \u201ca voluntary consensual basis\u201d on a lack of express statutory authority to operate such schools except as a program supplemental to traditional calendar schools. We, therefore, first address the Board\u2019s authority to create and operate year-round schools.\nThe North Carolina Constitution specifies that \u201c[t]he General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 2(1). The Constitution, however, further provides that \u201c[t]he State Board of Education shall supervise and administer the free public school system . . . and shall make all needed rules and regulations in relation thereto, subject to laws enacted by the General Assembly.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 5. The General Assembly has-codified this constitutional authority of the State Board of Education in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-12 (2007), which states: \u201cThe general supervision and administration of the free public school system shall be vested in the State Board of Education. The State Board of Education shall establish policy for the system of free public schools, subject to laws enacted by the General Assembly.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nNevertheless, as our Supreme Court has explained, the General Assembly \u201cmay delegate to local administrative units the power to make such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary or expedient, and when so delegated it is peculiarly within the province of the administrative officers of the local unit to determine what things are detrimental to the successful management, good order, and discipline of the schools in their charge and the rules required to produce those conditions.\u201d Coggins v. Bd. of Educ. of Durham, 223 N.C. 763, 767, 28 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1944). Consistent with Coggins, the General Assembly has exercised its right to delegate power to local school boards by providing a broad grant of authority:\nAll powers and duties conferred and imposed by law respecting public schools, which are not expressly conferred and imposed upon some other official, are conferred and imposed upon local boards of education. Said boards of education shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units and they shall enforce the school law in their respective units.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-36 (2007) (emphasis added). See also N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-40 (2007) (\u201cLocal boards of education, subject to any paramount powers vested by law in the State Board of Education or any other authorized agency shall have general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective local school administrative units . . . .\u201d); Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N.C. 86, 94, 253 S.E.2d 898, 903 (1979) (\u201cIn the scheme of public education adopted by the General Assembly, the \u2018general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units\u2019 is delegated to the county and city boards of education, subject to any paramount powers vested by law in the State Board of Education or any other authorized agency.\u201d (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115-27)).\nIn addition to this broad grant of authority, the General Assembly has also set out a list of specific powers and duties vested in local school boards. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-47 (2007). These enumerated powers complement the \u201cgeneral control and supervision\u201d vested in local school boards by \u00a7\u00a7 115C-36 and -40, with the result that \u201c[e]ach County Board of Education is vested with authority to fix and determine the method of conducting the public schools in its county so as to furnish the most advantageous method of education available to the children attending its public schools.\u201d Coggins, 223 N.C. at 767, 28 S.E.2d at 530.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-47(11) specifies that \u201c[l]oeal boards of education shall determine the school calendar under G.S. 115C-84.2.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a) (2007), in turn, requires that each local board of education \u201cadopt a school calendar consisting of 215 days all of which shall fall within the fiscal year.\u201d In addition, the statute mandates \u201c[a] minimum of 180 days and 1,000 hours of instruction covering at least nine calendar months.\u201d Id. The local board, however, \u201cshall designate when the 180 instructional days shall occur.\u201d Id. Significantly, subsection (a) of \u00a7 115C-84.2 concludes by stressing: \u201cLocal boards and individual schools are encouraged to use the calendar flexibility in order to meet the annual performance standards set by the State Board.\u201d Id. Thus, local school boards have been granted the flexibility to adopt the school calendars best suited to fulfilling the State\u2019s educational mandates.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2 does, however, place some limitations on the design of a school calendar, including a mandate that the calendar include 42 consecutive days when teacher attendance is not required \u201cunless . . . the school is a year-round school.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(b)(2). Further, although reiterating that \u201c[l]ocal boards of education shall determine the dates of opening and closing the public schools under subdivision (a)(1) of this section,\u201d the statute specifies that \u201c[e]xcept for year-round schools, the opening date for students shall not be before August 25, and the closing date for students shall not be after June 10.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(d) (emphasis added).\nThus, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-47 grants local school boards broad authority to set the school calendar in accordance with N.C..Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2, which, in turn, encourages local school boards to consider calendar flexibility as a means of achieving educational standards. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2 does require 180 days of instruction over \u201cat least nine calendar months,\u201d but exempts \u201cyear-round schools\u201d from the requirement of a 42-day break for teachers and from the restrictions on opening and closing dates. The express language exempting year-round schools from the calendar-design restrictions demonstrates that the General Assembly recognized a year-round calendar as a valid alternative to the traditional calendar (which includes a significant summer vacation).\nAlthough the issues in this case have been discussed in terms of \u201ctraditional\u201d calendar schools versus \u201cyear-round\u201d calendar schools, both of these school calendar options comply with the requirements set out in \u00a7 115C-84.2(a) and (b). Indeed, there has been no suggestion that a year-round calendar such as the one adopted by the Board in this case fails to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2. Thus, the Board has authority under these statutes to operate year-round schools.\nWhile the trial court seemed to agree that the Board has this authority, it also concluded that the Board cannot assign students to year-round schools without informed parental consent. This conclusion is precluded by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-366(b) (2007), which provides:\nEach local board of education shall assign to a public school each student qualified for assignment under this section. Except as otherwise provided by law, the authority of each board of education in the matter of assignment of children to the public schools shall be full and complete, and its decision as to the assignment of any child to any school shall be final.\n(Emphasis added.) The only restrictions placed on a Board\u2019s assignment authority are set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-367 (2007), which prohibits local school boards from assigning students to a given school \u201con account of race, creed, color or national origin.\u201d\nIf, as we have held, the Board has authority to operate schools in the WCPSS on a year-round calendar, then N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-366(b) grants \u201cfull and complete\u201d authority to the Board to assign children to such schools. Indeed, the Board\u2019s decision to assign a child to \u201cany school\u201d \u2014 which by its plain language must include all lawfully-operated schools \u2014 \u201cshall be final.\u201d Id.\nIt appears that the trial court and plaintiffs base their requirement that any assignment to a year-round school be voluntary on a strained reading of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2 combined with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-1 (2007). According to the trial court, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-1 provides a right for students to attend a traditional calendar school:\nThe text of [\u00a7 115C-1] makes mandatory what the text of the constitution leaves discretionary. Because the constitution references the phrase \u201cuniform school term\u201d as-being at least nine months, and the legislature has required that the term be nine months, the school term is a feature of public school uniformity inherent in the constitutional mandate of a general and uniform school system. A nine month term is therefore mandatory upon local school administrative units throughout the state. Equal access to a nine month school term is part of the constitutional privilege of a general and uniform system of free public schools and a part of \u201cthe property right\u201d of an education.\nThe trial court and plaintiffs attempt to reconcile this \u201cright\u201d with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2 by reading that statute as equating \u201cyear-round schools\u201d with voluntary \u201csupplemental or additional educational programs or activities,\u201d as provided for in \u00a7 115C-84.2(e).\nAccording to the trial court, \u201c[t]he permissive use of the term year round schools in G.S. 115C-84.2(d) does not alter the force or effect of the mandatory language in G.S. 115C-1 relating to a uniform nine month term.\u201d The trial court\u2019s construction of the statutes and plaintiffs\u2019 contentions cannot be reconciled with the plain language of the statutes or prior appellate opinions.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-I states:\nA general and uniform system of free public schools shall be provided throughout the State, wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Constitution of North Carolina. . . . There shall be operated in every local school administrative unit a uniform school term of nine months, without the levy of a State ad valorem tax therefor.\nThis Court has previously held that \u201c\u00a7 115C-1 simply codifies the \u2018general and uniform\u2019 and \u2018equal opportunities\u2019 clauses of the Constitution . . . .\u201d Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 14, 468 S.E.2d 543, 552 (1996), aff\u2019d in part and rev\u2019d in part, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).\nInitially, we note that there is no dispute regarding whether the Constitution provides the right to a uniform nine-month term asserted by plaintiffs and recognized by the trial court; it does not. Article IX provides for a \u201cuniform system\u201d that \u201cshall be maintained at least nine months in every year . . . .\u201d N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 2(1) (emphasis added). \u201c[T]he word \u2018uniform\u2019 modifies the word \u2018system,\u2019 not the word \u2018term.\u2019 The Constitution, therefore, does not require a uniform 180 day term.\u201d Morgan v. Polk County Bd. of Educ., 74 N.C. App. 169, 174, 328 S.E.2d 320, 324 (1985) (citing Bd of Educ. v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Granville County, 174 N.C. 469, 473, 93 S.E. 1001, 1002 (1917)).\nThe language of art. IX, \u00a7 2(1) does not explicitly require uniformity with respect to the opening and closing dates. It requires the State to maintain a free public school system with a minimum quantum of instruction of nine months each year. Frazier v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Guilford County, 194 N.C. 49, 63, 138 S.E. 433, 440 (1927) (prior N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 3, now N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 2(1), \u201cis not a limitation as to the length of the school term; it is the minimum required by the Constitution\u201d).\nOur Supreme Court has also specifically considered what the references to a \u201cuniform system\u201d and \u201cequal opportunities\u201d mean:\n[The North Carolina Constitution] places upon the General Assembly the duty of providing for \u201ca general and uniform system of free public schools . . . wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 2(1). We conclude that at the time this provision was originally written in 1868 providing for a \u201cgeneral and uniform\u201d system but without the equal opportunities clause, the intent of the framers was that every child have a fundamental right to a sound basic educa lion which would prepare the child to participate fully in society as it existed in his or her lifetime. The 1970 amendment adding the equal opportunities clause ensured that all the children of this state would enjoy this right.\nLeandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 348, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255-56 (1997) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). As \u00a7 115C-1 is a codification of the constitutional provision, this analysis necessarily also controls as to \u00a7 115C-1.\nLeandro established that the requirement of \u201cequal opportunities\u201d was added to ensure that all children had equal access to a sound basic education. The Court stressed: \u201cAlthough we have concluded that the North Carolina Constitution requires that access to a sound basic education be provided equally in every school district, we are convinced that the equal opportunities clause of Article IX, Section 2(1) does not require substantially equal funding or educational advantages in all school districts.\u201d Leandro, 346 N.C. at 349, 488 S.E.2d at 256 (emphasis added). Since there is no contention that plaintiffs are being denied equal access to a sound basic education by being assigned to year-round calendar schools, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-1 does not provide plaintiffs with a right to \u201cequal opportunity\u201d to attend a school with a traditional calendar.\nFurther, we cannot agree with the trial court\u2019s assumption that \u00a7 115C-l\u2019s reference to a \u201cuniform school term of nine months\u201d necessarily means a term of no more and no less than nine months. The statute, especially as a codification of the Constitution, can equally be read as setting a floor for the quantum of education required. Any other construction of the statute would place \u00a7 115C-1 in conflict with \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)(l)\u2019s requirement that a school calendar include \u201c[a] minimum of 180 days and 1,000 hours of instruction covering at least nine calendar months.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nOur Supreme Court has held that the statutes governing education \u201care to be construed in pari materia\u201d and, \u201c [i]f possible, they are to be reconciled and harmonized.\u201d Bd. of Educ. of Onslow County v. Bd. of County Comm\u2019rs of Onslow County, 240 N.C. 118, 126, 81 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1954). In order to do so, the Court directed the following \u201cjudicial approach\u201d:\n\u201cThe different sections should be regarded, not as prior and subsequent acts, but as simultaneous expressions of the legislative will; but, where every means of reconciling inconsistencies has been employed in vain, the section last adopted will prevail, regardless of their relative positions in the code or revision. An unnecessary implication arising from one section, inconsistent with the express terms of another on the same subject, yields to the expressed intent, and the two sections are not repugnant.\u201d\nId. (quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes \u00a7 385(b)). See also Whittington v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Human Res., 100 N.C. App. 603, 606, 398 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1990) (\u201c[W]hen one statute speaks directly and in detail to a particular situation, that direct, detailed statute will be construed as controlling other general statutes regarding that particular situation, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. . . . [Statutes relating to the same subject should be construed in pari materia, in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions without destroying the meaning of the statutes involved.\u201d).\nHere, construing \u00a7 115C-1, a general statute codifying the constitutional provision, as mandating a term of precisely nine months rather than establishing a minimum term of nine months (as set out in the constitution) would conflict with the later-enacted \u00a7 1I5C-84.2. That more recent statute, however, specifically addresses the requirements for school calendars and requires \u201cat least nine months.\u201d The construction of \u00a7 115C-1 adopted by the trial court is unnecessary and should, therefore, \u201cyield[]\u201d to the express intent in \u00a7 115C-84.2. Bd. of Educ. of Onslow County, 240 N.C. at 126, 81 S.E.2d at 262.\nWe hold, therefore, that \u00a7 115C-1, consistent with the purpose of the constitutional provision it was designed to implement, does not mandate equal access to a school term of nine consecutive months, but rather refers to the minimum quantum of educational instruction required. How that minimum quantum of instruction is translated into an annual school calendar is then prescribed by \u00a7 115C-84.2, which sets out certain requirements, but otherwise mandates that \u201c[t]he local board shall designate when the 180 instructional days shall occur\u201d and specifically recognizes \u201cyear-round school[s]\u201d \u00e1s a permissible calendaring scheme. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)(l), (b)(2), (d).\nThe trial court and plaintiffs, however, construe \u00a7 115C-84.2 as denying local school boards the authority to operate schools on a year-round calendar except, according to the trial court, as part of \u201csupplemental or additional programs which supplement or add to the uniform school calendar,\u201d referencing \u00a7 115C-84.2(e). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(e) states: \u201cNothing in this section prohibits a local board of education from offering supplemental or additional educational programs or activities outside the calendar adopted under this section.\u201d The trial court apparently believed that this subsection of \u00a7 115C-84.2 permitted year-round schools as \u201csupplemental\u201d to the nine-month calendar, but because such schools were merely supplemental programs, students could not be assigned to them without parental consent. We cannot accept this reading of the statute.\nIt is, of course, fundamental \u201cthat when construing a statutory provision, the words in the statute are to be given their natural or ordinary meaning; unless the context of the provision indicates that they should be interpreted differently.\u201d Whittington, 100 N.C. App. at 606, 398 S.E.2d at 42. In this case, \u00a7 115C-84.2(d) expressly exempts \u201cyear-round schools\u201d from the statute\u2019s requirement regarding opening and closing dates of school calendars: \u201cExcept for year-round schools,.the opening date for students shall not be before August 25, and the closing date for students shall not be after June 10.\u201d (Emphasis added.) N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(e) relates only to \u201csupplemental or additional educational programs or activities outside the calendar adopted under this section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Since the provision in \u00a7 115C-84.2(d) referencing \u201cyear-round schools\u201d governs calendars permitted under the statute, \u201cyear-round schools\u201d necessarily do not constitute programs \u201coutside the calendar\u201d permitted by the statute.\nNonetheless, the trial court ruled that \u201cit is clear the way to reconcile this exception in the opening and closing of schools [in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(d)] with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-1 is to define year round schools or modified calendar schools as schools which are \u2018additional\u2019 or \u2018supplemental\u2019 and having a voluntary aspect to participation by students.\u201d The court then added: \u201c[T.]he only way the Legislature would allow schoolf] boards to operate schools which did not adhere to its protection of summer vacation provisions was to allow a school board to have \u2018supplemental\u2019 or \u2018additional\u2019 school programs.\u201d\nContrary to this assumption by the trial court, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(b)(2), in fact, does specifically exempt year-round schools from the stat\u00fate\u2019s apparent protection of a teacher\u2019s summer vacation: \u201cThe calendar shall include at least 42 consecutive days when teacher attendance is not required unless: (i) the school is a year-round school . . . .\u201d This provision \u2014 within the portions of the statute setting out standards for school calendars and unrelated to \u201csupplemental\u201d programs \u2014 runs counter to the trial court\u2019s construction of the statute. Indeed, the General Assembly could not have intended in this reference to \u201cyear-round schools\u201d to equate such schools with \u201csupplemental\u201d or \u201cadditional\u201d programs as set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(e). Subsection (b)(2) was added in 1997, 1997 N.C. Sess. Laws 443, s. 838, while subsection (e), addressing supplemental programs, did not come into existence until 2004, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 180, s. 1.\nAs support for its construction of \u00a7 115C-84.2, the trial court relied upon legislative history regarding the General Assembly\u2019s amendments to \u00a7 115C-84.2 in 2004. That legislation added the limitation on opening and closing dates (with the exception for year-round schools) and added subsection (e) discussing supplemental educational programs. 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 180, s. 1. According to plaintiffs, the fact that the House and Senate Conference Committee that produced 2004 N.C. Sess. Law 180 chose to remove proposed definitions of \u201cyear-round schools\u201d from the Act while adding the authorization in subsection (e) of supplemental programs necessarily means that year-round schools are supplemental or additional programs under \u00a7 115C-84.2(e).\nThe Supreme Court has, however, stressed that \u201cwhere the language of a statute expresses the legislative intent in clear and unambiguous terms, the words employed must be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended unaffected by its legislative history.\u201d Piedmont Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Johnson, 256 N.C. 155, 161, 123 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1962). We believe that the language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)(l) and (d) is clear and unambiguous. Legislative history cannot, therefore, be relied upon to force a construction on that statute inconsistent with the plain language.\nIn any event, the inference drawn by the trial court and plaintiffs from the events in 2004 is at best tenuous. One can just as readily infer that the General Assembly felt that it was unnecessary to define \u201cyear-round schools\u201d and that any such definition would inappropriately constrain local school boards from \u201cusfing] the calendar flexibility in order to meet the annual performance standards set by the State Board,\u201d as encouraged by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a).\nMoreover, the trial court\u2019s and plaintiffs\u2019 legislative history analysis overlooks the General Assembly\u2019s adoption in 1997 of the exemption for \u201cyear-round school[s]\u201d in the calendar limitation regarding teacher vacation days. This prior amendment adding an exception for year-round schools, long before a subsection relating to supplemental programs existed, undercuts the inference drawn by the trial court from the \u2014 at best \u2014 ambiguous legislative history.\nNeither the trial court nor plaintiffs have presented any other statutory basis for a requirement of informed parental consent prior to assignment of a child to a year-round school. We note further that the trial court\u2019s approach is inconsistent with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)\u2019s requirement that \u201c[l]ocal boards of education shall consult with parents and the employed public school personnel in the development of the school calendar.\u201d While this provision requires only consultation, the trial court\u2019s order requires agreement by parents in their children\u2019s calendar. \u201c[W]hen confronted with a clear and unambiguous statute, courts \u2018are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u2019 \u201d In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 292, 643 S.E.2d 920, 923 (quoting In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 169 L. Ed. 2d 396, 128 S. Ct. 615 (2007). Thus, we cannot impose a duty to obtain consent when the statute provides only a duty to consult.\nWe, therefore, hold that the Board has the authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-84.2 to create and operate year-round schools. Further, no authority exists to support the trial court\u2019s requirement of informed parental consent prior to assignment to such schools. To the contrary, under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-366(b), when a local school board exercises its \u201cfull and complete\u201d authority to assign a student to a year-round school, that decision is \u201cfinal\u201d subject only to an application by the student under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 115C-369 for reassignment.\nConclusion\nWe note that much of the trial court\u2019s decision as well as the materials submitted by the parties to the trial court addressed the advantages and disadvantages of a year-round calendar. Such questions are for the local boards of education, the State Board of Education, and the General Assembly to decide. As our Supreme Court stressed in its landmark education decision:\nThe legislature, unlike the courts, is not limited to addressing only cases and controversies brought before it by litigants. The legislature can properly conduct public hearings and committee meetings at which it can hear and consider the views of the general public as well as educational experts and permit the full expression of all points of view as to what curricula will best ensure that every child of the state has the opportunity to receive a sound basic education.\nLeandro, 346 N.C. at 355, 488 S.E.2d at 259. The Court \u201creemphasize [d] [its] recognition of the fact that the administration of the public schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government.\u201d Id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.\nThe Court also recognized more than 60 years ago that \u201c[i]f the opinion of court or jury is to be substituted for the judgment and dis-. cretion of the board at the will of a disaffected pupil, the government of our schools will be seriously impaired, and the position of school boards in dealing with such cases will be most precarious.\u201d Coggins, 223 N.C. at 769, 28 S.E.2d at 531. As the Court stated then, \u201ccomplaints of disaffected pupils of the public schools against rules and regulations promulgated by school boards for the government of the schools raise questions essentially political in nature, and the remedy, if any, is at the ballot box.\u201d Id.\nThus, if plaintiffs disagree with mandatory assignment to year-round schools, their remedy lies with the electoral process or through communications with the legislative and executive branches of government. We cannot improve upon the incisive statement contained in the amicus brief filed on behalf of the North Carolina Association of School Administrators:\nTo the extent that the General Assembly wanted to limit or even eliminate \u201cyear round\u201d calendar schools, it has the power to do so. It has not done so, obviously recognizing the importance of giving school boards the necessary flexibility to deal with diverse student populations and the particular challenges faced during a school year by different districts from the mountains to the coast, from small rural districts to large urban districts. To allow the trial court\u2019s order and reasoning to stand would significantly impair the ability of boards and school administrators to tailor school calendars and assignment policies of each district so as to provide each student an opportunity for a sound basic education and to prudently utilize the tax resources which fund that opportunity.\nAccordingly, we reverse the decision below and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Board.\nReversed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur.\n. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 claims against the individual school board members asserted against them only in their official capacity as members of the Board on the ground that those claims were redundant. Plaintiffs have not appealed that dismissal. Therefore, the only remaining defendant is the Board.\n. The facts set forth in this opinion were recited by the trial court. The parties have not contested these facts on appeal.\n. We do not address whether plaintiffs\u2019 equal protection and due process claims would be barred for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. Nothing in this decision should be viewed as expressing any opinion on that issue.\n. The trial court acknowledged in its order that \u201cthere is no contention that the educational opportunity offered by a year round school is better or worse than the educational opportunity offered by a traditional elementary or middle school. . . .\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "GEER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Hunter, Higgins, Miles, Elam & Benjamin, PLLC, by Robert N. Hunter, Jr.; and William Peaslee, for plaintiff s-appellees.",
      "Tharrington Smith, L.L.P, by Ann L. Majestic and Curtis H. Allen III, for defendants-appellants.",
      "Kelly & Rowe, P.A., by Robert F. Orr, for amicus curiae North Carolina Association of School Administrators.",
      "Roberts & Stevens, RA., by Christopher Z. Campbell and K. Dean Shatley, II, for amicus curiae North Carolina Council of School Attorneys.",
      "Poyner & Spruill, LLP, by Edwin M. Speas, Jr.; and Allison Schafer for amicus curiae North Carolina School Boards Association.",
      "UNC Center for Civil Rights, by Ashley Osment, for amici curiae The Wake County Voters Education Coalition, Eugene Weeks, Jennifer A. Bowden, Gerald Wright, Calla Wright, Erica Edwards, Quanta Edwards and Denise Winters."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WAKE CARES, INC., PATRICE LEE, individually and as guardian ad litem of her minor children, IAN LEE, DELANEY LEE, MARGARET LEE and BAILEY LEE; KATHLEEN BRENNAN, individually and as guardian ad litem of her minor child, ELIZABETH BRENNAN; SCOTT P. HAVILAND and GIHAN I. EL-HABBAL, individually and as guardians ad LITEM OF THEIR CHILDREN, AHMED HAVILAND, AYAH HAVILAND and IMAN HAVILAND; MICHAEL JOHN STANTON and ANGELA MARIE STANTON, individually and as guardians ad litem of their children, JACOB STANTON, ALEXIS STANTON, DANIELLE STANTON, DALLAS STANTON and JORDAN STANTON; and KIMBERLY SINNOTT and JOHN NADASKY, individually and as guardians ad litem of their children, REID NADASKY, SEAN NADASKY, and JAMES NADASKY, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs v. WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and LORI MILBERG, HORACE J. TART, CAROL PARKER, ROSA GILL, SUSAN PARRY, PATTIE HEAD, ELEANOR GOETTEE, RON MARGIOTTA, and BEVERLEY CLARK, in their official capacity as members of the WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants\nNo. COA07-810\n(Filed 6 May 2008)\n1. Associations; Schools and Education\u2014 standing \u2014 nonprofit organization \u2014 associational basis inapplicable\nWake Cares, Inc., a nonprofit organization, did not have associational standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging a county board of education\u2019s plan to convert traditional calendar schools to year-round schools and then to assign students to those schools on a mandatory basis because the organization has no members and could not seek relief \u201con behalf of its members.\u201d Furthermore, the organization could not rely on the constituency theory of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm\u2019n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977), to establish standing where it made no attempt to show that it meets the constituency test of that case.\n2. Declaratory Judgments; Schools and Education\u2014 standing \u2014 challenge to mandatory year-round schools \u2014 parents of students\nThe individual plaintiffs, parents of public school students, have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action individually and as guardians ad litem of their children challenging a county board of education\u2019s plan to assign students to year-round schools on a mandatory basis because the individual plaintiffs were directly affected by the board\u2019s action where each of the students was initially assigned to a year-round school, and even though some of the students were ultimately reassigned to traditional calendar schools, they may still be assigned to year-round schools in the future.\n3. Declaratory Judgment; Schools and Education\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 exhaustion of administrative remedies\nThe trial court did not err by denying the board of education\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for a declaratory judgment based on an alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-369 provides no means for determining whether a plan for mandatory year-round schools is statutorily or constitutionally permitted; (2) the statute focuses on the individual assignment of a student and would not supply the relief sought in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint regarding the board\u2019s plan and regulations; and (3) the board has not pointed to any other statute that would provide an administrative remedy encompassing that sought by plaintiffs.\n4. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 mootness\nThe trial court did not err in a declaratory judgment action by concluding that plaintiffs\u2019 challenge to defendant board of education\u2019s plan to assign public school students to year-round schools on a mandatory basis was not rendered moot even though all the plaintiffs who were initially assigned to a year-round school under its 2007-2008 assignment plan and subsequently applied for transfer had been reassigned to a traditional calendar or magnet school because plaintiffs\u2019 individual reassignments do not terminate the uncertainty and controversy giving rise to this action as would a declaration that the board does or does not have the authority to implement the plan.\n5. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue at trial \u2014 failure to cross-assign error\nAlthough plaintiffs contend the trial court\u2019s order in a declaratory judgment action should be affirmed based on the rhetoric of constitutional rights, this argument is not properly before the appellate court because: (1) the trial court based its decision solely on the board of education\u2019s lack of statutory authority and its conclusion that mandatory year round schools are not authorized under the law; and (2) plaintiffs did not cross-assign error on the grounds that those constitutional arguments present alternative bases for upholding the trial court\u2019s decision.\n6. Schools and Education\u2014 board of education\u2019s authority\u2014 operation of year-round schools\nLocal boards of education have the authority to create and operate year-round schools because: (1) in the scheme of public education adopted by the General Assembly, the general control and supervision of all matters pertaining to the public schools in their respective administrative units is delegated to the county and city boards of education subject to any paramount powers vested by law in the State Board of Education or any other authorized agency; (2) the- General Assembly has also set out a list of specific powers and duties vested in local school boards under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-47 including granting local school boards broad authority to set the school calendar in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-84.2, which in turn encourages local school boards to consider calendar flexibility as a means of achieving educational standards; and (3) the express language exempting year-round schools from the calendar-design restrictions demonstrated that the General Assembly recognized a year-round calendar as a valid alternative to the traditional calendar.\n7. Schools and Education\u2014 assignment of students to year\u2014 round schools \u2014 informed parental consent not required\nThe trial court erred by concluding the local board of education may not assign students to year-round schools without informed parental consent because: (1) the conclusion is precluded by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-366(b); (2) the only restrictions placed on a board\u2019s assignment authority are set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-367 which prohibits local school boards from assigning students to a given school on account of race, creed, color or national origin; (3) the board has the authority to operate schools in the county school system on a year-round calendar, and thus. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-366(b) grants full and complete authority to the board to assign children to such schools; (4) there was no contention that plaintiffs are being denied equal access to a sound basic education by being assigned to year-round calendar schools, and thus, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-1 does not provide plaintiffs with a right to equal opportunity to attend a school with a traditional calendar; (5) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-84.2 does specifically exempt year-round schools from the statute\u2019s requirement regarding opening and closing dates of school calendars, and the apparent protection of a teacher\u2019s summer vacation; (6) the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-84.2 is clear, and thus legislative history cannot be relied upon to force a construction on that statute inconsistent with the plain language; (7) the trial court\u2019s and plaintiffs\u2019 legislative history analysis overlooks the General Assembly\u2019s adoption in 1997 of the exemption for year-round schools in the calendar limitation regarding teacher vacation days; (8) neither the trial court nor plaintiffs have presented any other statutory basis for a requirement of informed parental consent prior to assignment of a child to a year-round school; (9) a duty to consult under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-84.2(a)' cannot be changed to impose a duty to obtain consent; and (10) under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-366(b), when a local school board exercises its full and complete authority to assign a student to a year-round school, that decision is final subject only to an application by the student under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-369 for reassignment.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 3 May 2007 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 2008.\nHunter, Higgins, Miles, Elam & Benjamin, PLLC, by Robert N. Hunter, Jr.; and William Peaslee, for plaintiff s-appellees.\nTharrington Smith, L.L.P, by Ann L. Majestic and Curtis H. Allen III, for defendants-appellants.\nKelly & Rowe, P.A., by Robert F. Orr, for amicus curiae North Carolina Association of School Administrators.\nRoberts & Stevens, RA., by Christopher Z. Campbell and K. Dean Shatley, II, for amicus curiae North Carolina Council of School Attorneys.\nPoyner & Spruill, LLP, by Edwin M. Speas, Jr.; and Allison Schafer for amicus curiae North Carolina School Boards Association.\nUNC Center for Civil Rights, by Ashley Osment, for amici curiae The Wake County Voters Education Coalition, Eugene Weeks, Jennifer A. Bowden, Gerald Wright, Calla Wright, Erica Edwards, Quanta Edwards and Denise Winters."
  },
  "file_name": "0001-01",
  "first_page_order": 33,
  "last_page_order": 60
}