{ "id": 4158575, "name": "SUE ELLEN ESTROFF, Plaintiff v. SROBONA TUBLU CHATTERJEE, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Estroff v. Chatterjee", "decision_date": "2008-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA07-384", "first_page": "61", "last_page": "76", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 61" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "346 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633052 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640280 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640930 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68-69", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "69" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "69" }, { "page": "67-70", "parenthetical": "holding Price standard met when couple jointly decided to create family; intentionally acted to identify third party as parent (through multiple means" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798082, 3795365, 3797350, 3794823, 3804744, 3796621, 3795799 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0632-01", "/nc/359/0632-04", "/nc/359/0632-03", "/nc/359/0632-07", "/nc/359/0632-06", "/nc/359/0632-02", "/nc/359/0632-05" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468656 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "786 A.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 9456042, 404567 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/786/0913-01", "/pa/567/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 Pa. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 404567 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/567/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382", "parenthetical": "declining to adopt approach towards stepparents employed in other states because \"[o]ur case law as enunciated in Peterson and refined in Price ... is very clear\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9377870 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571568, 571498, 571702 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0356-02", "/nc/349/0356-03", "/nc/349/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11467730 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "deeming the mislabeling of findings of fact and conclusions of law \"not fatal\" to the trial court's order" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250860 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "deeming the mislabeling of findings of fact and conclusions of law \"not fatal\" to the trial court's order" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court decides what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, and appellate court may not substitute its view for that of the trial court" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523406 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269", "parenthetical": "holding that trial court decides what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, and appellate court may not substitute its view for that of the trial court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "\"Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "\"Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551639 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 A.2d 1314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7874586, 771030 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/682/1314-01", "/pa-super/453/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 Pa. Super. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 771030 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/453/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 243", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 926", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9614433, 9614337, 9615652, 9614617, 9615334, 9614537, 9615225, 9615437, 9615533, 9615087, 9614765, 9614709, 9614873, 9614975 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0926-02", "/us/531/0926-01", "/us/531/0926-14", "/us/531/0926-04", "/us/531/0926-11", "/us/531/0926-03", "/us/531/0926-10", "/us/531/0926-12", "/us/531/0926-13", "/us/531/0926-09", "/us/531/0926-06", "/us/531/0926-05", "/us/531/0926-07", "/us/531/0926-08" ] }, { "cite": "163 N.J. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 105812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/163/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155151 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491798 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138519 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 15, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "535" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "537" }, { "page": "537" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158635 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" }, { "page": "222" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139523 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0068-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1244, "char_count": 38029, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1653663164193907e-07, "percentile": 0.770404374926878 }, "sha256": "7a8360c90c4ed23b3573a87c66ad60999ba3abc0ff3f1f4e8cecd624e1415554", "simhash": "1:87bb553e64c79f75", "word_count": 6162 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "SUE ELLEN ESTROFF, Plaintiff v. SROBONA TUBLU CHATTERJEE, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "GEER, Judge.\nPlaintiff Sue Ellen Estroff appeals from the district court\u2019s 17 November 2006 order dismissing her claim for joint custody of two children bom to her former domestic partner, defendant Srobona Tublu Chatterjee. This appeal is resolved by the principles set forth in our opinion filed this same date in Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).\nAs in many custody cases, the struggling of adults over children raises concern regarding the consequences of the rulings for the children involved. Our General Assembly acted on this concern by mandating that disputes over custody be resolved solely by application of the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2(a) (2007). Nevertheless, our federal and state constitutions, as construed by the United States and North Carolina Supreme Courts, do not allow this standard to be used as between a legal parent and a third party unless the evidence establishes that the legal parent acted in a manner inconsistent with his or her constitutionally-protected status as a parent. See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997). No litmus test or set of factors can determine whether this standard has been met. Instead, the legal parent\u2019s \u201cconduct would, of course, need to be viewed on a case-by-case basis____\u201d Id. at 83, 484 S.E.2d at 537.\nIn this case, we hold that the trial court was entitled to conclude, based on the evidence presented at trial and its findings of fact, that Chatterjee did not engage in conduct inconsistent with her constitutionally-protected status. As a result, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order dismissing Estroff\u2019s custody action.\nFacts\nThe custody dispute in this case arises from the relationship between Estroff and Chatterjee, who were domestic partners for approximately eight years. The trial court made the following findings of fact.\nEstroff is a university professor and Chatterjee is a medical doctor. The two met when Chatterjee, a graduate student at the time, took a seminar taught by Estroff. After Chatterjee completed the seminar, the. two women entered into an intimate relationship. At the time the relationship began, Estroff was 44 years old and Chatterjee was 30.\nThe women lived together from June 1996 until January 2003. In May 1997, the couple bought a house together. Prior to the purchase of the residence, Estroff and Chatterjee signed an agreement establishing each person\u2019s rights and responsibilities with respect to the residence and identifying each individual\u2019s personal property. Simultaneously, each woman signed a document appointing the other as her attorney-in-fact. Estroff executed a health care power of attorney naming Chatterjee as her attorney-in-fact; Chatterjee did not do the same. Although they never discussed having a commitment ceremony, the two women identified themselves as a couple, and it was well-known by their families and select friends that the women were in an intimate relationship.\nIn 1997, Chatterjee, who was then 32, decided that she wanted to conceive a child. Estroff had previously chosen not to have children herself. When Chatterjee asked whether Estroff had any objection, Estroff responded that because it was Chatterjee\u2019s body, it was her choice. As the trial court phrased it, \u201c[ultimately, [Estroff] agreed that [Chatterjee] could raise a child within the context of their relationship and in their jointly owned home.\u201d\nChatterjee first asked a long-time friend to be the sperm donor because it was important to her that her child know and have a relationship with his or her biological father. When the friend declined, Chatterjee decided to use an anonymous sperm donor from a particular sperm bank. While family and friends helped Chatterjee review several profiles, Chatterjee ultimately chose the donor. Among her reasons for selecting the particular donor was the donor\u2019s willingness to meet any child when he or she became an adult.\nA joint credit card for the couple paid for the purchase of the sperm. Estroff also went to medical appointments with a reproductive specialist and with an obstetrician for pre-natal care. Estroff learned how to perform the artificial insemination and did so when Chatterjee\u2019s physician could not.\nAfter a miscarriage, Chatterjee became pregnant in September 2000 with twins. When Chatterjee was required to go on bed rest in March 2001, her mother came to stay with her and became her primary caretaker. During this time, Chatterjee began to feel concerned about her relationship with Estroff. Estroff, however, announced to her colleagues and friends that Chatterjee was going to have twins and that they would be raising the children together. The trial court found that Chatterjee never made similar pronouncements to her colleagues and was uncomfortable when Estroff did so. Nonetheless, Chatterjee did not express her objections or feelings to Estroff.\nBefore the twins\u2019 birth, Estroff requested and Chatterjee agreed to give the children Estroff\u2019s last name as their middle names. When it came time for the twins to be born, Estroff and Chatterjee\u2019s mother both accompanied Chatterjee to the hospital. Estroff was in the delivery room when the children were bom and held them before Chatterjee did. When, however, hospital staff referred to Estroff as the other \u201cmom,\u201d Chatterjee objected to Estroff\u2019s being called a \u201cmom,\u201d and, as a result, Estroff asked the staff to stop referring to her as a \u201cmom.\u201d\nBecause the children were born prematurely, they required around-the-clock care. When they first came home from the hospital, both Chatterjee\u2019s mother and Estroff helped Chatterjee care for the twins. After Chatterjee\u2019s mother left, Estroff and Chatterjee shared the daily care of the children. In addition, in the early days, Estroff\u2019s family came to help care for the children.\nEstroff took the children to university events and held the children out as her own. Estroff helped financially support and care for the children. The women jointly interviewed applicants for a nanny and decided who to hire. Chatterjee, however, reminded Estroff that Estroff was not the mother of the children and that Chatterjee was and always would be their only mother.\nIn early 2002, Chatterjee finally decided to terminate her relationship with Estroff and began looking for a separate residence. After moving to a new house in January 2003, approximately 18 months after the birth of the twins, Chatterjee worked with a parental coach to develop a structured schedule so that the children were in Estroff\u2019s custody approximately half of every week. According to the trial court\u2019s findings, \u201c[i]t was [Chatterjee\u2019s] intent to gradually reduce the time the children would spend with [Estroff] as they became settled and at ease in their new home.\u201d\nIn the spring of 2005, Chatterjee told Estroff that she would no longer be allowed to spend time with the twins more than one night a week. In response, on 26 May 2005, Estroff sued seeking joint custody, recognition of her parental status, and reinstatement of the original visitation schedule. Chatterjee subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in a 3 August 2005 order. Beginning on 17 April 2006, the trial court held a two-week trial and ultimately dismissed Estroff\u2019s claims.\nThe trial court entered its order on 17 November 2006. With respect to Estroff\u2019s status, the trial court found:\nWhile [Estroff] has played a unique and special role in the lives of [Chatterjee\u2019s] children, she is neither a biological nor an adoptive parent of [the twins]. [Estroff] is not a \u201cparent by estoppel\u201d nor a \u201cde facto parent\u201d. There was never a legal nor contractual written or verbal agreement between [Estroff] and [Chatterjee] that [Estroff] was a parent, custodian or legal guardian. Moreover, [Estroff] and [Chatterjee] never discussed entering into a parenting or custodial agreement or filing a friendly lawsuit to attempt to formally provide [Estroff] with parental or custodial rights. [Chatterjee] never would have agreed to such a request if it had been made by [Estroff]. [Chatterjee] would never have agreed to bestow on [Estroff] or anyone else any parental or custodial rights with regard to her children.\nWith respect to Chatterjee, the trial court found that she had \u201cnot conveyed or relinquished custody or parental status to [Estroff] by her conduct and/or by her actions.\u201d\nThe court then concluded that \u201c[Chatterjee], as the biological parent of [the twins] has a constitutionally-protected right to the care, custody, and control of her children under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.\u201d Further, according to the trial court, \u201c[Estroff] has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that [Chatterjee] has engaged in conduct inconsistent with her constitutionally-protected status as a parent or otherwise forfeited her constitutionally-protected status as a parent.\u201d\nOn 27 November 2006, Estroff filed a motion for a new trial and/or relief from the judgment. That motion primarily argued that a new trial was warranted \u25a0 based on misconduct by Chatterjee. According to the motion, although Chatterjee had \u201crepeatedly and consistently represented] to the Court throughout the proceedings until June 5, 2006 that she would never cut off contact between the Minor Children and [Estroff], [she] cut off all contact between the Minor Children and [Estroff]\u201d once the trial court indicated it was dismissing the case. The trial court denied the motion in an order filed 20 December 2006. Estroff timely appealed from both the 17 November 2006 order and the 20 December 2006 order.\nDiscussion\nEstroff primarily challenges the trial court\u2019s ultimate determination, pursuant to Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997), that Chatterjee did not engage in conduct inconsistent with her constitutionally-protected status as a parent. As we recognized in Mason, Price holds that the General Assembly\u2019s \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50-13.2(a), has constitutional limitations. 190 N.C. App. at 219, 660 S.E.2d at 65. Our Supreme Court determined in Price that in a custody dispute between a legal parent and a third party, the following test applies in determining whether the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard governs:\n[T]he parent may no longer enjoy a paramount status if his or her conduct is inconsistent with this presumption [that he or she will act in the best interest of the child] or if he or she fails to shoulder the responsibilities that are attendant to rearing a child. If a natural parent\u2019s conduct has not been inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status, application of the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard in a custody dispute with a nonparent would offend the Due Process Clause.\n346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534. When a trial court finds conduct inconsistent with the parent\u2019s constitutionally-protected status, \u201ccustody should be determined by the \u2018best interest of the child\u2019 test mandated by statute.\u201d Id., 484 S.E.2d at 535.\nThis determination must be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 63, 550 S.E.2d 499, 503 (2001). Under our standard of review of custody proceedings, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.\u201d Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 147, 579 S.E.2d 264, 268 (2003). Whether these findings support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law is reviewable de novo. Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527 530, 655 S.E.2d 901, 904 (2008).\nI\nAs an initial matter, Estroff contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law, when applying the Price test, by basing its determination in part on Chatterjee\u2019s \u201cintentions\u201d as to Estroff\u2019s role in the children\u2019s lives. According to Estroff, in making the determination mandated by Price, courts should apply the \u201cwell settled\u201d principle of civil legal responsibility \u201cthat it is not a party\u2019s intention that controls whether he is to be held legally accountable, but his conduct and the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his conduct.\u201d This case is not, however, a contract or tort action, but rather involves a legal parent\u2019s \u201cconstitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his or her child.\u201d Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534.\nEstroff further argues, however, that Price supports her view that only manifested intentions are relevant. She asserts that, in Price, \u201cthe Supreme Court held that the mother needed to have made it clear at the time she left the child with the Plaintiff that the placement was temporary.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree with Estroff\u2019s reading of Price. To the contrary, the Court noted that the biological mother \u201cchose to rear the child in a family unit with plaintiff being the child\u2019s de facto father.\u201d Id. at 83, 484 S.E.2d at 537 (emphasis added). \u201cChoice\u201d is a volitional factor that necessarily incorporates a person\u2019s intent.\nIn addition, although the mother in Price had relinquished custody to the plaintiff for a period of time, the Court observed that the testimony was disputed \u201cwhether defendant\u2019s voluntary relinquishment of custody to plaintiff was intended to be temporary or indefinite and whether she informed plaintiff and the child that the relinquishment of custody was temporary.\u201d Id. Thus, both conduct and intent are relevant. The language referenced by Estroff stated that if a parent finds it necessary to relinquish custody of his or her child to a third party, \u201cto preserve the constitutional protection of parental interests in such a situation, the parent should notify the custodian upon relinquishment of custody that the relinquishment is temporary . ...\u201d Id. This recommendation \u2014 in effect, setting out the better practice for parents \u2014 does not require that only conduct and manifested intentions be considered.\nIn our decision in Mason, we held that the specific question to be answered in cases such as this one is: \u201cDid the legal parent act inconsistently with her fundamental right to custody, care, and control of her child and her right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of that child?\u201d Mason, 190 N.C. App. at 222, 660 S.E.2d at 67. We believe that in answering this question, it is appropriate to consider the legal parent\u2019s intentions regarding the relationship between his or her child and the third party during the time that relationship was being formed and perpetuated.\nIndeed, in Mason, we pointed out that the trial court had found that the legal parent and her domestic partner had \u201cintentionally\u201d taken steps to identify Mason as a parent of the child and that the legal parent \u201cintended that [the] parent-like relationship [between her partner and child] be a permanent relationship for her child.\u201d Id. at 223, 660 S.E.2d at 67. We also concluded that the trial court properly considered a parenting agreement executed by the couple because it \u201cconstitute [d] admissions by [the legal parent] regarding her intentions and conduct in creating a permanent parent-like relationship between [her partner] and her biological child.\u201d Id. at 224, 660 S.E.2d at 68.\nOur analysis of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact stressed:\nWhile this case does not involve the biological mother\u2019s leaving the child in the care of a third person, we still have the circumstances of [the mother\u2019s] intentionally creating a family unit composed of herself, her child and, to use the Supreme Court\u2019s words, a \u201cde facto parent.\u201d [Price, 346 N.C. at 83, 484 S.E.2d at 537], . . . Even though [the mother] did not completely relinquish custody, she fully shared it with [her partner], including sharing decision-making, caretaking, and financial responsibilities for the child. And, in contrast to Price, the findings establish that [the mother] intended \u2014 during the creation of this family unit \u2014 that this parent-like relationship would be permanent, such that she \u201cinduced [her partner and the child] to allow that family unit to flourish in a relationship of love and duty with no expectations that it would be terminated.\u201d Id. [at 83, 484 S.E.2d at 537.]\nId. at 225-26, 660 S.E.2d at 68-69 (emphasis added). We concluded that once a parent chooses to forego as to a third party his or her constitutionally-protected parental rights, he or she \u201ccannot now assert those rights in order to unilaterally alter the relationship between her child and the person whom she transformed into a parent.\u201d Id. at 227, 660 S.E.2d at 70.\nThus, as Mason holds, the court\u2019s focus must be on whether the legal parent has voluntarily chosen to create a family unit and to cede to the third party a sufficiently significant amount of parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent parent-like relationship with his or her child. Id. at 226, 660 S.E.2d at 69. The parent\u2019s intentions regarding that relationship are necessarily relevant to that inquiry. By looking at both the legal parent\u2019s conduct and his or her intentions, we ensure that the situation is not one in which the third party has assumed a parent-like status on his or her own without that being the goal of the legal parent.\nIn V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 224, 748 A.2d 539, 552, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926, 148 L. Ed. 2d 243, 121 S. Ct. 302 (2000), the New Jersey Supreme Court applied an analysis similar to that in Mason in concluding that a third party may be entitled to custody if \u201cthe legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the third party\u2019s status would not otherwise warrant.\u201d With respect to this determination, the court concluded that \u201cthe intent of the legally recognized parent is critical.\u201d Id.\nWe agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that the focus must, however, be on the legal parent\u2019s \u201cintent during the formation and pendency of the parent-child relationship\u201d between the third party and the child. Id. Intentions after the ending of the relationship between the parties are not relevant because \u201cthe right of the legal parent \u2018[does] not extend to erasing a relationship between her partner and her child which she voluntarily created and actively fostered simply because after the party\u2019s separation she regretted having done so.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 224-25, 748 A.2d at 552 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa. Super. 78, 92-93, 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (1996)).\nEstroff also complains that the sole evidence to support the trial court findings of fact regarding Chatterjee\u2019s intentions was Chatterjee\u2019s own testimony and that none of those intentions were disclosed to Estroff. Our authority does not, however, require that the intentions be disclosed to the third party, although if they were, it might make resolution of the Price issue easier, as Price pointed out. Estroff\u2019s emphasis on the harm to her from the lack of disclosure\u2014 including her concerns about Chatterjee\u2019s deceit towards her and Chatterjee\u2019s \u201cus[ing]\u201d her \u2014 reflects Estroff\u2019s mistaken belief that principles of civil liability should be imported into the custody context. Estroff\u2019s approach implies that she has rights and has suffered harm, but harm to the third party is immaterial to the standard set forth in Price and further discussed in Mason.\nEstroff also argues that \u201cthere is ample evidence to contradict [Chatterjee\u2019s] statements of her intentions . . . .\u201d Even if so, such evidence simply presented questions of credibility and weight for the trial court to resolve. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 357, 446 S.E.2d 17, 25 (1994). We, therefore, hold that the trial court properly considered Chatterjee\u2019s intentions at the various stages prior to her decision to terminate her relationship with Estroff. It was for the trial court to decide the credibility of current expressions of the mother\u2019s past intent in light of the mother\u2019s actual conduct. We cannot revisit those credibility determinations on appeal.\nII\nEstroff next argues that the trial court\u2019s determination that she failed to meet her burden of proof under Price is not supported by the evidence, citing testimony and exhibits that she asserts warrant a ruling in her favor. Findings of fact are, however, binding on appeal\u2014 regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence \u2014 unless assigned as error. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 98, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (\u201cWhere no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.\u201d). Although Estroff did assign error to a number of findings of fact, many of those assignments of error were not then argued in her appellate brief. Her objections to those findings are, therefore, deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (\u201cAssignments of error not set out in the appellant\u2019s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.\u201d).\nEstroff does argue in her brief that no evidence supports the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201c[Estroff] agreed that [Chatterjee] could raise a child within the context of their relationship and in their jointly owned home.\u201d While Estroff urges, that this finding \u201cattributes to [Estroff] her agreement to view [Chatterjee] as a single parent,\u201d we cannot accept that construction of the court\u2019s finding. We believe a more reasonable reading of the finding is that it was intended to convey that although the couple did not make a joint decision to have a child, Estroff did not object to Chatterjee\u2019s raising the child while the women continued to have a relationship. The evidence may not explicitly support this finding, but it is a reasonable inference from the evidence as to Chatterjee\u2019s conversations with Estroff regarding Chatterjee\u2019s decision to have a child. The trial court is entitled to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Baines, 116 N.C. App. 263, 269, 447 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1994) (holding that trial court decides what reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, and appellate court m\u00e1y not substitute its view for that of the trial court).\nEstroff next challenges findings of fact that actually appear favorable to her. Finding of fact 22 states that \u201c[Chatterjee] needed [Estroff\u2019s] help and depended on it.\u201d Finding of fact 24 states: \u201c[Chatterjee] was grateful for [Estroff\u2019s] presence and her help in the care of the children.\u201d Third, finding of fact 33 states: \u201c[Estroff] supported [Chatterjee] in many ways both before and during the pregnancy.\u201d Estroff\u2019s argument as to these findings is based on her belief that the trial court was portraying Estroff as only a \u201chandmaiden\u201d and \u201chelper\u201d to Chatterjee rather than a joint caretaker of the children. We do not believe this is a necessary inference from the findings; nor is such an inference consistent with other findings of the trial court.\nFinally, Estroff objects to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact that (1) Estroff was not a parent by estoppel or a de facto parent, (2) Chatterjee had not voluntarily relinquished custody of her children, and (3) Chatterjee had not conveyed or relinquished custody or parenthood status to Estroff by her conduct or her actions. Estroff argues only that these assertions are in fact conclusions of law. While the first statement may be a conclusion of law, we believe the other two are mixed questions of law and fact. In any event, Estroff has not argued how she was harmed by any mislabeling of these findings. See In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 569, 571 S.E.2d 65, 68 (2002) (deeming the mislabeling of findings of fact and conclusions of law \u201cnot fatal\u201d to the trial court\u2019s order).\nThus, Estroff has not demonstrated that any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were unsupported by competent evidence. Those findings are, therefore, binding on appeal. The question remains whether the findings are sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Estroff failed to establish that Chatterjee engaged in behavior inconsistent with her constitutionally-protected status as a parent.\nEstroff lists in her brief eight findings that she contends were necessary in order to reach the trial court\u2019s conclusion, but were not made. Estroff argues that in order to rule in favor of Chatterjee, the trial court was required to find the following: (\u00cd) that there was no parent-child bond, (2) that the children were not attached to Estroff, (3) that Estroff was not involved in performing parent-like duties and responsibilities with the children, (4) that Estroff did not provide substantial financial support and caretaking for the children, (5) that Estroff was not viewed as a co-parent by family and friends, (6) that Estroff was not seen by the children as one of their parents, (7) that Chatterjee had not engaged in \u201cany conduct inconsistent with her claim to exclusive control of the children,\u201d and (8) that Estroff was not viewed as a co-parent by professionals and medical providers. Estroff then argues that \u201c[t]here were no such findings because they could not have been made. The evidence was overwhelmingly to the contrary.\u201d\nWe pointed out in Mason that Price \u201cdeclined to specify the universe of conduct that would \u2018constitute conduct inconsistent with the protected status parents may enjoy,\u2019 but rather directed that a parent\u2019s conduct \u2018be viewed on a case-by-case basis.\u2019 \u201d Mason, 190 N.C. App. at 218, 660 S.E.2d at 64 (quoting Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534). There is thus no specific set of factors that must be found or analyzed in order for the standard in Price and Mason to be met. While the factors identified by Estroff may be relevant to the question required to be answered by Price and Mason, their absence from the trial court\u2019s order in this case does not require reversal.\nHere, the trial court\u2019s findings establish that Chatterjee did not jointly decide with Estroff to create a family, but rather made the decision on her own and asked only if Estroff had any objection to sharing her home with children. Chatterjee chose the sperm donor herself based on her desire that the donor be willing to meet the children when they became adults. According to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, Chatterjee \u2014 in contrast to Estroff \u2014 did not announce to others that the couple was going to raise the twins together. Then, after the twins were born and while the couple lived together, Chatterjee objected to Estroff\u2019s being called the children\u2019s \u201cmom\u201d and reminded Estroff \u201cthat [Estroff] was not the mother of the children; that she, [Chatterjee,] was and always would be their only mother.\u201d Finally, as the trial court found, the parties never entered into any written or verbal agreement that Estroff was a parent, custodian, or legal guardian. Indeed, the couple never discussed entering into a parenting or custodial agreement or taking other action to provide Estroff with parental or custodial rights.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings reflect that Chatterjee did not choose to create a family unit with two parents, did not intend that Estroff would be a \u201cdefacto parent,\u201d Price, 346 N.C. at 83, 484 S.E.2d at 537, and did not allow Estroff to function fully as a parent. Instead, according to the trial court\u2019s findings, Chatterjee saw Estroff as \u201ca significant, loving adult caretaker but not as a parent.\u201d As the trial court found, this role was modeled on the roles of adults to which Chatterjee was accustomed as a result of her Indian upbringing.\nConsistent with that role, the trial court found that Estroff assisted in the care of the children, financially supported the children, and joined with Chatterjee in interviewing and hiring the children\u2019s nanny. Contrary to Estroff\u2019s contention, these facts do not preclude the trial court\u2019s ultimate determination in Chatterjee\u2019s favor. The fact that a third party provides caretaking and financial support, engages in parent-like duties and responsibilities, and has a substantial bond with the children does not necessarily meet the requirements of Price and Mason. Those factors could exist just as equally for a person such as the plaintiff in Mason (who was found to have met the standard in Price) as for a step-parent or simply a significant friend of the family, who might not meet the Price standard.\nThese facts establish the existence of a relationship \u201cin the nature of a parent and child relationship\u201d and are sufficient to support a finding of standing to bring a custody action. Ellison v. Ramos, 130 N.C. App. 389, 394, 502 S.E.2d 891, 894, appeal dismissed and disc, review denied, 349 N.C. 356, 517 S.E.2d 891 (1998). But, simply because a person has the necessary relationship for standing purposes does not establish without more that the requirements of Price have been met. In Seyboth v. Seyboth, 147 N.C. App. 63, 68, 554 S.E.2d 378, 382 (2001), this Court stressed: \u201cRegardless of the compelling and significant relationship between the stepfather and ex-stepchild in the case sub judice, the trial court could not grant the stepfather visitation solely based on the best interest analysis.\u201d Further evidence and findings \u2014 beyond just the parent-like relationship and strong parent-child bond between the stepfather and child \u2014 were necessary to comply with the standard in Price. Id. at 68-69, 554 S.E.2d at 382.\nAs the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[w]hat is relevant ... is the method by which the third party gained authority\u201d to assume a parent-like status and perform parental duties. T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 232, 786 A.2d 913, 919 (2001). Thus, the focus is not on what others thought of the couple or what responsibility Estroff elected to assume, but rather whether Chatterjee \u201ccho[se] to cede to [Estroff] a sufficiently significant amount of parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent parent-like relationship with her child.\u201d Mason, 190 N.C. App. at 226, 660 S.E.2d at 69.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u2014 although made without benefit of our opinion in Mason \u2014 essentially decide that Chatterjee did not choose to do so. The findings are, therefore, sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s determination that Estroff did not establish that Chatterjee engaged in conduct inconsistent with her paramount constitutionally-protected status. Compare id. at 223-25, 660 S.E.2d at 67-70 (holding Price standard met when couple jointly decided to create family; intentionally acted to identify third party as parent (through multiple means); mother repeatedly identified partner publicly as child\u2019s parent; mother stipulated that couple and child lived together as family unit; mother shared her decision-making authority as to child with partner; mother signed medical power of attorney allowing partner to participate in child\u2019s medical decisions; and mother entered into parenting agreement providing that partner was a defacto parent and setting out provisions for continued custody by partner if couple\u2019s relationship ended).\nIII\nFinally, Estroff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she was neither a parent by estoppel nor a de facto parent because the court failed to make the necessary findings of fact to support that conclusion. We need not address this argument since those doctrines, as adopted in other states, have not yet been recognized in North Carolina and are not appropriately considered in this appeal.\nDuring the oral argument in this case, Estroff\u2019s counsel represented that her client was not seeking parental status, but rather was only seeking visitation. Our Supreme Court has set out in Price the standard, under the federal and state constitutions, for determining whether a third party is entitled to custody, including visitation. This Court, in light of Price and subsequent Supreme Court decisions following Price, does not have authority to adopt a different standard as to custody. See Seyboth, 147 N.C. App. at 68, 554 S.E.2d at 382 (declining to adopt approach towards stepparents employed in other states because \u201c[o]ur case law as enunciated in Peterson and refined in Price ... is very clear\u201d). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order of 17 November 2006.\nAffirmed.\nJudges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.\n. We use the phrase \u201clegal parent\u201d to reference both biological and adoptive parents.\n. We note, in passing, that Estroff has also argued that the trial court erred by finding that she did not have standing to seek custody in this case. The trial court, however, in its 3 August 2005 order, denied Chatterjee\u2019s motion to dismiss for lack of standing and, in its 17 November 2006 order, concluded that it \u201cha[d] personal and subject matter jurisdiction.\" (Emphasis added.) See Estate of Apple v. Commercial Courier Express, Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14, 16 (\u201cIf a party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.\u201d), disc, review denied, 359 N.C. 632, 613 S.E.2d 688 (2005). Thus, the trial court necessarily concluded twice that Estroff had standing, and there is no need for us to address the issue.\n. Although Estroff appealed from the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion for a new trial, she has not addressed that order on appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "GEER, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lewis, Anderson, Phillips & Hinkle, PLLC, by Susan H. Lewis and Brian C. Johnston, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Northen Blue, L.L.P, by Carol J. Holcomb and Samantha H. Cabe, for defendant-appellee.", "Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson, for amicus curiae Elizabeth MacLean." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SUE ELLEN ESTROFF, Plaintiff v. SROBONA TUBLU CHATTERJEE, Defendant\nNo. COA07-384\n(Filed 6 May 2008)\n1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 child custody\u2014 domestic partners \u2014 focus on legal parent\u2019s intentions\nThe trial court did not err in a domestic partner\u2019s child custody case when applying the test under Price, 346 N.C. 68 (1997), by basing its determination in part on defendant biological mother\u2019s intentions as to plaintiff domestic partner\u2019s role in the children\u2019s lives because: (1) the court\u2019s focus must be on whether the legal parent has voluntarily chosen to create a family unit and to cede to the third party a sufficiently significant amount of parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent parent-like relationship with his or her child; (2) the legal parent\u2019s intentions are not required to be disclosed to the third party; and (3) the trial court properly considered defendant\u2019s intentions at the various stages prior to her decision to terminate her relationship with plaintiff, it was for the trial court to decide the credibility of current expressions of the mother\u2019s past intent in light of the mother\u2019s actual conduct, and those credibility determinations cannot be revisited on appeal.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation\u2014 child custody\u2014 domestic partners \u2014 sufficiency of findings of fact \u2014 third-party\u2019s burden of proof\nThe trial court did not err in a child custody case brought by a domestic partner by determining that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof under Price, 346 N.C. 68 (1997), even though she contends various testimony and exhibits warranted a ruling in her favor, because: (1) although plaintiff did assign error to a number of findings of fact, many of those assignments of error were not argued in her appellate brief, and thus her objections to those findings are deemed abandoned; (2) plaintiff has not argued how she was harmed by any mislabeling of findings of fact she claims are in fact conclusions of law; (3) plaintiff has not demonstrated that any of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are unsupported by competent evidence, and thus they are binding on appeal; (4) there are no specific set of factors that must be found or analyzed in order for the standard in both Price and Mason, 190 N.C. App.-(2008), to be met, and the absence from the trial court\u2019s order of the factors identified by plaintiff do not require reversal even though they may be relevant to the question required to be answered by those cases; (5) the findings reflect that defendant did not choose to create a family unit with two parents, did not intend for plaintiff to be a de facto parent, did not allow plaintiff to function fully as a parent, but instead saw plaintiff as a significant loving adult caretaker as modeled on the roles of adults to which defendant was accustomed as a result of her Indian upbringing; (6) the fact that a third party provides caretaking and financial support, engages in parent-like duties and responsibilities, and has a substantial bond with the children does not necessarily meet the requirements of Price and Mason, (7) the fact that a person has the necessary relationship for standing purposes does not establish, without more, that the requirements of Price have been met; and (8) the findings are sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s determination that plaintiff did not establish that defendant engaged in conduct inconsistent with her paramount constitutionally-protected status as a parent.\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 parent by estoppel \u2014 de facto parent \u2014 doctrines not recognized by North Carolina\nAlthough plaintiff domestic partner contends the trial court erred in a child custody case by concluding that plaintiff domestic partner was neither a parent by estoppel nor a de facto parent, this argument does not need to be addressed because those doctrines, as adopted in other states, have not been recognized in North Carolina and thus are not appropriately considered on appeal.\nAppeal by plaintiff from orders entered 17 November 2006 and 20 December 2006 by Judge Joseph Moody Buckner in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 October 2007.\nLewis, Anderson, Phillips & Hinkle, PLLC, by Susan H. Lewis and Brian C. Johnston, for plaintiff-appellant.\nNorthen Blue, L.L.P, by Carol J. Holcomb and Samantha H. Cabe, for defendant-appellee.\nWyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson, for amicus curiae Elizabeth MacLean." }, "file_name": "0061-01", "first_page_order": 93, "last_page_order": 108 }