{ "id": 4158823, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LORI SHANNON ICARD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Icard", "decision_date": "2008-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA07-610", "first_page": "76", "last_page": "90", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 76" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633690 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "13" }, { "page": "13", "parenthetical": "\"Seizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\" (quotation and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation'omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation'omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "\"Because the evidence was disclosed at trial, we find no Brady violation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524437 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "\"Because the evidence was disclosed at trial, we find no Brady violation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644" }, { "page": "644" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562282 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1078", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11601344, 11601924, 11601414, 11601018, 11601319, 11601258, 11600907, 11601841, 11601466, 11601497, 11601210, 11601659, 11601756, 11601565 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1078-06", "/us/522/1078-14", "/us/522/1078-07", "/us/522/1078-02", "/us/522/1078-05", "/us/522/1078-04", "/us/522/1078-01", "/us/522/1078-13", "/us/522/1078-08", "/us/522/1078-09", "/us/522/1078-03", "/us/522/1078-11", "/us/522/1078-12", "/us/522/1078-10" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139431 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205331 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "682" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 F.3d 187", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9041287 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/89/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439841 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "emphasizing that, where a trial judge sits as the trier of the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute itself for the trial judge in this task" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548873 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275", "parenthetical": "emphasizing that, where a trial judge sits as the trier of the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute itself for the trial judge in this task" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695126 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523319 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566852 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659880 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 S.E.2d 315", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511339, 1511472, 1511603, 1511415, 1511259 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0685-02", "/nc/356/0685-04", "/nc/356/0685-01", "/nc/356/0685-03", "/nc/356/0685-05" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9126768 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 280", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9496982 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 121", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 869", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11508578, 11508517, 11508485, 11508458, 11508557, 11508432, 11508499, 11508661, 11508407, 11508536, 11508633, 11508698, 11508604 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0869-09", "/us/522/0869-06", "/us/522/0869-04", "/us/522/0869-03", "/us/522/0869-08", "/us/522/0869-02", "/us/522/0869-05", "/us/522/0869-12", "/us/522/0869-01", "/us/522/0869-07", "/us/522/0869-11", "/us/522/0869-13", "/us/522/0869-10" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54192 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "834-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. App. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11916495 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/122/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 221", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959006 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "616" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 5314046 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/106/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 L. Ed. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 1073", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108039 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "\"The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.\"" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "\"We have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.\"" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3801139 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 194", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254966 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "\"Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.\"" }, { "page": "251", "parenthetical": "\"Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.\"" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "585-86" }, { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "\"[C]ommunication between the police and citizens involving no coercion or detention . . . [falls] outside the compass of the Fourth Amendment.\" (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "585-86" }, { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "141" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491616, 491810, 491436, 491885, 491438, 491569, 491772, 491391 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0166-06", "/nc/357/0166-05", "/nc/357/0166-02", "/nc/357/0166-01", "/nc/357/0166-04", "/nc/357/0166-08", "/nc/357/0166-07", "/nc/357/0166-03" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 812", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "820" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556019 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 729", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251989 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633690 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519564 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 L. Ed. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 621", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11320254 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108039 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3801139 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0644-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1189, "char_count": 33850, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.3053293840683376 }, "sha256": "0d9ce9d130d103e779e1ad4280f9144f72398ecaf39c186bcc88aa0ac4f92ca9", "simhash": "1:0b81d63a1a169e5e", "word_count": 5557 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judge ELMORE concurs.", "Judge BRYANT concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LORI SHANNON ICARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WYNN, Judge.\nIn determining whether Fourth Amendment protections apply to a search or seizure by the police, we consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt that she was not free to decline the police request or otherwise term\u00ednate the encounter with them. Here, because we find that a reasonable person in Defendant Lori Shannon Icard\u2019s position would not have felt \u201cfree to . . . terminate the encounter\u201d with the police, we hold that the police search of her purse was governed by the Fourth Amendment. However, noting that Defendant also consented to the search, we remand to the trial court for findings as to the voluntariness of Defendant\u2019s consent.\nAt 12:30 a.m. on 21 September 2004, Officer Curt Moore of the Maiden Police Department noticed a pickup truck parked in the lot adjacent to the Fairview Market. After checking the front of the building, Officer Moore drove by the front of the pickup truck, noticed a silhouette in the driver\u2019s seat, and activated his blue flashing strobe lights. Thereafter, he approached the pickup truck and asked the individual in the driver\u2019s seat, later identified as Carmen Coleman, for his license and registration. Officer Moore asked Mr. Coleman why he was parked at the Market; Mr. Coleman responded that he had come from a neighboring area to meet a friend. After engaging in a short conversation with Mr. Coleman about this answer, Officer Moore returned to his own vehicle to verify Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration information. Officer Moore acknowledged at trial that the pickup truck was not illegally parked and was violating no traffic laws at the time he approached the vehicle; he likewise confirmed that his check of Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration returned no outstanding warrants for Mr. Coleman or problems with the ownership of the truck.\nIn response to Officer Moore\u2019s request for back-up assistance, made while he was checking Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration, Officer Darby Hedrick soon arrived and parked his marked vehicle on the right side of the pickup truck, with his headlights and take-down spotlights illuminating the passenger side of the truck. At that point, Officer Moore turned off his blue flashing lights and approached the passenger side of the truck.\nWhen Defendant, sitting in the passenger seat, failed to respond to Officer Moore\u2019s repeated taps on the passenger-side window, Officer Moore opened the passenger-side door and asked her for identification. Defendant stated that she did not have any identification with her, but Officer Moore noticed a bag at her feet and asked if she had identification in the bag. Defendant then picked up the purse and unzipped it, revealing a wallet which contained her identification card. Officer Moore then asked Defendant to step to the rear of the vehicle and for permission to look through her purse. Defendant agreed and got out of the pickup truck and moved to its rear; in searching her purse, Officer Moore found several bullets and a piece of glass that appeared burned at one end. Officer Moore testified at trial that he also found a clear plastic bag with a stamp of a skunk on the outside in Defendant\u2019s purse; the substance inside the bag later tested positive for methamphetamine.\nWhile standing with Defendant at the rear of the pickup truck, Officer Moore saw Mr. Coleman moving in the cab of the pickup, and he went to investigate. After more questioning, Mr. Coleman gave Officer Moore a lockblade clip-type knife that was in his pocket, as well as a clear plastic bag containing marijuana and another clear bag containing a white- and tan-colored powder. An altercation between Mr. Coleman and Officer Moore then ensued, and Officer Hedrick assisted Officer Moore in subduing Mr. Coleman. A subsequent search of the pickup truck turned up glass pipes used to inhale controlled substances, a crack pipe, a digital scale, a loaded .357 Magnum revolver, and a clear plastic bag with what was later determined to be residue from methamphetamine on the inside.\n. Defendant was initially indicted on charges of resisting a public officer, carrying a concealed weapon, possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, possession with intent to- sell and deliver methamphetamine, possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, the State dismissed the cocaine-related charge. At trial, upon Defendant\u2019s motion at the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court dismissed the concealed weapon and marijuana-related charges, as well as the charge of possession with intent to sell and deliver methamphetamine. However, the State was allowed to proceed with the lesser-included charge of simple possession of methamphetamine, of which Defendant was found guilty by the jury. The jury also found Defendant not guilty of the charges of resisting a public officer and of possession of drug paraphernalia. Upon the jury\u2019s conviction for simple possession, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of five to six months\u2019 imprisonment, which was then suspended, as well as twenty-four months of supervised probation, sixty hours of community service, a fine, and restitution.\nDefendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (I) denying her motion to suppress and instead allowing evidence from an unlawful search and seizure; (II) failing to dismiss the case or to order a new trial after the State did not provide her with exculpatory information in a timely manner; and (III) failing to order a new trial or to strike evidence that the prosecutor admitted that he reasonably believed to be false.\nI.\nIn her first argument, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence that was obtained through the search of her purse, as the search and seizure violated the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment.\nOur standard of review to determine whether a trial court properly denied a motion to suppress is \u201cwhether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Cockerham, 155 N.C. App. 729, 736, 574 S.E.2d 694, 699 (citing State v. Wynne, 329 N.C. 507, 522, 406 S.E.2d 812, 820 (1991)), disc, review denied, 357 N.C. 166, 580 S.E.2d 702 (2003). The trial court\u2019s findings of fact \u201care conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (citations omitted). The conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo by this Court. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 141, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).\nIn the instant case, Defendant challenges both findings of fact and the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law that Defendant was in a public place, such that Officer Moore\u2019s approach and subsequent interactions with Defendant did not fall within the Fourth Amendment\u2019s protections against unreasonable search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 251 (2002) (\u201cLaw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment\u2019s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.\u201d); Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 585-86 (\u201cThe Supreme Court of the United States recently reaffirmed that police officers may approach individuals in public to ask them questions and even request consent to search their belongings, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.\u201d (citations omitted)). According to our state Supreme Court, \u201c[t]he test for determining whether a seizure has occurred is whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was not free to decline the officers\u2019 request or otherwise terminate the encounter.\u201d Id., 446 S.E.2d at 586 (citations omitted). Thus, our task is to determine whether the circumstances on the night of 21 September 2004 were such that a reasonable person would have felt free to decline Officer Moore\u2019s requests and to leave the premises.\nUnder the facts of this case, Officer Moore did not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to approach the pickup truck, which was parked in a public place. Nor did he need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to ask Mr. Coleman and Defendant questions, for their identification, or even for consent to search their belongings, if they were \u201cwilling to listen.\u201d Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 251. Nevertheless, Officer Moore was barred from \u201cindue[ing] cooperation by coercive means.\u201d Id.; see also Brooks, 337 N.C. at 141, 446 S.E.2d at 585 (\u201c[C]ommunication between the police and citizens involving no coercion or detention . . . [falls] outside the compass of the Fourth Amendment.\u201d (citation omitted)). More specifically, \u201c[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a \u2018seizure\u2019 has occurred.\u201d State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 662, 617 S.E.2d 1, 13 (2005) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2006); see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398 (\u201cThe encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses its consensual nature.\u201d).\nThe evidence offered at trial in the instant case supports each of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact as to the chain of events that unfolded from the time that Officer Moore pulled his vehicle behind the pickup truck at the Fairview Market until Defendant and Mr. Coleman were arrested. As noted by the trial court, the Fairview Market \u201cis located in a high crime area where numerous complaints of drug activity and prostitution have been received by law enforcement authorities.\u201d Moreover, although the pickup truck \u201cwas not being operated in violation of any traffic laws[,]\u201d Officer Moore parked his vehicle behind the pickup truck, such that it could not back up but \u201ccould have driven away by going forwardf,]\u201d and he had his headlights and blue flashing visor lights on at that time. Officer Moore requested, and received, Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration, which his voir dire testimony showed that he kept for the duration of his encounter with Mr. Coleman and Defendant. The blue flashing lights remained on until Officer Moore asked for Defendant\u2019s identification, after Officer Hedrick had arrived and parked his marked vehicle such that his headlights and take-down spotlights were shining on the passenger side of the pickup truck.\nMost notably, as found by the trial court in its order, Officer Moore knocked twice on the passenger-side window of the pickup truck, where Defendant was sitting; she did not respond either time. At that point, Officer Moore \u201copened the passenger door of the truck.\u201d He told Defendant who he was, \u201cwhich she could see [he] was in uniform,\u201d and \u201casked her if she had any type of identification on her.\u201d She answered that she did not, because it was in her other purse; however, seeing a handbag at Defendant\u2019s feet in the truck, Officer Moore \u201casked her if there was some identification in that purse.\u201d After unzipping the purse and \u201cfumbling through\u201d a wallet on top, Defendant produced a North Carolina identification card with her name on it. Officer Moore then \u201casked [Defendant], if she would, to step to the rear of the vehicle with Officer Hedrick and [himself].\u201d\nCombined with the other circumstances of that night, we find these actions to be a \u201cshow of authority,\u201d Campbell, 359 N.C. at 662, 617 S.E.2d at 13, such that this encounter \u201clos[t] its consensual nature.\u201d Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398. By ignoring Officer Moore\u2019s taps on the window, Defendant had shown that she was not \u201cwilling to listen\u201d to Officer Moore\u2019s questions, Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 251, and had essentially \u201crefuse[d] to cooperate.\u201d Brooks, 337 N.C. at 142, 446 S.E.2d at 585-86. Officer Moore\u2019s opening the door and insistence that Defendant produce identification were a show of authority that transformed this encounter from \u201c \u2018the mere approach of police officers in a public place,\u2019 \u201d id. at 141, 446 S.E.2d at 585 (citation omitted), into a seizure of Defendant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As noted by this Court in a previous case, \u201c[w]ere we to conclude otherwise, we would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches which the Fourth Amendment is specifically designed to protect against.\u201d State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165, 171, 415 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1992) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).\nHad Officer Moore stopped the pickup truck due to a traffic violation or some reasonable suspicion that its occupant^ were engaged in unlawful activity, he would have been \u201cauthorized to take such steps as reasonably necessary to protect [his] personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.\u201d United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 616 (1985). Indeed, had he had probable cause for a stop, Officer Moore could have ordered the driver, Mr. Coleman, to exit the vehicle, State v. McGirt, 122 N.C. App. 237, 239, 468 S.E.2d 833, 834-35 (1996), aff\u2019d per curiam, 345 N.C. 624, 481 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 869, 139 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1997), or even ordered Defendant, a passenger, to exit despite having no probable cause or reasonable suspicion with respect to her. State v. Pulliam, 139 N.C. App. 437, 440, 533 S.E.2d 280, 283 (2000). Likewise, had Officer Moore had a \u201creasonable suspicion based on articulable facts under the circumstances\u201d that Defendant, as a passenger, was armed and dangerous, he would have been constitutionally permitted to conduct a pat-down safety search of Defendant. Id. at 441, 533 S.E.2d at 283.\nHowever, Officer Moore had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion when he approached the pickup truck, such that these cases are inapplicable to the facts at hand. Likewise, at the moment that Officer Moore opened the passenger door of the pickup truck and began questioning Defendant, there was still no evidence that either Defendant or Mr. Coleman was engaged in any unlawful activity. Indeed, the only evidence of a crime came later, from the search of Defendant\u2019s purse and the lawful search of the pickup truck subsequent to Mr. Coleman\u2019s arrest for drug possession and assault on a police officer.\nAs found by the trial court, the pickup truck \u201cwas not being operated in violation of any traffic laws.\u201d Officer Moore\u2019s check of Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration showed no outstanding warrants or issues with ownership of the truck; he also maintained possession of Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration throughout the encounter. Additionally, his blue flashing lights had remained on until another marked police vehicle parked with its headlights and take-down spotlights directed at the passenger side of the truck. Although the pickup truck, blocked from behind by Officer Moore\u2019s vehicle, could have left the parking light by driving forward, to do so would have placed Mr. Coleman in violation of traffic laws', as he would have been driving without a license. At 12:30 a.m. in an area known for drug activity and prostitution, any passenger, particularly a female, would undoubtedly have felt uncomfortable or unsafe by attempting to leave the parking lot on foot.\nAccordingly, in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident, we conclude that a reasonable person in Defendant\u2019s position would not have believed that she was free to leave. See Campbell, 359 N.C. at 662, 617 S.E.2d at 13 (\u201cSeizure of a person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\u201d (quotation and citation omitted)); see also Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 400 (\u201cWe have consistently held that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.\u201d). As such, Defendant was entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment at the time Officer Moore asked her to exit the pickup truck.\nRespectfully, contrary to the assertions of the dissent, we reach this conclusion based on the totality of the circumstances of the encounter between Defendant and Officer Moore, not solely on Officer Moore\u2019s words and actions in approaching Defendant and requesting that she produce identification. Officer Moore\u2019s vehicle, with its blue lights flashing, was parked behind the pickup truck. Moreover, even if the pickup truck could have pulled forward to exit the parking lot, Officer Moore maintained possession of Mr. Coleman\u2019s license and registration for the duration of this encounter, essentially preventing him from leaving. Another officer arrived and parked his vehicle to the right of the truck, with his takedown lights shining on the passenger side. Combined with Officer Moore\u2019s words and actions in opening the door to the pickup truck after Defendant had essentially refused to cooperate with his requests for information, we conclude that an objective evaluation of the totality of these circumstances \u201cwould have conveyed ... to a reasonable person[,]\u201d including one who was a passenger in the pickup truck, that \u201c[s]he was being ordered to restrict [her] movement.\u201d California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698 (1991). As such, the police in this instance \u201crestrained the liberty of a citizen,\u201d Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 398, and the encounter was subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.\nNevertheless, we observe that the record and transcripts before us indicate that Officer Moore asked Defendant if he could search her purse, and she agreed. A police officer may search an individual or her property at any time with the person\u2019s consent. State v. Graham, 149 N.C. App. 215, 218, 562 S.E.2d 286, 288 (2002), disc, review denied and appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 685, 578 S.E.2d 315 (2003). However, our United States Supreme Court has also noted that, \u201c \u2018[c]onsent\u2019 that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse.\u201d Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 401. Further, \u201c[t]here must be a clear and unequivocal consent before a defendant can waive his constitutional rights.\u201d State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 277, 498 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1998) (citation omitted). \u201cTo be voluntary, it must be shown that the waiver was free from coercion, duress or fraud, and not given merely to avoid resistance.\u201d State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 239, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967) (citation omitted). The burden is on the State to show that consent was voluntary. State v. Morocco, 99 N.C. App. 421, 429, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1990). As held by our state Supreme Court, voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 344, 333 S.E.2d 708, 714 (1985).\nHere, the trial court concluded in its order denying Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress that the search was not subject to the provisions of the Fourth Amendment because it was the mere approach of police officers in a public place. Campbell, 359 N.C. at 662, 617 S.E.2d at 13. As such, the trial court did not include findings of fact as to whether Defendant\u2019s consent to search her purse was voluntary or coerced. Having found that the Fourth Amendment did apply to the search of Defendant\u2019s purse, we remand this matter to the trial court for additional findings as to Defendant\u2019s consent. See General Specialties Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 41 N.C. App. 273, 275, 254 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1979) (emphasizing that, where a trial judge sits as the trier of the facts, the appellate court cannot substitute itself for the trial judge in this task).\nII.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the case or to order a new trial after the State did not provide her with exculpatory information in a timely manner. She contends that this discovery violation, conceded by the State, violated her right to due process and therefore warranted a dismissal or new trial. We disagree.\nUnder Brady v. Maryland, \u201csuppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.\u201d 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963). Evidence is \u201cfavorable\u201d if it \u201ctends to exculpate the accused, as well as \u2018any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses.\u2019 \u201d State v. McGill, 141 N.C. App. 98, 102, 539 S.E.2d 351, 355 (2000) (quoting United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1996)). Further, evidence is \u201cmaterial\u201d where \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A \u2018reasonable probability\u2019 is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.\u201d United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985); see also State v. Strickland, 346 N.C. 443, 456, 488 S.E.2d 194, 202 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078, 139 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1998). However, \u201c[a] defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on trial errors unless such errors were material and prejudicial.\u201d State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 339, 298 S.E.2d 631, 644 (1983). The State must demonstrate that the violation of a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or the violation is presumed to have been prejudicial. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (2005).\nHere, although the State conceded it had committed a discovery violation by failing to disclose Officer Moore\u2019s handwritten notes until the middle of the trial, the violation was not a Brady violation. See, e.g., State v. Shedd, 117 N.C. App. 122, 124, 450 S.E.2d 13, 14 (1994) (\u201cBecause the evidence was disclosed at trial, we find no Brady violation.\u201d). Nor was the discovery violation prejudicial to Defendant. The trial court allowed defense counsel the final argument at trial, regardless of whether Defendant put on any evidence of her own, as well as the opportunity to impeach Officer Moore with his handwritten notes. Indeed, defense counsel used the notes to highlight the inconsistencies between Officer Moore\u2019s testimony and his earlier notes as to the caliber of the bullets found in Defendant\u2019s purse. For some reason, defense counsel elected not to do the same with respect to inconsistencies as to where the methamphetamine that was recovered was found. Thus, the transcript reflects that defense counsel had adequate time to prepare and change his cross-examination with respect to the caliber of the bullets; he must therefore have had the same opportunity concerning the location of the methamphetamine.\nMoreover, defense counsel was also aware prior to trial that there was some confusion as to where the methamphetamine was located and that Officer Moore was going to be a witness. As noted by the trial court, defense counsel could therefore have conducted his own investigation into where the methamphetamine was when it was recovered. Given that Defendant had the handwritten notes while Officer Moore was still being cross-examined, we find that the discovery violation was not sufficiently material nor prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Alston, 307 N.C. at 339, 298 S.E.2d at 644; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIII.\nFinally, Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by failing to order a new trial or to strike evidence that the prosecutor admitted that he reasonably believed to be false. Specifically, Defendant objects to the prosecutor\u2019s statement, made outside the presence of the jury, as to his \u201cunderstanding from speaking with the officer that the evidence will show that the methamphetamine was in a container located in a common area of . . . the front seat of the vehicle[,]\u201d when Officer Moore later testified that the methamphetamine was found in a small pouch located in Defendant\u2019s purse. We disagree.\nThe plain error rule is \u201calways to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record,\u201d the error is found to have been \u201cso basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done[.]\u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (internal citation and quotation\u2019omitted). Here, given that the prosecutor\u2019s statement was made outside the presence of the jury, and the record and transcript reflect general confusion as to where the methamphetamine was recovered, we find that the trial court acted properly in allowing Officer Moore to testify and clarify where each piece of evidence was recovered. This assignment of error is overruled.\nRemanded in part; no error in part.\nJudge ELMORE concurs.\nJudge BRYANT concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.\n. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 142, 446 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1994).", "type": "majority", "author": "WYNN, Judge." }, { "text": "BRYANT, Judge\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nThe majority holds that the police search of Defendant\u2019s purse was governed by the Fourth Amendment. However, because I find the search was not governed by the Fourth Amendment, I respectfully dissent.\n\u201cA seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.\u201d Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 L. Ed. 2d 389, 398 (1991) (citation and quotation omitted). \u201cOnly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a seizure has occurred.\u201d Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Communication between the police and citizens involving no coercion or detention falls outside the compass of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Sugg, 61 N.C. App. 106, 108, 300 S.E. 3d 248, 250 (1983). \u201c[T]he test for existence of a \u2018show of authority\u2019 is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer\u2019s words and actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.\u201d California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 698 (1991).\nThe majority concludes the search of Defendant\u2019s purse was governed by the Fourth Amendment because Officer Moore\u2019s \u201copening the door and insistence that Defendant produce identification were a show of authority\u201d transforming the encounter into a seizure of Defendant. The majority rests its conclusion that Office Moore\u2019s opening the door and requesting Defendant\u2019s identification was a show of force due to the other circumstances that night which placed Defendant in a position where \u201cat 12:30 a.m., in an area known for drug activity and prostitution, any passenger, particularly a female, would undoubtedly have felt uncomfortable or unsafe by attempting to leave the parking lot on foot.\u201d However, the inquiry regarding the totality of circumstances for Fourth Amendment purposes is not whether a reasonable person was uncomfortable leaving because of the surrounding environment, but whether \u201cin view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,\u201d State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 662, 617 S.E.2d 1, 13 (2005), because of \u201cthe offic\u00e9r\u2019s words and actions,\u201d Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 698.\nOfficer Moore\u2019s words and actions in this case would not cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave. After back-up assistance arrived, Officer Moore approached the passenger-side of the pickup truck and tapped on the window. When Defendant ignored his taps oh the window, Officer Moore opened the passenger-side door and asked Defendant to produce identification. Although persistent, at no time during the beginning of his encounter with Defendant did Officer Moore\u2019 actions or words constitute a show of authority amounting to a restraint on Defendant\u2019s liberty. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent on the issue of whether the search of Defendant\u2019s purse was within the realm of the Fourth Amendment.\nI concur with the majority as to the remaining issues raised by Defendant.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "BRYANT, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Marc X. Sneed, for the State.", "Brock, Payne & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LORI SHANNON ICARD\nNo. COA07-610\n(Filed 6 May 2008)\n1. Search and Seizure\u2014 Fourth Amendment \u2014 evidence seized from defendant\u2019s purse \u2014 show of authority \u2014 consent\nThe trial court erred in a simple possession of methamphetamine case by failing to find that the search of defendant\u2019s purse was governed by the Fourth Amendment because: (1) combined with the other circumstances of the pertinent night, the officer\u2019s actions were a show of authority such that the encounter lost its consensual nature when defendant had shown she was not willing to listen to the officer\u2019s questions and had essentially refused to cooperate by ignoring the officer\u2019s taps on the car window, and the officer opened the door and insisted that defendant produce identification, thus transforming the encounter from the mere approach of an officer in a public place into a seizure of defendant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the officer did not stop the pertinent vehicle based on a traffic violation or some reasonable suspicion that its occupants were engaged in unlawful activity; (3) at the moment the officer opened the passenger door of the vehicle and began questioning defendant, there was still no evidence that either defendant or the driver was engaged in any unlawful activity; (4) the only evidence of a crime came later from the search of defendant\u2019s purse and the lawful search of the vehicle subsequent to the driver\u2019s arrest for drug possession and assault on a police officer; and (5) in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s position would not have believed that she was free to leave, although the vehicle could have left the parking lot by driving forward, when to do so would have placed the driver in violation of traffic laws since the officer had his license, and any passenger, particularly a female, would have felt uncomfortable or unsafe by attempting to leave the parking lot on foot at 12:30 am in an area known for drug activity and prostitution. Having found that the Fourth Amendment did apply to the search of defendant\u2019s purse, the case is remanded to the trial court for additional findings as to the voluntariness of defendant\u2019s consent to the search.\n2. Discovery\u2014 violation \u2014 providing exculpatory information in middle of trial \u2014 failure to show prejudicial error\nThe trial court did not err in a simple possession of methamphetamine case by failing to dismiss the case or order a new trial after the State allegedly failed to provide defendant with exculpatory information in a timely manner because: (1) although the State conceded it had committed a discovery violation by failing to disclose an officer\u2019s handwritten notes until the middle of trial, the violation was not a violation under Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), nor was the discovery violation prejudicial to defendant when defense counsel was allowed the final argument at trial as well as the opportunity to impeach the officer with the notes; (2) the transcript reflects that defense counsel had adequate time to prepare and change his cross-examination with respect to the caliber of bullets found in defendant\u2019s purse, and therefore he had the same opportunity concerning the location of the methamphetamine; (3) defense counsel could have conducted its own investigation into where the methamphetamine was when it was recovered since counsel was aware there was some confusion as to its location and that the same officer was going to be a witness; and (4) the discovery violation was not sufficiently material or prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial when defendant had the handwritten notes while the officer was still being cross-examined.\n3. Evidence\u2014 location of methamphetamine \u2014 statement made outside presence of jury \u2014 general confusion\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a simple possession of methamphetamine case by failing to order a new trial or to strike evidence that the prosecutor admitted that he reasonably believed to be false regarding the location of the methamphetamine because, given that the prosecutor\u2019s statement was made outside the presence of the jury, and the record and transcript reflect general confusion as to where the metlu amphetamine was recovered, the trial court acted properly in allowing the officer to testify and clarify where each piece of evidence was recovered.\nJudge BRYANT concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 1 December 2006 by-Judge Robert C. Ervin in Superior Court, Catawba County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Marc X. Sneed, for the State.\nBrock, Payne & Meece, P.A., by C. Scott Holmes, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0076-01", "first_page_order": 108, "last_page_order": 122 }