{ "id": 4157594, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. LINDA P. GAYLOR and PAUL E. GAYLOR, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Gaylor", "decision_date": "2008-05-06", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1421", "first_page": "448", "last_page": "453", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 448" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631237, 12631238 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0194-02", "/se2d/594/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631237, 12631320, 12631321, 12631259, 12631260, 12631261 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0194-02", "/se2d/596/0020-02", "/se2d/596/0020-01", "/se2d/594/0033-02", "/se2d/594/0033-01", "/se2d/594/0034-02" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639270 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "per curium" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138521 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "per curium" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 S.E.2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11433000 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8959205 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5) and (9)" }, { "page": "(5) and (9)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8212179 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "internal citation and quotation omitted" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 508, "char_count": 11237, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.155461896083572e-08, "percentile": 0.3825188263871755 }, "sha256": "f377e5cc5de2fbf1f20b89b4e5399144e26a856c6970c2c6e5b8397e764217aa", "simhash": "1:033b47b2083fbeca", "word_count": 1780 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. LINDA P. GAYLOR and PAUL E. GAYLOR, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nLinda P. Gaylor (\u201cMrs. Gaylor\u201d) and Paul E. Gaylor (\u201cMr. Gaylor\u201d) (collectively, \u201cthe Gaylors\u201d) appeal from orders entered, which granted State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company\u2019s (\u201cState Farm\u201d) motions to dismiss the Gaylors\u2019 counterclaims and for summary judgment. We affirm.\nI.Background\nOn 30 March 2006, State Farm filed a complaint and sought a declaration of rights between the parties as a result of the Gaylor\u2019s selection of uninsured motorists coverage for personal injury damages sustained by Mrs. Gaylor in an automobile accident on 26 March 2002. State Farm sought, inter alia, for \u201cthe Court [to] determine and adjudicate that [it] is not required to provide underinsured motorists coverage to [Mrs.] Gaylor[.]\u201d On 25 May 2006, the Gaylors filed their answer and asserted counterclaims against State Farm for: (1) reformation of contract due to mutual mistake and misrepresentation; (2) negligent failure to procure insurance; and (3) misrepresentation.\nOn 21 July 2006, State Farm filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer to Counterclaims. State Farm\u2019s motion was heard 13 November 2006. On 15 November 2006, the superior court granted State Farm\u2019s motion to dismiss the Gaylors\u2019 counterclaims.\nOn 16 November 2006, State Farm filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on its remaining claim. State Farm\u2019s motion was heard 16 January 2007. On 23 January 2007, the superior court denied State Farm\u2019s motion as premature. The superior court\u2019s order was entered without prejudice to State Farm\u2019s right to refile its motion after the conclusion of Mrs. Gaylor\u2019s underlying case, which stemmed from the 26 March 2002 automobile accident.\nOn 6 March 2007, State Farm refiled its Motion for Summary Judgment on its remaining claim. State Farm\u2019s motion was heard 16 April 2007. On 23 April 2007, the superior court granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The Gaylors appeal the superior court\u2019s granting of State Farm\u2019s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.\nII.Issues\nThe Gaylors argue the superior court erred when it: (1) dismissed their counterclaims and (2) granted summary judgment for State Farm.\nIII.Standard of Review\nSummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that a party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. On appeal of a trial court\u2019s allowance of a motion for summary judgment, we consider whether, on the basis of materials supplied to the trial court, there was a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Evidence presented by the parties is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.\nSummey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted). \u201cWe review an order allowing summary judgment de novo. If the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\u201d Wilkins v. Safran, 185 N.C. App. 668, 672, 649 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted).\nIV. Motion to Dismiss\nThe Gaylors argue the trial court erred when it dismissed their counterclaims \u201cdue to the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitation . ...\u201d We disagree.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b) (2005) states, \u201c[i]f, on amotion asserting the defense numbered (6), to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . .\u201d (Emphasis supplied). In its order dated 15 November 2006, the superior court stated that \u201cupon [State Farmj\u2019s motion to dismiss the [Gaylors\u2019] counterclaims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure],] [this court] . . . reviewed the pleadings and considered the arguments and submissions of counsel. . ..\u201d Because the superior court considered matters outside the pleading when it heard State Farms\u2019s motion to dismiss, we review the superior court\u2019s grant of State Farm\u2019s motion to dismiss as the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Id.\nThe Gaylors asserted counterclaims against State Farm for: (1) reformation of contract due to mutual mistake and misrepresentation; (2) negligent failure to procure insurance; and (3) misrepresentation. The Gaylors\u2019 counterclaims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52(5) and (9) (2005).\nThis Court recently considered similar facts to those at bar in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Darsie. 161 N.C. App. 542, 589 S.E.2d 391 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 241, 594 S.E.2d 194 (2004). In Darsie, the insurer instituted the action for determination of the parties\u2019 rights and obligations under an automobile insurance policy and personal liability umbrella policy. 161 N.C. App. at 544, 589 S.E.2d at 394. The insured counterclaimed and the insurer filed a motion for summary judgment based, inter alia, on the affirmative defense of statute of limitations. Id. at 544, 589 S.E.2d at 395. The superior court denied the insurer\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations defense. Id. This Court reversed and stated:\n[I]n cases such as insurance claims, when a claim becomes ripe and due under a policy requiring action on the part of the insured, at that point or a reasonable time thereafter, the policyholder is charged with more than a cursory knowledge of the extent of their coverage. . . .\n[W]hen the statute of limitations\u2019 trigger is based on discovery by reasonable diligence,... there must be some competent evidence as to when discovery . . . was reasonable. Or alternatively, when it was otherwise reasonable to discover, there must be some competent evidence that plaintiff lacked capacity and opportunity at all time while discovery was reasonable and before the three years preceding the claims.\nId. at 552, 589 S.E.2d at 399 (internal quotation omitted).\nThe record contains no evidence that the Gaylors lacked any opportunity or capacity to inquire into their coverage at all times after the 26 March 2002 accident and before they filed their counterclaims on 25 May 2006. Id. Consistent with this Court\u2019s reasoning in Darsie, the Gaylors were charged with due diligence to notify State Farm within a year of the accident, or by 26 March 2003. 161 N.C. App. at 552, 589 S.E.2d at 399. Based on the uncontroverted evidence in the record, we hold that an \u201cotherwise reasonable\u201d time for the Gaylors to discover a mutual mistake, misrepresentation, or negligent failure to procure insurance occurred when the terms of the policy required certain claims be brought to the attention of State Farm for the purpose of determining coverage. Id.\nThe Gaylors failed to file their counterclaims within the three-year statute of limitations period as prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-52(5) and (9). The superior court did not err when it granted State Farm\u2019s motion to dismiss the Gaylors\u2019 counterclaims. Summey, 357 N.C. at 496, 586 S.E.2d at 249. This assignment of error is overruled.\nV. Motion for Summary Judgment\nThe Gaylors argue the superior court erred when it granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment because \u201c[t]here were genuine issues of material fact. ...\u201d We disagree.\nPersons entering contracts of insurance, like other contracts, have a duty to read them and ordinarily are charged with knowledge of their contents. . . . Where a party has reasonable opportunity to read the instrument in question, and the language of the instrument is clear, unambiguous and easily understood, failure to read the instrument bars that party from asserting its belief that the policy contained provisions which it does not.\nBaggett v. Summerlin Ins. & Realty, Inc., 143 N.C. App. 43, 53, 545 S.E.2d 462, 468-69 (Tyson, J. dissenting) (internal citation and quotation omitted), rev\u2019d, 354 N.C. 347, 347, 554 S.E.2d 336, 337 (2001) (per curium) (\u201cFor the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion by Judge Tyson, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\u201d).\nHere, the record shows that on 23 June 1992, Mr. Gaylor executed a \u201cSelection/Rejection Form\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). The \u201cSelection/Rejection Form\u201d states, \u201cI choose to reject Combined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage and select Uninsured Motorists Coverage at limits of: Bodily Injury 100/300; Property Damage 50[.]\u201d The record further shows that on 27 December 2002, Mrs. Gaylor executed a new \u201cSelection/Rejection Form,\u201d which changed the < Gaylors\u2019 coverage to \u201cCombined Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Coverage at limits of: Bodily Injury 100,000/300,000; Property Damage 50,000[.]\u201d\nReviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Gaylors, no genuine issues of material fact exist of whether the Gaylors had underinsured motorists coverage at the time of the 26 March 2002 accident. Summey, 357 N.C. at 496, 586 S.E.2d at 249. The superior court did not err when it granted State Farms\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Id. This assignment of error is overruled.\nVI. Conclusion\nUndisputed evidence in the record shows the Gaylors failed to file their counterclaims within the applicable three-year statute of limitations. The superior court did not err when it granted State Farm\u2019s motion to dismiss the Gaylors\u2019 counterclaims. No genuine issue of any material fact exist of whether the Gaylors had underinsured motorists coverage at the time of the 26 March 2002 accident. The superior court did not err when it granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment and its orders are affirmed. Summey, 357 N.C. at 496, 586 S.E.2d at 249.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Scott Lewis and Ellen J. Persechini; and Golding, Holden & Pope, L.L.P., by Robert J. Aylward, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Doran, Shelby, Pethel and Hudson, P.A., by Michael Doran, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff v. LINDA P. GAYLOR and PAUL E. GAYLOR, Defendants\nNo. COA07-1421\n(Filed 6 May 2008)\n1. Statutes of Limitation and Repose\u2014 underinsured motorists coverage \u2014 filing of action not timely\nThe trial court did not err when it granted State Farm\u2019s motion to dismiss defendants\u2019 counterclaim in an action to declare the rights between the parties regarding underinsured motorists coverage in an action arising from an automobile accident. Undisputed evidence shows that defendants failed to file their counterclaims within the applicable three-year statute of limitations.\n2. Insurance\u2014 uninsured motorist coverage \u2014 summary judgment for insurance company\nThere was no genuine issue of material fact about whether defendants had underinsured motorists coverage at the time of an accident, and the court did not err when it granted the insurance company\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nAppeal by defendants from orders entered 15 November 2006 by Judge Michael E. Beale and 23 April 2007 by Judge Kimberly S. Taylor in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 April 2008.\nHedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Scott Lewis and Ellen J. Persechini; and Golding, Holden & Pope, L.L.P., by Robert J. Aylward, for plaintiff-appellee.\nDoran, Shelby, Pethel and Hudson, P.A., by Michael Doran, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0448-01", "first_page_order": 480, "last_page_order": 485 }