{ "id": 4158497, "name": "IN RE: S.M.", "name_abbreviation": "In re S.M.", "decision_date": "2008-05-20", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1373", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "586", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "622 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634478 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/622/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637855 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 790, 795, 622 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 S.E.2d 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640012 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/654/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639303 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915", "parenthetical": "citing In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 129, 562 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 398", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "399", "parenthetical": "upholding adjudication where \"teacher, heard respondent yell 'shut the f - k up' to a group of students\" and \"escorted Respondent to the school detention center\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9190967 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415", "parenthetical": "upholding adjudication where \"teacher, heard respondent yell 'shut the f - k up' to a group of students\" and \"escorted Respondent to the school detention center\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/156/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249369 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "798-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 N.C. App. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521320 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/103/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 N.C. App. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550351 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/8/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571698 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497700 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 N.C. App. 790", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353318 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "795" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/174/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8170089 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 790, 795, 622 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2005)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376440 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8154922 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111-12", "parenthetical": "citing In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 129, 562 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11435150 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/145/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(6)" }, { "page": "(a)(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 802, "char_count": 17661, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.242105476459474e-08, "percentile": 0.4776039066370279 }, "sha256": "19cc411e7f66a31c4f1b9b53d9059ae14e7c6496465165c266dd0380523ce7b4", "simhash": "1:8523d12ce73f987a", "word_count": 2878 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur." ], "parties": [ "IN RE: S.M." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARROWOOD, Judge.\nRespondent, \u201cS.M.\u201d appeals from adjudication and disposition as a delinquent juvenile for disorderly conduct in a school, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6). We'reverse.\nAt the hearing on this matter, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show, in relevant part, the following: Herman Ivory testified that he was the Dean of Students at Rocky Mount High School. On 6 October 2006 Ivory noticed two female students out in the hall during class hours, both wearing red jackets with hoods. When Ivory called out to them, the girls started \u201claughing and giggling,\u201d pulled up the hoods on their jackets, and went \u201crunning and laughing\u201d away. Ivory responded by calling Officer T.C. Wilder, the school\u2019s resource officer.\nWilder testified that he was in the school office when Ivory called him to report two students roaming in the hall during class. Wilder \u201cfigured [he\u2019d] go and try to look for them after [he] finished [handling another juvenile matter].\u201d A few minutes later, the girls walked past the office and Ivory, who had returned to the office, told Wilder that these were the girls he had seen in the hall. Wilder asked the girls several times to stop, saying \u201cHey you two\u201d and \u201cGirls, y\u2019all stop.\u201d The girls just \u201cgrinned\u201d and \u201csmiled\u201d and then headed down the hall. Wilder ran after them and caught Respondent at the end of the hall after a brief chase of 10-15 seconds. Wilder informed Respondent that she was \u201cunder arrest\u201d and took her back to the office. He testified that as he escorted Respondent back to the office, he saw a few teachers and some students in the hall. At the office, Ivory asked her why she had been running in the hall, and Respondent had no answer.\nBefore the hearing, Respondent subpoenaed six teachers of the seven teachers with classrooms on the hall by the office, where Respondent was escorted by Wilder. The teachers did not honor the subpoenas, but each made a brief written statement to the effect that the teacher did not remember the incident in question. At the hearing, the State stipulated to the contents of these written statements. Respondent\u2019s evidence consisted of these statements. After the presentation of evidence, the trial court found Respondent guilty of disorderly conduct in a school, adjudicated her delinquent, and entered a dispositional order. From this disposition and adjudication, Respondent appeals.\nStandard of Review\n\u201cWhere the juvenile moves to dismiss, the trial court must determine \u2018whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, . . . and (2) of [juvenile\u2019s] being the perpetrator of such offense.\u2019 \u201d In re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 28, 550 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2001) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). \u201cIn reviewing amotion to dismiss a juvenile petition, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, which is entitled to every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d In re B.D.N., 186 N.C. App. 108, 111-12, 649 S.E.2d 913, 915 (2007) (citing In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 129, 562 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2002)).\nThe dispositive issue in this case is the sufficiency of the evidence of Respondent\u2019s commission of the. offense of disorderly conduct in a school.\nPreliminarily, we address the State\u2019s argument that Respondent waived review of the sufficiency of the evidence against her. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, Respondent moved for dismissal for insufficient evidence, and her motion was denied. Respondent did not offer any witness testimony; her evidence consisted of the written statements by several teachers. After Respondent introduced these statements, she rested her case and the trial court immediately asked \u201cWould you like to be heard?\u201d Respondent\u2019s counsel argued vigorously that the evidence was insufficient to support the charged offense. We conclude this is sufficient to preserve respondent\u2019s right to review.\nRespondent first argues that the trial court erred by failing to adjudicate her based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The adjudication order states that the facts were \u201cproven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Respondent nonetheless argues that the trial court erred because, in its response to Respondent\u2019s argument for dismissal, the court stated that it was considering the evidence \u201cin the light, you know, most favorable to the State.\u201d The State agrees with Respondent that this was error, but argues that the error was corrected by the written order which controls over the trial court\u2019s oral statements. In fact, the court did not err by applying this standard.\nPursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2409 (2007), \u201c[t]he allegations of a petition alleging the juvenile is delinquent shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Moreover, the court \u201cis required to affirmatively state if it finds that the allegations in the petition have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-2411 [(2007)].\u201d In re C.B., 187 N.C. App. 803, 805, 654 S.E.2d 21, 23 (2007). However, as discussed above:\n\u201cIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d\nIn re B.N.S., 182 N.C. App. 155, 157, 641 S.E.2d 411, 412 (2007) (quoting State v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 790, 795, 622 S.E.2d 120, 123 (2005)). Thus, although the court ultimately determines the existence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a respondent\u2019s guilt, in considering a motion to dismiss, the evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the State. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next consider whether there was sufficient evidence of the Respondent\u2019s guilt of disorderly conduct. Disorderly conduct in a school is defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6) (2007) as \u201ca public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who ... [disrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students at any public or private educational institution or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution or on the grounds adjacent thereto.\u201d\nIn re Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 417 S.E.2d 479 (1992), is a leading case on the kind of behavior that properly may support an adjudication of delinquency based on disorderly conduct in school. In Eller, the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed a decision by this Court that upheld an adjudication of delinquency based on evidence that the juvenile \u201c[made] a move toward another student\u201d while holding a nail in his hand, and repeatedly banged on a radiator, causing \u201ca rattling metallic noise\u201d that distracted the other students. Id. at 715-16, 417 S.E.2d at 481. The Court first discussed State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 154, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1967), in which it interpreted an earlier version of the disorderly conduct statute:\n[W]e stated that the words in the statute \u201care to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless the context, or the history of the statute, requires otherwise.\u201d Proceeding to interpret the terms of the statute, we stated: \u201cWhen the words \u2018interrupt\u2019 and \u2018disturb\u2019 are used in conjunction with the word \u2018school,\u2019 they mean to a person of ordinary intelligence a substantial interference with, disruption of and confusion of the operation of the school in its program of instruction and training of students there enrolled.\u201d\nEller, 331 N.C. at 717, 417 S.E.2d at 481 (quoting Wiggins, 147 N.C. at 154, 158 S.E.2d at 42). \u201cAn example of such conduct [substantial interference] is contained in State v. Midgett, 8 N.C. App. 230, 174 S.E.2d 124 (1970). In Midgett, students locked the secretary to the principal out of her office, barred entry to the doors and windows with filing cabinets and tables and activated the bell system, resulting in the necessary early dismissal , of the students from their classes. This court, applying the language in Wiggins, supra, held that the students had substantially interfered with the operation of schoolf.]\u201d In re Grubb, 103 N.C. App. 452, 454, 405 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1991). Applying Wiggins to the facts in Eller, the Court held that the State had not produced \u201csubstantial evidence that the respondents\u2019 behavior constituted a \u2018substantial interference.\u2019 \u201d Eller, 331 N.C. at 718, 417 S.E.2d at 482.\nThere is no \u2018bright line\u2019 test for what constitutes \u201csubstantial interference\u201d with a school. However, appellate cases decided since Eller have tended to uphold juvenile adjudications for disorderly conduct in school when there is evidence of, e.g., (1) the use of vulgar language by the student; (2) aggressive or violent behavior by the juvenile; or (3) disruptive behavior serious enough to require the student\u2019s teacher to leave her class unattended in order to discipline the student. Thus, in In re Pineault, 152 N.C. App. 196, 566 S.E.2d 854 (2002), this Court upheld the adjudication of a juvenile for disorderly conduct in school where there was evidence that:\n[Respondent\u2019s teacher] heard respondent state, in a loud, angry voice, \u201cf\u2014 you.\u201d Ms. Carlson was required to stop teaching the class and escort respondent to the principal\u2019s office..... [Respondent] twice said to her, \u201cf\u2014 you, b--ch,\u201d evincing a clear disrespect for her authority. . . . [Ms. Carlson] was away from the classroom for more than several minutes. We hold, given the severity and nature of respondent\u2019s language, coupled with the fact that Ms. Carlson was required to stop teaching her class for at least several minutes, that respondent\u2019s actions substantially interfered with the operation of Ms. Carlson\u2019s classroom[.]\nId. at 199, 566 S.E.2d at 857. See also, e.g., In re M.G., 156 N.C. App. 414, 415, 576 S.E.2d 398, 399 (2003) (upholding adjudication where \u201cteacher, heard respondent yell \u2018shut the f \u2014 k up\u2019 to a group of students\u201d and \u201cescorted Respondent to the school detention center\u201d).\nOn the other hand, adjudications have been reversed where the evidence shows no more than ordinary misbehavior or rule-breaking. For example, in In re Brown, the juvenile respondent was reprimanded for talking during a test. When his teacher found him again talking to another student she \u201cbecame upset\u201d and \u201creminded respondent that she could give him a zero, to which he replied, \u2018Well give me a zero.\u2019 \u201d Thereafter:\nRespondent headed back to the classroom and slammed the door behind him.... Ms. Carbone called respondent back into the hallway. She began to write a \u2018referral slip\u2019 to send respondent to the office. . . . [Respondent began begging the teacher not to send him to the office . . . crying and . . . [holding] Ms. Carbone\u2019s arm in his attempt to block her.\nBrown, 150 N.C. App. at 128, 562 S.E.2d at 584. The respondent was adjudicated delinquent based on disorderly conduct in a school. On appeal, this Court held that the evidence was insufficient:\nThe evidence in the case sub judice shows a student who talked during a test, slammed a door, and begged a teacher in the hallway that he not be sent to the office. . . . [W]hen students act as respondents in this case, they are troublesome and a burden in the classroom. These are the trials faced by teachers in today\u2019s schools. But if we were to hold that the present actions are of such gravity that they warrant a conviction of disorderly conduct, every child that is sent to the office for momentary lapses in behavior could be convicted under such precedent.\nId. at 131, 562 S.E.2d at 586. Similarly, min re Grubb, the Respondent \u201cwas talking to another student in a loud and disruptive voice\u201d and refused to stop talking when asked by her teacher. Grubb, 103 N.C. at 452-53, 405 S.E.2d at 797. Instead, Respondent \u201cmade a \u2018smurky\u2019 face and shrugged her shoulders.\u201d Id. \u201cOther students were distracted by the episode and started looking up from their work\u201d when the Respondent would not stop talking in class. Id. This Court held this was insufficient to show a substantial disruption of the school:\nThe conduct in the case at bar does not approach the conduct in Midgett. . . . [Respondent stopped talking after being asked a second time and the class was only momentarily disrupted. This evidence even in the light most favorable to the State was insufficient to establish a violation of Section 14-288.4(a)(6) and respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss should have been granted.\nGrubb, 103 N.C. App. 454-55, 405 S.E.2d at 798-99.\nThe evidence in the present case, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, tended to show that: (1) Respondent and a friend were walking in the hall when they should have been in class; (2) when asked to stop, they instead grinned, giggled, and ran down the hall; (3) Respondent was stopped by the school resource officer after a brief chase down the hall; and (4) a few students and teachers looked out into the hall while the resource officer was escorting .Respondent to the school office. There was no evidence that the school or classroom instruction was substantially disrupted, that Respondent was aggressive or violent; or that Respondent used disturbing or vulgar language. Indeed, Respondent and her friend were described several times as \u201cgiggling\u201d or \u201csmiling.\u201d We conclude that Respondent\u2019s behavior, although no doubt an annoyance to the school administrator, does not rise to the level of criminal activity.\nIn ruling on Respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss, the trial court agreed that Respondent\u2019s behavior was \u201cborderline.\u201d The court appears to have been influenced by generalized social concerns about violence, even though the evidence bore no indicia of violence. The trial court expressed a concern about school violence nationwide, asking \u201c[H]ow many kids have walked onto school campuses in the last three years in the United States and shot up the campus?\u201d and speculating on what might have happened if Respondent and her friend had \u201cturned out to be some kind of psycho killers that went on that day to kill 15 students at Rocky Mount Senior High School.\u201d The trial court\u2019s generalized apprehension about school safety in today\u2019s world is understandable, given various highly-publicized incidents in the past few years. Fortunately, the instant case involved no violence, but only foolish mischief.\nWe conclude, based on the relevant precedent and our review of the facts in this case, that the trial court erred by denying Respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss and that the trial court\u2019s order of adjudication and disposition must be\nReversed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur.\n. To preserve the privacy of the juvenile, we refer to her in this opinion by the initials \u201cS.M.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "ARROWOOD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Susannah R Holloway, for the State.", "Peter Wood, for Respondent-Appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE: S.M.\nNo. COA07-1373\n(Filed 20 May 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nAlthough the State contends respondent juvenile waived review of the sufficiency of the evidence against her for the offense of disorderly conduct in a school, her counsel\u2019s vigorous argument, after resting her case, that the evidence was insufficient to support the charged offense was sufficient to preserve respondent\u2019s right to review.\n2. Juveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 burden of proof \u2014 motion to dismiss\nThe trial court did not err in a juvenile delinquency case by allegedly failing to adjudicate a juvenile based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt when the written order stated the facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt whereas the trial court\u2019s oral statements indicated it was considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, because although the court ultimately determines the existence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of respondent\u2019s guilt, in considering a motion to dismiss, the evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the State.\n3. Juveniles\u2014 delinquency \u2014 disorderly conduct in school\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court erred in a juvenile delinquency case by concluding there was sufficient evidence of respondent juvenile\u2019s guilt of disorderly conduct in a school because: (1) while appellate courts tend to uphold juvenile adjudications for disorderly conduct in school when there is evidence of the use of vulgar language by the student, aggressive or violent behavior by the juvenile, or disruptive behavior serious enough to require the student\u2019s teacher to leave the class unattended in order to discipline the student, adjudications have been reversed where the evidence shows no more than ordinary misbehavior or rule-breaking; (2) viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State in the instant case revealed that respondent and a friend were walking in the hall when they should have been in class; when asked to stop, they instead grinned, giggled, and ran down the hall; respondent was stopped by the school resource officer after a brief chase down the hall; and a few students and teachers looked out into the hall while the resource officer was escorting respondent to the school office; (3) there was no evidence that the school or classroom instruction was substantially disrupted, that respondent was aggressive or violent, or that respondent used disturbing or vulgar language, but instead respondent and her friend were described several times as giggling or smiling; and (5) although respondent\u2019s behavior was an annoyance to the school administrator, it did not rise to the level of criminal activity.\nAppeal by Respondent from judgment entered 5 June 2007 by Judge John Covolo in Nash County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 April 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Susannah R Holloway, for the State.\nPeter Wood, for Respondent-Appellant." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 618 }