{ "id": 4157812, "name": "TIMOTHY J. HASH, Plaintiff v. THE ESTATE OF PAIGE WALTON HENLEY, by and through its Co-Administrators, RODNEY W. HENLEY and JEWEL R. HENLEY, NEAL S. GORDON, JR. and GORDON & SONS FINE GRADING INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Hash v. Estate of Henley", "decision_date": "2008-05-20", "docket_number": "No. COA07-845", "first_page": "645", "last_page": "649", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 645" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "419 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "223-24" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.C. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527394 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/107/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570355 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560100 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552769 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/26/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403377 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 567, "char_count": 10268, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13545654592217538 }, "sha256": "e076d9ed020c006084fe187a024857e7ea4c3c525fc60e5e953c347f3d73f530", "simhash": "1:5dd32666207e8641", "word_count": 1653 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "TIMOTHY J. HASH, Plaintiff v. THE ESTATE OF PAIGE WALTON HENLEY, by and through its Co-Administrators, RODNEY W. HENLEY and JEWEL R. HENLEY, NEAL S. GORDON, JR. and GORDON & SONS FINE GRADING INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nTimothy J. Hash (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Paige Walton Henley, by and through its co-administrators, Rodney W. Henley and Jewel R. Henley (\u201cdefendants\u201d). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nOn or about 22 November 2002, plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a car driven by defendants\u2019 decedent, Paige Walton Henley (\u201cHenley\u201d). As they proceeded northbound on Highway 801 near Mocksville in Davie County, a two-lane road, defendant Neal S. Gordon (\u201cGordon\u201d) tailgated them for a mile or two, flashing his high-beam headlights at them. Gordon eventually passed them, then slowed down significantly in front of them.\nHenley became irritated and attempted to pass Gordon. Gordon sped up, staying alongside Henley to prevent her from passing his truck. Although plaintiff asked Henley to slow down and pull in behind Gordon, she did not. She eventually gained a little distance on Gordon and asked plaintiff if there was enough room for her to pull in front of Gordon.\nAt this point, one of the vehicles crossed into the other lane, causing the vehicles to collide. Henley\u2019s car spun partly in front of Gordon, then into some trees on the side of the road, then back into Gordon\u2019s truck. As a result of the accident, Henley died and plaintiff received multiple injuries.\nGordon eventually was found guilty of misdemeanor death by motor vehicle on 17 July 2003. Plaintiff testified for the State at Gordon\u2019s trial. On 25 November 2003, defendants filed a civil suit against Gordon. Plaintiff was deposed in that suit on 9 June 2004; however, he did not testify at trial. The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on Gordon\u2019s part in that case.\nPlaintiff filed the instant suit on 29 July 2005. Plaintiff settled with defendants Gordon and Gordon & Sons Fine Grading, and they were released. The settlement specifically reserved \u201cany and all claims.\u201d\nOn 19 January 2007, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was heard on 5 February 2007. Summary judgment was granted in defendants\u2019 favor by order filed 13 February 2007. Plaintiff appeals.\nPlaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact such that the trial court\u2019s granting of summary judgment was in error. We disagree.\nWe review an order allowing summary judgment de novo. See Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2005).\nThe moving party bears the burden of showing that no triable issue of fact exists. Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984)). This burden can be met by proving: (1) that an essential element of the non-moving party\u2019s claim is nonexistent; (2) that discovery indicates the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim; or (3) that the non-moving party cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989) (citations omitted).\nIn the case sub judice, defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment alleged that plaintiff previously had provided sworn testimony that Henley was not negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle that resulted in plaintiff\u2019s injuries. In response, plaintiff filed an affidavit in which he alleged facts that directly contradict his prior testimony.\nAt issue in the present appeal is whether plaintiff\u2019s prior testimony constitutes evidential admissions by which he is not bound, or judicial admissions by which he is bound. In Cogdill v. Scates, 26 N.C. App. 382, 216 S.E.2d 428 (1975), aff'd, 290 N.C. 31, 224 S.E.2d 604 (1976), the plaintiff had alleged in her complaint that her injuries were the result of her husband\u2019s negligent driving. At trial, however, she testified that her husband acted reasonably. This Court held that the plaintiff was \u201cconclusively bound by her unequivocal testimony\u201d that her husband was not negligent. Id. at 385-86, 216 S.E.2d at 430. Cogdill did not address whether the plaintiff\u2019s testimony constituted a judicial admission. Id. at 385, 216 S.E.2d at 430.\nIn Woods v. Smith, 297 N.C. 363, 255 S.E.2d 174 (1979), the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the difference between evidential and judicial admissions. The Court concluded, \u201cwhen a party gives adverse testimony in a deposition or at trial, that testimony should not, in most instances, be conclusively binding on him to the extent that his opponent may obtain either summary judgment or a directed verdict.\u201d Id. at 374, 255 S.E.2d at 181. However, Woods recognized an exception \u201cwhen a party gives unequivocal, adverse testimony under factual circumstances such as were present in Cogdill, [in which case] his statements should be treated as binding judicial admissions rather than as evidential admissions.\u201d Id.\nThis Court previously has affirmed summary judgment when the plaintiff\u2019s deposition testimony unequivocally and unambiguously repudiated the allegations in the complaint. In Body v. Varner, 107 N.C. App. 219, 224, 419 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1992), the Court recognized the general rule as stated in Woods, but noted that Cogdill applied to the extent that a party\u2019s deposition testimony unequivocally repudiates the allegations raised in the party\u2019s complaint. Id. at 223-24, 419 S.E.2d at 211.\nTherefore, the central issue we must decide in the instant case is whether plaintiff\u2019s prior testimony unequivocally and unambiguously repudiates the allegations in his complaint and affidavit. We hold that it does.\nOn 17 July 2003, plaintiff testified against Gordon at the criminal trial resulting from the underlying accident in this case. When asked about road markings present at the time Henley began to pass Gordon, plaintiff responded, \u201cWe had the separated lines. The passing marks.\u201d On cross-examination, he reiterated that \u201c[s]he pulled out in a passing zone. There was a passing zone there.\u201d He stated that Gordon \u201cwasn\u2019t letting us over.\u201d Plaintiff further testified that as soon as he turned his head to see if there was enough room for Henley to move into the lane in front of Gordon, \u201c[Gordon] smacked us.\u201d \u201cHe hit us. He hit us in the right rear wheel.\u201d Plaintiff continued that Henley\u2019s car was \u201cclearly in the southbound lane.\u201d He further testified that, to his knowledge, Henley had had nothing to drink and that he did not smell alcohol on her breath. Plaintiff testified unequivocally that Gordon caused the accident.\nOn 9 June 2004, plaintiff provided deposition testimony in connection with defendants\u2019 civil suit against Gordon and Gordon & Sons Fine Grading. In his deposition, plaintiff stated that he could not recall a time when Henley had ever been visibly intoxicated to the point that she lost some control of her motor skills. He further stated that at the time of the accident, she did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs of any sort. When asked to describe Henley as a driver, plaintiff stated that she was a \u201cvery good driver.\u201d He testified that Henley was driving the speed limit just prior to the accident. As in the criminal trial, plaintiff testified that Henley began to pass Gordon in a passing zone and that it was Gordon who then crossed the center line and hit them. As in the criminal trial, plaintiff testified unequivocally that Gordon caused the accident.\nIn addition, plaintiff testified that Gordon\u2019s maneuvers \u201ckind of irritated\u201d Henley. In contrast to defense counsel\u2019s characterization of Henley \u201cslammfing her car] into third\u201d gear, plaintiff said, \u201cShe put it in third gear; yes.\u201d Similarly, instead of \u201cwhip[ping] around [Gordon,]\u201d plaintiff said Henley \u201cproceeded to go around him.\u201d In contrast to this testimony in his 5 February 2007 affidavit, plaintiff alleged that Henley \u201cin a fit of road rage,\u201d began her pass \u201con a double yellow line, or at least during part of the time was on a double yellow line.\u201d This is in direct contradiction to his prior sworn statements.\nPursuant to Woods and Cogdill, we hold that plaintiffs earlier testimony was unequivocal and unambiguous that it was Gordon\u2019s negligence, and not Henley\u2019s, that caused his injuries. Therefore, his statements constitute judicial admissions by which he is bound. Thus, the trial court\u2019s granting of summary judgment against him was proper.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wells Jenkins Lucas & Jenkins PLLC, by Ellis B. Drew, III and R. Michael Wells, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Bennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Rodney A. Guthrie and Jason P. Burton, for defendant-appellee, The Estate of Paige Walton Henley, by and through its Co-Administrators, Rodney W. Henley and Jewel R. Henley." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TIMOTHY J. HASH, Plaintiff v. THE ESTATE OF PAIGE WALTON HENLEY, by and through its Co-Administrators, RODNEY W. HENLEY and JEWEL R. HENLEY, NEAL S. GORDON, JR. and GORDON & SONS FINE GRADING INC., Defendants\nNo. COA07-845\n(Filed 20 May 2008)\nEvidence\u2014 judicial admission \u2014 prior testimony repudiated allegations and affidavit \u2014 summary judgment\nThe trial court did not err in an action arising out of an automobile accident by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants when defendants\u2019 motion alleged that plaintiff passenger previously had provided sworn testimony that decedent driver Henley was not negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle that resulted in plaintiff\u2019s injuries, and in response plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging facts that directly contradicted his prior testimony, because: (1) plaintiff\u2019s prior testimony unequivocally and unambiguously repudiated the allegations in his complaint and affidavit; and (2) plaintiff\u2019s statements constitute judicial admissions by which he is bound.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an order entered 13 February 2007 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Davie County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 January 2008.\nWells Jenkins Lucas & Jenkins PLLC, by Ellis B. Drew, III and R. Michael Wells, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nBennett & Guthrie, P.L.L.C., by Rodney A. Guthrie and Jason P. Burton, for defendant-appellee, The Estate of Paige Walton Henley, by and through its Co-Administrators, Rodney W. Henley and Jewel R. Henley." }, "file_name": "0645-01", "first_page_order": 677, "last_page_order": 681 }