{
  "id": 4158715,
  "name": "J. KAMAU CHRISTOPHER a/k/a JOSEPH KAMAU CHRISTOPHER BEY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Christopher v. North Carolina State University",
  "decision_date": "2008-05-20",
  "docket_number": "No. COA07-1516",
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    "judges": [
      "Judges McCULLOUGH and STROUD concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "J. KAMAU CHRISTOPHER a/k/a JOSEPH KAMAU CHRISTOPHER BEY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nJ. Kamau Christopher (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) appeals from the Full Commission of the North Carolina Industrial Commission\u2019s (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) order dismissing his tort claim action against North Carolina State University (\u201cdefendant\u201d). We affirm.\nI. Background\nPlaintiff was enrolled as a student at North Carolina State University from August 1999 to May 2004. In July 2002, plaintiff enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve and attained the status of serving as an Active Duty member in the Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate Program. Plaintiff\u2019s initial enlistment physical revealed he was \u201cfit for full service.\u201d In August 2002, plaintiff was hired as a Resident Advisor for Wood Residence Hall (\u201cWood Hall\u201d) for the 2002-2003 term. Plaintiff was subsequently rehired as Resident Advisor for the following 2003-2004 term.\nOn 18 September 2003, plaintiff resigned from his position due to \u201cmold and mildew growing in visible areas in the living space of residents [sic] and a lack of responsiveness from the University Administration[.]\u201d In November 2003, plaintiff was diagnosed with a permanent asthmatic and respiratory condition. Despite these medical conditions, plaintiff was granted a waiver by the Navy Recruiting Command. After graduation, plaintiff was transferred to the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. Upon plaintiffs arrival, a commissioning physical was conducted, plaintiffs medical waiver was revoked, and further analysis of plaintiffs medical condition and fitness to serve was ordered.\nSuch analysis revealed plaintiffs respiratory condition had further progressed. On 5 May 2005, the Navy Medical Command Physical Evaluation Board issued an order finding plaintiff had acquired a medical condition, asthma, which was a physically disqualifying factor. Plaintiff was released from his military obligation with an honorable discharge, which terminated his commitment five years early.\nOn 30 December 2005, plaintiff filed an affidavit under the Tort Claims Act alleging he was damaged in the amount of $150,000.00 from \u201cexposure to substandard and unhealthy indoor environment\u201d while he was employed as a Resident Advisor in Wood Hall. On 9 March 2006, defendant filed a motion to dismiss and answer. Defendant asserted plaintiff alleged he was injured while employed with defendant and therefore his exclusive remedy was to assert a claim under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. On 20 July 2006, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.\nPlaintiff filed a response to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and asserted plaintiff\u2019s injury \u201cdid not arise out of and in the course of employment, nor is the injury compensable under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and thus the Plaintiff . . . can only seek compensation for damages under the Tort Claims Act as filed.\u201d On 9 February 2007, Deputy Commissioner Wanda Taylor filed an order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s tort claim with prejudice and entered the following conclusions:\n7. Defendant has met its burden of proof by forecasting sufficient, competent evidence to show that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant at the time he was allegedly exposed to a \u201charmful\u201d indoor environment, which in turn allegedly caused him to sustain a respiratory illness.\n8. Plaintiff has failed to forecast sufficient, competent evidence to rebut Defendant\u2019s evidence, and has failed to show that Plaintiff was not an employee of Defendant at the time of the alleged exposure.\n9. Plaintiff has failed to forecast sufficient, competent evidence to show that the Industrial Commission has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs claim under the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff has further failed to show there is a genuine issue as to a material fact.\nOn 10 August 2007, the Full Commission affirmed the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s order and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s tort claim with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.\nII.Issues\nPlaintiff argues the Industrial Commission erred by: (1) failing to make findings of fact concerning all crucial issues, including the alleged injury; (2) hearing defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment and finding no genuine issues of material fact exist; and (3) dismissing plaintiff\u2019s tort claim based upon the assertion that a claim under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy.\nIII.Standard of Review\n[W]hen reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, appellate courts must examine whether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether those findings . . . support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by such competent evidence, even though there is evidence that would support findings to the contrary.\nMcRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). However, our Supreme Court has repeatedly held \u201cthat jurisdictional facts found by the Industrial Commission, even when supported by competent evidence, are not binding upon the courts on appeal, and that the reviewing court has the duty to make its own independent findings.\u201d Lemmerman v. Williams Oil Co., 318 N.C. 577, 580, 350 S.E.2d 83, 86 (1986) (citations omitted).\nIV.Subject Matter Jurisdiction\nThe dispositive issue before us is whether the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides plaintiff his exclusive remedy for his alleged injury and divests the Industrial Commission of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff\u2019s tort claim.\nThe determinative factor that subjects the parties to the provisions of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is whether an employee-employer relationship exists. Cox v. Transportation Co., 259 N.C. 38, 42, 129 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1963); see also Askew v. Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 170, 141 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1965) (\u201cThe question whether the employer-employee relationship exists is clearly jurisdictional.\u201d).\nHere, plaintiff conceded numerous times in his pleadings and before the Industrial Commission that he was an employee of defendant while he attended classes during the 2002-2003 school term and briefly for the 2003-2004 term. Plaintiff specifically states in his Response to Defendant\u2019s Motion for Summary Judgment, \u201cPlaintiff admits and acknowledges that his relationship with the Defendant included a employer-employee arrangement, as defined by the Statutes, and thus he was employed with the Defendant during a period in which the alleged injury manifested itself[] . . . .\u201d\nIt is well settled in this jurisdiction that the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy when an employee is injured by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of employment. Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 164, 558 S.E.2d 490, 493 (2002) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-10.1). Because the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy for the alleged injury that occurred during his employment, the Industrial Commission properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s tort claim with prejudice. This assignment of error is overruled. In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to address plaintiff\u2019s remaining assignments of error.\nV. Conclusion\nThe North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides plaintiff\u2019s exclusive remedy for his alleged injury that arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. The Industrial Commission\u2019s order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s tort claim with prejudice is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and STROUD concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "TYSON, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Joseph Kamau Christopher Bey, pro se, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Dahr Joseph Tanoury, for the defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "J. KAMAU CHRISTOPHER a/k/a JOSEPH KAMAU CHRISTOPHER BEY, Plaintiff v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant\nNo. COA07-1516\n(Filed 20 May 2008)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 exclusive remedy \u2014 employment conceded\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for a resident advisor in a university residence hall who allegedly developed asthma from mold and mildew in the building. The determinative factor is whether an employee-employer relationship exists and plaintiff conceded numerous times that he was an employee of defendant university.\nAppeal by plaintiff from decision and order entered 10 August 2007 by Commissioner Christopher Scott for the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 May 2008.\nJoseph Kamau Christopher Bey, pro se, for plaintiff-appellant.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Dahr Joseph Tanoury, for the defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0666-01",
  "first_page_order": 698,
  "last_page_order": 701
}