{ "id": 4157676, "name": "STEPHEN P. GRESS, Plaintiff v. THE ROWBOAT COMPANY, INC., and C&C GRADING, INC., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Gress v. Rowboat Co.", "decision_date": "2008-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA07-961", "first_page": "773", "last_page": "778", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 773" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523445 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that evidence of deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of a restaurant is sufficient to establish an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of \u00a7 75-1.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4746211, 4744518, 4745104, 4748123, 4747612 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that evidence of deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of a restaurant is sufficient to establish an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of \u00a7 75-1.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0459-02", "/nc/319/0459-03", "/nc/319/0459-05", "/nc/319/0459-04", "/nc/319/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358890 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567648, 2572322, 2567851, 2572779, 2570637 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0480-04", "/nc/321/0480-03", "/nc/321/0480-05", "/nc/321/0480-02", "/nc/321/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227-28" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358244 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" }, { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 N.C. App. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11359685 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/146/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135724 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 N.C. App. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170351 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/52/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155746, 1155907, 1155630 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0191-01", "/nc/351/0191-03", "/nc/351/0191-02" ] }, { "cite": "519 S.E.2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155931 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560900, 8560934, 8560883, 8560952, 8560924 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0127-02", "/nc/307/0127-04", "/nc/307/0127-01", "/nc/307/0127-05", "/nc/307/0127-03" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569627 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919", "parenthetical": "quoting Edmisten, Attorney General v. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 316-17, 233 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525273 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444-45", "parenthetical": "quoting Edmisten, Attorney General v. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 316-17, 233 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917470 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E.2d 838", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170267 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "quoting Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987)" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440839 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "quoting Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 N.C. App. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526156 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/91/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11914421 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0154-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 701, "char_count": 14138, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7817273071113374e-08, "percentile": 0.30044454329190623 }, "sha256": "52e248ff0812781a269612afe5b155009fc8c563da6d45e8f2cd702c516e746c", "simhash": "1:b9837548d8b11c4f", "word_count": 2222 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges ELMORE and ARROWOOD concur." ], "parties": [ "STEPHEN P. GRESS, Plaintiff v. THE ROWBOAT COMPANY, INC., and C&C GRADING, INC., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "McCullough, Judge.\nThe sole issue before us is whether the trial court properly dismissed defendants\u2019 counterclaim asserting that plaintiff engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. \u201cIn our review of the dismissal of this action pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1,] Rule 12(b)(6) [(2007)], we must consider the allegations of plaintiff\u2019s complaint as true.\u201d Arroyo v. Scottie\u2019s Professional Window Cleaning, 120 N.C. App. 154, 155, 461 S.E.2d 13, 14 (1995).\nThe facts as pled by defendants are as follows: The Rowboat Company, Inc. (\u201cRowboat\u201d) and C&C Grading, Inc. (\u201cC&C\u201d) (collectively referred to as \u201cdefendants\u201d) are North Carolina corporations wholly owned by Robert Wilson (\u201cWilson\u201d), who is the president of both corporations. Rowboat is engaged in the business of building piers, docks, boathouses, boat slips, and other waterfront structures for residential and commercial customers. C&C is engaged in the business of grading real property and constructing upland amenities for resort developments.\nIn May 2005, Stephen P. Gress (\u201cplaintiff\u201d) approached Wilson about the possibility of buying the assets of both Rowboat and C&C. Plaintiff and Wilson entered into a written letter of intent on 30 May 2005, and plaintiff paid Wilson a $10,000 earnest money deposit, refundable only in the event of a material misrepresentation. Plaintiff represented that he would close the asset purchase within sixty to ninety days.\nDuring negotiations, plaintiff and Wilson agreed that plaintiff would be permitted to observe the operations of the businesses and to conduct due diligence measures in and about the business premises prior to the closing of the deal. Further, in the interest of maintaining the continuity of business, the parties agreed to keep plaintiff\u2019s pending purchase of defendants\u2019 assets confidential. To that end, the parties agreed to introduce plaintiff as an employee of C&C and entered into a fictitious employment agreement, entitled \u201cC&C Grading Co. Inc. Agreement President Opportunities and Expectations.\u201d Neither party intended for this contract to be a true contract of employment; rather, the parties agreed that defendants would \u201crecoup from [pjlaintiff at the closing of the purchase and sale of the [defendants\u2019] assets . . . those sums . . . paid to [p]laintiff as a nominal employee[.]\u201d\nThereafter, plaintiff did not purchase defendants\u2019 assets as planned within ninety days. In fact, plaintiff had no intention of purchasing defendants\u2019 assets, yet plaintiff induced defendants to continually extend the closing deadline so that plaintiff could continue to draw a salary and receive quarterly profit-sharing bonuses. Further, while acting as a \u201cnominal employee,\u201d plaintiff knowingly engaged in a series of unauthorized activities that resulted in financial loss and damage to defendants, including among other acts, upgrading the business\u2019s computer network, rebuilding and painting a remote office, and negotiating the purchase of another company.\nIn January of 2006, it became evident to defendants that plaintiff had no intention and no ability to close the purchase of defendants\u2019 assets. C&C terminated the \u201cnominal\u201d employment contract and revoked plaintiff\u2019s access to defendants\u2019 business premises and records.\nPlaintiff brought suit against defendants to recover his $10,000 earnest money deposit. Defendants asserted counterclaims against plaintiff for breach of contract and for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices (\u201cthe UDTPA claim\u201d) under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1 (2007). Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff moved to dismiss the UDTPA claim on the ground that defendants had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted this motion, concluding that the relationship between plaintiff and defendants was that of an employee and employer, and defendants\u2019 counterclaim was, therefore, outside of the intended scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nOn appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their UDTPA claim. We agree. Treating defendants\u2019 allegations as true and construing their claim liberally, as we must at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, defendants have alleged that plaintiff engaged in a fraudulent scheme arising from the sale of corporate assets, which is sufficient to establish a claim for relief under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1.\n\u201cAn inquiry into the sufficiency of a counterclaim to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is identical to that regarding the sufficiency of a complaint to survive the same motion.\u201d Chesapeake Microfilm, Inc. v. Eastern Microfilm Sales & Service, 91 N.C. App. 539, 542, 372 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1988). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the trial court must determine \u201c \u2018whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory.\u2019 \u201d Block v. County of Person, 141 N.C. App. 273, 277, 540 S.E.2d 415, 419 (2000) (quoting Harris v. NCNB, 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987)). The court must construe the complaint liberally and \u201cshould not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.\u201d Id. at 277-78, 540 S.E.2d at 419.\nTo establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, the defendants must show: (1) plaintiff committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to defendants. Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 650, 664, 464 S.E.2d 47, 58 (1995). \u2018[T]he unfair and deceptive acts and practices forbidden by G.S. 75-1.1(a) are those involved in the bargain, sale, barter, exchange or traffic.\u2019 \u201d Cameron v. New Hanover Memorial Hospital, 58 N.C. App. 414, 444-45, 293 S.E.2d 901, 919 (1982) (quoting Edmisten, Attorney General v. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 316-17, 233 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1977)), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 307 N.C. 127, 297 S.E.2d 399 (1982). The UDTPA is intended to apply \u201c \u2018 \u201cto dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce.\" \u2019 \u201d Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 351 N.C. 27, 32, 519 S.E.2d 308, 311 (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, 351 N.C. 191, 541 S.E.2d 716 (1999). This Court has held that \u201cit is not necessary for the plaintiff to show fraud, bad faith, deliberate or knowing acts of deception, or actual deception,\u201d but \u201cplaintiff must. . . show that the acts complained of possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead, or created the likelihood of deception.\u201d Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 444, 452-53, 279 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1981).\nA. Employee-Employer Relationships\nAs a general rule, there is a presumption against unfair and deceptive practice claims as between employers and employees. Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 658, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001). Ordinarily, in such a context, the claimant must make a showing of business related conduct that is unlawful or of deceptive acts that affect commerce beyond the employment relationship. Durling v. King, 146 N.C. App. 483, 488-89, 554 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2001). The rationale behind this general rule is that pure employer-employee disputes are not sufficiently \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d to satisfy the second element of a UDTPA claim. Id. at 489, 554 S.E.2d at 5.\nHere, however, defendants do not allege the existence of a true employer-employee relationship. See State ex rel. Employment Security Comm. v. Faulk, 88 N.C. App. 369, 374, 363 S.E.2d 225, 227-28 (\u201cWhether someone is an \u2018employee\u2019 is a mixed question of law and fact. The question of fact is what the terms, express or implied, of the employment contract are; the question of law is whether those terms show the requisite degree of control.\u201d). Id. (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d-917 (1988). Defendants allege that both Wilson and plaintiff intended for a fictitious employer relationship to exist solely as a cover to enable plaintiff to conduct due diligence measures related to the purchase of defendants\u2019 assets, while maintaining the confidentiality of the pending transaction. Plaintiff was not to be legitimately compensated for his work as a \u201cnominal\u201d employee; rather, the parties agreed that defendants were to receive a credit at closing for all sums paid to plaintiff as fictitious compensation. Thus, the facts alleged by defendants do not establish a true employer-employee relationship; rather, they show a fictitious relationship that would not exist but for plaintiff and defendants\u2019 buyer-seller relationship. Furthermore, the conduct at issue all arises from an underlying contract to purchase corporate assets which .satisfies the \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d element of a UDTPA claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1. See La Notte, Inc. v. New Way Gourmet, Inc., 83 N.C. App. 480, 484-86, 350 S.E.2d 889, 891-92 (1986), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 319 N.C. 459, 354 S.E.2d 888 (1987) (holding that evidence of deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of a restaurant is sufficient to establish an unfair and deceptive trade practice in violation of \u00a7 75-1.1). Accordingly, we conclude that the general presumption against unfair and deceptive practice claims as between employers and employees does not apply to the facts before us.\nB. Fraudulent Scheme\nInstead, we find the facts before us demonstrate a fraudulent scheme concerning the sale of corporate assets, which is sufficient to establish a claim for relief pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1. In Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 421, 344 S.E.2d 297 (1986), a car dealer induced a customer to sign a purchase agreement for a car .by promising her that he would allow rescission of the contract if she was not satisfied with the car; the car dealer had no intention of keeping such promise. The customer attempted to return the car the next day, and the car dealer refused to rescind the contract and refused to return the customer\u2019s money and trade-in vehicle. We reasoned that the plaintiff\u2019s evidence \u201cshowed not just a breach of promise; it showed a fraudulent scheme, i.e., a contract induced by the defendant\u2019s promise to allow rescission of the contract by plaintiff, which promise defendant never intended to keep.\u201d Id. at 426, 344 S.E.2d at 301. We held that the dealer\u2019s misrepresentations to plaintiff were sufficiently \u201coffensive, oppressive and outrageous,\u201d to support an award under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nHere, the facts alleged by defendants are largely analogous to those of Mapp. Defendants allege that plaintiff induced Wilson to sign an employment agreement by promising that all compensation paid to plaintiff would be reimbursed upon closing of the asset purchase. Plaintiff\u2019s promise to return all compensation paid under the employment contract is much like the car dealer\u2019s promise to allow rescission of the purchase agreement in Mapp. Thereafter, while plaintiff had no intention of closing on the sale, plaintiff used the pending sale to induce C&C to continue paying him a salary and quarterly profit-sharing bonuses. These facts establish more than just a breach of contract by plaintiff; they show a fraudulent scheme in which plaintiff\u2019s misrepresentations were sufficiently deceptive to (1) constitute unfair or deceptive acts (2) in or affecting commerce, which (3) proximately caused injury to defendants. As such, defendants\u2019 allegations, treated as true, are sufficient to establish a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nWhile defendants may not be able to prove their allegations after the discovery stage, these allegations are sufficient to survive plaintiff\u2019s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order dismissing defendants\u2019 counterclaim for unfair and deceptive trade practices.\nReversed.\nJudges ELMORE and ARROWOOD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "McCullough, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Templeton & Raynor, RA., by Kenneth R. Raynor, for plaintiff appellee.", "Homesley, Jones, Gaines, Dudley, Childers, McLurkin & Donaldson, PLLC, by Mark L. Childers, for defendant appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEPHEN P. GRESS, Plaintiff v. THE ROWBOAT COMPANY, INC., and C&C GRADING, INC., Defendants\nNo. COA07-961\n(Filed 3 June 2008)\n1. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 presumption against employer-employee claims \u2014 fictitious employment\nThe general presumption against unfair and deceptive practice claims between employers and employees did not apply to a fictitious employment between defendant corporations and plaintiff potential purchaser of the corporations\u2019 assets where the owner of the corporations and plaintiff intended for a fictitious employer relationship to exist solely as a cover to enable plaintiff to conduct due diligence measures related to the purchase of defendants\u2019 assets while maintaining the confidentiality of the pending transaction; and plaintiff was not to be legitimately compensated for his work as a \u201cnominal\u201d employee, but defendants were to receive a credit at closing for all sums paid to plaintiff as fictitious compensation.\n2. Unfair Trade Practices\u2014 fraudulent asset purchase scheme \u2014 fictitious employment relationship\nDefendant corporations stated a claim for relief against plaintiff potential purchaser of the corporate assets under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act based upon a fraudulent scheme concerning the sale of the assets to plaintiff where defendants alleged that plaintiff induced the owner of defendant corporations to sign an employment agreement by promising that all compensation paid to plaintiff would be reimbursed upon closing of the asset purchase; that plaintiff had no intention of closing on the sale; and that plaintiff used the pending sale to induce one corporation to continue paying him a salary and quarterly profit-sharing bonuses. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 26 April 2007 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 February 2008.\nTempleton & Raynor, RA., by Kenneth R. Raynor, for plaintiff appellee.\nHomesley, Jones, Gaines, Dudley, Childers, McLurkin & Donaldson, PLLC, by Mark L. Childers, for defendant appellants." }, "file_name": "0773-01", "first_page_order": 805, "last_page_order": 810 }