{ "id": 4157945, "name": "STEVE SAWYER, Plaintiff v. MARKET AMERICA, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Sawyer v. Market America, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1257", "first_page": "791", "last_page": "797", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 791" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637514 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003); and citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639662 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615831 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 829", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 442", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11301312 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Idaho 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 8585231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/22/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "quoting Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 245, 125 P. 812, 815 (1912) (citations omitted" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877-78", "parenthetical": "quoting Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 245, 125 P. 812, 815 (1912) (citations omitted" }, { "page": "877" }, { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 U.S. 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5699846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1895, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/159/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8289427 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/213/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 U.S. 185", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3689310 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1918, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909)" }, { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/248/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-25.1(b) ([2007])" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080948 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-25.1(b) ([2007])" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 F.3d 1219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9350549 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1222", "parenthetical": "\"The contract's choice of law clause states that the [contract] is to 'be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of Califomia[.]' . . . Honoring that choice of law does not give extraterritorial application to the [California] statutef.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/323/1219-01" ] }, { "cite": "908 F.2d 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10531961 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/908/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 N.C. App. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553101 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/46/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "quoting Behr v. Behr, 46 N.C. App. 694, 696, 266 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12124643 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241", "parenthetical": "quoting Behr v. Behr, 46 N.C. App. 694, 696, 266 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574310 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2499908 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739419 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003); and citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743751 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633-34", "parenthetical": "quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-25.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "[2007]" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 733, "char_count": 14407, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3575557916770267e-07, "percentile": 0.6348387492861552 }, "sha256": "b4cd38137f4156fa987bfcc9a94bc4e98bd605cf444413ab42ba43dd6c239234", "simhash": "1:688a920a14afee96", "word_count": 2353 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur." ], "parties": [ "STEVE SAWYER, Plaintiff v. MARKET AMERICA, INC., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ARROWOOD, Judge.\n.Steve Sawyer, Plaintiff, appeals from an order granting Defendant\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff\u2019s claim under the North Carolina Wage & Hour Act. We affirm.\nPlaintiff is a resident of the State of Oregon. Defendant, Market America, Inc., is a North Carolina corporation based in Greensboro, North Carolina. On 1 December 2004 the parties met in Greensboro and signed an \u201cIndependent Contractor Agreement.\u201d Pursuant to this agreement, Plaintiff performed services for Defendant from December 2004 until his contract was terminated on 30 January 2006. Plaintiff\u2019s work for Defendant was performed outside North Carolina.\nIn March 2006 Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, seeking recovery of certain sums to which Plaintiff claimed entitlement under the terms of the parties\u2019 agreement. Plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract and for violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-25.1 (2007), et seq. In April 2007 Defendant moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff\u2019s claim under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. On 9 May 2007 the trial court granted Defendant\u2019s motion and entered summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim. The court ruled that \u201cthe North Carolina Wage & Hour Act does not apply to Plaintiff as an individual who resides and primarily works outside of the State of North Carolina[.]\u201d From this order Plaintiff appeals.\nStandard of Review\nPlaintiff\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s summary judgment order \u201cis interlocutory because the trial court\u2019s order \u2018does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u2019 An interlocutory order is immediately appealable if the trial court certifies that: (1) the order represents a final judgment as to one or more claims in a multiple claim lawsuit or one or more parties in a multi-party lawsuit, and (2) there is no just reason to delay the appeal. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b) [(2007)].\u201d Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 361 N.C. 630, 633-34, 652 S.E.2d 231, 233 (2007) (quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)). In the instant case, the trial court certified its summary judgment order for immediate review, as provided in Rule 54(b).\n\u201cWe review a trial court\u2019s order for summary judgment de novo to determine whether there is a \u2018genuine issue of material fact\u2019 and whether either party is \u2018entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196, 639 S.E.2d 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003); and citing N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c)). In the case sub judice, neither party contends that there exist genuine issues of material fact. Rather, the dispositive appellate issue is whether, as a matter of law, Defendant was entitled to summary judgment.\nThe issue presented on appeal is whether Plaintiff, an Oregon resident performing work outside the State of North Carolina, can bring a claim against Defendant under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.\nPreliminarily, we address the validity of the North Carolina choice of law provision in the Independent Contractor Agreement. A \u201cchoice of law provision^ names a particular state and provides that the substantive laws of that jurisdiction will be used to determine the validity and construction of the contract, regardless of any conflicts between the laws of the named state and the state in which the case is litigated.\u201d Johnston County v. R.N. Rouse & Co., 331 N.C. 88, 92, 414 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1992). In the instant case, the Independent Contractor Agreement contains a clause providing in pertinent part that the \u201cAgreement shall be governed and construed under the laws of the State of North Carolina,\u201d and the parties agree that North Carolina law should be utilized to resolve the issues in this case.\n\u201cThis Court has held that where parties to a contract have agreed that a given jurisdiction\u2019s substantive law shall govern the interpretation of the contract, such a contractual provision will be given effect.\u201d Tanglewood Land Co. v. Byrd, 299 N.C. 260, 262, 656 261 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1980). \u201cWe have previously held that \u2018the parties\u2019 choice of law is generally binding on the interpreting court as long as they had a reasonable basis for their choice and the law of the chosen State does not violate a fundamental public policy of the state or otherwise applicable law.\u2019 \u201d Torres v. McClain, 140 N.C. App. 238, 241, 535 S.E.2d 623, 625 (2000) (quoting Behr v. Behr, 46 N.C. App. 694, 696, 266 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1980)).\nWe conclude that there is no obstacle to the application of North Carolina law to this appeal. Accordingly, we will apply the substantive law of North Carolina to our determination of the territorial ambit of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act.\nPlaintiff first asserts that the choice of law provision effectively removed the scope of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act from consideration. He argues that Defendant\u2019s assertion that the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act does not have extraterritorial effect \u201cignores the determinative fact that the parties agreed\u201d that their agreement would be governed by North Carolina law.\nPlaintiff appears to take the position that our general application of North Carolina law automatically brings him within the scope of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act and obviates the need to determine whether the statute has any extraterritorial effect. However, Plaintiff fails to articulate any argument, or cite any authority, that supports this view. Moreover, we note that Plaintiff\u2019s argument has previously been rejected in other jurisdictions.\nFor example, in Highway Equipment Co. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 908 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1990), an Ohio plaintiff sued an Illinois defendant for breach of contract and violation of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act (IFDA). The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the plaintiff\u2019s IFDA claim, on the grounds that the IFDA could not be applied extraterritorially to an Ohio plaintiff. On appeal the plaintiff argued that the Illinois choice of law provision in the parties\u2019 agreement gave the IFDA extraterritorial application to the Ohio plaintiff. The Court disagreed, noting that plaintiff did \u201cnot present any evidence that the IFDA was intended to apply outside Illinois,\u201d and concluding that \u201cthe IFDA was enacted for the protection of Illinois residents only.\u201d See also, e.g., Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int'l, 323 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. Ct. App. 2003) (\u201cThe contract\u2019s choice of law clause states that the [contract] is to \u2018be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of Califomia[.]\u2019 . . . Honoring that choice of law does not give extraterritorial application to the [California] statutef.]\u201d). We conclude that the choice of law provision in the parties\u2019 contract, although it requires us to apply North Carolina law, does not change the limits or requirements of the North Carolina statutes thus applied. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPlaintiff also argues that the court erred by granting summary judgment, on the grounds that North Carolina North Carolina Wage and Hour Act is \u201cnot limited in application to residents of North Carolina.\u201d We disagree and hold that the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act does not apply to the wage payment claims of a nonresident who neither lives nor works in North Carolina.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-25.1 (2007) provides that:\n(a) This Article shall be known and may be cited as the \u201cWage and Hour Act.\u201d\n(b) The public policy of this State is declared as follows: The wage levels of employees, hours of labor, payment of earned wages, and the well-being of minors are subjects of concern requiring legislation to promote the general welfare of the people of the State without jeopardizing the competitive position of North Carolina business and industry. The General Assembly declares that the general welfare of the State requires the enactment of this law under the police power of the State.\nThe plain language of the statute identifies it as being for the benefit of North Carolina residents. This Court has noted that the \u201cWage and Hour Act was enacted to safeguard the hours worked by and the wages paid to \u2018the people of the State without jeopardizing the competitive position of North Carolina business and industry.\u201d Horack v. S. Real Estate Co. of Charlotte, Inc., 150 N.C. App. 305, 309, 563 S.E.2d 47, 52 (2002) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 95-25.1(b) ([2007])).\nPlaintiff directs our attention to the absence of statutory language that explicitly restricts application of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act to North Carolina residents. Plaintiff argues that, because the statute does not expressly bar its extraterritorial application, the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act may properly be applied to a resident of the State of Oregon. We disagree, and note the long established common law rule to the contrary.\nThe U.S. Supreme Court has long held that \u201c[legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction.\u201d Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195, 63 L. Ed. 200, 204 (1918) (citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 53 L. Ed. 826 (1909)). \u201cNo law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived.\u201d Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 40 L. Ed. 95, 108 (1895). The North Carolina Supreme Court has also shown a longstanding adherence to this rule:\nThe law is unmistakably clear that the Legislature has no power to enact statutes, even though in general words, that can extend in their operation and effect beyond the territory of the sovereignty from which the statute emanates. . . .\u201cPrima facie, every statute is confined in its operation to the persons, property, rights, or contracts, which are within the territorial jurisdiction of the legislature which enacted it. The presumption is always against any intention to attempt giving to the act an extraterritorial operation and effect.\u201d ... No presumption arises, from a failure of the state through its legislative authority to speak on the subject, that the state intends to grant any right, privilege, or authority under its laws to be exercised beyond its jurisdiction.\nMcCullough v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 877-78, 109 S.E. 789, 796 (1921) (quoting Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Idaho 236, 245, 125 P. 812, 815 (1912) (citations omitted).\nThus, although \u201ca state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there[,]\u201d Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 449, 98 L. Ed. 829, 838 (1954), \u201c[i]t is axiomatic that courts have no extraterritorial jurisdiction.\u201d In re De Ford, 226 N.C. 189, 192, 37 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1946). Therefore, \u201cgeneral words used in statutes are taken as limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the Legislature passing the statute, and confining its operation to matters affecting persons and property in such jurisdiction.\u201d McCullough, 182 N.C. at 877, 109 S.E. at 796. In McCullough, our Supreme Court noted that its holding was not only in accord with long-established law, but also constituted good public policy:\nEither the statute applies . . . within the State ... or its scope is unlimited, and . . . the board may hold examinations anywhere and everywhere it sees fit. And if this board may go outside the state to hold examinations, why not every other examining board of the State do likewise, if the place is left to its discretion? Obviously, this would be subversive of public policy, of the spirit and intent of the law, would defeat the very ends which these protective statutes were enacted to accomplish[.]\nId. 182 N.C. at 878, 109 S.E. at 796-97.\nWe conclude that the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act does not provide a private cause of action for a nonresident who neither lived nor worked in North Carolina. We further conclude that the trial court did not err and that its order granting partial summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff\u2019s North Carolina North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim should be\nAffirmed.\nChief Judge MARTIN and Judge BRYANT concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ARROWOOD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Carruthers & Roth, RA., by Kenneth R. Keller, and William J. McMahon, IV, for Plaintiff-Appellant.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Pressly M. Millen, for Defendant-Appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STEVE SAWYER, Plaintiff v. MARKET AMERICA, INC., Defendant\nNo. COA07-1257\n(Filed 3 June 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 appealability \u2014 partial summary judgment \u2014 certification by trial court\nAlthough plaintiff\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s grant of partial summary judgment is an appeal from an interlocutory order since it does not dispose of the case but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy, the trial court certified the order for immediate review under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 54(b).\n2. Employer and Employee\u2014 North Carolina Wage and Hour Act \u2014 nonresident who neither lives nor works in North Carolina\nThe trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment for defendant on the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act claim when plaintiff was an Oregon resident performing work outside the State of North Carolina because: (1) although plaintiff asserted that the choice of law provision effectively removed the scope of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act from consideration, he failed to articulate any argument or cite any authority that supports this view, and plaintiff\u2019s argument has previously been rejected in other jurisdictions; (2) the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act does not apply to the wage payment claims of a nonresident who neither lives nor works in North Carolina when the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-25.1 identifies it as being for the benefit of North Carolina residents; and (3) the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction, and courts have no extraterritorial jurisdiction.\nAppeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 9 May 2007 by Judge John O. Craig, III, in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 April 2008.\nCarruthers & Roth, RA., by Kenneth R. Keller, and William J. McMahon, IV, for Plaintiff-Appellant.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Pressly M. Millen, for Defendant-Appellee." }, "file_name": "0791-01", "first_page_order": 823, "last_page_order": 829 }