{ "id": 4157977, "name": "VICTORIA L. ROEMER, Plaintiff v. PREFERRED ROOFING, INC., formerly known as PREFERRED ROOFING, L.L.C., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Roemer v. Preferred Roofing, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1554", "first_page": "813", "last_page": "817", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 813" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "635 S.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636868, 12636869 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/635/0062-01", "/se2d/635/0062-02" ] }, { "cite": "625 S.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635089 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861-62", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "861-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/625/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796101, 796107, 796077, 796024, 796153 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0655-01", "/nc/342/0655-03", "/nc/342/0655-04", "/nc/342/0655-05", "/nc/342/0655-02" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 N.C. App. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11918424 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/120/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-50", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(5)" }, { "page": "(a)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512874 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474-75", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4757989 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790787, 3792621, 3790321, 3787794, 3791418, 3786559 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0545-03", "/nc/360/0545-05", "/nc/360/0545-01", "/nc/360/0545-06", "/nc/360/0545-02", "/nc/360/0545-04" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708418 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 N.C. App. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8300917 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/176/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491579 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187002 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4691903 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 423", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535573 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541726 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0689-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 536, "char_count": 10904, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.56058319852244e-08, "percentile": 0.5254049560418387 }, "sha256": "1982241a5d1d9c1a4df7a4ca9f44be607492c5f5158681966638d43df3e96112", "simhash": "1:632951fa09194c35", "word_count": 1784 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McCULLOUGH and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "VICTORIA L. ROEMER, Plaintiff v. PREFERRED ROOFING, INC., formerly known as PREFERRED ROOFING, L.L.C., Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nVictoria Roemer (\u201cplaintiff\u2019) appeals from order entered, which granted Preferred Roofing, Inc.\u2019s (\u201cdefendant\u201d) motion to dismiss. We affirm.\nI.Background\nOn or about 23 November 1999, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract to remove the existing roof on plaintiffs home and replace it with a new roofing system. Several years after the project was completed, plaintiff discovered alleged defects with the roof including: (1) loose slate tiles; (2) separation of gutters from the house; and (3) rotten wood under the roof.\nOn 18 July 2007, plaintiff filed a complaint and alleged claims of: (1) negligence; (2) breach of contract; and (3) breach of warranty. Plaintiffs complaint asserted defendant had: (1) negligently performed its obligations under the contract; (2) failed to install the new roof in a professional and competent manner as was required by the parties\u2019 contract; and (3) failed to comply with its express lifetime warranty of the dependability and reliability of the installation of the roof. Plaintiff sought compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $10,000.00.\nOn 19 September 2007, defendant moved to dismiss all of plaintiff\u2019s claims. Defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss alleged: (1) plaintiff had failed to obtain valid service of process over defendant; (2) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over both defendant and the subject matter of the action; and (3) plaintiff\u2019s complaint failed to state any claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant withdrew its motions to dismiss challenging service of process and jurisdiction. On 12 October 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice of her negligence and breach of contract claims.\nOn 15 October 2007, the trial court entered its order, which found \u201cas a matter of law that plaintiff\u2019s [c]omplaint is barred by the applicable statute of repose and that defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss should be allowed.\u201d The trial court dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim for damages for breach of warranty with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals.\nII.Issue\nPlaintiff argues the trial court erroneously dismissed her complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.\nIII.Breach of Warranty Claim\nPlaintiff argues her \u201ccomplaint . . . stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.\u201d We disagree.\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cA motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure presents the question whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.\u201d Lynn v. Overlook Development, 328 N.C. 689, 692, 403 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1991) (citation omitted). \u201cA statute of limitation or repose may be the basis of a 12(b)(6) dismissal if on its face the complaint reveals the claim is barred.\u201d Forsyth Memorial Hospital v. Armstrong World Industries, 336 N.C. 438, 442, 444 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1994) (citation omitted).\nDismissal of a complaint is proper under the provisions of Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure when one or more of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) when the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports plaintiffs claim; (2) when the complaint reveals on its face the absence of fact sufficient to make a good claim; (3) when some fact disclosed in the complaint necessarily defeats the plaintiffs claim.\nOates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276, 278, 333 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1985) (citation omitted). \u201cThis Court must conduct a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct.\u201d Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C. App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4, aff\u2019d, 357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003).\nB. Analysis\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a (2007) states:\nNo action to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall be brought more than six years from the later of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement.\n\u201c[N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a] is a statute of repose and provides an outside limit of six years for bringing an action coming within its terms.\u201d Whittaker v. Todd, 176 N.C. App. 185, 187, 625 S.E.2d 860, 861 (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 427-28, 302 S.E.2d 868, 873 (1983)), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 545, 635 S.E.2d 62 (2006).\n\u201cUnlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the period contained in the statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.\u201d Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 633, 325 S.E.2d 469, 474-75 (1985) (internal citations omitted). \u201cIf the action is not brought within the specified period, the plaintiff literally has no cause of action. The harm that has been done is damnum absque injuria \u2014 a wrong for which the law affords no redress.\u201d Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 341, 368 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1988) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis original).\nPlaintiffs complaint, filed 18 July 2007, alleged the roofing project \u201cwas completed in the summer of 2000, and [p]laintiff accepted the completed project.\u201d Plaintiffs complaint was filed approximately seven years after \u201csubstantial completion of the improvement.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a. \u201cPlaintiff\u2019s action is barred by the statute of repose which prohibits an action to recover damages for \u2018the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property\u2019 that is not brought within six years of \u2018substantial completion of the improvement.\u2019 \u201d Whittaker, 176 N.C. App. at 187, 625 S.E.2d at 861 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-50(a)(5)a) (emphasis supplied).\nPlaintiff cites Haywood Street Redevelopment Corp. v. Peterson Co. for her assertion that the statute of repose does not bar their action to recover compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $10,000.00. 120 N.C. App. 832, 463 S.E.2d 564 (1995), disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 655, 467 S.E.2d 712 (1996). This Court, in Whittaker, addressed this argument and stated:\nIn Haywood, the plaintiff sued for negligence, breach of contract, and breach of express and implied warranties. This Court held plaintiff\u2019s breach of warranty claims were not barred by the statute of limitations because the warranty was for a specified period of time and each day there was a breach a new caus\u00e9 of action accrued. In the instant case, however, plaintiff filed a complaint for monetary damages only and did not sue for breach of warranty. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s reliance on Haywood is misplaced. We conclude plaintiff\u2019s action for monetary damages is barred by the statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a.\n176 N.C. App. at 187, 625 S.E.2d at 861-62 (internal citation omitted). While plaintiff\u2019s complaint lists her third claim for relief as a breach of warranty action, plaintiff only sought compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $10,000.00. Consistent with this Court\u2019s reasoning in Whittaker, plaintiff\u2019s claim for monetary damages only, is barred by the statute of repose pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1-50(a)(5)a. 176 N.C. App. at 187, 625 S.E.2d at 861-62.\nPlaintiff\u2019s remedy for breach of an alleged lifetime warranty claim that is \u201cbrought more than six years from the later of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement^\u201d lies in specific performance, and not damages. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a; see John N. Hutson, Jr. & Scott A. Miskimon, North Carolina Contract Law \u00a7 16-7, at 798-99 (2001) (citation omitted) (\u201cStatutes of repose operate differently than statutes of limitation. The term of \u2018statute of repose\u2019 is used to distinguish ordinary statutes of limitation from those statutes that impose a deadline for filing suit unrelated to the actual accrual of the cause of action. A statute of repose serves as an unyielding and absolute barrier that prevents a plaintiff\u2019s right to bring suit even before his cause of action may accrue and functions to give a defendant a vested right not to be sued if the plaintiff fails to file within the prescribed time period.\u201d).\nThe trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. Conclusion\nPlaintiff\u2019s action for monetary damages is barred by the applicable six-year statute of repose. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint does not assert a claim for specific performance of the alleged lifetime warranty. The trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and its order is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McCULLOUGH and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. West, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.", "Robert J. Rawing and H. Brent Helms, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VICTORIA L. ROEMER, Plaintiff v. PREFERRED ROOFING, INC., formerly known as PREFERRED ROOFING, L.L.C., Defendant\nNo. COA07-1554\n(Filed 3 June 2008)\nConstruction Claims; Statutes of Limitation and Repose\u2014 roofing system \u2014 negligence\u2014breach of contract \u2014 breach of warranty \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 specific performance\nThe trial court did not err' in a negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty case arising out of the installation of a new roofing system by granting defendant roofing company\u2019s motion to dismiss under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), because: (1) plaintiff\u2019s complaint filed 18 July 2007 alleged the roofing project was completed in the summer of 2000, and plaintiff accepted the completed project; (2) plaintiff\u2019s complaint was filed approximately seven years after substantial completion of the improvement, and thus plaintiff\u2019s action was barred by the statute of repose under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-50(a)(5)a prohibiting an action to recover damages for the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property that is not brought within six years of substantial completion of the improvement; (3) plaintiff\u2019s claim for monetary damages only was barred by the statute of repose; and (4) plaintiff\u2019s remedy for breach of an alleged lifetime warranty claim brought more than six years from the later of the specific act or omission of defendant giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement lies in specific performance and not damages, and plaintiff\u2019s complaint failed to assert a claim for specific performance of the alleged lifetime warranty.\nAppeal by plaintiff from order entered 15 October 2007 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 2008.\nWilliam E. West, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.\nRobert J. Rawing and H. Brent Helms, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0813-01", "first_page_order": 845, "last_page_order": 849 }