{ "id": 4158437, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY M. JOHNSON, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Johnson", "decision_date": "2008-06-03", "docket_number": "No. COA07-971", "first_page": "818", "last_page": "821", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "190 N.C. App. 818" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637935 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633605 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "676-77" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "654-55", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "678-79" }, { "page": "655", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "678" }, { "page": "654", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he court gives significant weight to defense counsel's representation that a client is competent, since counsel is usually in the best position to determine if his client is able to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense.\"" }, { "page": "684" }, { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573792 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8171463 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321231 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0673-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 492, "char_count": 9244, "ocr_confidence": 0.736, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13550230148553064 }, "sha256": "7c82c5dcffa0b6641f6b29e94808fb31cd639f056a755972c553b058e55eadc9", "simhash": "1:0f8fd0a672268dd4", "word_count": 1501 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:40:45.332452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCCULLOUGH and ARROWOOD concur." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY M. JOHNSON, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nA grand jury indicted Billy M. Johnson (defendant) for robbery with a dangerous weapon in 2005. Following defendant\u2019s conviction after a jury trial, the trial court sentenced defendant to 103 months\u2019 to 133 months\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.\nThree days after police arrested defendant, a district court judge entered a safekeeping order removing defendant from the county facilities to the Department of Corrections. The court\u2019s decision, which was based on defendant\u2019s refusal of necessary dialysis treatment, came after the court received a nurse\u2019s report that defendant was refusing to cooperate with the staff, was on suicide watch, and had been throwing feces and urine.\nOne month later, the trial court granted defens.e counsel\u2019s motion to have defendant examined for the purposes of determining his competency to stand trial. Following the November 2005 examination, the forensic examiner concluded that defendant was \u201ccapable of proceeding to trial at this time.\u201d\nDefendant, acting pro se, filed notice of his intent to rely on an insanity defense on 11 May 2006. On 25 September 2006, defendant\u2019s trial counsel filed a motion with the court requesting a continuance. The motion stated that although defendant had \u201cfrom time to time\u201d indicated that he planned to raise the defense of insanity, he had \u201cexpressed multiple intentions as to how he would ultimately proceed in this case.\u201d However, the motion indicated \u201c[tjhat on September 22, 2006 the Defendant indicated to counsel his serious intend [sic] to proceed with an insanity defense in this matter.\u201d Stating that she was not prepared to present that defense, defendant\u2019s attorney requested a continuance \u201cto allow for a mental health examination.\u201d The trial court granted the motion in an order entered 25 October 2006, ordering \u201cthat the Defendant shall be evaluated by the appropriate state facility . . . .\u201d\nOn 20 February 2006, defendant again filed a handwritten pro se document with the trial court, this time requesting leave to terminate his court appointed attorney. The court took no action on defendant\u2019s request.\nOn 12 March 2007, the court called defendant\u2019s case for trial. Neither defendant nor his attorney mentioned anything about defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial or his desire to terminate his attorney when the trial court asked if there were any matters that needed to be addressed. Throughout the trial, defendant was cooperative and appeared to be actively engaged in his defense. Defendant held a discussion with the court regarding his decision not to testify in his own defense, he requested that his attorney ask the trial court for an instruction on a lesser included offense, and he testified on his own behalf at his sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, defendant\u2019s trial counsel stated that defendant had always treated her respectfully, and that defendant \u201chelped me a great deal in his defense with his ideas and opinions about things.\u201d\nOn appeal, defendant first argues that \u201cthe trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on [his] capacity to proceed.\u201d We disagree.\nWe find this Court\u2019s recent decision in State v. Staten, 172 N.C. App. 673, 616 S.E.2d 650 (2005), particularly helpful in our analysis. The defendant in that case, a mentally retarded man, argued that the court should have ordered a competency hearing sua sponte. Id. at 677, 616 S.E.2d at 654. As in this case, a mental health professional found that the Staten defendant was competent prior to trial. Id. at 676-77, 616 S.E.2d at 653. The Staten court stated,\nThe question of capacity may be raised at any time by motion of the prosecutor, the defendant or defense counsel, or the court. Once a defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial is questioned, the trial court must hold a hearing pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1002(b) (2003). A defendant has the burden of proof to show incapacity or that he is not competent to stand trial.\nId. at 678, 616 S.E.2d at 654 (quotations and citations omitted). No one requested a hearing in Staten-, the same is true in the present case. However, as we acknowledged in Staten,\n[a] trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial evidence that the accused may be mentally incompetent. In other words, a trial judge is required to hold a competency hearing when there is a bona fide doubt as to the defendant\u2019s competency even absent a request.\nId. at 678, 616 S.E.2d at 654-55 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The issue therefore becomes whether there was bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency in this case. We hold that there was not.\nEvidence of a defendant\u2019s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant to a bona fide doubt inquiry. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is .often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.\nId. at 678-79, 616 S.E.2d at 655 (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, as in Staten, defendant\u2019s actions and courtroom behavior did not indicate that defendant was incompetent. He participated in the proceedings, his demeanor was appropriate, and his trial counsel represented that he was competent. See id. at 678, 616 S.E.2d at 654 (\u201c[T]he court gives significant weight to defense counsel\u2019s representation that a client is competent, since counsel is usually in the best position to determine if his client is able to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense.\u201d) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, the only examination conducted as to defendant\u2019s capacity resulted in a determination that he was fit to stand trial. As we stated in Staten, \u201cwhere, as here, the defendant has been . . . examined relative to his capacity to proceed, and all evidence before the court indicates that he has that capacity, he is not denied due process by the failure of the trial judge to hold a hearing.\u201d Id. at 684, 616 S.E.2d at 658 (quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). The trial court did not err by choosing not to conduct a hearing.\nWe also disagree with defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court should have allowed him to represent himself. Contrary to defendant\u2019s argument, this case is not controlled by this Court\u2019s decision in State v. Walters, 182 N.C. App. 285, 641 S.E.2d 758 (2007). In Walters, the defendant \u201cclearly and unequivocally declared before trial that he wanted to represent himself and did not want assistance of counsel when he stated, \u2018I\u2019d rather just go ahead and represent myself.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 291, 641 S.E.2d at 761. Defendant in the present case merely requested that the trial court terminate his appointed attorney; at no time did he request to represent himself.\nDefendant attempts to persuade this Court that any ambiguity is the fault of the trial court. Defendant argues that had the trial court conducted a hearing as defendant requested, it would have been abundantly clear that he did, in fact, wish to represent himself, and that he should not be penalized for the trial court\u2019s failure to conduct such a hearing. We are not convinced. Defendant had ample opportunity to state to the trial court that he wished to represent himself. He failed to do so. His written request that his attorney be terminated does not amount to a request to represent himself. As our Supreme Court has established, \u201c[statements of a desire not to be represented by court-appointed counsel do not amount to expressions of an intention to represent oneself.\u201d State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 339, 279 S.E.2d 788, 800 (1981) (citations omitted). The trial court did not err.'\nHaving conducted a thorough review of the briefs and record in this case, we find no error.\nNo error.\nJudges MCCULLOUGH and ARROWOOD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General James A. Wellons, for the State.", "Russell J. Hollers, III, for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BILLY M. JOHNSON, Defendant\nNo. COA07-971\n(Filed 3 June 2008)\n1. Criminal Law\u2014 insanity \u2014 no hearing \u2014 positive mental health examination \u2014 courtroom demeanor indicating competence\nThe trial court did not err by failing to conduct a hearing on an armed robbery defendant\u2019s capacity to proceed where he had filed a pro se notice of intent to rely on insanity, defendant\u2019s attorney later requested a continuance for a mental health examination, a mental health professional found defendant competent, no one requested a hearing on competence, and defendant\u2019s actions and courtroom behavior did not indicate incompetence.\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to self-representation \u2014 desire not clearly expressed\nThe trial court did not err in an armed robbery prosecution by failing to allow defendant to represent himself where defendant requested that the trial court terminate his appointed attorney but did not ask to represent himself.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment entered 20 March 2007 by Judge Timothy L. Patti in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 February 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General James A. Wellons, for the State.\nRussell J. Hollers, III, for defendant." }, "file_name": "0818-01", "first_page_order": 850, "last_page_order": 853 }