{ "id": 4159089, "name": "LINDA RAMSEY and ERIN KNOX, Plaintiffs v. CINDIE HARMAN, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Ramsey v. Harman", "decision_date": "2008-06-17", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1536", "first_page": "146", "last_page": "152", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 N.C. App. 146" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639852, 12639853, 12639854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0144-01", "/se2d/653/0144-02", "/se2d/653/0144-03" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637407 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637816, 12637817, 12637818 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0301-01", "/se2d/641/0301-02", "/se2d/641/0301-03" ] }, { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636656 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "\"[f]or the purposes of this section, the term 'harasses' or 'harassment' means knowing conduct, including . . . computerized or electronic transmissions, directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522271 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484-85", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 S.E.2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8899393 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 S.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491460, 491496, 491880, 491884, 491632, 491542, 491863, 491607 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0469-07", "/nc/357/0469-04", "/nc/357/0469-02", "/nc/357/0469-05", "/nc/357/0469-08", "/nc/357/0469-06", "/nc/357/0469-03", "/nc/357/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "580 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. App. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188322 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "644-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/157/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567370 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-47", "parenthetical": "internal quotation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 S.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497384 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150502 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8371773 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3742896 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8237484 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11795407 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 U.S.C. \u00a7 203", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 728, "char_count": 13777, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1172975312990564e-07, "percentile": 0.7640374014083446 }, "sha256": "ad19e04358255479d64de94328efc7f24e6e60fa04e2f7fcf77d6b713efa643b", "simhash": "1:7beb14463afc6e48", "word_count": 2172 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:10.260573+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges MCCULLOUGH and STROUD concur." ], "parties": [ "LINDA RAMSEY and ERIN KNOX, Plaintiffs v. CINDIE HARMAN, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TYSON, Judge.\nCindie Harman (\u201cdefendant\u201d) appeals from entry of a No-Contact Order For Stalking Linda Ramsey and her minor child, Erin Knox (collectively, \u201cplaintiffs\u201d). We vacate the trial court\u2019s order.\nI. Background\nOn 27 August 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant for \u201cstalking\u201d and sought issuance of a civil no-contact order. Plaintiffs alleged defendant had \u201cposted information on her website stating that Erin Knox [Linda Ramsey\u2019s daughter] harasses other children and accused [Erin Knox] of being the reason kids hate to go to school.\u201d Plaintiffs also alleged that on numerous occasions defendant had referred to Erin Knox on her website as \u201cendangered,\u201d \u201coffspring,\u201d \u201cbully,\u201d and \u201cpossum,\u201d which caused Erin Knox to suffer emotional distress. At the hearing, defendant admitted publishing the following message on her website:\nWith all the bulling [sic] and harassing that goes on in our school system. Then the trouble that went on Friday at Madison Middle. The first student in that age group that came to mind was Linda Knox\u2019s daughter. Wasn\u2019t this the student that harassed the Cantrell child? And we wonder why some kids hate to go to school. . . .\nDefendant\u2019s website also featured: (1) a voice recording of plaintiffs\u2019 deceased mother and grandmother and (2) references to Linda Ramsey as being a \u201ccrow,\u201d \u201cidiot,\u201d and \u201cwack.\u201d\nPlaintiffs sought a temporary civil no-contact order to be issued ex parte in order to protect Erin Knox from continued harassment. On 28 August 2007, the trial court granted plaintiffs\u2019 request and ordered defendant to cease entering comments on her website regarding Erin Knox or other members of plaintiffs\u2019 family.\nOn 7 September 2007, defendant filed a motion to dismiss and asserted the trial court\u2019s order violated her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the Communications Decency Act found at 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 203. Later that day, a hearing was held. Both parties testified and presented evidence. The trial court reviewed several of plaintiffs\u2019 exhibits including the following \u201cblog\u201d written by defendant and published on her website on 7 May 2007:\nIf anyone retaliates against anyones [sic] children \u2014 Let me know \u2014 I will report it and follow up at the state level \u2014 This is all the more reason to do this.\nWhy do you think there is so much of a problem at the schools \u2014 when it comes to bullying? Because these children watch their parents. Fine example Linda Ramsey \u2014 :one of the biggest bullys [sic] in this county. She gets it honest. . .\nShe learned from her mother and now she is teaching her daughter the ropes. This is fact and this county knows it. [] But it is going to stop and if you want change \u2014 WRITE THE LETTERS____CH\nThe trial court found that defendant had harassed plaintiffs within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6) and (7) and issued a civil no-contact order against defendant based, inter alia, upon the preceding message. Defendant was ordered to: (1) cease \u201ccyber-stalking\u201d plaintiffs; (2) cease harassment of plaintiffs; and (3) not contact plaintiffs by telephone, written communication, or electronic means. Defendant appeals.\nII. Issues\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) finding defendant had violated N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1; (2) violating her First Amendment constitutional and federal statutory rights of freedom of speech and of the press; and (3) conducting defendant\u2019s trial in a closed session.\nTTT. N.C. Gen. Stat \u00a7 50C-1\nDefendant argues the trial court erred by finding defendant had \u201cstalked\u201d plaintiffs as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1 and entering the civil no-contact order. We agree.\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cA trial judge, sitting without a jury, acts as fact finder and weigher of evidence. Accordingly, if [the] findings are supported by competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, although there may be evidence that may support findings to the contrary.\u201d Southern Bldg. Maintenance v. Osborne, 127 N.C. App. 327, 331, 489 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1997) (citation omitted).\nB. Analysis\n1. Stalking\n\u201cStalking\u201d is statutorily defined as:\nOn more than one occasion, following or otherwise harassing, as defined in G.S. 14-277.3(c), another person without legal purpose with the intent to do any of the following:\na. Place the person in reasonable fear either for the person\u2019s safety or the safety of the person\u2019s immediate family or close personal associates.\nb. Cause that person to suffer substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and that in fact causes that person substantial emotional distress.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6) (2007) (emphasis supplied).\nHere, the trial court\u2019s sole finding of fact in its order stated: \u201cDefendant has harassed plaintiffs within the meaning of [N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7] 50C-1(6) and (7) by knowingly publishing electronic or computerized transmissions directed at plaintiffs that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies plaintiffs and serves no legitimate purpose[.]\u201d The trial court correctly articulated the definition of harassment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-277.3(c) (\u201c[f]or the purposes of this section, the term \u2018harasses\u2019 or \u2018harassment\u2019 means knowing conduct, including . . . computerized or electronic transmissions, directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.\u201d). However, a finding of harassment alone, even if supported by competent evidence, cannot be the sole basis to sustain entry of a civil no-contact order under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6).\n2. Specific Intent\nThe statute requires the trial court to further find defendant\u2019s harassment was accompanied by the specific intent to either: (1) place the person in fear for their safety, or the safety of their family or close personal associates or (2) cause the person substantial emotional distress by placing that person in fear of death, bodily injury, or continued harassment and in fact cause that person substantial emotional distress. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6).\nDuring the hearing, the trial court explicitly stated: \u201cAny words or language threatening to inflict bodily harm, we don\u2019t have that, or physical injury, we don\u2019t have that[.]\u201d Based upon the preceding statement, the trial court eliminated either of these grounds as a basis for the order. The only remaining ground to support the order would be that defendant had intended to cause and in fact caused plaintiffs to suffer substantial emotional distress from continued harassment. (Emphasis supplied).\nThis Court has previously interpreted what evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant intended to and in fact caused the plaintiff to suffer substantial emotional distress from continued harassment in the context of domestic violence protective orders. See Wornstaff v. Wornstaff 179 N.C. App. 516, 634 S.E.2d 567 (2006), aff\u2019d without precedential value, 361 N.C. 230, 641 S.E.2d 301 (2007). Even if Womstaff were to have precedential value, its holding would not be particularly instructive based upon the very different factual backgrounds present in that case and the case at bar. Id.\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6) has only once been interpreted by this Court. See Williams v. Vonderau, 181 N.C. App. 18, 638 S.E.2d 644, aff\u2019d in part and rev\u2019d in part, 362 N.C. 76, 653 S.E.2d 144 (2007). In Vonderau, the central issues before this Court were: (1) whether an appeal of an entry of a civil no-contact order was moot based upon the expiration of the order prior to the appeal being heard and (2) whether the statute required more than one instance of harassment prior to entry of the order. Id. Neither Womstaff nor Yondercm provide substantial guidance on how to interpret N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6) based upon the facts and issues presently before us.\n3. Statutory Construction\nThe dispositive issue in this case is whether any evidence was presented to show defendant intended to and in fact caused plaintiffs to suffer substantial emotional distress. We note that our Supreme Court has defined \u201csevere emotional distress\u201d in the context of an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990) (\u201cIn th[e] context [of negligent infliction of emotional distress], the term \u2018severe emotional distress\u2019 means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and. disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.\u201d); Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 446-47, 276 S.E.2d 325, 331 (1981) (internal quotation omitted) (Liability arises under th[e] tort [of intentional infliction of emotional distress] when a defendant\u2019s conduct exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and the conduct causes mental distress of a very serious kind.\u201d).\nHowever, neither the statue nor our prior case law defines \u201csubstantial emotional distress.\u201d We turn to the rules of statutory construction to decide this issue. Because our General Assembly chose not to define \u201csubstantial emotional distress,\u201d these terms must be given their plain meaning. See State v. Thompson, 157 N.C. App. 638, 644-45, 580 S.E.2d 9, 13 (citation omitted) (\u201c[I]n construing a statute, undefined words should be given their plain meaning if it is reasonable to do so.\u201d), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 469, 587 S.E.2d 72 (2003).\n\u201cSubstantial\u201d is defined as \u201cconsiderable in [] value, degree, amount or extent[.]\u201d American Heritage Dictionary 1727 (4th ed. 2000). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines emotional distress as \u201c[a] highly unpleasant mental reaction (such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from another person\u2019s conduct.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 563 (8th ed. 2004). Applying the plain meaning of these terms, we hold that no substantial evidence was presented that tended to showed defendant intended to and in fact caused plaintiffs to suffer substantial emotional distress to warrant issuance of a civil no-contact order.\nWhile Linda Ramsey\u2019s self-serving testimony indicated that she felt \u201cthreatened\u201d by the messages, the trial court expressly stated the messages posted on defendant\u2019s website did not contain language \u201cthreatening to inflict bodily harm\u201d or \u201cphysical injury.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 only other assertion was that Erin Knox became \u201cembarrassed\u201d when she had allegedly observed teachers viewing defendant\u2019s website in her school\u2019s library. Other evidence tended to show that access to defendant\u2019s website had been blocked at Erin Knox\u2019s school, which would make plaintiffs\u2019 contention implausible.\nFurther, during the hearing, defendant testified that she had \u201cnever had any communication with Linda Ramsey or her daughter[]\u201d and the evidence shows Erin Knox\u2019s name had not been specifically mentioned on defendant\u2019s website. Defendant further explained that she had posted the 7 May 2007 \u201cblog\u201d in retaliation for: (1) messages posted by plaintiff Linda Ramsey on \u201cmadisonspeaks\u201d, a rival political commentary website and (2) an alleged threatening phone call defendant had received from plaintiffs\u2019 mother and grandmother. None of this evidence was contradicted.\nHere, the record is wholly devoid of any evidence that tends to show the messages published on defendant\u2019s website were intended to and in fact caused plaintiffs to suffer \u201csubstantial emotional distress\u201d as is required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1(6). We also note the trial court failed to enter any findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding \u201csubstantial emotional distress\u201d for either plaintiff. Id.\nWithout condoning the language used on defendant\u2019s website, the statute does not allow parties to implicate and interject our courts into juvenile hurls of gossip and innuendo between feuding parties where no evidence of any statutory ground is shown to justify entry of a no-contact order. Because the trial court\u2019s sole finding of fact does not compel a conclusion that defendant \u201cstalked\u201d plaintiffs in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1, the order appealed from is vacated. Woodring v. Woodring, 164 N.C. App. 588, 593, 596 S.E.2d 370, 374 (2004).\nIn light of our holding, it is unnecessary to and we do not address defendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error. See State v. Wallace, 49 N.C. App. 475, 484-85, 271 S.E.2d 760, 766 (1980) (citations omitted) (\u201cIf the case c\u00e1n be decided on one of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of lesser importance, the latter alone will be determined. The Court will not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.\u201d).\nIV. Conclusion\nThe trial court\u2019s finding of fact that defendant \u201cstalked\u201d plaintiffs in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 50C-1 by posting messages on a website is not supported by any competent evidence. The trial court\u2019s order is vacated.\nVacated.\nJudges MCCULLOUGH and STROUD concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "TYSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert J. Deutsch, RA., by Robert J. Deutsch and Tikkun A.S. Gottschalk, for plaintiff-appellees.", "Goldsmith, Goldsmith & Dews, P.A., by C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINDA RAMSEY and ERIN KNOX, Plaintiffs v. CINDIE HARMAN, Defendant\nNo. COA07-1536\n(Filed 17 June 2008)\nStalking\u2014 comments posted on website \u2014 evidence not sufficient\nThe trial court\u2019s finding that defendant \u201cstalked\u201d plaintiffs in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50C-1 by posting messages on a website was not supported by any competent evidence and was vacated.\nAppeal by defendant from order entered 7 September 2007 by Judge Thomas G. Foster, Jr. in Madison County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 2008.\nRobert J. Deutsch, RA., by Robert J. Deutsch and Tikkun A.S. Gottschalk, for plaintiff-appellees.\nGoldsmith, Goldsmith & Dews, P.A., by C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0146-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 184 }