{ "id": 4158984, "name": "CATHY AZAR as ADMINISTRATOR of the ESTATE OF MARY EDITH KEETON, Plaintiff v. THE PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE d/b/a NOVANT HEALTH, INC., NOVANT HEALTH INC. d/b/a PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE, JANE/JOHN DOE, RN, JANE/JOHN DOE, NA, JANE/JOHN DOE, DIETICIAN, et al., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Azar v. Presbyterian Hospital", "decision_date": "2008-07-15", "docket_number": "No. COA08-40", "first_page": "367", "last_page": "372", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 N.C. App. 367" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 620", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634918 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640450 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "366" }, { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 S.E.2d 912", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135777 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719396, 4721386, 4721131, 4718827, 4724383 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0596-02", "/nc/313/0596-05", "/nc/313/0596-04", "/nc/313/0596-03", "/nc/313/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526104 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "citing Bridges v. Shelby Women's Clinic, P.A., 72 N.C. App. 15, 21, 323 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596, 330 S.E.2d 605 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358281 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "citing Bridges v. Shelby Women's Clinic, P.A., 72 N.C. App. 15, 21, 323 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596, 330 S.E.2d 605 (1985)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2482580 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563912, 8563948, 8563931, 8563986, 8563963 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0467-01", "/nc/295/0467-03", "/nc/295/0467-02", "/nc/295/0467-05", "/nc/295/0467-04" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551364 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 435", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "citing e.g., Mosley v. Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 109, 111, 243 S.E.2d 145, 147, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 467, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2541066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citing e.g., Mosley v. Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 109, 111, 243 S.E.2d 145, 147, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 467, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403377 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353", "parenthetical": "citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 699, 314 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4725743 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491", "parenthetical": "citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 699, 314 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684915 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" }, { "page": "694", "parenthetical": "citing Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "citing Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3790975 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0191-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 667, "char_count": 11017, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.58878735531575e-07, "percentile": 0.6817449588759809 }, "sha256": "5ef62abe7e36579f3381bea2d0202c94ccc124a50f99c3286d7bd550a83ce613", "simhash": "1:85fc572419b7b462", "word_count": 1789 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:10.260573+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges HUNTER and TYSON concur." ], "parties": [ "CATHY AZAR as ADMINISTRATOR of the ESTATE OF MARY EDITH KEETON, Plaintiff v. THE PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE d/b/a NOVANT HEALTH, INC., NOVANT HEALTH INC. d/b/a PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE, JANE/JOHN DOE, RN, JANE/JOHN DOE, NA, JANE/JOHN DOE, DIETICIAN, et al., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Judge.\nCathy Azar (\u201cplaintiff\u2019), as administrator of the Estate of Mary Edith Keeton (\u201cdecedent\u201d), appeals the granting of summary judgment in favor of The Presbyterian Hospital, Presbyterian Healthcare d/b/a Novant Health, Inc., and Novant Health, Inc. d/b/a Presbyterian Healthcare (\u201cdefendants\u201d). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nOn or about 9 February 2004, decedent was admitted to defendant hospital. Decedent underwent kidney stent, dialysis, and dialysis access procedures while in defendant hospital\u2019s care. On or about 17 March 2004, decedent was discharged. Decedent returned to defendant hospital and was readmitted on or about 24 March 2004. Decedent died on 14 April 2004 while a patient at defendant hospital.\nPlaintiff filed a medical negligence action against defendants and various known and unknown hospital staff on 28 July 2006. On 30 March 2007, defendants deposed plaintiff\u2019s expert nurse, Patricia Hahn Crow, R.N. (\u201cCrow\u201d). Defendants deposed Victor Gura, M.D. (\u201cDr. Gura\u201d), plaintiff\u2019s expert physician, on 16 May 2007. On 30 August 2007, plaintiff deposed defendants\u2019 expert nurse, Anita Faye H. Freeze, R.N.\nOn 29 August 2007, defendants served a motion to strike and dis- \u2022 qualify plaintiff\u2019s experts and for summary judgment. The motion, as well as a brief and supporting affidavits, was filed 30 August 2007. The motion was heard on 11 September 2007 and granted by order filed 20 September 2007. Plaintiff appeals.\nBy two assignments of error, plaintiff argues that genuine issues of material fact exist and that defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law such that the grant of summary judgment was in error. We disagree.\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that plaintiff has violated our Rules of Appellate Procedure. \u201cCompliance with the rules ... is mandatory.\u201d Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 194, 657 S.E.2d 361, 362 (2008) (citations omitted). These violations include: (1) the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the summons or other statement of personal jurisdiction, in violation of Rule 9(a)(1)(c); (2) no transcript of the summary judgment hearing was submitted with the record on appeal, although there is a statement in the record that one was submitted contemporaneously with the record, in violation of Rules 9(a)(1)(e) and 9(c)(3)(b); (3) some of the documents in the record on appeal do not indicate the date on which they were filed, only the date on which they were served, in violation of Rule 9(b)(3); (4) the assignments of error direct our attention to an affidavit located at record page 59; however, they discuss the order of summary judgment, which is located at record page 86, in violation of Rule 10(c)(1); (5) the standard of review is stated in pieces in appellant\u2019s brief \u2014 partly in the procedural history section and partly in the argument section \u2014 with the appropriate standard for this Court stated in the procedural history, in violation of Rules 28(b)(3) and 28(b)(6); (6) not all factual statements in appellant\u2019s brief are supported by references to the record, in violation of Rule 28(b)(5); and (7) the statement of facts in appellant\u2019s brief is argumentative, also in violation of Rule 28(b)(5).\nThe violations noted are non-jurisdictional in nature. Therefore, pursuant to the dictates of Dogwood, we first must determine \u201cwhether [the] noncompliance with the appellate rules rises to the level of a substantial failure or gross violation[.]\u201d Dogwood, 362 N.C. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366. If not, we are to address the merits of the appeal to the extent possible. Id. at 199, 657 S.E.2d at 366. If so, we may sanction the responsible party pursuant to Rules 25 and 34. Id. Due to the number and nature of rules violations, we consider them \u2018gross\u2019 or \u2018substantial\u2019 and elect to tax costs to plaintiff\u2019s attorney. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order accordingly.\nSummary judgment is properly granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2007). This Court reviews an order allowing summary judgment de novo. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 285, 624 S.E.2d 620, 625 (2006) (citing Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470, 597 S.E.2d 674, 693 (2004)).\nIn deciding a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003). If there is any evidence of a genuine issue of material fact, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 471, 597 S.E.2d 674, 694 (2004) (citing Dobson v. Harris, 352 N.C. 77, 83, 530 S.E.2d 829, 835 (2000)). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no triable issue of fact exists. Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 491, 329 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1985) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 699, 314 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1984)). This burden can be met by proving: (1) that an essential element of the non-moving party\u2019s claim is nonexistent; (2) that discovery indicates the non-moving party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim; or (3) that the non-moving party cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. Collingwood v. G.E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989) (citations omitted). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must forecast evidence that demonstrates the existence of a prima facie case. Id. (citation omitted).\nWe note that plaintiff\u2019s assignments of error question the trial court\u2019s failure to make adequate findings of fact. However, \u201cordinarily, findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required in the determination of a motion for summary judgment, and if these are made, they are disregarded on appeal.\u201d Sunamerica Financial Corp. v. Bonham, 328 N.C. 254, 261, 400 S.E.2d 435, 440 (1991) (citing e.g., Mosley v. Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 109, 111, 243 S.E.2d 145, 147, disc. rev. denied, 295 N.C. 467, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1978)).\nPlaintiff\u2019s argument focuses on whether genuine issues of material fact exist as to the appropriate standard of care to which defendants were to be held. Specifically, she contends that decedent\u2019s bedsores were not treated properly. However, \u201c[i]f the granting of summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.\u201d Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989).\nIn order to survive the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was required to forecast evidence demonstrating the existence of a prima facie case for medical negligence, one element of which is causation. Dr. Gura testified in his deposition that decedent suffered multiple conditions during her stay at defendant hospital, among them: (1) atrial fibrillation, (2) decreased circulation in her legs, (3) pneumonia, (4) infections, (5) coronary artery disease, (6) problems with vascular access to dialysis, (7) valvular disease, (8) microregurgitation, (9) obesity, (10) diabetes, (11) hypertension, and possibly (12) congestive heart failure.\nIn a medical negligence case, \u201c[t]he connection or causation between the negligence and death must be probable, not merely a remote possibility.\u201d White v. Hunsinger, 88 N.C. App. 382, 387, 363 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1988) (citing Bridges v. Shelby Women\u2019s Clinic, P.A., 72 N.C. App. 15, 21, 323 S.E.2d 372, 376 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596, 330 S.E.2d 605 (1985)). Our courts rely on medical experts to show medical causation because \u201cthe exact nature and probable genesis of a particular type of injury involves complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen[.]\u201d Click v. Freight Carriers, 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (citations omitted). When this testimony is based merely upon speculation and conjecture, however, it is no different than a layman\u2019s opinion, and as such, is not sufficiently reliable to be considered competent evidence on issues of medical causation. Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000).\nHere, Dr. Gura\u2019s testimony was mere speculation as to whether decedent\u2019s bedsores were the proximate cause of her death. Decedent suffered from many ailments, any number of which could have been the cause of her death. According to Dr. Gura, decedent\u2019s bedsores were \u201cat least one cause of infection.\u201d He further testified that decedent passed away \u201cas a result of all of [her] complications.\u201d Dr. Gura stated an opinion that \u201cher cardiac condition definitely may have contributed to her death.\u201d He testified that he could not say whether one or more of decedent\u2019s multiple complications was the ultimate cause of her death. He further stated that although decedent\u2019s bedsores were one of the significant causes of infection that caused her demise, there may have been others, and probably were.\nPlaintiff had another expert witness; however, Crow stated in her deposition that she was not going to offer an expert opinion with respect to the cause of decedent\u2019s death. She stated that she was not qualified to provide an opinion on cause of death.\nBecause plaintiff failed to forecast evidence demonstrating causation, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in defendants\u2019 favor.\nAffirmed.\nJudges HUNTER and TYSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Perry, Perry & Perry, P.A., by Robert T Perry, for plaintiff - appellant.", "Wilson & Coffey, LLP, by J. Chad Bomar and Tamura D. Coffey, for defendants-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CATHY AZAR as ADMINISTRATOR of the ESTATE OF MARY EDITH KEETON, Plaintiff v. THE PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE d/b/a NOVANT HEALTH, INC., NOVANT HEALTH INC. d/b/a PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE, JANE/JOHN DOE, RN, JANE/JOHN DOE, NA, JANE/JOHN DOE, DIETICIAN, et al., Defendants\nNo. COA08-40\n(Filed 15 July 2008)\n1. Appeal and Error\u2014 Rules violations \u2014 substantial\u2014costs as sanction\nThe Court of Appeals imposed costs on plaintiff\u2019s attorney as a sanction where the number and nature of the Appellate Rules violations were considered gross or substantial.\n2. Medical Malpractice\u2014 bedsores \u2014 proximate cause of death \u2014 evidence speculative\nPlaintiff failed to forecast evidence demonstrating causation in a medical malpractice action involving the treatment of bedsores, and defendants were entitled to summary judgment where the decedent .suffered from many ailments and testimony as to whether decedent\u2019s bedsores were the proximate cause of her death was speculative.\nAppeal by plaintiff from an order entered 20 September 2007 by Judge Robert P. Johnston in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 June 2008.\nPerry, Perry & Perry, P.A., by Robert T Perry, for plaintiff - appellant.\nWilson & Coffey, LLP, by J. Chad Bomar and Tamura D. Coffey, for defendants-appellees." }, "file_name": "0367-01", "first_page_order": 399, "last_page_order": 404 }