{ "id": 4160092, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: S.D.R.", "name_abbreviation": "In re S.D.R.", "decision_date": "2008-08-05", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1481", "first_page": "552", "last_page": "560", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 N.C. App. 552" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "634 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636584 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/634/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636187 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640283 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "917", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/655/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638933 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134-35", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/647/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8235693 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245-46", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-72", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8376797 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/178/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "333" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547578 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573566 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 N.C. App. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4155327 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564-65", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/188/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080140 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365644 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8187030 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9251366 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139625 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527137 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/94/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" }, { "page": "452" }, { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468501 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "quotations and citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0143-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 822, "char_count": 20213, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.419814850804574e-08, "percentile": 0.5164370586856608 }, "sha256": "7bda8d118a37b21274aebec517787ca10d35ddcc6efbf157b4392da0f926f1af", "simhash": "1:83aa747452ffba7e", "word_count": 3329 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:10.260573+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: S.D.R." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nS.D.R. (defendant), a juvenile, appeals his finding of delinquency for resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer, and felonious breaking and entering and larceny. After a careful review of the record, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s finding of delinquency for resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer, and felonious breaking and entering and larceny.\nAt approximately noon on 11 April 2007, defendant was brought to the Anson Cooperative Extension Service in Wadesboro (the Extension) by the Extension\u2019s community service assistant, Betty Garris. Defendant was a participant in the community service and restitution after school program. Garris directed defendant to the Extension\u2019s library, brought him lunch, turned on the TV, and directed defendant to stay in the library until she returned from a meeting at 1:00 p:m. On the day in question, the building was nearly vacant.\nThe library was located directly across the hall from the office of Janine Rywak, the Anson County Extension Director. Rywak observed defendant in the library across from her office for approximately forty-five minutes. Rywak testified that she was not familiar with defendant before this day, but that when she returned from a brief trip to the restroom, defendant greeted her in her office doorway. Rywak later discovered that her pocketbook had been unzipped and the enclosed wallet had been opened.\nAfter searching her pocket book in the presence of several other individuals, Rywak discovered that all of her cash was missing. The total sum of the cash missing from the purse was $140.00 or $160.00. When asked, defendant denied taking the money. Shortly thereafter, an officer from the Wadesboro Police Department arrived to investigate. The officer requested that defendant consent to a search of his person, and defendant consented to the search without protest. After patting defendant down and searching his shoes, the officer proceeded to question defendant. At this point, defendant became unresponsive, and did not make eye contact with the officer.\nThe officer noticed what appeared to be something green in defendant\u2019s mouth. The officer asked defendant to open his mouth; defendant did not respond. The trial court received evidence that defendant immediately attempted to swallow. After requesting that defendant open his mouth, the officer placed his hand on defendant\u2019s chin in an attempt to prevent swallowing. Defendant began to struggle with the officer. The officer, defendant, and another individual fell to the floor during the course of the struggle. There was evidence presented at trial that during the physical confrontation, money emerged from defendant\u2019s mouth, and defendant then proceeded to eat the money.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in finding him delinquent for resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer because there was not sufficient evidence to find defendant delinquent on this charge.\nIn reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, it is not our duty to weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the adjudication, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.\nIn re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. 143, 146, 607 S.E.2d 304, 306 (2005) (quotations and citations omitted).\n\u201cSubstantial evidence is such relevant \u25a0 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 451, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988) (quotations and citations omitted). Furthermore, \u201c[circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.\u201d Id. at 452, 373 S.E.2d at 433 (citation omitted). The issue of resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer is addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223. That statute provides that \u201c[i]f any person shall willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office, he shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-223 (2007). \u201cThe conduct proscribed under G.S. 14-223 is not limited to resisting an arrest but includes any resistance, delay, or obstruction of an officer in the discharge of his duties.\u201d State v. Lynch, 94 N.C. App. 330, 332, 380 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1989). Because the State provided substantial evidence to support the adjudication, defendant\u2019s contention is without merit.\nThe State, at trial and on appeal, relies upon the following evidence: (1) the officer was investigating Rywak\u2019s missing cash; (2) the officer was on duty and in uniform at the time of the investigation; (3) defendant consented to a search by the officer; (4) defendant refused to comply when the officer asked him to open his mouth; (5) defendant attempted to swallow what he had in his mouth; and (6) defendant willfully engaged in a physical confrontation with the officer and attempted to flee.\nDefendant further argues that he consented to a search of his person, which did not extend to the interior of his mouth. Consent searches are \u201crecognized as a special situation excepted from the warrant requirement, and a search is not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when lawful consent to the search is given.\u201d State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 798, 488 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1997) (citation omitted). \u201c[T]he question of whether consent to a search was in fact \u2018voluntary\u2019 or was the product of duress or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.\u201d State v. Motley, 153 N.C. App. 701, 707, 571 S.E.2d 269, 273 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).\nIn order for a seizure to pass constitutional muster, the officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot. Factors relevant in determining whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion include [among others] ... nervousness of an individual. . . . Also, [t]he facts known to the officers at the time of the stop [or seizure] must be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by experience and training.\nIn re I.R.T., 184 N.C. App. 579, 585, 647 S.E.2d 129, 134-35 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).\nIn the present case, the officer was investigating a potential larceny. When the officer requested a search, defendant consented. The officer began to question defendant after the search. The trial court received evidence that defendant became unresponsive to the officer\u2019s questions and would not make eye contact. Furthermore, there was evidence that the officer observed something in defendant\u2019s mouth. The police officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Reviewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we must agree with the State\u2019s contention that this evidence was sufficient to justify the adjudication.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious breaking and entering and larceny and then finding defendant delinquent on this charge. \u201cTo survive a motion to dismiss, the State must present substantial evidenc\u00e9 of each element of the charged offenses sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d In re T.C.S., 148 N.C. App. 297, 301, 558 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2002) (quotations and citations omitted). \u201cThe evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to receive every reasonable inference of fact that may be drawn from the evidence.\u201d In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 129, 562 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2002) (citation omitted). As previously stated, \u201c[circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.\u201d Stone at 452, 373 S.E.2d at 433 (citation omitted). The issue of felonious breaking or entering is addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(a). That statute provides that \u201c[a]ny person who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein shall be punished as a Class H felon.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(a) (2007). \u201c \u2018[B]uilding\u2019 shall be construed to include any . . . structure designed to house or secure within it any activity or property.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(c) (2007). \u201cTo support a conviction for felonious breaking and entering under [N.C. Gen. Stat.] \u00a7 14-54(a), there must exist substantial evidence of each of the following elements: (1) the breaking or entering, (2) of any building, (3) with the intent to commit any felony or larceny therein.\u201d State v. Jones, 188 N.C. App. 562, 564-65, 655 S.E.2d 915, 917 (2008) (quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original).\nThe State relies upon the following evidence: (1) Rywak observed defendant sitting in the library across the hall from her office; (2) Rywak left her office for the restroom; (3) approximately five minutes after visiting the restroom, Rywak returned and was greeted by defendant, who was standing in her office; (4) defendant had not been given permission to enter Rywak\u2019s office; and (5) upon entering her office, Rywak discovered that her pocketbook had been tampered with and money was missing.\nDefendant argues that there was no evidence that he committed a breaking or entering, even if he entered Rywak\u2019s office, because Rywak\u2019s office was held open to the public. We disagree.\n\u201c[A]n entry with consent of the owner of a building, or anyone empowered to give effective consent to entry, cannot be the basis of a conviction for felonious entry under G.S. 14-54(a).\u201d State v. Boone, 297 N.C. 652, 659, 256 S.E.2d 683, 687 (1979). However, \u201cthere may be occasions when subsequent acts render the consent void ab initio, as where the scope of consent as to areas one can enter is exceeded ....\u201d Id. at 659 n.3, 256 S.E.2d at 687 n.3 (citation omitted). We held in State v. Winston that the rule from Boone applies to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-54(b) \u201cinsofar as it discusses the meaning of \u2018entry.\u2019 \u201d 45 N.C. App. 99, 102, 262 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1980).\nIn Winston, the \u201c[defendant was convicted of wrongfully entering an office in the Cumberland County Courthouse ..., a violation of N.C.G.S. 14-54(b).\u201d Id. at 100, 262 S.E.2d at 332. The office was \u201coccupied by Irene Russell, assistant clerk, who handle[d] adoptions, foreclosures and \u2018anything anybody need[ed her] to do.\u2019 \u201d Id. A corridor connected the office \u201cto a large hallway in front of the civil division offices of the clerk. There [were] no signs indicating that either the corridor or the office [was] private or that the general public should \u2018keep out.\u2019 \u201d Id. While Russell was in the neighboring break room, the defendant entered her office, although the door was partially closed. Id. When asked what he wanted, the defendant replied that \u201che was looking for the public defender\u2019s office and was going to leave a note for him. The public defender\u2019s office [was] in the courthouse.\u201d Id. The defendant did not have explicit permission to enter Russell\u2019s office and took nothing from it. Id.\nIn our analysis, we stated that \u201cthe evidence indicates that members of the general public do use the office.\u201d Id. at 101, 262 S.E.2d at 333. The office\n[was] used to handle adoptions, foreclosures and other business of the clerk of court, a public official. These functions necessarily require the general public to have access to the office .... It was open for public business when entered by defendant between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. The general public, including the defendant, had implied consent and invitation to enter the office at that time.\nId. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). We reversed the trial court\u2019s judgment because the defendant had implied consent to enter Russell\u2019s office and therefore could not be guilty of wrongful entry. We noted that there was no evidence that \u201cthe defendant after entry committed acts sufficient to render the implied consent void ah initio.\u201d Id. at 102, 262 S.E.2d at 333.\nThe case at hand is distinguishable from Winston in two important ways. First, Rywak\u2019s office was not held out to the public in the same way that Irene Russell\u2019s was. Although the Extension is a public building that houses a public agency, just as the Cumberland County Courthouse is a public building that houses public agencies, the evidence does not show that Rywak\u2019s job functions necessarily require the general public to have access to her office or that members of the general public use Rywak\u2019s office. Rywak testified,\nWe have people come to our offices by appointment and invitation only. It is not open to regular foot traffic. Anybody just can\u2019t come into the building like they come and sit in on a courtroom and listen to the hearing. You\u2019ve go [sic] to \u2014 to actually come in to our offices, you need to either have an appointment with us or you need to be invited.\u201d\nShe further explained that when people walk into the building \u201cjust out of the blue\u201d saying, \u201cI need somebody to look at my tomato plants,\u201d then the receptionist notifies the appropriate agent and either sends the visitor back to the agent\u2019s office or the agent comes to the lobby and escorts the visitor back to the agent\u2019s office. For Rywak to carry out the function of the Anson County Extension Director, it is not necessary for the general public to have access to her office, nor does the general public have actual access to her office.\nSecond, even if defendant did have implied consent to enter Rywak\u2019s office because it was necessary for the general public to have access to her office, that consent was void ab initio. Stealing cash from Rywak\u2019s purse certainly constitutes an act sufficient to render implied consent void ab initio as contemplated by Winston and Boone. There was no evidence that the defendant in Winston did anything other than wander into the wrong office. Here, the evidence showed that defendant was seated in the library and from that seat he could see Rywak\u2019s office. Only after she left her office did defendant exit the library and enter the office. At that point, defendant removed the cash from Rywak\u2019s purse. Defendant\u2019s situation here is more similar to that of the defendant in State v. Brooks, who \u201ctook action which rendered [his] consent void ab initio when he went into areas of the firm that were not open to the public so that he could commit a theft____\u201d 178 N.C. App. 211, 215, 631 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2006).\nIn Brooks, the defendant was convicted of felonious breaking or entering and felonious larceny in a law office. Id. at 212, 631 S.E.2d at 56. This Court held that the defendant had implied consent to enter the reception area of the law office, which was open to the public. Id. at 215, 631 S.E.2d at 57. The defendant testified that he distracted a secretary while his accomplice stole an attorney\u2019s day planner and wallet from the attorney\u2019s office. Id. at 213, 631 S.E.2d at 56. We held that the defendant had the firm\u2019s implied consent to enter the reception area of the \u201claw office[,] which was open to members of the public seeking legal assistance\u201d and \u201cwhere members of the public were generally welcome . . . .\u201d Id. at 215, 631 S.E.2d at 57. However, this consent was rendered \u201cvoid ab initio when he went into areas of the firm that were not open to the public so that he could commit a theft. ...\u201d Id.\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was proper because the State presented substantial evidence of a felonious breaking and entry sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nDefendant next contends that there was no felonious breaking or entering, and therefore the felonious larceny charge should have been dismissed. Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendant committed a larceny. As stated above, the State presented substantial evidence of each element of the charged offenses sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did commit a felonious breaking or entering. The issue of felonious larceny is addressed by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-72(b). That statute provides that \u201c[t]he crime of larceny is a felony, without regard to the value of the property in question, if the larceny is . .. [committed pursuant to a violation of G.S. 14-51, 14-53, 14-54, 14-54.1, or 14-57.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-72(b) (2007). This Court has held that \u201c[t]o convict a defendant of larceny, the State must show that the defendant: (1) took the property of another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner\u2019s consent; and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently.\u201d State v. Watson, 179 N.C. App. 228, 245-46, 634 S.E.2d 231, 242 (2006) (quotations and citations omitted). The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that: (1) Rywak observed defendant sitting in the library across the hall from her office; (2) Rywak left her office for the restroom; (3) approximately five minutes after visiting the restroom, Rywak returned and was greeted by defendant, who was standing in her office; (4) defendant had not been given permission to enter Rywak\u2019s office; and (5) upon entering her office, Rywak discovered that her pocketbook had been tampered with and money was missing. At trial and on appeal, the State presented substantial evidence of a felonious larceny sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. The trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to dismiss was therefore proper.\nAfter a. thorough review of the briefs and record, we find no error.\nNo error.\nJudges McGEE and JACKSON concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Allison A. Angel\u00ed, for the State.", "James N. Freeman, Jr., for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: S.D.R.\nNo. COA07-1481\n(Filed 5 August 2008)\n1. Obstruction of Justice \u2014 : juvenile \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find a juvenile delinquent for resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer during an investigation of missing cash at an Extension Service office.\n2. Search and Seizure\u2014 consent to search body \u2014 inside of mouth\nA juvenile\u2019s consent to a search of his body extended to his mouth where the officer was investigating missing money, defendant consented to a search, defendant became unresponsive to the officer\u2019s questions and would not make eye contact, and the officer saw something in defendant\u2019s mouth.\n3. Burglary and Unlawful Breaking or Entering\u2014 juvenile\u2014 money taken from purse in office\nThere was sufficient evidence to support a charge of felonious breaking or entering and larceny and to find a juvenile delinquent where defendant was sitting in a library across the hall from the office of an Extension Service director, she left her office for about five minutes and was greeted by defendant standing in her office, defendant did not have permission to be in the office, the director discovered that her pocket book had been tampered with, and there was money missing. The director\u2019s office is in a public building, but her job functions do not require public access to her office, so that there was no implied consent to the juvenile\u2019s entry into her office; even if there had been, stealing cash from the director\u2019s purse voids that consent ab initio.\n4. Larceny\u2014 money taken from purse \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe evidence was sufficient to deny a juvenile\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of felonious larceny pursuant to a breaking or entering where defendant was seen across the hall from an office, an occupant of the office left for about five minutes and returned to find defendant in her office, defendant did not have permission to be in the office, and her purse had been tampered with and money was missing.\nAppeal by defendant from disposition order entered 6 July 2007 by Judge Kevin Bridges in Anson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14 May 2008.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Allison A. Angel\u00ed, for the State.\nJames N. Freeman, Jr., for defendant." }, "file_name": "0552-01", "first_page_order": 584, "last_page_order": 592 }