{ "id": 4160015, "name": "FREE SPIRIT AVIATION, INC., and GEORGE RONAN, Plaintiffs v. RUTHERFORD AIRPORT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Authority", "decision_date": "2008-08-05", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1034", "first_page": "581", "last_page": "587", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "191 N.C. App. 581" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "651 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639607 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389" }, { "page": "389" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/651/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638848 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "internal footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639966 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "allowing injunctive relief against violations of the open meetings law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 425", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488503 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94", "parenthetical": "A \"wrongful [act] done intentionally without just cause or excuse\" is malicious. (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9131361 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689", "parenthetical": "A \"wrongful [act] done intentionally without just cause or excuse\" is malicious. (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "A claim for wrongful interference with contract must allege, inter alia, that \"the defendant intentionally induce[d] the third person not to perform the contract. .. and in doing so actfed] without justification]" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 643", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518481 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8157452 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" }, { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986221 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 815", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817", "parenthetical": "\"Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will.\" (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8953784 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43-44", "parenthetical": "\"Duress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will.\" (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 F.Supp.2d 543", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8928276 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "\"[A] survey of the applicable North Carolina authority indicates that no civil cause of action exists for the tort of extortion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/387/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 F.Supp.2d 615", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9450996 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/179/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 S.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2526923, 2531052, 2531542, 2532248, 2531164 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0171-04", "/nc/335/0171-02", "/nc/335/0171-03", "/nc/335/0171-05", "/nc/335/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" }, { "page": "773", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525880 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" }, { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220106, 220010, 220045, 219924, 220085 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0493-04", "/nc/355/0493-01", "/nc/355/0493-05", "/nc/355/0493-02", "/nc/355/0493-03" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436581 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567648, 2572322, 2567851, 2572779, 2570637 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0480-04", "/nc/321/0480-03", "/nc/321/0480-05", "/nc/321/0480-02", "/nc/321/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 N.C. App. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358559 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/87/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" }, { "page": "(a)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"the open meetings law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8185227 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "internal footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. App. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8468526 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/169/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 N.C. App. 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527995 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/114/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374908 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0480-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 14479, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4253213364130466e-07, "percentile": 0.649841361407557 }, "sha256": "671d4114c21c338edbaa0353c04a607053568685ecf0b2048592a72c6a63e537", "simhash": "1:8d615567de3b4640", "word_count": 2320 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:44:10.260573+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges TYSON and GEER concur." ], "parties": [ "FREE SPIRIT AVIATION, INC., and GEORGE RONAN, Plaintiffs v. RUTHERFORD AIRPORT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "STROUD, Judge.\nDefendants appeal from an order denying summary judgment. Because we conclude that defendants have not met their burden of showing that the affirmative defense of public official immunity bars plaintiffs\u2019 claims, we affirm.\nI. Background\nPlaintiff George Ronan (\u201cRonan\u201d) is the president of corporate plaintiff Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. (\u201cFree Spirit\u201d). In November 1995, Free Spirit became the Fixed Base Operator (\u201cFBO\u201d) at the Rutherford County Airport (\u201cthe Airport\u201d). Free Spirit served as FBO at the Airport under a contract with the Rutherford Airport Authority (\u201cthe Authority\u201d) which included granting Free Spirit \u201cthe right to sell petroleum products\u201d and the duty to sell them at \u201cfair, reasonable, competitive, and nondiscriminatory prices[.]\u201d On 13 January 2006 the Authority voted not to renew the FBO contract with Free Spirit and instead awarded the FBO contract to Leading Edge Aviation effective 1 March 2006.\nOn 27 January 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Rutherford County Superior Court against the Authority; Rusty Washburn, Phillip Robbins, Alan Guffey, Don Greene, all individually (\u201cthe individuals\u201d) and as members of the Authority; and David Reno, as a member of the Authority. The gravamen of the complaint, discussed in more detail below, asserted that defendants wrongfully deprived plaintiffs of the privilege of serving as FBO at the Airport. The complaint sought to enjoin the Authority from performing the FBO contract granted to Leading Edge Aviation, and prayed for compensatory and punitive damages from the individuals.\nPlaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint against David Reno on or about 23 February 2006. The remaining defendants, the Authority and the individuals, filed a joint answer 18 December 2006, denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting six affirmative defenses including the defense of public official immunity. The Authority and the individuals jointly moved for summary judgment on 2 May 2007.\nOn 23 May 2007, the trial court heard the motion for summary judgment. On 15 June 2007, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for summary judgment on the basis that factual questions remained as to the material issues. Defendants appeal.\nII. Standard of Review\nThe denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order which ordinarily would not be subject to immediate appellate review. Snyder v. Learning Servs. Corp., 187 N.C. App. 480, 482, 653 S.E.2d 548, 550 (2007). Defendants contend that because their argument on appeal is the affirmative defense of public official immunity (\u201cPOI\u201d), a substantial right is affected which is subject to immediate review. We agree.\nWhere the doctrine of public official immunity applies, the public official is immune from suit, not simply from any liability arising from a lawsuit. Blevins v. Denny, 114 N.C. App. 766, 769, 443 S.E.2d 354, 355 (1994). The right of a public official to be immune from suit, where applicable, is a substantial right. Id. The denial of a motion for summary judgment which is based on a defendant\u2019s assertion of public official immunity therefore affects a substantial right, subject to immediate review. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 l-277(a) (2007).\nWhen the denial of a summary judgment motion is properly before this Court, as here, the standard of review is de novo. Moody v. Able Outdoor, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 80, 83, 609 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2005). Summary judgment must be granted \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c). In applying Rule 56, this Court has held that \u201c[s]ummary judgment is appropriate ... if the non-moving party is unable to overcome an affirmative defense offered by the moving party.\u201d Griffith v. Glen Wood Co., 184 N.C. App. 206, 210, 646 S.E.2d 550, 554 (2007) (internal footnote omitted).\nIII. Analysis\nThe complaint alleged that four types of wrongful acts by the individuals entitle plaintiffs to relief: (1) discussion of the FBO contract in closed or secret meetings of the Authority in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.9 (\u201cthe open meetings law\u201d); (2) personal benefit from a contract made or administered on behalf of a public agency in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l); (3) wrongful interference with plaintiffs\u2019 contract to operate the FBO at Rutherford County Airport; and (4) conspiracy to wrongfully interfere with plaintiffs\u2019 contract to operate the FBO at Rutherford County Airport. Plaintiffs alleged injury only to the citizens of Rutherford County resulting from violation of the open meetings law; alleged injury to the citizens of Rutherford County resulting from the individuals\u2019 violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l), and specific injury to themselves resulting from defendant Don Greene\u2019s violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l); and specific injury to themselves for wrongful interference with contract and conspiracy to interfere with a contract. Plaintiffs added a \u201ccatch-all\u201d provision at the end of the complaint asking that the individuals \u201cbe found personally financially liable due to their acts in willful violation of state law[.]\u201d\nOn appeal, defendants argue only that the affirmative defense of POI bars the claims for violation of the open meetings law, violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l) and wrongful interference with contract. Plaintiffs contend that they have overcome the defense of POI because they alleged and forecast evidence that the individuals acted with malice.\nPOI bars a lawsuit seeking to recover compensation from a public official as an individual for injuries suffered as a result of his negligence in performing acts within the scope of his official duties. Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Silk Hope Automobile, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 467, 469, 361 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1987), disc. review denied, 321 N.C. 480, 364 S.E.2d 672 (1988). Put another way, where a plaintiff seeks compensation from a public official as an individual for his official acts, the complaint \u201cmust allege and forecast evidence demonstrating that the officfial] acted maliciously, corruptly, or beyond the scope of duty.\u201d Prior v. Pruett, 143 N.C. App. 612, 623, 550 S.E.2d 166, 173-74 (2001), disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 493, 563 S.E.2d 572 (2002). A public official for purposes of applying the immunity doctrine is a person \u201cwhose position is created by the constitution or statutes of the sovereignty,\u201d Cherry v. Harris, 110 N.C. App. 478, 480, 429 S.E.2d 771, 772 (citation, quotation marks, brackets and ellipses omitted), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 171, 436 S.E.2d 371 (1993), and who exercises discretion in the execution of \u201csome portion of the sovereign power,\u201d Cherry, 110 N.C. App. at 480, 429 S.E.2d at 773 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The parties do not dispute that the individuals are all public officials.\nWe consider the claims seriatim. Plaintiffs do not allege that defendants\u2019 violation of the open meetings law caused injury for which they are entitled to compensation as persons distinct from the general public. Therefore POI does not apply to the allegation of violation of the open meetings law and we conclude that defendants\u2019 reliance on it is misplaced.\nLikewise, plaintiffs do not allege injury to themselves or seek compensation resulting from violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l), except as to defendant Don Greene (\u201cGreene\u201d). As with the open meetings law, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234 does not contemplate recovery of compensation by an individual citizen from a public official as an individual. Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs seek relief other than monetary compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l), POI is not applicable to bar the claim.\nPlaintiffs do allege injury to themselves on two of their claims, both arising from an allegation that defendant Greene demanded from plaintiff George Ronan, in a threatening manner, \u201c[y]ou\u2019re gonna give us a discount on fuel or you\u2019re gonna lose.\u201d Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint alleges that Greene\u2019s demand and the subsequent discount offered by Free Spirit are evidence that (1) Greene extorted an improper benefit from plaintiffs through his position as a public official in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l), and (2) Greene was speaking on behalf of all the individual defendants in an attempt to wrongfully interfere with plaintiffs\u2019 contract with the Authority to operate the FBO.\nThough N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-234 does not contemplate recovery of compensation by an individual, plaintiffs\u2019 complaint also expressly states a claim for extortion. While we are aware that two federal district courts which have considered the issue have concluded that \u201cno [civil] cause of action for extortion exists under North Carolina law[,]\u201d Delk v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 179 F.Supp.2d 615, 626 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Godfredson v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 387 F.Supp.2d 543, 555 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (\u201c[A] survey of the applicable North Carolina authority indicates that no civil cause of action exists for the tort of extortion.\u201d), we construe plaintiffs\u2019 complaint as a cause of action for duress for the sole purpose of determining whether or not it is barred by the affirmative defense of POI. See Radford v. Keith, 160 N.C. App. 41, 43-44, 584 S.E.2d 815, 817 (2003) (\u201cDuress exists where one, by the unlawful act of another, is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will.\u201d (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)), aff\u2019d per curiam, 358 N.C. 136, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004). An intentional wrongful act is an essential element of a claim for duress. Id. Greene\u2019s threatening demand for a discount, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs\u2019 favor, Carolina Bank v. Chatham Station, Inc., 186 N.C. App. 424, 427-28, 651 S.E.2d 386, 389 (2007), was intentional and wrongful, and therefore a malicious act. Because POI does not apply to claims based on malicious acts, POI does not bar plaintiffs\u2019 claim against Greene for duress.\nFinally, defendants argue that POI bars plaintiffs\u2019 claim for wrongful interference with contract. Again, we disagree. Recovery of damages for injuries arising from wrongful interference with contract is a tort claim which is recognized in North Carolina. United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988). Malice is an essential element of a claim for wrongful interference with contract. Id. at 661, 370 S.E.2d at 387 (A claim for wrongful interference with contract must allege, inter alia, that \u201cthe defendant intentionally induce[d] the third person not to perform the contract. .. and in doing so actfed] without justification])]\u201d); see also Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 149 N.C. App. 672, 689, 562 S.E.2d 82, 94 (2002) (A \u201cwrongful [act] done intentionally without just cause or excuse\u201d is malicious. (Citation and quotation marks omitted.)), aff\u2019d, 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004).\nAs we concluded above, Greene\u2019s demand for a fuel discount is evidence of an intentional wrongful act. Plaintiffs further alleged and forecast evidence that Greene appeared to be speaking for all the individual members of the Authority when he made his demand. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as required on defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, Carolina Bank, 186 N.C. App. at 427-28, 651 S.E.2d at 389, this statement is sufficient evidence of the individuals\u2019 malicious intent to interfere with Free Spirit\u2019s contractual right and duty to sell petroleum products at \u201cfair, reasonable, competitive and nondiscriminatory prices\u201d to survive summary judgment on the issue of POI.\nDefendants have not shown that plaintiffs could not overcome the affirmative defense of POI as to any of plaintiffs\u2019 claims. See Collingwood v. G. E. Real Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989). Therefore, denial of their summary judgment motion was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court. We emphasize that we are not deciding on the merits of plaintiffs\u2019 claims. Defendants\u2019 sole issue on appeal is the applicability of POI and our holding is therefore strictly limited to the application of POI to plaintiffs\u2019 claims.\nAffirmed.\nJudges TYSON and GEER concur.\n. In fact, the open meetings law does not allow for such recovery. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16 (allowing injunctive relief against violations of the open meetings law); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16A (allowing the superior court to declare an action taken in violation of the open meetings law to he \u201cnull and void\u201d).\n. We are aware that the trial court may award reasonable attorney\u2019s fees to the prevailing party in an action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16 or N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16A. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 143-318.16B (2005). However, the issue of whether POI applies to an award of attorney\u2019s fees under the statute is not before the Court in this appeal.\n. As the issue of whether a civil claim for extortion exists in North Carolina was not argued, we make no ruling either way on this issue.", "type": "majority", "author": "STROUD, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Yelton, Farfour, McCartney, Lutz & Craig, PA., by Sam B. Craig, for plaintiff-appellees.", "Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLG, by Sean F. Perrin, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FREE SPIRIT AVIATION, INC., and GEORGE RONAN, Plaintiffs v. RUTHERFORD AIRPORT AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants\nNo. COA07-1034\n(Filed 5 August 2008)\nImmunity\u2014 public official \u2014 airport authority contract\nSummary judgment for defendants was correctly denied on the issue of public official immunity in an action arising from an airport authority decision to not renew a Fixed Base Operator contract. Plaintiffs did not allege injury to' themselves as distinct from the general public in their open .meetings claim and did not seek compensation for an alleged violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-234(a)(l) so that public official immunity did not apply to such claims. Also, plaintiffs\u2019 claims for duress and wrongful interference with contract required malicious intent so that public official immunity was inapplicable to those claims.\nAppeal by defendants from order entered 15 June 2007 by Judge Laura J. Bridges in Superior Court, Rutherford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2008.\nYelton, Farfour, McCartney, Lutz & Craig, PA., by Sam B. Craig, for plaintiff-appellees.\nWomble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLG, by Sean F. Perrin, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0581-01", "first_page_order": 613, "last_page_order": 619 }