{ "id": 4160067, "name": "ROBBIE C. SCARBORO, Employee, Plaintiff v. EMERY WORLDWIDE FREIGHT CORP., Employer, CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Scarboro v. Emery Worldwide Freight Corp.", "decision_date": "2008-09-02", "docket_number": "No. COA07-1437", "first_page": "488", "last_page": "496", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "192 N.C. App. 488" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C. Ct. App.", "id": 14983, "name": "North Carolina Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638641 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 235", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.C. App. 913", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9133316 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/149/0913-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Timmons TV" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "182" }, { "page": "64-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155841 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Timmons TV" }, { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570", "parenthetical": "Timmons II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 745", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470308 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750", "parenthetical": "Timmons II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11465738 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904", "parenthetical": "quoting Bryant v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 130 N.C. App. 135, 139, 502 S.E.2d 58, 62 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9367224 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562", "parenthetical": "quoting Bryant v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 130 N.C. App. 135, 139, 502 S.E.2d 58, 62 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519986 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160-61", "parenthetical": "determining that providing compensation to the relatives of a claimant who needed constant care was included in \"other treatment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570183 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694-95", "parenthetical": "determining that providing compensation to the relatives of a claimant who needed constant care was included in \"other treatment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" }, { "page": "409", "parenthetical": "holding that neither \"other treatment or care\" nor \"rehabilitative services\" can be interpreted to include providing the wheelchair-using plaintiff with compensation for his specially equipped van" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "755-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" }, { "page": "825" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "823" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 N.C. App. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/98/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 10, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(19)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" }, { "page": "(19)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 S.E.2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8619057 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8598826 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "citing Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1954)" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "citing Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1954)" }, { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "weight": 18, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8184791 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "quotations removed" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "quotations removed" }, { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "quotations and emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8173561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "quotations and emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0493-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 833, "char_count": 20363, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31471776925990663 }, "sha256": "4bd689733c9bc5a2113fad0c373b4e5f97a9a33f501167314669b78d98da0894", "simhash": "1:094447c3343b7e16", "word_count": 3219 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:54:33.452279+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Judges McGEE and JACKSON concur." ], "parties": [ "ROBBIE C. SCARBORO, Employee, Plaintiff v. EMERY WORLDWIDE FREIGHT CORP., Employer, CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ELMORE, Judge.\nBoth parties in this case appeal from an Opinion and Award issued by the Full Commission on 7 August 2007. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the Full Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award.\nRobbie Scarboro (plaintiff) was employed as a utility driver for Emery Worldwide Freight Corporation (defendant). On 4 November 1998, plaintiff injured his upper back and left shoulder while he was unloading freight off of a truck. Defendants filed a Form 60 admitting compensability of plaintiff\u2019s injuries. On 14 March 2001, Deputy Commissioner (now Commissioner) Pamela T. Young filed an Opinion and Award which found plaintiff\u2019s injury to be causally related to his 4 November 1998 accident.\nSince plaintiff\u2019s injury, he has been treated by numerous physicians. On 5 January 2001, neurologist Dr. Erik Borresen began treating plaintiff and has remained his primary treating physician. Dr. Borresen diagnosed plaintiff as having \u201cleft low thoracic neuropathy, left pectoralis transposition, chronic myofascial neck and shoulder pain, chest pain, lumbar disc disease, right knee meniscal tear, depression, and muscle contraction headaches.\u201d Plaintiff has a fifty percent permanent partial impairment as a result of his chronic pain disorder and a forty percent permanent functional impairment to his left shoulder. Dr. Borresen said that it was highly unlikely that plaintiff would return to gainful employment. On 2 February 2002, a life care plan was prepared for plaintiff by Ms. Laura Weiss, a registered nurse, certified life care planner, certified case manager, and certified disability management specialist. The life care plan included recommendations that plaintiff be provided lawn care services and that grab rails and handrails be installed in his home. Dr. Borresen reviewed the life care plan and agreed that the recommendations were reasonable and medically necessary.\nDeputy Commissioner Bradley W. Houser heard this case on 23 July 2003. Deputy Commissioner Houser issued an Opinion and Award on 12 November 2003. Plaintiff appealed the 12 November 2003 Opinion and Award to the Full Commission. On 26 October 2004, the Full Commission entered an Opinion and Award that ordered defendants to provide the Botox injections ordered by Dr. Borresen and the recommended home guard rails. It also conclud\u00e9d that there was insufficient evidence on the issue of lawn care services, but did not make a final decision as to whether medical evidence could sufficiently support lawn care services for plaintiff.\nOn 26 May 2005, plaintiff requested that defendants reimburse him for $4,700.58, the cost of the life care plan, but defendants refused. On 1 July 2005, plaintiff filed a Motion for Approval of Specific Medical Treatment/Life Care Plan, which Special Deputy Commissioner Meredith Henderson denied on 22 July 2005. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Form 33 appealing the 22 July 2005 order and requesting further decision on the medical necessity for lawn care services.\nOn 16 November 2005, the appeal was heard before Deputy Commissioner Ronnie E. Rowell. Deputy Commissioner Rowell filed an Opinion and Award on 10 October 2006 that required defendants to pay for the preparation of plaintiffs life care plan and to provide plaintiff compensation for lawn care services.\nDefendants appealed the 10 October 2006 Opinion and Award and the matter was heard before the Full Commission on 24 May 2007. On 7 August 2007, the Full Commission entered an Opinion and Award that denied plaintiff compensation for lawn care services and ordered defendants to reimburse plaintiff for the costs associated with preparing his life care plan. Plaintiff appeals the Full Commission\u2019s denial of lawn care services and defendants appeal the order requiring them to pay for the preparation of plaintiff\u2019s life care plan.\nI. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nOur review of an appeal from a decision of the North Carolina Industrial Commission is limited to the following: (1) \u201cwhether there was any competent evidence to support the Full Commission\u2019s findings of fact\u201d and (2) \u201cwhether these findings of fact support the conclusions of law.\u201d Ard v. Owens-Illinois, 182 N.C. App. 493, 496, 642 S.E.2d 257, 259 (2007) (quotations and emphasis omitted). A finding of fact is \u201cconclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence[,]\u201d even where there is evidence to contradict the finding. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quotations removed). We review the Full Commission\u2019s conclusions of law de novo. Oxendine v. TWL, Inc., 184 N.C. App. 162, 164, 645 S.E.2d 864, 865 (2007).\nII. PLAINTIFF\u2019S APPEAL\nPlaintiff appeals the Full Commission\u2019s denial of the lawn care services and assigns error to conclusion of law 4, which states the following:\nAn ordinary necessity of life is to be paid from the statutory wages provided by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Extraordinary and unusual expenses are embraced in the \u201cother treatment\u201d language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25. ... In the present case, the lawn care services recommended by the life care plan are ordinary expenses of life for plaintiff and are not extraordinary and unusual expenses that plaintiff has incurred as a result of his work-related injury. Accordingly, these expenses are not payable by defendants. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-25; -2(19); -29.\nPlaintiff has not assigned error to any findings of fact; therefore all factual findings are \u201cpresumed to be supported by the evidence and are binding on appeal.\u201d Watson v. Employment Security Comm., 111 N.C. App. 410, 412, 432 S.E.2d 399, 400 (1993) (citing Beaver v. Paint Co., 240 N.C. 328, 330, 82 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1954)). Our review of plaintiff\u2019s appeal is limited to whether conclusion of law 4 is supported by the factual findings.\nThe North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act requires employers to provide medical compensation to workers \u201cwho suffer disability by accident arising out of and in the course of their employment.\u201d Henry v. Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 127, 66 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1951). N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 states that \u201c[mjedical compensation shall be provided by the employer.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2007). Medical compensation is:\nmedical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services, and medicines, sick travel, and other treatment, including medical and surgical supplies, as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief and for such additional time as, in the judgment of the Commission, will tend to lessen the period of disability[.]\nN.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) (2007) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that the lawn care services, recommended by the life care plan, are reasonably medically necessary because of his chronic pain condition. Plaintiff asserts that the lawn care services are not an ordinary expense, but instead are an extraordinary and unusual expense included in the \u201cother treatment\u201d language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2007).\n\u201cOne purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to [ejnsure a limited and determinate liability for employers.\u201d Grantham v. Cherry Hosp., 98 N.C. App. 34, 40, 389 S.E.2d 822, 826 (1990). \u201cWhile the Act should be liberally construed to benefit the employee, the plain and unmistakable language of the statute must be followed.\u201d Id. To this end, \u201ccourts must not legislate expanded liability under the guise of construing a statute liberally.\u201d McDonald v. Brunswick Elec. Membership Corp., 77 N.C. App. 753, 756, 336 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1985).\nNorth Carolina courts have previously interpreted the term \u201cother treatment\u201d in relation to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 (Supp. 1989); see McDonald, 77 N.C. App. at 755-57, 336 S.E.2d at 409 (holding that neither \u201cother treatment or care\u201d nor \u201crehabilitative services\u201d can be interpreted to include providing the wheelchair-using plaintiff with compensation for his specially equipped van); Godwin v. Swift & Co., 270 N.C. 690, 694-95, 155 S.E.2d 157, 160-61 (1967) (determining that providing compensation to the relatives of a claimant who needed constant care was included in \u201cother treatment\u201d).\nIn Grantham v. Cherry Hospital, this Court held that the Full Commission improperly ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff\u2019s consumer debts under the \u201cother treatment... or rehabilitative services\u201d provision of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29. 98 N.C. App. at 40, 389 S.E.2d at 825; N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 (Supp. 1989). In Grantham, the plaintiff had accumulated nearly $28,000.00 in debt because his income had substantially decreased after he became disabled. Id. at 35, 389 S.E.2d at 822. The plaintiffs physician testified that as a result of the plaintiffs indebtedness, the plaintiff had developed depression, which was interfering with his rehabilitation. Id. The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiffs debts in order to improve his rehabilitation. Id. at 36, 389 S.E.2d at 823. We reversed this order and held that the Industrial Commission had misinterpreted the statute by ordering expenses for basic necessities under the guise of rehabilitative services. Id. at 40-41, 389 S.E.2d at 826. Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, we do not find that the lawn care services for plaintiff fall into the category of \u201cother treatment\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25.\nThe determination of \u201cwhat treatment is appropriate for a particular employee is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [Full] Commission.\u201d N.C. Chiropractic Assoc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 89 N.C. App. 1, 5, 365 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1988). The Full Commission \u201cis not required to make \u2018exhaustive findings as to each statement made by any given witness or make findings rejecting specific evidence^]\u2019 \u201d Smith v. Beasley Enters., Inc., 148 N.C. App. 559, 562, 577 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2002) (quoting Bryant v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 130 N.C. App. 135, 139, 502 S.E.2d 58, 62 (1998)). The factual findings are sufficient so long as this Court can \u201creasonably infer that [the Full Commission] gave proper consideration to all relevant testimony.\u201d Id. Here, the findings of fact contain information about plaintiffs injury and medical treatments, plaintiffs testimony about his lawn care services, and a few physicians\u2019 recommendations on the matter. These factual findings provided the Full Commission with all of the relevant information it needed to decide whether the lawn care services for plaintiff were medically necessary.\nThe recommendations in plaintiff\u2019s life care plan as well as his physicians\u2019 testimony supported his argument that the lawn care services were medically necessary. However, defendants also provided evidence supporting their contention that the lawn care services for plaintiff were an ordinary expense, not included in his medical compensation from defendants. This Court may not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses, as \u201c \u2018[t]he Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 680, 509 S.E.2d at 413 (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)).\nWe find that the Full Commission\u2019s factual findings support its conclusion of law that the lawn care services for plaintiff are not extraordinary or unusual expenses included in the \u201cother treatment\u201d language of N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2007). Findings of fact 8 and 9 recount Dr. Dickerson\u2019s opinions that \u201cwith [plaintiff\u2019s] orthopedic problems, specifically [his] back problems . . . yard work is contraindicated in [his] case\u201d and \u201cit would be hard for [plaintiff] to do his yard work without having a lot of pain, so I don\u2019t have an objection to [lawn care services] in this particular case.\u201d In finding of fact 10, Dr. Chewning, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that \u201cdue to [plaintiff\u2019s] back and his shoulder problems, plaintiff should stay away from lawn mowing activities].]\u201d Furthermore, factual finding 11 stated that plaintiff had previously cut his own grass and has since hired a lawn care service because \u201che feared penalties would be levied against him by his homeowners\u2019 association for violating his restrictive covenants by failing to keep his lawn presentable.\u201d\nPlaintiff contends that the Full Commission\u2019s factual findings could only support a conclusion that the lawn care services are medically necessary for plaintiff. We disagree. The factual findings establish that because of plaintiff\u2019s medical condition, he should refrain from mowing his lawn. We understand and appreciate plaintiff\u2019s efforts to keep his yard in compliance with the rules of his homeowners\u2019 association. However, providing plaintiff with the resources to comply with this restrictive covenant does not rise to the level of \u201cother treatment^ ]\u201d These factual findings support the conclusion that the lawn care services are an ordinary expense of life, which is not included in medical compensation, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) and N.C. Gen. Stat.\u00a7 97-25.\nWe also agree with defendants\u2019 argument that just because the life care plan was determined to be a reasonable medical expense, defendants are not necessarily required to pay for each item mentioned in the plan. See Timmons v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 130 N.C. App. 745, 750, 504 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1998) (Timmons II) (finding that an order requiring the defendant to pay for preparation of the plaintiff\u2019s life care plan does not require that the defendant must pay for each item recommended in the plan), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 351 N.C. 177, 522 S.E.2d 62 (1999) (Timmons TV). Due to the aforementioned factors, we do not find error in the Full Commission\u2019s denial of lawn care services for plaintiff.\nII. DEFENDANTS\u2019APPEAL\nDefendants appeal the Full Commission\u2019s order requiring them to pay the costs of preparing a life care plan for plaintiff. Defendants assign error to conclusion of law 2 which states the following:\nThe greater weight of the evidence shows that the life care plan has been pertinent to plaintiff\u2019s case and was reasonably necessary for plaintiff to function optimally, avoid potential complications related to his injuries, and live a productive life. As such, the life care plan was a \u201creasonable rehabilitative service.\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 97-2(19);-25; Timmons v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 351 N.C. 177, 522 S.E.2d 62 (1999).\nThe Full Commission\u2019s conclusion that plaintiff\u2019s life care plan was a \u201creasonable rehabilitative servicef,]\u201d pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25, is supported by its factual findings. We affirm the Full Commission\u2019s order taxing the costs of preparing plaintiff\u2019s life plan to defendants.\nIn workers\u2019 compensation cases, the employer is required to provide the injured employee with medical compensation, which includes \u201cmedical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and rehabilitative services ... as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relieff.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) (2007) (emphasis supplied); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2007). The Full Commission \u201chas discretion in determining whether a rehabilitative service will effect a cure, give relief, or will lessen a claimant\u2019s period of disability.\u201d Foster v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 913, 923, 563 S.E.2d 235, 242 (2002). Defendants contend that the order was improper because plaintiff\u2019s life care plan was never recommended by an authorized treating physician. Defendants also question Ms. Weiss\u2019s qualifications to prepare the life care plan and argue that they have never used the life care plan in their medical treatment decisions for plaintiff. The arguments have no merit and are irrelevant to our review of the Full Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award.\nAs previously discussed, we can only review a decision of the North Carolina Industrial Commission to determine if the factual findings are supported by competent evidence and if the conclusions of law are supported by the factual findings. Ard, 182 N.C. App. at 496, 642 S.E.2d at 259. We find that conclusion of law 2 is sufficiently supported by the factual findings.\nOur Supreme Court has previously decided that pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25, preparation of a life care plan can constitute a rehabilitative service. See Timmons IV, 351 N.C. at 182, 522 S.E.2d at 65. In Timmons TV, a rehabilitation expert recommended developing a life care plan to evaluate the plaintiffs medical needs. Id. at 182, 522 S.E.2d at 64-65. Our Supreme Court held that the rehabilitation expert\u2019s recommendation provided competent evidence to support the finding that the plaintiff\u2019s life care plan was a rehabilitative service, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25. Id.\nWe do not need to discuss each of the Full Commission\u2019s factual findings that support conclusion of law 2. Conclusion of law 2 can be sufficiently supported by finding of fact 6, which states the following:\nOn February 6, 2002, a life care plan was prepared by Laura Weiss, a registered nurse, certified life care planner, certified case manager, and certified disability management specialist. The life care plan included recommendations that plaintiff be provided lawn care services and that grab rails be installed in plaintiff\u2019s home. Dr. Borresen subsequently reviewed the life care plan and agreed that such accommodations were reasonable and medically necessary. Defendants provided handrails and grab rails for Plaintiff, but denied lawn care services.\nDefendants have not assigned error to this factual finding; therefore the finding is \u201cpresumed to be supported by the evidence and [is] binding on appeal,\u201d Watson, 111 N.C. App. at 412, 432 S.E.2d at 400. Dr. Borresen\u2019s opinion, that the life care plan was medically necessary for plaintiff, supports the Full Commission\u2019s conclusion that the life care plan was a \u201creasonable rehabilitative service\u201d for plaintiff. For these reasons, we affirm the Full Commission\u2019s order to tax the cost of preparing plaintiff\u2019s life plan to defendants.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nHaving conducted a thorough review of the record and briefs, we discern no error in the Full Commission\u2019s Opinion and Award. Accordingly, we must affirm.\nAffirmed.\nJudges McGEE and JACKSON concur.\n. All relevant provisions in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 and N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) contained the same language when plaintiff filed his claim. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2003).\n. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 previously stated that \u201ccompensation, including reasonable and necessary nursing services, medicines, sick travel, medical, hospital, and other treatment o/[sic] care or rehabilitative services shall be paid by the employer [.]\u201d N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). Similar language is now codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19), which is used to define for \u201cmedical compensation\u201d in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-2(19) (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-25 (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 97-29 (Supp. 1989).", "type": "majority", "author": "ELMORE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch and Lyons, P.A. by John F. Ayers, III, for plaintiff", "Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by M. Duane Jones, for defendants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBBIE C. SCARBORO, Employee, Plaintiff v. EMERY WORLDWIDE FREIGHT CORP., Employer, CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE COMPANY, Carrier, Defendants\nNo. COA07-1437\n(Filed 2 September 2008)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 lawn care services \u2014 not a reasonable medical expense\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by denying lawn care services to plaintiff despite the inclusion of such services in a life care plan as a reasonable medical expense. The conclusion that the lawn care services were an ordinary expense of life not included in medical compensation was supported by the findings, and defendants are not necessarily required to pay for each item mentioned in the life care plan.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 life care plan \u2014 reasonable rehabilitative service\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s decision in a workers\u2019 compensation case that a life care plan was a reasonable rehabilitative service was supported by a physician\u2019s opinion that the plan was medically necessary for plaintiff.\nAppeal by plaintiff and defendants from opinion and award entered 7 August 2007 by the Full Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 April 2008.\nSellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch and Lyons, P.A. by John F. Ayers, III, for plaintiff\nHedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by M. Duane Jones, for defendants." }, "file_name": "0488-01", "first_page_order": 516, "last_page_order": 524 }